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 ABSTRACT 
Origins and Departures: Childhood in the Liberal Order 
Andrew Hall 
 
Central to most forms of liberal social and political philosophy is the idea of the free and 
equal, self-governing person.  And yet we do not come into the world as autonomous and 
accountable individuals; at best, this is the outcome of a long process of development and 
education which (in many societies) now extends throughout the first quarter of the average life.  
During this period of childhood, moreover, we are governed, not by ourselves, but by others.  
This dissertation examines the paradoxical position of children in liberal theory, who (as Locke 
put it) though not born in a state of freedom and equality, are born to it.  In particular, the 
dissertation’s three parts examine three interrelated questions.  First, what is the basis of the 
paternalistic authority that is exercised over children?  Second, what is the moral basis of the 
special rights of parents over particular children?  And third, when, if ever, are inequalities of 
education and opportunity justified, when these emerge from decentralized authority over 
children in families and local communities? 
Part I: On what grounds do we deny children the personal freedom we accord to adults?  
The standard liberal view is that we are “born free as we are born rational” (Locke).  That is, we 
are only born with the potential for freedom and rationality.  Others ought to respect our liberty 
once we have, with age, become sufficiently reasonable to govern ourselves.  On this view, a 
person’s age matters only insofar as it is correlated with reason.  I, on the contrary, argue that we 
should recognize age to have independent moral significance.  This is because the educational 
paternalism at the beginning of a life does not impede our ability to carry out our life plans in the 
 
 
same way as would similar interference in the middle of a life.  This explains why it is 
appropriate for parents and educators to aspire to more than fostering the minimal competence 
necessary for just getting by in life. 
Part II: What is the moral basis and extent of parental rights?  Typically, liberals assume 
that governmental authority is only justified insofar as it serves the interests of the governed.  Is 
parental authority the same, or is it partly justified by the interests of the “governors” as well 
(e.g., the interest parents have in passing on their values to another generation)?  While many 
contemporary philosophers have followed Locke in describing parental authority as a fiduciary 
power, I suggest that Hegel provides a richer account in two respects.  First, because Hegel has a 
more nuanced account of the differences between natural right, personal morality, and social 
ethics, he has the resources for a more sophisticated philosophy of moral education than Locke.  
From this we can derive a more detailed account of parental duties, as well as see why, without 
the help of schools, individual families are not generally well-suited to educate children for the 
modern world.  Second, Hegel’s conceptions of love and of social roles help illuminate the 
interests that adults have in rearing their children.     
Part III:  When, if ever, are inequalities in the provision of education justified?  While 
parents have traditionally been responsible for providing for their children’s education, this role 
has increasingly been taken on by the state.  In Brown v. Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that public education must be made available “on equal terms” to all.  But how is this 
to be understood?  Does it require that the state spend roughly the same amount on educating 
every child?  Or does it require that the state attempt to compensate children who have fewer 
educational advantages in the home to even out life chances?  Or should educational equality be 
understood in a more modest way:  an equal opportunity for a decent or adequate education?  I 
 claim that, assuming a rich and multi-faceted conception of adequate outcomes, educational 
inequalities above the adequacy threshold that emerge from differences in native ability or 
family background are not necessarily unjust.  However, a norm of equal treatment establishes a 
defeasible presumption of resource equality in the public school system, once the adequacy 
threshold is met.  I allow that inequalities between local communities may be justifiable if 
communities have chosen to tax themselves at different rates, but not if the school-finance 
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A NOTE ON CITATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 Generally, I have cited contemporary sources by author, date, and page number—though 
sometimes I refer to chapter or section numbers instead.  However, this is an inconvenient 
convention when citing historical texts which have appeared in many different editions with 
different paginations.  Instead, I have cited these texts by title or by an abbreviation of the title.  
And for these works, where possible, I have referred to standard page numbers and/or to standard 
chapters, sections, etc.  The only contemporary work cited with an abbreviation is John Rawls’s 
Theory of Justice, since this makes it easier to give the page numbers for both the original and 
revised editions, or to give the common chapter or section number.  To make it easier to find 
passages in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and The Subjection of Women, I have 
cited the chapter and paragraph number, although editions generally do not actually enumerate 
the paragraphs.  In citing Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and Encyclopedia, I have adopted the 
following conventions: 
  R = Remark    A = Addition      
   163 + R, A = section 163 along with the accompanying remark and addition 
Furthermore, in very long Additions from Hegel’s Encyclopedia, I have also occasionally cited 
the page number from the Oxford University Press English translations.  Finally, in older English 
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PR = Hegel, Philosophy of Right.  Cited by section. 
PS = Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit.  Cited by paragraph. 
RSV = Revised Standard Version of the Bible. 
RWP = Grotius, On the Rights of War and Peace (De jure belli ac pacis).   Cited by book, 
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Childhood in the Liberal Order 
 
 
It is sometimes said that liberalism has special difficulties in handling children.  Sanford 
Levinson, for example, claims that “Liberals are always happier talking about adults, precisely 
because it is they who can most easily be envisioned as possessing autonomy and giving 
consent” (1995: 642).  Similarly, Susan Moller Okin objects that most political philosophers 
today, liberals no less than others, “take mature, independent human beings as the subjects of 
their theories without any mention of how they got that way” (1989: 9).  Too often, according to 
Okin, liberals appear to take on board the simplifying assumption Hobbes once recommended: 
that we think of the individuals who are about to enter into political relations with one another as 
if they had simply sprung from the earth “and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to maturity, 
without all kinds of engagement to each other” (DC: VIII.1).1   
Are these concerns well-founded?  Should liberals be embarrassed that their supposedly 
autonomous “individuals” begin their lives as dependent children and often fashion their lives 
around supporting children of their own?  Of course, the question is vague in that “liberalism” 
refers to a broad family of views, the members of which differ markedly in both philosophical 
foundations and political outlooks.  For our purposes we can think of liberalism as the tradition 
of social and political thought that descends from the work of such philosophers as Locke, Kant, 
Mill, and which is exemplified in recent political philosophy by the likes of John Rawls, Robert 
                                                          





Nozick, and Ronald Dworkin.  In most of its formulations, then, liberalism is committed to broad 
civil liberties, some interpretation of equality, limited and secular representative government, and 
(to a greater or lesser extent) the importance of competitive markets and free exchange.2  Basic 
to the liberal understanding of these values and institutions are certain conceptions of free and 
equal individuals.  Children, therefore, pose puzzles and problems for liberal theory largely 
because they do not fit the mold of the ideal liberal “individual.”  However, since different 
brands of liberalism employ different kinds of individualism, the challenges facing liberal 
theories regarding children differ as well.  In this introduction, I want to briefly situate the topics 
taken up in the chapters that follow in terms of some of these challenges.  
Some versions of liberalism are individualistic in the sense that, in the tradition of Hobbes, 
they regard morality to be a mutually advantageous agreement amongst individuals, each of 
whom is only interested in satisfying his own desires (e.g., Gauthier 1986).  Since young 
children cannot make such agreements and do not at first have much to offer adults, they would 
appear to fall outside the moral community on these theories (along with those adults 
incompetent to make agreements or unable to benefit others through cooperation).3  Jan 
Narveson is one philosopher who boldly accepts this conclusion.  He argues that, in fact, children 
have no rights and that they should be regarded as the property of those who made them until 
they become capable of entering into mutually advantageous agreements with others.  Narveson 
is forced to concede, however, that “the libertarian idea” he defends is intuitively at its most 
                                                          
2 Left liberals like Rawls may be open to broad public ownership of the means of production, and yet understand this 
to be consistent with the use of markets.  See Rawls, TJ: §42.  Competitive markets are even more important to the 
thought of John Stuart Mill and Ronald Dworkin.  See Mill, Principles of Political Economy, esp. II.i xii-xiii, IV.vi-
vii, V.xi; and Dworkin (1978) and (1980b).     
3 The issue is discussed by Barry (1989); Buchanan (1989); and Nussbaum (2006).  See also the discussion of 





strained when it has to deal with “the problem of children” (1988: ch. 19).  Indeed, 
commonsense morality supposes that there are very stringent duties to avoid harming and 
neglecting vulnerable children.  Like many, I think the “strain” Narveson alludes to exceeds 
credibility, and though I do examine Hobbes’s account of parental authority (in Chapter 7), I 
devote relatively little space in this dissertation to how children fit into a picture framed by this 
brand of individualism.   
Most liberals—including Locke, Kant, Mill, Rawls, Nozick, and Dworkin— are “moral 
individualists” in a quite different sense than are Hobbesians.  Instead of arguing that morality is 
a part of the rational self-interest of each individual, these thinkers hold that individuals are the 
loci of ultimate moral value—as opposed to society, the nation, families, or other groups—and 
that to take up the moral point of view is to consider impartially the interests of all individuals as 
individuals, not merely as members of larger wholes.  Philosophers of this cast of mind have 
typically assumed that children count as individuals of equal moral worth to adults.  But, at least 
in the case of infants and very young children, this is not without difficulties.  The difficulties are 
especially apparent for those following Locke, Kant, and Rawls in maintaining that human moral 
status is grounded in the possession of rational and moral agency—something infants and very 
young children patently lack.  Although this is an important and puzzling issue, I deal with the 
basic moral status of infants and young children in only a cursory fashion here (in Chapter 6).   
In the main, I proceed in what follows on the common assumption that children are 
“individuals” with interests of their own, which are worthy of equal moral consideration.  A 
natural corollary of this assumption is that the interests of children can come into conflict with 
those of their parents and society at large.  Thus, the challenge that children pose to 





resolving conflicts of interests between various parties in a fair and reasonable way.  But children 
do raise a special kind of problem.  Central to most forms of liberalism is the idea of the 
individual as free and self-governing.  And yet we do not come into the world as autonomous 
and accountable persons; at best this is only the outcome of a long process of development and 
education which (in many societies) now extends throughout the first quarter of the average life.  
During our minority, moreover, we are governed, not by ourselves, but by others.  This 
dissertation, then, examines the paradoxical position of children in liberal theory: beings who (as 
Locke put it) though not born in a state of freedom and equality, are born to it.  In particular, the 
dissertation’s three parts examine three interrelated questions about the government of children.  
First, what accounts for the special paternalistic authority exercised over children?  Second, what 
is the moral basis of the special rights of parents over particular children?  And third, when, if 
ever, are inequalities of education and opportunity justified, when these emerge from the 
decentralized authority over children in families and local communities?  Let me now say 
something more about the contents of each of these parts in turn. 
I 
The individual’s interest in personal liberty and autonomy is, naturally, central to the liberal 
outlook.  And yet it seems inappropriate to grant children these broad liberty and autonomy 
rights.  In Part I, then, we ask: “What is it that justifies treating children more paternalistically 
than adults in this way?” After delineating the concept of paternalism in Chapter 1, I consider in 
Chapters 2 and 3 several versions of the argument that the freedom of children is to be restricted 
because they will not use it to their own advantage; rather—so the argument goes—the child is 
better off, especially in the long run, if his activity is restricted and supervised by adults until he 





But for many liberals, this sort of answer opens up the door to paternalism far too widely.  
For them, as for Mill, promotion of a person’s physical or moral good typically is not a sufficient 
warrant to restrict his freedom.  Instead, individuals have the authority to make their own 
decisions about their own affairs, even if their decisions are not very wise or prudent.  
Nevertheless, as children presumably do not enjoy this same authority over themselves, we still 
need an account as to what characteristics of the person justify the conferral of this authority.  
Many philosophers insist that age, in itself, cannot be one of the morally relevant differences 
between children and adults; rather, they hold with Locke that what matters is the child’s lack of 
an adequately developed capacity for rational and moral agency.  After discussing this position 
in Chapter 4, I defend in Chapter 5 the opposing view: that the fact that a person is at the 
beginning of his life can itself be a morally relevant reason for determining how far we ought to 
respect his self-regarding choices.  This, I claim, allows us to relieve the tension between our 
ambitious educational ideals and the very modest threshold for competence in a liberal society.   
II 
Whether or not one accepts my argument in Part I, it is relatively uncontroversial that, as 
children, we should be subject to the authority of adults.  But this raises questions about the 
character and justification of adult authority, which is the focus of Part II.  Most liberals are 
anxious to deny that children are owned by their parents as a form of personal property, since this 
seems incompatible with respecting the fundamental moral equality of children with adults.  For 
this reason, many follow Locke’s lead in characterizing parental authority as a kind of 
“government” or fiduciary trust, which is to be exercised for the good of the governed or trustee.  
But others hold that, by assimilating parenthood to a kind of public office, the fiduciary model 





parent.  Moreover, if parental authority is a kind of fiduciary trust, then how is that trust vested in 
particular individuals?  Do we simply vest authority in whomever is best suited to exercise it?  
Or do procreators have a special claim over their offspring in virtue of their biological 
relationship?  And to what extent do guardians have the right to make decisions about their 
children’s upbringing, when others might decide more wisely?  In that we are concerned here 
with the authority to make decisions, even when those decisions are the wrong ones, there is an 
obvious structural similarity between the issues addressed in Parts I and II; the difference is that, 
in Part II, we are concerned with the contours of an individual’s authority, not over herself, but 
now over her children. 
Unlike the chapters of Part I, Part II has a strongly historical character.  In the first three 
chapters (Chapters 6-8), I explore the above questions in the company of Locke and his 
seventeenth-century contemporaries, such as Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf.  Although Locke 
is much-discussed in the contemporary literature on the rights of parents and children, his 
position is almost never discussed in its historical context.  This is unfortunate.  Because 
seventeenth-century philosophers were seriously concerned with the relation between political 
and paternal power, the moral foundations of parental authority received unparalleled attention 
by the best and most original philosophers of the period.  Chapters 9 and 10 continue our inquiry 
into the foundations of parental authority, but introduce the value of intimacy, which is largely 
missing from the seventeenth-century discussions.  Chapter 9 looks at the role of intimacy in 
some recent arguments about parental rights, while Chapter 10 brings Hegel into the discussion.  
In dramatic contrast with Locke, Hegel has largely been ignored in the contemporary 
philosophical literature, and yet he has a conception of the family much more like our own than 





is of special interest as it forces us to critically examine some of the more individualistic 
assumptions of mainstream liberalism.   
III 
The liberal value of the most obvious relevance to childhood is equality of opportunity.  The 
idea that a person’s origins should not determine her life prospects, and that every child should 
have an open future, has broad appeal.  The most important way that modern societies have 
attempted to underwrite broad opportunity for all is by ensuring that all children have access to 
formal education.  And, in the words of Brown v. Board of Education, it seems that the state 
ought to make these opportunities “available to all on equal terms.”  But how is “equal terms” to 
be understood in this context?  Does it require that the state spend roughly the same amount on 
educating every child?  Or does it require that the state attempt to compensate children who have 
fewer educational advantages in the home?  Should equality be understood in a more modest 
way: as an equal opportunity for a decent or adequate education?  These are the questions 
explored in Part III.  The theme of domains of authority, already encountered in Parts I and II, 
reappears in Part III in a new way.  When educational authority is devolved upon families or 
local communities, differences and inequalities in education are bound to emerge.  Under what 
circumstances, then, are inequalities that emerge from decentralized authority unjust?   
Chapter 11 introduces these topics by sketching the ideological origins of public schools in 
the United States and the legal history of challenges to school-finance systems from the 1970s to 
the present.  Chapter 12 sorts out conceptual issues for talking about distributive justice in 
education by drawing together tools from the fields of political philosophy and school finance.  
Chapters 13-15 contain the more philosophically substantive arguments.  Chapter 13 examines 





Rawls’s principle of “Fair Equality of Opportunity.”  In Chapter 14, I turn to the adequacy 
approach to thinking about educational justice, with particular attention paid to the work of John 
Dewey, Amy Gutmann, and Elizabeth Anderson.  Finally, in Chapter 15, I defend an account of 
justice in education that incorporates from both the equity and adequacy approaches. 
∴ 
Although this is not a short dissertation, the selection of topics is nonetheless selective, and 
there are naturally many important issues of related interest that I have not had the time or space 
to explore in these pages.  (I touch upon some of these in the Epilogue.)  Throughout this work, I 
have developed my own views by engaging critically with previous writers, historical and 
contemporary.  The most constructive discussions are to be found in the last chapter of Parts I 
and II and the last two chapters in Part III:  that is, in Chapters 5, 10, 14-15.  In the interests of 
the selective reader, I have sought to make these chapters stand alone as much as possible.  There 
is also an introduction to each of the three parts, which offers an overview of each topic and 
additional direction to some of the most important sections.  Finally, in the Epilogue I take stock 





PART I:  CHILDREN AND PATERNALISM 
Introduction and Overview 
Liberalism and paternalism 
The value of personal autonomy is central to liberalism.  To echo Mill, the liberal believes 
that each individual has an equal right to pursue his own good in his own way on fair terms with 
others.  This typically makes the liberal wary of paternalism—of impeding a person’s freedom 
for his own good.  The very word is evocative of treating a person “like a child,” and that as 
Tamar Schapiro puts it, seems to mean treating a person “as if her life is not quite her own to 
lead and as if her choices are not quite her own to make” (1999: 715).   
In fact, the insistence that adults not be treated like children should be understood as a basic 
trope of liberal theory and rhetoric—one that is particularly evident in the writings of Locke, 
Mill, and Kant.  Locke was especially keen to reject the patriarchalist assimilation of paternal 
and political power.  Locke concedes that paternal authority is natural and is based on the child’s 
inferior capacity for reason, but he also insists that this power lapses when the child reaches 
maturity.  Political authority, on the other hand, is conventional and must garner the consent of 
adults who are by nature free and equal (2T: II.vi).  Kant goes so far as to say that “A 
government established on the principle of benevolence toward the people like that of a father 
toward his children – that is, a paternalistic government…, in which the subjects [are treated] 





is the greatest despotism thinkable.”1  But the locus classicus of liberal opposition to paternalism 
is Mill’s On Liberty, which defends the view that “the individual is sovereign” over himself, 
“over his body and mind,” and that a person’s “own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant” to compel him to do anything.  On the contrary, “it is the privilege and proper 
condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret 
experience in his own way” (OL: I, ¶ 9; III, ¶ 3 / CW, XVIII: 223-224, 262).   
This heavy reliance on the distinct moral status of the adult vis-à-vis the child, however, 
forces us to consider the foundation of that dichotomy.  Why should it be permissible to treat 
children any more paternalistically than adults?  Why shouldn’t children have the same right to 
pursue their own good in their own way?  What do children lack such that it is appropriate to 
deny them full liberal autonomy?  These are the questions that will occupy us in Part I. 
Although the answers may seem obvious, consideration of these questions is important for 
three reasons.  First, although it is easy to justify denying full autonomy to young children, the 
case of adolescents poses harder questions.  This is not just a problem of vague boundaries—
something I shall not belabor.  More significant are the broad social and economic changes that 
have altered our ideas about familial authority and the nature and boundaries of different stages 
of life.  For instance, the accelerated onset of sexual maturity in women, increased rates of early 
sexual activity, and greater integration of children in institutions and culture outside the home 
have all compressed the period of true childhood, while the lengthening period of education 
necessary for economic self-sufficiency, now extended to both sexes, tends to postpone the 
independence of adulthood.  The consequence has been to extend and make more self-conscious 
                                                          
1 “On the common saying: that may be true in theory, but it is of no use in practice,” 8:290-291.  Quoted from Kant 





the liminal period of “adolescence” between childhood and adulthood (cf. Erikson 1968: 122).  
Such changes have led some to question whether we treat young people like children, in law and 
in the family, far longer than is justifiable and whether adolescents are entitled to more freedom 
than they are now granted.  A deeper understanding of the moral significance of becoming an 
adult can give us some perspective on these controversies.  Second, it is important to know when, 
if ever, it is appropriate to treat adults “like children.”  This is particularly pressing in the case of 
adults with serious mental disabilities, whom writers on paternalism often lump together with 
children as “incompetents.”  And third, by asking what it means morally to become an adult, we 
can shed light on the philosophical basis of autonomy rights in general.  In this way, our study 
into the special status of children can make a contribution to a fundamental question in liberal 
thought. 
An overview of the argument of Part I 
Because the chapters in Part I form one long argument, let me offer an overview to orient the 
reader.  The central question, once again, is this: Why is it that there should be a strong 
presumption against paternalism toward adults on the liberal outlook, but no such presumption 
with respect to children?  A good place to begin is by asking why paternalism is ever 
objectionable at all.  By paternalism I understand, roughly, cases in which P tries to promote Q’s 
good by restricting Q’s freedom.  (This concept of paternalism is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 1).  Now one might think that, if the paternalistic act really would promote the subject’s 
good, then there could be nothing objectionable about it.  The problem with much paternalism is 
merely that it tends to interfere “wrongly and in the wrong place,” and thus the paternalist fails to 
accomplish his object of really helping the subject.  Because this way of looking at things 





approach.”  On a second view, however, paternalism is generally objectionable because, 
beneficial or not, it invades the subject’s personal zone of sovereignty or autonomy.  Here we 
invoke a reason that does not appeal to the subject’s well-being.  I call this the sovereignty 
approach.  The welfarist and sovereignty approaches face opposite challenges in accounting for 
the liberal outlook on paternalism.  The welfarist approach must explain why paternalism toward 
adults is so often counterproductive, while the sovereignty approach must explain why there is 
less reason to respect the autonomy of children than that of adults. 
I discuss welfarist arguments for the liberal outlook in Chapters 2 and 3, and turn to the 
sovereignty approach in Chapter 4.  While I am ultimately sympathetic to the sovereignty 
approach, I do not think that the standard accounts do a good job of explaining the moral 
difference between adolescence and adulthood.  Roughly speaking, such accounts tend to argue 
that adults, as a group, possess a capacity for agency that children, as a group, lack.  But if one 
were to look at the psychological evidence without preconceptions, I believe one would conclude 
that, in terms of the capacity for practical reasoning, middle adolescence is the beginning of 
adulthood, not the end of childhood.  In Chapter 5, I offer a different way of thinking about the 
duty to respect autonomy.  Instead of thinking about it as the duty to respect a person’s choices, 
abstracting from a person’s stage of life, I argue that a person’s position in a lifespan ought to 
make a difference to the way that we think about her authority over her choices.  The idea is that 
paternalistic restraints in adolescence—coming at the beginning of a life—have a very different 
character than the same restraints would have in the middle of a life, because they do not 
undermine the young person’s ability to determine the primary structure or character of her life 






Let me offer a little guidance for the selective reader.  Because Chapter 5 is the most 
constructive of Part I, I have tried to make it self-standing, and it begins with a summary of the 
most important points made in Chapters 1-4.  The most important sections in the first four 
chapters are:  the very end of 1.4 (where our working-concept of paternalism is defined); 1.5 
(which describes what I take to be the “Liberal Outlook” on paternalism); 2.1 (distinguishing the 
welfarist and sovereignty approaches in more detail); 4.2 (arguing for the intrinsic value of 
respect for autonomy); and 4.6 (which lays out my criticism of standard sovereignty arguments).  
The main arguments discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 are briefly outlined in 2.4.  Readers interested 
in the argument about life narratives in 5.3 and 5.4 are directed to the related discussion in 2.6.  





CHAPTER 1:  TREATING PEOPLE LIKE CHILDREN 
1.1  The Concept of Paternalism 
Like many everyday social concepts, the word “paternalism” has a protean character.  In 
ordinary discourse, “paternalism” probably marks a range of concepts linked by family 
resemblance, rather than a single unified concept.  Moreover, because the word has a pejorative 
connotation, it is often reserved for disapproval.  These facts make it unprofitable to attempt to 
ferret out the “true definition” of paternalism, testing our linguistic intuitions by working through 
examples and counterexamples.  What is important is mainly to be clear about the concept that 
we shall employ and to explain why the concept is of particular moral importance.  I will begin 
with a simple definition that picks out the focal case of paternalism.  Then I will discuss the 
concept in more detail, taking notice of nuances along the way.  At the end of this section, I will 
offer a more complex definition to replace the simple definition that takes into account these 
details.  The simple definition is as follows: 
P acts paternalistically toward Q if and only if P intentionally restricts Q’s freedom in 
order to promote Q’s good.1 
I will often refer to party P as either the paternalist or the agent (depending on whether I wish to 
withhold judgment as to whether or not P is acting paternalistically), and I will refer to party Q 
as the subject.  The virtue of this definition is that it directs our attention to conflicts between two 
                                                          
1 Although it would, of course, be possible to define the principle differently, this is by no means an idiosyncratic 
definition.  Compare, for instance, the definition of paternalism in The Oxford English Dictionary: “The policy or 
practice of restricting the freedoms and responsibilities of subordinates or dependents in what is considered or 





intuitively important moral values: freedom and a person’s good.  The issue has considerable 
theoretical importance, then, since it requires us to organize our ideas about these values and to 
think about how to handle conflicts between them.  I will now flesh out this conception of 
paternalism by discussing three of its central elements:  intention (1.2.), a person’s good (1.3), 
and restrictions on freedom (1.4).  In the final section, I characterize what I will call the “Liberal 
Outlook on paternalism” (1.5).   
1.2  Intention 
What makes an act paternalistic is generally the intention that motivates the act.  If P 
intentionally restricted Q’s freedom but only inadvertently benefited Q, then we would not 
consider that to be paternalistic.  The same is true if P intentionally benefited Q, but only 
inadvertently restricted Q’s freedom.  What if the agent has multiple intentions in performing a 
particular act?  In that case, the action is more or less paternalistic, depending on the importance 
of the paternalistic motive in his set of effective reasons for action.  In general, we should reserve 
the label of “paternalistic” for those cases where the paternalistic reason is the primary—or at 
least a necessary—motivation for acting.2  For instance, most people believe that committing a 
horrible crime, like murder, makes one’s life go worse.  It would be odd, however, to say that the 
                                                          
2 We might propose the following analysis to formulate a rough categorization.  Assuming that, amongst a person’s 
reasons, there is at least one paternalistic reason, we can then ask the following two questions: (1) Was the 
paternalistic motive necessary to motivate the agent to act as he had?  (2) Was the paternalistic motive sufficient to 
motivate the agent to act as he had?  If the paternalistic motive is necessary and sufficient, then the act is strongly 
paternalistic.  If the paternalistic motive is necessary but not sufficient, then it is weakly paternalistic.  If the 
paternalistic motive is not necessary but is sufficient, then it is marginally paternalistic.  And if the paternalistic 
motive is neither necessary nor sufficient, then the act is not at all paternalistic.  A similar test could be used for 
assessing how paternalistic an act by a collective agent, like a legislature, ultimately is.  Clearly such analyses could 





law prohibiting murder is, for that reason, essentially paternalistic.  Even if the paternalistic 
reason does speak in favor of prohibiting murder, that is not the primary reason for such a law. 
Plainly not every case where a person claims to act paternalistically is in fact paternalistic.  
Just as people can misrepresent their motives as benevolent, they can misrepresent their motives 
as paternalistic.  Very often when P restricts the freedom of Q, P will claim with less than perfect 
candor that the restriction is in Q’s best interests.  In the case of genuine paternalism, therefore, 
the agent must sincerely act on the intention to benefit another by restricting his freedom.  There 
may even be cases where a person deceives himself about his true motives, but this leads to 
puzzles about self-deception and human motivation, not to puzzles about the concept of 
paternalism.   
Suppose, however, that P does intend to benefit Q by restricting Q’s freedom, but fails to 
actually do so.  This might be for two reasons.  First, P might employ ineffective means to 
achieving his end.  Second, while P may have the proper formal aim (Q’s good), he may have the 
wrong substantive aim, which is to say, P may be misguided in his understanding of what Q’s 
good really consists in.  Still we would usually call ineffective or misguided attempts to act 
paternalistically “paternalistic.”  This, however, leads to some ambiguity between freedom-
inhibiting acts that are actually beneficial to Q and those that merely intend to be beneficial to Q.  
It is useful therefore to distinguish between what we can dub “perfect” and “imperfect” cases of 
paternalism, where in the latter cases the paternalist genuinely intends to benefit the subject, but 
actually fails to do so because he employs ineffective means or has the wrong substantive aim. 
Sometimes there is a policy already in place and what we are interested in are not the reasons 
that led to its initial enactment, but the reasons available to us for either endorsing or objecting to 





us to describe the policy as paternalistic, but rather the reasons that feature in our own intentions 
or attitudes.  For instance, we might say that, although a law was passed for paternalistic reasons, 
it is not really paternalistic, because we can endorse it for non-paternalistic reasons (e.g., those 
of social justice).  Or vice versa.3  
1.3  A Person’s Good 
Paternalistic conduct involves not just any restrictions on Q’s freedom, but specifically 
restrictions aimed at promoting or protecting Q’s good.  Included in this notion of promoting Q’s 
good is that of preventing harm to Q, or generally what is bad for Q.  The idea of something 
being good or bad for Q is essential to the concept of paternalism.  To restrict someone’s 
freedom to promote the good or to prevent what is bad from an impersonal point of view is not 
paternalistic.  To see this, consider the following contrast:  If P tries to prevent Q and R from 
engaging in certain sexual acts because P believes that such acts will make the lives of Q and R 
worse (perhaps because P believes such acts are degrading), then P is acting paternalistically.  
On the other hand, if P tries to prevent the same conduct simply because P believes it is 
inherently wicked, or perhaps abhorrent in the eyes of God,4 then P is not acting paternalistically; 
                                                          
3 This section serves as my answer to the puzzle recently raised by Peter de Marneffe (2006) as to whether the “for a 
person’s  own good” clause in the definition of paternalism refers to a policy’s motivation or its justification.  My 
view is that one shouldn’t get too wrapped up in the question as to whether an action or policy is paternalistic tout 
court.  Ultimately, the adjective “paternalistic” refers to a species of practical reason.  To say that an action or 
intervention is paternalistic is always either to refer obliquely to the individual motivations that explain why the 
intervention happened, or to take up a first person point of view and consider the reasons that exist for acting or for 
endorsing the actions of others.   
4 I am assuming here that when P wants to prevent Q from engaging in conduct abhorrent to God, P is simply 
motivated by a desire to wipe out what is abhorrent or wicked.  On the other hand, that some conduct is 
abhorrent in the eyes of God may mean that it is bad for Q to engage in that conduct. This could be either because 
God will punish Q or because God finds abhorrent what is independently bad for Q.  If P was motivated to prevent 






the evil P wishes to prevent in this second case is not something primarily bad for Q and R, but 
something bad in itself. 
Many philosophers refer to what is good for Q as Q’s “well-being.”  If we accept that 
definition of well-being, then paternalism always involves restricts on Q’s freedom aimed at 
promoting or protecting Q’s well-being.  In the following chapters, I shall follow this common 
usage and assume that paternalism is aimed at the promotion of well-being.  However, if well-
being is understood to refer to a narrower concept than a person’s good, then paternalism should 
be defined in terms of the broader concept of a person’s good.   
Why might the concepts of a person’s good and a person’s well-being come apart?  There are 
two reasons.  First, some philosophers use the word “well-being” in a more restricted (and thus 
more conventional) way, such that well-being refers to a person’s state of happiness, health, or 
prosperity.  In that case, well-being may be thought to be only one component of a person’s 
good, where a person’s good might also include his freedom or his moral rectitude.  As I 
understand it, paternalism might as well aim to promote a person’s future freedom or moral 
character as his happiness, health, or prosperity.  The second reason someone might think that a 
person’s good and his well-being may come apart is more substantive.  Several philosophers 
understand well-being to refer to the quality of a complete life (cf. Parfit 1984: Appendix I; 
Griffin 1986: 34-37; Raz 2004: 276-281).  In this respect, they follow Aristotle’s thought that 
eudaimonia, or “happiness,” is a property of a life as a whole (NE: I.7-8, 10).  Now on an 
atomistic conception of what makes a complete life go well, each individual episode, good or 
bad, contributes to or detracts from a good life.  Thus, if a wasp gives me a painful sting which is 
sore for a couple of days, this makes my life as a whole go a little bit worse than it would have 





paternalistically, P acts with the aim of promoting or protecting Q’s well-being.  But the 
atomistic view of well-being is controversial.  On a global conception of well-being, the overall 
character of a life is insensitive to minor and isolated pleasures and pains (though it is sensitive 
to mild chronic pain); likewise the overall character of a complete life is insensitive to minor 
gains and setbacks that don’t affect the central aims of my life (cf. esp. Raz 2004).  On this kind 
of non-atomistic view, what is good or bad for Q in a temporally local sense can come apart from 
Q’s well-being.  This is not for the obvious reason that present suffering may instrumentally 
contribute to future well-being; the point is that isolated episodes may simply have no effect on 
the overall character of a life.  But that doesn’t mean that such minor and isolated episodes 
cannot be good or bad for a person locally.  Although being stung by a wasp will not affect the 
quality of my life as a whole, it will significantly affect the quality of my day.  If I am stung, I 
might say, “Today would have been a good day, except that I was stung by a wasp.”  If this is 
correct, then what is “good for” Q in a temporally local sense can come apart from Q’s well-
being (in the sense of what makes Q’s life go best overall).5  If the concept of Q’s well-being is 
limited what is good for Q in a global sense, then paternalism should be understood to be 
concerned more broadly with Q’s good—whether global or local.  Suppose that P forbids Q from 
cleaning out the barn because P thinks Q will be stung by a wasp if he does so.  I think we will 
want to be able to say that P acts paternalistically, since P restricts Q’s freedom to prevent 
something bad from happening to Q, even if P also acknowledges that the quality of Q’s life as a 
whole will be unaffected either way.   
                                                          
5 Alternatively, we might say with Velleman (2000) that we need concepts of both local and global well-being and 





For the most part, I shall leave the content of “Q’s good” unanalyzed here.  There are many 
different ideas about what a person’s good consists in.  Some people think that a person’s good 
depends wholly on his desires or on his conscious experience.  Other people think that a person’s 
good depends on certain “objective goods” like being morally good or participation in valuable 
activities and relationships (see 2.2).  Since we have defined paternalism in terms of the reasons 
or intentions that motivate an agent, it is enough for our purposes to say that P acts 
paternalistically when P restricts Q’s freedom in order to promote what P sincerely believes to be 
Q’s good.  Thus, in order to classify conduct as paternalistic, we don’t need to know whether P’s 
conception of Q’s good is the best conception.  (However, to know what counts as perfect 
paternalism, we would need to know what the best conception of well-being is). 
Some writers take a more expansive view of paternalism than the one offered here, in that 
they do not require that paternalistic conduct be aimed at benefiting the subject.  It is sufficient 
on these more spacious accounts that the conduct fails to respect a person’s capacity for acting or 
making decisions on his own about matters that ought to be left up to his discretion (cf. Shiffrin 
2000).  Of course, to be complete, these accounts require a further story about what a person’s 
proper domain of control ought to be, but in many cases we have an everyday sense of what 
these would look like.  For instance, imagine an employer who does not afford his employees 
any leeway in carrying out their assigned tasks in their own way, or who monitors their every 
action at work—perhaps even requiring them to get permission before using the restroom.  
Though such an employer undoubtedly treats his employees like children, he may not be in the 
least motivated by his employees’ good—far from it, he may be exclusively concerned with 
productivity and his own gain (cf. Feinberg 1986: 4).  Not unreasonably, some would describe 





intention to promote the subjects’ good, the conduct does not count as paternalistic on the 
conception that I will be relying upon.   
What if someone’s freedom is restricted in order “to preserve a wider range of freedom for 
the individual concerned” (G. Dworkin 1972: 76)?  For instance, we prevent children from 
leaving school partly in order to provide for them a wider sphere of freedom as adults.  Is this 
paternalistic on our conception?  While this may be a plausible principle for justifying 
paternalism,6 we should regard it to be paternalistic nonetheless.  If we restrict Q’s present 
freedom in order to preserve Q’s future freedom, then we must surely think that this is good for 
Q, insofar as we are doing it for Q’s sake.  It would be absurd to undertake such a restriction (for 
Q’s sake) if we thought it made Q worse off, and it would be unduly intrusive to intervene if we 
thought it made Q neither better off nor worse off.  The best way to think about this, then, is as a 
limited form of paternalism:  freedom may be restricted, not to make a person better off in any 
respect, but only better off in the special respect of having more freedom later. 
There are some special reasons for restricting a person’s freedom which might seem 
paternalistic at first glance, but which are probably not best categorized that way.  First, 
sometimes having fewer options improves a party’s strategic position or bargaining power vis-à-
vis others (Schelling 1960; Elster 1984; 2000).  Minimum wage laws, for instance, place a floor 
beneath which workers cannot bargained.  There is a sense in which this is restricting the 
worker’s freedom for his own good, but since the narrow purpose of the restriction is to 
eliminate options that the worker doesn’t want to be forced to choose, such restrictions really are 
not paternalistic in spirit.  Similarly, it is often the case that coercion is necessary to solve 
                                                          





coordination problems and prisoner’s dilemmas.  For example, everyone might want to work 
shorter hours, but if they cannot negotiate these terms individually, legislation might be 
introduced that sets a limit to the number of hours that anyone can work.  Again, the purpose of 
such restrictions is to help people attain what they really want.  Of course, this may not be what 
everyone wants, but then this is just another case where some are forced to contribute to public 
goods they don’t really want.  Naturally, restrictions on a person’s freedom to protect the 
interests of others are not paternalistic, but sometimes it is necessary to require a person to look 
after his own welfare for the benefit of society as a whole.  Two examples are mandatory 
vaccinations and mandatory contributions to a social insurance scheme (which could be 
undermined by adverse selection effects).7  Though these measures appear superficially 
paternalistic, they are not really paternalistic in spirit either. 
Finally, some writers take a narrower view on the notion of “a person’s good” as far as the 
concept of paternalism is concerned.  This is in two senses.  First, some writers define 
paternalism as essentially concerned with restrictions of freedom aimed at preventing people 
from harming themselves.  This is distinguished from a more extensive principle which also 
permits restrictions of freedom in order to confer positive benefits.  Second, some writers think 
of paternalism as aimed primarily at protecting a person’s physical or economic interests, rather 
than his moral character or his good all-things-considered.  Crossing these distinctions, we arrive 
at four ideal types: (1) non-moralistic, harm-preventing paternalism (“negative paternalism”), (2) 
non-moralistic, benefit-conferring paternalism (“positive paternalism”), (3) moralistic, harm-
preventing paternalism (“moral paternalism”), and (4) moralistic, benefit-conferring paternalism 
                                                          





(“perfectionism”).8  Writers mainly interested in principles regulating the application of the 
criminal law toward adults often focus on (1)—negative paternalism—which seems to be the 
least intrusive and the most plausible as a public principle in a modern, pluralistic society (see 
1.5 below).  However, when we expand our focus to include children, and when we look at 
paternalism beyond the law, this narrow focus is much less compelling.  We often restrict the 
freedom of children, not only to protect their basic interests, but also to promote their future 
opportunities and to foster their moral and ethical development.  Furthermore, the distinction 
between harm-prevention and benefit-conferral is not very clear-cut when we are thinking about 
the development of children.  For instance, when we require a child to attend school against his 
will, are we conferring the benefit of education on the child, or are we preventing the child from 
harming himself and his future prospects?   
1.4  Restriction of a Person’s Freedom 
The most elusive part of the definition of paternalism is the interpretation of what is meant by 
a restriction on a person’s freedom.  Some writers focus narrowly on “interference with a 
person’s liberty of action,” especially legal interference (G. Dworkin 1972: 65).  One reason for 
adopting this limited focus is simply that it makes discussion more manageable.  A second 
reason is that many liberals think that the justification of coercion, especially state coercion, is 
the fundamental problem of political philosophy.9  Thus, an examination of coercive paternalism, 
                                                          
8 This typology is similar to that in Feinberg (1986; 1990).  Incidentally, I am using “perfectionism” in a narrower 
sense here than it is sometimes used.  Much of what goes under the label “perfectionism” in contemporary 
political philosophy is not paternalistic, at least in my sense, since the political goal of helping people to lead good 
lives may be pursued without restricting freedom.  See for instance the discussions in Raz (1986); Hurka (1993); 
Sher (1997); and Wall (1998). 





and particularly coercive legal paternalism, seems to have a special urgency.  In spite of these 
considerations, I will assume a broader conception of what it means to restrict a person’s 
freedom.  First of all, if we are interested in paternalism toward children, then a narrowly legal 
focus seems inappropriate, since the law is not the main social mechanism by which we govern 
children.  If we want a realistic sense of the freedom that children in our society possess, a very 
poor method would be to use legal codes, especially the criminal law, as our primary guide.  As a 
society, we assume that children are governed primarily in the family (and secondarily in 
schools, which in many countries parents have considerable discretion in choosing).  True, there 
are legal limits on parental authority, but by no means is that authority strictly defined by law.  
Arguably the most important function of the law in this domain is simply to ensure that every 
child is under the care and guidance of a minimally suitable guardian.  To expand our focus 
beyond the law, but to retain a focus on coercion, is also unsatisfactory.  Although parents do 
force their children to act against their will, the boundaries of what counts as “coercion” are not 
very clear beyond the paradigmatic cases of threats of violence and criminal sanctions.  
Moreover, there are important ways of restricting a person’s effective freedom other than 
coercing her in any straightforward sense, and many of these are particularly important for 
thinking about the freedom that children actually possess.10 
On my conception of paternalism, what is central is the idea of restrictions on, impediments 
to, or acts undermining, freedom of choice.  I will discuss the different kinds of restrictions and 
impediments below under four headings.  My strategy is to begin with some of the more literal 
                                                          
10 Since I am concerned with the morality of personal relations and informal social relations as well as legal 
institutions, my subject might be called “comprehensive liberalism.”  Political liberalism might be conceived as a 





and concrete forms of restricting a person’s freedom and move outward to the more peripheral 
and abstract forms.  The most straightforward restrictions are those that involve compulsion, 
coercion, and other threats.  These involve direct interference with a person’s agency.  Somewhat 
more subtle are cases that involve interference with the opportunities available to a person.  
Other restrictions on freedom are not best conceived of as physical impediments to liberty of 
action, but rather as normative restraints imposed by the exercise of authority.  Finally, there are 
cases of manipulation and deception, many of which involve undermining the conditions for 
autonomous freedom of choice.  Although the primary focus here is on forms of “restricting 
freedom” generally, I will often take the opportunity to apply these points to particular forms of 
paternalism, and especially to paternalism toward children. 
A corollary of this focus on freedom of choice is that restrictions on liberty that are 
themselves voluntarily chosen by the subject himself are not genuinely paternalistic.  To take a 
familiar example, suppose I know that I am prone to drink too much at parties, so I ask you now 
not to pour me any more than two drinks tonight, even if I ask for more.  Later on, when I ask for 
a third drink and you decline to give it to me, you are in a straightforward way limiting my 
current freedom to do what I want.  But, of course, you are doing so because of my prior express 
authorization.  We may call these cases of self-binding or pre-commitment (cf. Elster 1984; 
2000).  Cases with a similar structure can be found in many corners of life.   
In light of the phenomenon of pre-commitment, you might think that there could be no such 
thing as democratically enacted paternalistic laws, since any such restrictions on the freedom of 
citizens will have been consented to by the citizens.  If support for the law were indeed 





modern societies.  Moreover, paternalistic laws sometimes target a particular group of people, 
and were that group alone consulted, the law might not be enacted. 
A) Compulsion, coercion, and other threats 
The most straightforward kind of restriction on freedom is direct physical compulsion and 
restraint.  This is to restrict liberty in Hobbes’s literal sense of “external impediments to 
movement,” and it consists in literally overpowering a person’s will with opposing physical 
force.11   Mill gives a classic example of compulsive paternalism, in which an official or 
bystander sees a person “attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe” 
and seizes the person to prevent him from crossing it (OL: V, ¶ 5 / CW, XVIII: 294).  This kind 
of restraint is especially common with young children of course, as when parents prevent 
children from running out into the street.  More subtly, it is possible to “push” someone into 
doing something by constant and aggressive badgering and pestering.  Joel Feinberg tells the 
story of Steve Lewis, an ill-fated stuntman who was to appear on a dare-devil television show.  
Lewis’s intended feat was to leap over two cars as they drove toward him at one-hundred miles 
per hour.  “When the cameras began to roll, [Lewis] got cold feet, told the director he ‘didn’t feel 
comfortable,’ and asked for a postponement of the jump.”  The uncompromising director, 
however, screamed at Lewis, “I want you to jump now!  We have a plane to catch.  It’s getting 
dark…Wrap it up; wrap it up.  Jump!  Jump!”  Lewis was cowed, attempted the jump, but failed 
to entirely clear the oncoming cars.  He suffered serious injuries and his mangled foot had to be 
                                                          
11 “Liberty, or freedom, signifieth (properly) the absence of opposition; (by opposition I mean external Impediments 
to motion;) and may be applied no less to irrational, and inanimate creatures, than to rational.  For whatsoever is so 
tied, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of 
some external body, we say it hath not liberty to go further” (Lev: XXI.1).  To be sure, this is not the only way that 
Hobbes speaks of liberty, for later in the same chapter (XXI.4) he describes covenants and laws as “artificial chains” 





amputated.12  Although such “psychological compulsion” is seldom thought to violate a person’s 
legal rights, it is a common way of “forcing” someone to do something in personal relationships.  
Young children, who are emotionally vulnerable to their parents to a very high degree, are 
particularly susceptible to psychological compulsion.   
Besides direct compulsion, we also say that P forced Q to do something, when P gets Q to act 
by threatening Q.  The idea here is that Q is not “pulled” by the desirability of performing a 
particular action, but rather is “pushed” to do so in his desire to avoid the consequence that Q 
threatens to bring about.  Some threats, we say, are “coercive.”  Clear instances of coercion 
involve threats to employ violence and (by extension) criminal sanctions.  Paradigmatic of 
coercive legal paternalism are laws that require motorists to wear seatbelts and motorcyclists, 
helmets. 
Though there are these uncontroversial examples of coercive threats, it is not easy to 
delineate the families of coercive and non-coercive threats.  Some writers suggest that P coerces 
Q whenever P communicates to Q his intention to bring about a consequence that Q believes will 
leave him worse off unless Q performs some required action.13  But making all threats coercive 
seems inflationary and revisionary.  I find that very few people regard as coercive, for instance, 
an employee’s threat to quit unless she receives a raise, or a woman’s threat to leave her lover 
unless he stops drinking.  A second suggestion is that coercive threats are those where the 
consequences threatened are prima facie wrong to bring about.  The background picture here is 
something like this.  First we define the permissible actions for people to perform at will and 
                                                          
12 Feinberg (1986): 156, quoting the Arizona Daily Star, July 14, 1981. 
13 For this suggestion, see Nozick (1969); Raz (1986): 148-151; and, in an effort to apply the concept of coercion to 





without any special justification.  Call these actions a person’s “pure liberties.”  Generally, one is 
within one’s rights to perform a pure liberty, although it is not always the right thing to do.  That 
is, no one has any personal grievance against me when I act within the bounds of my pure 
liberties, although someone may blame me for acting badly or inappropriately.  On the other 
hand, to perform an act that does not belong to the set of pure liberties is prima facie wrong and 
does need special justification.  For instance, you may not ordinarily kick a person, but it may be 
justifiable to do so in self-defense.  This would seem to explain why threats in our above 
examples do not intuitively count as coercive: the consequences they threaten may permissibly 
be brought about at will and without any special justification.14   
If the above analysis is on the right track, however, then the concept of coercion seems to 
have only tangential relevance to the issue of paternalism.  This is because it is possible to apply 
threats and to pressure someone in ways that effectively restrict a person’s freedom for his own 
good without stepping beyond the boundaries of one’s pure liberties.  For instance, suppose the 
woman in our previous example is motivated primarily by a desire to prevent her lover from 
ruining himself, and that the best leverage she has for pressuring him (within her rights) is to 
threaten to leave him.  The lover may well feel cornered, and that he has been left with no 
palatable option but to commit himself to reforming his behavior.  There seems to be no problem 
with saying that the pressure that the woman applies in this case is paternalistic, even though 
most people would not judge it to rise to the level of coercion.  We may allow, however, that 
                                                          
14 The point, once again, is not that there are no moral rules that apply to P’s bringing about these consequences, but 
only that P (in some sense) “has a right” to bring these consequences about at will.  Doing so may nonetheless be 
inappropriate or blamable.  It is possible to be uncomfortable with extending this juridical notion of “having a right” 
beyond the law to more informal parts of morality.  It is worth observing, though, that the notion is not a recent 





(other things equal) coercive paternalism may set a higher bar for justification than non-coercive 
paternalism. 
Children, because they are relatively weak and dependent on adults, tend to be particularly 
vulnerable to threats, coercive or otherwise.  Just to give one example, a child who is 
economically dependent on his parents can be pressured and disciplined without resort to 
violence by threats to withhold an allowance or by withholding access to the things that money 
can buy.  In most cases where parental discipline is justified, it is at least partly paternalistic in 
character. 
B) Interference with opportunities 
Compulsion and coercion are the most direct ways of interfering with a person’s freedom.  In 
cases of compulsion, a person is physically (or perhaps psychologically) overpowered.  In cases 
of coercion, a person’s will is forced.  But it is also possible to reduce a person’s effective 
freedom by interfering with his opportunities in a more indirect or remote way.  These cases are 
particularly important with respect to paternalism, since efforts to promote someone’s well-being 
by directly interfering with his liberty, or by penalizing him, often do more harm than good.   
At the outset, we have to distinguish between intentionally interfering with a person’s options 
and doing so as a byproduct of some other act.  Many actions inadvertently restrict the options of 
others.  If Perkins buys the last glass of bourbon at the bar, then he has reduced the options 
available to the next patron, Quinsby (perhaps even foreseeably so), but since he does so as an 
unintended byproduct of his desire for a drink, it would be unusual to say that Perkins has 
interfered with or restricted Quinsby’s freedom—though of course there is a sense in which that 





bar and bought up all the bourbon just to prevent Quinsby from having any, then it would be 
natural to say that Perkins has interfered with Quinsby’s freedom.  We are interested only in 
cases of the latter sort here: cases where P deliberately restricts the freedom of Q by interfering 
with Q’s option set. 
Our treatment of children provides numerous examples of this kind of intentional 
manipulation of a person’s option set.  John Dewey, for instance, emphasized the centrality to 
education of controlling the influences and options in a child’s environment: 
The only way in which adults consciously control the kind of education which the 
immature get is by controlling the environment in which they act, and hence think and 
feel.  We never educate directly, but indirectly by means of the environment.  Whether 
we permit chance environments to do the work, or whether we design environments for 
the purpose makes a great difference.  And any environment is a chance environment so 
far as its educative influence is concerned unless it has been deliberately regulated with 
reference to its educative effect.  An intelligent home differs from an unintelligent one 
chiefly in that the habits of life and intercourse which prevail are chosen, or at least 
colored, by the thought of their bearing upon the development of children.  But schools 
remain, of course, the typical instance of environments framed with express reference to 
influencing the mental and moral disposition of their members (1916: 18-19). 
Such controlled environments have an interesting relationship to liberty.  By controlling the 
child’s environment, both in terms of what can influence the child, and the options available to 
the child, the adult clearly restricts the child’s freedom.  But in another sense, since his 
environment is controlled, the child may be allowed more liberty to act without direct 
interference, than he could be permitted in an uncontrolled environment. 
The same logic is relevant to paternalism toward adults.  Liberals can make social 
conservatism look absurd when the issue is framed around the question as to whether individuals 
should be forced, one-by-one, to lead good lives.  Surely the harm of punishment will far 





plausible versions of social conservatism take a more holistic view: they essentially extend 
Dewey’s notion of a controlled environment to society at large.  Punishment simply becomes one 
(and probably not the most important) of the tools for controlling a “moral ecology” conducive 
to soulcraft.  As Robert George sees it:  
[A]ll rational human beings are capable of understanding moral reasons; yet all require 
guidance, support, and assistance from others.  All are susceptible to moral failure, even 
serious moral failure; and all are capable of benefiting from a milieu which is more or 
less free from powerful inducements to vice.  All require freedom if they are to flourish; 
but unlimited freedom is the enemy, not the friend, of everyone’s well-being (1993: 40).   
One important way that coercion can be used to control a person’s opportunities is to 
penalize a second party for engaging in certain consensual transactions or activities with a 
person.  The wording of the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is a good example: 
It prohibited the “manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxicating liquors” within the United 
States.  It did not directly prohibit the consumption of alcohol, though of course its aim was 
plainly to remove the option of alcohol consumption.  In similar fashion, in order to protect 
minors from alcohol and tobacco, we might rely more on the punishment of vendors who sell 
those products to minors than on the direct punishment of the minors themselves.  If effective, 
this strategy would have the benefit of not punishing the same people we intend to protect.  
Another good example of this are those laws that limit or prohibit child labor.  These laws are 
paternalistic in arguably three respects.  First and most obviously, they prevent minors from 
consenting to possibly harmful or exploitative employment conditions.  Second, they discourage 
children from sacrificing their long-term interest in education for short-term profits.  Third, they 
lengthen the time minors are economically dependent on their parents.  This has the effect of 
enhancing parental power and authority over adolescents, who might be capable of economic 





accomplished by imposing penalties on employers and perhaps parents, rather than directly on 
children. 
Options usually have opportunity costs.  The higher the cost, the more the selection of that 
option restricts one’s subsequent freedom.  Therefore, another way to effectively restrict a 
person’s opportunity set is to impose extra costs on choosing certain options.  Indeed, Mill 
thought that policies that imposed extra costs on conduct were a kind of graduated prohibition, 
since “every increase in cost is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the 
augmented price” (OL: V, ¶ 9 / CW, XVIII: 298).  The most common method of imposing extra 
costs on activities is to levy special taxes on the purchase of relevant products or services.  A 
protective tariff is a non-paternalistic example of a tax meant to discourage certain choices, while 
a “sin tax” is the paternalistic variety.15  Sin taxes seem to be especially useful in discouraging 
minors from making certain market choices: for example, proponents of raising the tax on 
tobacco often point out that children and adolescents, having limited means, are particularly 
sensitive to price increases.   
Some ways of “manipulating” a person’s options do not really restrict freedom, and so they 
are not paternalistic on my conception—at least not paradigmatically so.16  For instance, instead 
of imposing extra costs on bad options, a government might subsidize or incentivize good 
options.  Someone might say that (like directly imposing extra costs on bad options) 
                                                          
15 True sin taxes are paternalistic, but they must be distinguished from two other kinds of tax.  First, some taxes are 
used to internalize externalities.  For instance, if smokers use more medical resources without paying for them, then 
a tax on tobacco to fund health care might internalize the costs smokers are imposing on others.  Second, luxury 
taxes are placed on non-essential products.  The idea is that it is fairer to raise money by taxing products that people 
buy with disposable income.  Of course, in practice, taxes may be intended to serve more than one of these purposes.   
16 We may allow that there is a more extended notion, where any kind of benevolent manipulation of options counts 
as paternalistic.  This extended form of paternalism is worthy of attention, but since these cases do not involve 





incentivizing good options effectively raises the price of the bad options vis-à-vis the good ones, 
and for this reason such incentives ought to be considered paternalistic.  On my view, the 
question is whether the government (or other party) has made any choices more costly in an 
absolute sense.  If the government has made certain choices less costly, then—by expanding the 
opportunity set—it has enhanced freedom, not restricted it.17  The main exceptions to this are 
cases where the subject has no realistic choices except those that the government (or other party) 
makes affordable.  People dependent on welfare services may be in this situation, as are 
economically dependent children with respect to their parents.  In cases of extreme dependency, 
such “incentives” may assume the character of “coercive offers,” since they cannot really be 
refused (cf. Feinberg 1986: ch. 24).  Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2008) propose an even 
subtler form of choice manipulation.  Since there are common circumstances in which ordinary 
people make predictably bad decisions according to their own better judgment, Sunstein and 
Thaler recommend that public and private institutions structure the menu of options in ways that 
will influence or “nudge” choosers to make better decisions as judged by those very choosers.  
For instance, rearrange the display of food available in a cafeteria without actually eliminating 
any options and you can (in the aggregate) encourage patrons to make healthier choices.  
Sunstein and Thaler call this “choice architecture.”  As they emphasize, this is “a relatively 
weak, soft, and nonintrusive type of paternalism because choices are not blocked, fenced off, or 
significantly burdened” (2008: 5).  They nonetheless think of it as paternalistic since choice 
architects are “self-consciously attempting to move people in directions that will make their lives 
better” (6).  Since the range of options is not actually restricted or burdened, this brand of 
                                                          
17 This, however, is to ignore the question as to where the government revenues for the subsidy come from.  Insofar 
as these revenues come from taxes on the very people whose behavior the subsidies are intended to affect, then the 





“libertarian paternalism” is so soft as to not really count as paternalistic at all on our conception.  
Choice architecture would come closest to counting as paternalistic on my terms if we came to 
suspect that choosers were not only being “nudged,” but that their standing preferences were 
being manipulated as well.  In this case it would be a form of manipulation which I discuss 
below. 
C) The exercise of authority 
When we think about a person’s freedom, we often think about what he has an opportunity to 
do without “physical” interference or impediment (or the threat thereof).  But we can also think 
about a person’s freedom from a normative or “rule-based” point of view:  What is a person 
authoritatively forbidden or prevented from doing (or disempowered from doing)?     
The most direct way that one party can exercise authority over another is by issuing 
commands.  A party issues a command when she instructs the subject to do something, expects 
compliance on the basis of that instruction, and regards the person as insubordinate if he acts 
otherwise.  Assuming the authority of the party issuing commands is valid, the subject is thereby 
under an obligation to obey, and we typically think of this as a restriction on the subject’s 
freedom, although it is not, of course, a physical restraint.  (Etymologically, to obligate is to bind 
someone to something.)  A person may be bound by many obligations, but be subject to few 
physical restraints, or vice versa.  In political theory, we don’t always bother to distinguish 
between the ways that our de jure liberty is limited by law and the way that our de facto liberty is 
limited by the coercive sanctions standing behind the law.  The distinction is more important 
when we think about parental authority, however, since that authority is often effective in 
controlling conduct without any direct appeal to sanctions.  Usually, children cannot simply cast 





recognizing it, since even the disobedient child will recognize the parent’s authority to discipline 
(at least, as long as he is not in open rebellion).  That is why parents can often “ground” their 
children on command without having to lock them away in the cellar or to station an armed 
guard outside the child’s bedroom.18   
Of course, someone may issue commands delicately or imperiously.  For instance, a parent 
may give a child the choice to do x or y, but the parent has nonetheless implicitly invoked her 
authority by determining the initial range of options.  Issuing a command does not preclude 
giving the reasons behind one’s decision to issue the command, and indeed, for parents it is often 
pedagogically important to do so.  If the person commanded is convinced on the basis of this 
explanation, then that is all the better, but it is nonetheless a command if the person is expected 
to obey even if he disagrees with the judgment of the person who issued the instruction.   
Not only may an authority permit or forbid certain acts, the authority may also affect an 
agent’s ability to act by conferring or withholding normative powers.19  This is probably clearest 
in formal systems of rules like the law.  For example, children are legally denied the powers to 
make binding contracts, to vote, to marry, and to consent to things like medical procedures and 
sexual intercourse.  Denying a person the use of such powers does not restrict a person’s “liberty 
of action” or “natural liberty” in a direct way, but it does restrict a person’s opportunity set by 
preventing him from altering his normative or legal relationship with others.  For example, if a 
                                                          
18 Obviously, parents guide their children in many ways other than issuing commands.  For instance, parents reason 
with their children, give them advice, and make requests.  All of these differ from issuing commands in that a child 
who ignores reason, advice, or request may be foolish, impertinent, or inconsiderate, but is not insubordinate.  
Consequently, parents are likely to continue to reason with their children, give them advice, and make requests of 
them even once they are mature.  But in our society at least, parents are much less likely to issue authoritative 
commands to their mature offspring.  





child cannot bind himself by contract, others are unlikely to engage in transactions with him 
where some assurance of performance is necessary.  Limitations on the freedom of contract 
routinely raise questions about legitimate paternalism.  For instance, should a person be able to 
contract into slavery?  What about a marriage contract without the possibility of divorce?20   
More subtly, the law might restrict one party’s freedom by authorizing or requiring a second 
party to restrict the first party’s freedom.  Again, this authority to assign powers and impose 
special duties is particularly important for thinking about children.  For example, the law gives 
parents broad discretion in disciplining children and in making decisions for them, and it 
requires parents to ensure that their children are educated, against the child’s will if necessary 
(these being powers and duties that adults do not typically have with respect to one another). 
D) Manipulation and deception: 
I come at last to cases of manipulation and deception, which are probably the least 
straightforward instances of restricting or interfering with a person’s freedom.  Manipulation is a 
loose term and it is difficult to characterize it precisely.  We have already discussed some things 
that are called manipulation, such as the removal of options from a person’s opportunity set or 
the imposition of extra costs on the selection of some options.  Here I am interested in a narrower 
sense of manipulation: roughly, cases where P tries to manufacture particular wants or intentions 
in Q in a non-rational way and without Q’s awareness that P is doing so.  Rousseau gives us a 
striking description of paternalistic manipulation in Emile: 
Let [your pupil] always believe he is the master, and let it always be you who are.  There 
is no subjection so perfect as that which keeps the appearance of freedom.  Thus the will 
                                                          






itself is made captive…. Doubtless he ought to do only what he wants; but he ought to 
want only what you want him to do (Bk. II, p. 120). 
To be sure, this is not a focal case of restricting a person’s freedom, since nothing is done 
against the child’s will.  However, we are inclined to say that insofar the tutor’s will controls the 
pupil’s will, the pupil is not really free either. The tutor seems to be undermining the pupil’s 
ability to form a will of his own (though this might be in the service of promoting the child’s 
future autonomy).  Although this is not exactly the same thing as restricting a person’s freedom, 
it bears enough of a family resemblance to it to warrant the extension of our concept of 
paternalism to cover manipulation of a person for his own good.  Another way of thinking about 
this is to compare manipulation to coercion.  Like coercion, manipulation is a way of subjecting 
one person to the will of another.  The difference is only that the subject of manipulation doesn’t 
recognize that he is subject to the will of another, but thinks he is acting freely.     
Paternalistic manipulation, as in the passage from Emile, may sound quite insidious, but at 
least in the case of children, it need not always be so.  Most people accept that a part of the 
parent’s role is encouraging the child to develop the right preferences and values, and this is 
certainly not always to be accomplished by the rational presentation of alternatives.  On the other 
hand, it is plain enough that adults often object to being manipulated, especially for their own 
good.   
Finally, there are cases of deception.  Many forms of deception are essentially species of 
manipulation and, therefore, can be understood as undermining autonomy in the same way.  In 
this category, we have Kant’s well-known example of the person who obtains a loan by making 
the lying promise that he will repay.  With this kind of example in mind, Christine Korsgaard 





The idea of deciding for yourself whether you will contribute to a given end can be 
represented as a decision whether to initiate that causal chain which constitutes your 
contribution.  Any action which prevents or diverts you from making this initiating 
decision is one that treats you as a mediate rather than a first cause; hence as a mere 
means, a thing, a tool.  Coercion and deception both do this.  And deception treats you as 
a mediate cause in a specific way: it treats your reason as a mediate cause.  The false 
promiser thinks: if I tell her I will pay her back next week, then she will choose to give 
me the money.  Your reason is worked, like a machine: the deceiver tries to determine 
what levers to pull to get the desired results from you.  Physical coercion treats 
someone’s person as a tool; lying treats someone’s reason as a tool.  This is why Kant 
finds it so horrifying; it is a direct violation of autonomy (Korsgaard 1996a: 141). 
This is a fine analysis of manipulative deception, but not all deception is geared toward getting 
someone to do something at all.  This is especially the case with paternalistic deception, where P 
gets Q to believe something that is false, because P believes that Q will be better off not knowing 
the truth.  Some such lies are simply told to spare a person from the ugly truth.  Sidgwick, for 
instance, suggests that no one “shrinks from telling fictions to children, on matters upon which it 
is thought well that they should not know the truth.”  He also mentions the sort of scenario now 
often debated by medical ethicists: telling someone in a critical medical condition a falsehood in 
order to conceal “facts that might produce a dangerous shock” (1907: 316).  Expanding on this 
kind of case, Bernard Gert and Charles Culver (1979) describe a woman seriously injured in a 
car accident, whose “very tenuous hold on life might be weakened by the shock of hearing of her 
children’s conditions.”  Since these forms of deception are not aimed at getting people to 
perform any action at all, they cannot be analyzed as ways of getting people to contribute to ends 
that they do not consent to.   
Does all deception nonetheless infringe upon or undermine a person’s autonomy—at least 
presumptively?  Arguably it does, although perhaps in a peripheral sense.  When P deceives Q, P 





a person’s ability “to use and interpret experience in his own way,” as Mill put it (OL: III, ¶ 3 / 
CW, XVIII: 262).  This is most obvious when Q is actively seeking the truth, for then P’s 
deception seems to block Q from attaining his aim.  P’s “interference” seems even more intrusive 
when the deceit has to do with what we understand to be Q’s own affairs (like Q’s health status 
or the safety of Q’s children).21  
∴ 
Having discussed the nuances of the conception that I will be relying on in the following, I 
can now offer a more careful definition of paternalism: 
P acts paternalistically toward Q if and only if P  
(a) intentionally restricts Q’s freedom of choice (or restricts the scope of Q’s freedom 
of choice, or undermines Q’s ability to freely form his own choice), 
(b)  without Q’s consent,  
(c) in order to promote (what P sincerely believes to be) Q’s good.  
For convenience, I will usually employ the simpler formulation—that P acts paternalistically 
toward Q if and only if P intentionally restricts Q’s freedom in order to promote Q’s good (or 
well-being)—but this more complete definition should be taken as read. 
1.5  The Liberal Outlook on Paternalism 
In the following chapters, we will be looking for a justification of the “Liberal Outlook,” 
which holds that paternalism, while generally objectionable, is appropriate when exercised 
toward children.  We now have in hand a conception of paternalism, but just what is “the Liberal 
                                                          
21 It may fairly be asked why I am interested in assimilating deception to interference with a person’s freedom at all.  
Is this not like the absurdly intellectualistic claim that torture is wrong because it interferes with a person’s 
autonomy to decide for himself which activities to participate in?  My claim is not that deception is wrong only 
because it constitutes a kind of interference with freedom.  My claim is that insofar as non-manipulative deception 
can be paternalistic, we may understand its paternalistic character as consisting in the fact that it impedes a person’s 





Outlook on paternalism”?  Earlier I invoked the staunch antipathy to paternalism of liberals like 
Kant and Mill.22  But many liberals today take a more tolerant view of paternalism than Mill and 
Kant did.  (Brian Barry calls it “the relatively trivial issue of so-called paternalism” much 
discussed “by Americans, who seem quite obsessed by it” [1995: 87]).  Fifty years ago H.L.A. 
Hart suggested that Mill’s hard-line anti-paternalism was a relic of a bygone, more optimistic 
era:  
Paternalism—the protection of people against themselves—is a perfectly coherent policy.  
Indeed, it seems very strange in the mid-twentieth century to insist upon this, for the 
wane of laissez faire since Mill’s day is one of the commonplaces of social history, and 
instances of paternalism now abound in our law, criminal and civil….In Chapter 5 of [On 
Liberty] Mill carried his protests against paternalism to lengths that may now appear to us 
fantastic.  He cites the example of restrictions of the sale of drugs, and criticizes them as 
interferences with the liberty of the would-be purchaser rather than with that of the seller.  
No doubt if we no longer sympathize with this criticism this is due, in part, to a general 
decline in the belief that individuals know their own interests best, and to an increased 
awareness of a great range of factors which diminish the significance to be attached to an 
apparently freed choice or to consent (1963: 31-32).23 
                                                          
22 Here a note on vocabulary may be welcome:  The word “paternalism” is not used by Locke or Mill, nor (of 
course) by Kant.  According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “paternalism” only enters the English language in 
1873.  We are therefore forced to ask: Did these writers really share our concept of paternalism?  Mill certainly did.  
In spite of lacking the word, his harm principle is largely designed to exclude restrictions of liberty for a person’s 
own good—something he repeatedly says is appropriate only with respect to children.  Locke’s principles of liberty 
and toleration have anti-paternalistic implications, but when he spoke of “paternal power,” he was literally 
concerned with the authority of fathers and the kings who posed as the fathers of their people.  With the exception of 
religious meddling, he was less concerned with the extensive and benevolent regulation of personal liberty that 
worried Mill—perhaps because that was primarily a nineteenth-century development.  Where Gregor translates Kant 
in “Theory and Practice” as speaking of a “paternalistic government” (8:290-291; see pp. 9-10 above), the German 
reads väterlich Regierung, and what he has in mind is probably (like Locke) not entirely figurative.  But Gregor’s 
translation is not misleading since Kant is speaking of an authority who treats his subjects benevolently, but without 
respect for their practical judgment.  Moreover, Kant’s moral philosophy, with its emphasis on autonomy, is 
strongly anti-paternalistic (in the modern sense).  In sum, anti-paternalism is an evolving trope in liberal thought.  
Whereas earlier writers were often literally criticizing attempts to base political power on the authority of fathers, 
later writers were more likely to use that image of a “paternal” government in a more figurative or rhetorical way to 
attack supposedly benevolently motivated forms of subordination and restrictions on freedom.   
23 The passage is from Hart’s debate with Patrick Devlin on the legal enforcement of morality.  The context is this: 
Devlin (1968) had argued that the fact that the victim’s consent is not a defense for a murder charge shows that the 
law is concerned, not only with the protection of individual rights, but with the enforcement of morality and the 






Although there are contemporary philosophers sympathetic to the hard anti-paternalism of Mill 
and Kant (many of whom write on paternalism),24 a fair number of prominent liberal 
philosophers share Hart’s perspective.25  Kwame Anthony Appiah captures this more tolerant 
liberal attitude to paternalism well: 
Most modern citizens are little worried by laws that take aim at self-regarding harm, so 
long as they do not interfere with our ability to make a life.  In the face of human 
irrationality, then, we have helmet laws and seatbelt laws, and we typically see them as 
enforcing rational behavior, not promoting any particular conception of the good (2005: 
160).   
In light of this divergence of opinion within the liberal camp, you might wonder whether there is 
really anything we can say in general about the Liberal Outlook on paternalism other than it 
would permit considerably more paternalism toward children than toward adults.  But that after 
all doesn’t seem to be an exclusively liberal perspective. 
In fact, at least three more generalizations can be made.  First, with respect to adults, liberals 
are generally more tolerant of paternalism that aims only at securing or protecting certain 
primary goods or basic interests that everyone (or nearly everyone) is presumed to want 
whatever else they want—that is, things like health, safety, and economic security.  Above I 
called this “non-moralistic” paternalism (1.3).  Liberals are usually quite intolerant, on the other 
hand, of “moral paternalism,” which would restrict an adult’s freedom to act in ways that are 
presumed to harm his moral character.  This is not limited to controversial ethical or religious 
conceptions; though liberals may believe it permissible to promote civic virtue in the adult 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
doctrine of legal paternalism (which prevents people from harming themselves) rather than legal moralism (which 
enforces positive morality).  
24 See especially Feinberg (1971; 1986); VanDeVeer (1980); Arneson (1980); and Shiffrin (2000).   





population, liberals are generally opposed to pursuing this by restricting or interfering with the 
freedom of adults.26    
Second, with respect to non-moralistic interests, the liberal is far more likely to accept 
measures aimed at preventing an adult from harming these interests than he is to accept measures 
aimed at conferring benefits on the person.  For instance, the liberal is more likely to accept 
paternalistic restraints intended to protect a person from serious injury or illness than he is to 
accept restraints intended to promote a high degree of healthiness.  Putting these last two points 
together, liberals typically only endorse what we have called “negative paternalism” toward 
adults (1.3). 
Third, insofar as the liberal accepts any paternalistic restraints on the freedom of adults, he 
will (as Appiah suggests) generally only accept those that are relatively non-intrusive and impose 
only minor inconveniences (like requiring drivers to wear seatbelts).  He is much more unlikely 
to accept any paternalistic interference that would require reshaping the individual’s everyday 
life or stand in his way of making major life choices (such as those about sexuality and marriage, 
career, or family).  This is connected with both of the previous points.  Other things equal, non-
moralistic paternalism seems less intrusive than moral paternalism, and harm-preventing 
paternalism seems generally less intrusive than benefit-conferring paternalism.  The liberal will 
also often object to forms of paternalism that are coercive and will usually object to those that 
undermine a person’s autonomy in a serious manner, like manipulation and deception, since 
these forms of paternalistic interference seem especially intrusive.  True, the liberal will probably 
be more tolerant of paternalism by one adult toward another in personal (especially intimate) 
                                                          
26 On liberal civic virtue, see Macedo (1990): esp. chs. 1 and 7 and Rawls (1993): 190-195.  On the education of 





relations than he will be of legal paternalism.  But that tolerance too is strictly limited.  This is 
particularly apparent if we compare modern individualistic social mores to those that prevailed in 
societies committed to hierarchical social orders.  This contrast is most visible when we look at 
points in history where the more individualistic social mores are just emerging.  Consider, for 
example, Gordon Wood’s description of the emergence of republican society in early America:   
The Revolution had represented an attack on patriarchal monarchy, and that attack began 
to ramify throughout the society.  In vain did conservatives complain that too many 
people had been captivated by ‘false ideas of liberty.’  By collapsing all the different 
dependencies in the society into either freemen or slaves, the Revolution made it 
increasingly impossible for white males to accept any dependent status whatsoever.  They 
were, as they told superiors who paternalistically tried to intervene in their private affairs, 
“free and independent” (2009: 345). 
Another way in which informal paternalism is limited in liberal societies is that many social 
mores are attached to roles that individuals (at least ostensibly) choose to fill.  For instance, a 
church congregation may monitor the private behavior of its members (although that too is rare 
today), but this is a community the individual has in at least some sense chosen to join. 
In the case of children, on the other hand, the Liberal Outlook accepts a much more radical 
and far-reaching paternalism.  He will likely accept that children’s freedom is properly restricted, 
not only to protect his basic interests, but his moral character as well.  Likewise, the liberal will 
surely accept paternalistic restraints aimed at promoting the child’s positive good, and not just 
those that attempt to prevent serious harms.  Putting these last two ideas together, the liberal will 
generally accept that the child’s freedom (quite unlike the adults) may be restricted for the 
purpose of improving the child’s moral character—what I called “perfectionism” above (1.3).  
Finally, the liberal accepts that paternalistic restraints on children quite routinely prevent them 





interferences that hardly affect the shape of the child’s everyday life, and it is certainly not the 
case that children choose their subordinate roles.   
We have now laid out the concept of paternalism and the outlines of the Liberal Outlook on 
paternalism.  Having put our ideas in order, we can move on in the next chapter to begin working 
toward an answer to our central question:  Why should there be a strong presumption, on the 
Liberal Outlook, against paternalism toward adults, but not against paternalism toward 
children?27 
                                                          
27 To be clear, I am not asking the much-discussed question as to whether infants and children can be rights-holders.  
I assume that they can be.  I am only interested in the grounds for denying children the right to exercise autonomy.  
Some, on the other hand, think that children cannot have rights at all, since they think that rights always protect the 
power to make choices and that children cannot make choices.  See for instance Sumner (1987) and Griffin (2002).  
For the argument that, because young children obviously have rights, rights cannot be analyzed as protecting 





CHAPTER 2:  WELFARISM AND PATERNALISM 
2.1  Introduction:  The Welfarist and Sovereignty Approaches 
To treat someone paternalistically is (in the central cases) to restrict that person’s freedom, 
or to undermine his capacity or opportunity for free choice, for his own good (1.1-4).  The 
Liberal Outlook tends to be wary of paternalism toward adults, but accepting of rather extensive 
paternalism toward children (that is, all those we consider “minors”) (1.5).1 Assuming 
provisionally that the Liberal Outlook is substantially correct, what justifies it?  Why should 
there be a strong presumption in practice against paternalism toward adults, but not against 
paternalism toward children?2  What is the morally relevant difference—or differences—
between adults and children that accounts for this difference in treatment?  Answering this 
question will shed light, not only on the issue of paternalism, but also on the philosophical basis 
of freedom more generally.  Furthermore, our answer will give us a perspective from which to 
address some contested practical questions, such as when and in what respects we ought to treat 
young people, especially adolescents, like adults.  Of course, we may also find out that the 
Liberal Outlook is groundless, or at least misguided in some ways; by taking the Liberal Outlook 
as our point of departure, we do not foreclose those conclusions. 
                                                          
1 It may be that what I have called the “Liberal Outlook” on paternalism is far more widespread than its name 
suggests.  No doubt it is true that all cultures treat children more paternalistically than adults.  Central to the Liberal 
Outlook, however, is a somewhat stronger claim:  Paternalism toward adults (i.e., toward men and women of all 
social stations) is generally objectionable. 
2 I say “in practice” so as not to foreclose the possibility that the reasons for treating adults and children 





A good place to begin is simply by asking what it is that ever makes paternalism 
objectionable at all.  Indeed, if the paternalist sincerely acts to promote the subject’s good, what 
could be wrong with that?  Certainly it is not wrong in the same way that many acts are wrong:  
by pursing one’s own good at the expense of someone else.  There are two important approaches 
to answering this question. 
Before I explain the first approach, let me introduce a bit of terminology.  Let us distinguish 
between the paternalist’s formal aim and his substantive aim.  His formal aim is to promote the 
subject’s good or well-being,3 while his substantive aim is a thicker description of the sense in 
which the subject’s well-being is to be promoted.  By definition, all paternalists (indeed, 
everyone acting out of benevolence) share the same formal aim.  Someone who didn’t care about 
promoting the subject’s true good or well-being, whatever that is, is not acting paternalistically.  
But paternalists will often differ in their substantive aims, in that they differ in their 
understanding of what the subject’s well-being really consists in.  For instance, you and I may 
both wish to promote Quinsby’s well-being paternalistically, but your substantive aim may be to 
improve his mood, while mine may be to enhance his ability to do what he wants in the future.   
The first approach to justifying the Liberal Outlook accepts, at least for the sake of argument, 
the propriety of the paternalist’s formal aim:  to do what will promote the subject’s well-being.  
What is objectionable are cases in which the paternalist fails to accomplish this formal aim.  This 
could happen in two ways.  It could be that the paternalist is employing ineffective or 
                                                          
3 Henceforth, I will assume that Q’s well-being and Q’s good are equivalent expressions.  At 1.3 I observe that this 
may not always be true, in which case it is better to define paternalism in the more abstract terms of the subject’s 





counterproductive means in promoting his substantive end (or will tend to do so as a rule).4  Or it 
could be that, while the paternalist will succeed in accomplishing his substantive aim, he has the 
wrong conception of what the subject’s good really consists in; thus, in accomplishing his 
substantive aim, he fails to accomplish his formal aim (to promote the actual good of the 
subject).  To use the terminology I introduced in Chapter 1, what makes paternalism 
objectionable in these cases is that it is “imperfect.”5  Because these arguments ultimately turn on 
whether or not the subject’s well-being is actually promoted (or will tend to be so as a rule), let 
us call them “welfarist” arguments and this the welfarist approach (without implying that such 
arguments appeal to subjective welfare, or “utility,” rather than to a more objective conception of 
well-being).  Because the welfarist approach accepts the paternalist’s formal aim, explaining why 
paternalism toward children is appropriate seems straightforward.  The challenge is to explain 
why paternalism toward adults is often objectionable and, then, why these considerations do not 
also apply to children. 
The second approach holds that paternalism is (at least pro tanto) objectionable in principle 
because it fails to respect the subject’s right to freedom or autonomy in matters that affect only, 
or chiefly, the subject himself.6  On this view, the point is not that the right to freedom or 
autonomy is an element of, or in any way furthers, the subject’s well-being, but simply that the 
                                                          
4 That is, someone may object to paternalistic conduct on an act or on a rule basis.  I shall not always add this 
qualification, but it should be taken as read throughout.     
5 Perfect cases of paternalism, recall, are those in which the paternalist’s intervention actually promotes the subject’s 
genuine good.  Imperfect cases of paternalism are those in which the paternalist intends to promote the subject’s 
good, but fails to actually do so because he has the wrong idea of what the subject’s good really consists in and/or 
because he employs ineffective means (see 1.2).   
6 Some people object that there are virtually no actions that a person commits which affect only himself.  “No man is 
an island,” is their slogan.  Be that as it may, justifying a restriction on someone’s freedom because of the effects on 
others is not a paternalistic argument.  I shall not discuss the problem of the impact on others of largely self-





subject has, or should have, a kind of sovereign control over his own choices and life.  Kant 
refers to this condition of independence from the constraint of another’s choices as that of being 
“one’s own master” (MM: 6:237-238).  I will call this the “sovereignty approach” (cf. Feinberg 
1986: 47-51; Ripstein 2006).  Explaining why paternalism toward adults is often objectionable is 
straightforward on the sovereignty approach.  The difficulty for this view is in explaining 
intuitively permissible cases of paternalism—and given our interests, paternalism toward 
children in particular.7  I will discuss the sovereignty approach in more detail in Chapter 4. 
How do the welfarist and sovereignty approaches relate to one another?  Some philosophers 
are “welfarists” in that they want all moral arguments to ultimately appeal to considerations of 
well-being.  This is a common view in the utilitarian tradition as well as in certain strands of 
Aristotelian “eudaimonism.”  Philosophers who tack in exactly the opposite direction and never 
want to appeal to “well-being” in moral argument are less common.  But the welfarist and 
sovereignty approaches are not necessarily incompatible, and a pluralist might appeal to both 
kinds of argument.  On one brand of pluralism, sovereignty trumps welfarist considerations,8 
while on a more moderate view, welfarist considerations may sometimes override personal 
                                                          
7 The sovereignty approach may seem to be “deontological,” while the welfarist approach, “consequentialist.”  If 
consequentialism is defined narrowly (i.e., in the traditional way) such that only the consequences of actions are of 
intrinsic value (e.g., effects on well-being), as opposed to the performance of actions as such (e.g., lying, killing, or 
interference with autonomy), then this would be accurate.  But it is common now to define consequentialism 
broadly, so that all that it means is that we all have the same (agent-neutral) ultimate moral aim, which is to promote 
the best state of affairs in the world.  On the expansive notion of consequentialism, one thing that could make the 
state of affairs better or worse is the performance of certain kinds of intrinsically good and bad actions.  So 
understood, the only thing that consequentialism rules out are “agent-relative” restrictions: e.g., the duty not to kill, 
even if by doing so you would prevent more killing (Scheffler 1982).  On this broad rendering, the sovereignty 
approach is consistent with consequentialism.  In short, then, the much-debated question about agent-neutral versus 
agent-relative duties is orthogonal to the question at issue between the sovereignty and welfarist approaches.   





sovereignty, especially in cases where the costs in well-being are very great.9  Another 
alternative (familiar from rule-consequentialism) is to defend a two-stage theory, in which there 
is a right to personal sovereignty that trumps welfarist considerations in ordinary circumstances, 
but where that right is ultimately justified on welfarist grounds.  Different versions of the two-
stage approach allow the strength of the trump to vary.  Mill’s On Liberty, for existence, tries to 
defend a very strong right to personal sovereignty on utilitarian grounds.  Finally, it is possible to 
“embed” the right of personal sovereignty as an ideal element in a conception of well-being.  In 
contrast to the two-stage approach, in which the value of sovereignty is ultimately reducible to 
considerations of well-being (where well-being is independently defined), the embedding 
approach makes personal sovereignty an irreducible component of well-being, such that well-
being cannot be fully defined without invoking the idea of personal sovereignty.  On this view, a 
person’s life goes worse ipso facto if his sovereignty is infringed, even if it doesn’t have any 
further harmful consequences.  Again, various versions of this approach can differ in giving 
different weights to the right of personal sovereignty as a component of well-being.  I am 
inclined to think that pluralistic approaches and embedding approaches are ultimately inter-
translatable and are not really different in substance.  Because a person’s good is not defined 
independently of his rights on the embedding approach, I will not consider it to be a pure form of 
the welfarist approach.  
The central argument that I will make in Chapter 5 for the Liberal Outlook on Paternalism 
belongs to the sovereignty approach.  In this chapter and the next, however, I want to explore the 
                                                          
9 Since welfarist considerations are almost always in play, one cannot easily maintain both that sovereignty is an 
important value and that welfarist considerations trump sovereignty.  In theory, one could say that sovereignty only 
matters as a “tie-breaker” when the welfarist considerations for two courses of action are on a par, but I have never 





welfarist approach to justifying the Liberal Outlook.  There are three reasons for doing so.  First, 
the arguments are of interest in their own right, and the best of them seem to be a part of the best 
overall pluralist view.  Second, a discussion of the welfarist arguments helps to bring the 
sovereignty approach into sharper focus.  The third reason is the most critical however:  
Ultimately I think that even the best welfarist arguments fall short of justifying the Liberal 
Outlook on Paternalism.  In holding this opinion, of course, I am not alone.  But most writers 
inclined to what I have called the sovereignty approach dismiss welfarist views in a very 
peremptory way, often suggesting that welfarism is limited to something like Benthamite 
utilitarianism.  But the range of welfarist views is far richer than this allows, so I have tried to do 
justice to some of these more complex forms of welfarist argument in this chapter and the next.  
Finally, let me say that because most welfarist arguments depend on difficult-to-ascertain 
empirical claims, there is something unsatisfying about the resolution of some of the discussions 
that follow.  For instance, to what extent is it true that adults tend to be the best judges of where 
their own good lies?  We can list considerations on both sides of the question, but to give a 
determinate final answer is extremely difficult.  In many cases, then, I have had to rest content in 
showing why welfarist arguments are weaker or more doubtful than they are often presented to 
be.   
2.2  Conceptions of Well-Being 
The extent to which “perfect” paternalism (i.e., effective and not-misguided paternalism) is 
possible depends a great deal on what well-being actually consists in.  It will facilitate our 
subsequent discussion to lay out the main kinds of theory at the outset.  I shall understand a 





benefits that person.10  I would endorse Stephen Darwall’s suggestion that a good way to get a 
handle on the formal concept is to approach it from the third-person perspective:  a person’s 
well-being is what we should want for a person insofar as we care about his good for his own 
sake (2002: esp. 11-12).  It is common to divide up substantive conceptions of well-being into 
three main categories—mental state accounts, desire-fulfillment accounts, and objective (or 
“objective list”) accounts—and I shall employ that taxonomy as well (cf. Parfit 1984: Appendix 
I; Griffin 1986: chs. 1-4).     
A)  Mental state accounts 
A perennially attractive view about well-being is that it consists in “happiness,” where that is 
understood as a positive mental state.  The view is probably best-known to us from the classical 
utilitarians, for whom happiness was understood hedonistically as “pleasure and the absence of 
pain” (Mill, Utilitarianism, II, ¶ 2 / CW, X: 210).  One potential problem with this account is that 
it is hard to believe that everything that is good for us can really be described as pleasurable, 
without stretching the meaning of that word beyond all recognition.  James Griffin gives the 
example of Freud, who in his last days refused powerful narcotics to allay the pain of his mouth 
cancer:  “ ‘I prefer,’ he said, ‘to think in torment than not to be able to think clearly’” (1986: 8).  
It is hard to describe Freud in this case as preferring what is more pleasurable.  There are two 
ways of trying to deal with this objection within the framework of a mental state account.  One 
could try to say that what is good is not a “first-order” sensation, but a “second-order” felt 
quality that is characteristic of all good experiences, namely the second-order quale of 
enjoyment.  As Roger Crisp puts it,  “Eating, reading, and working … are very different from one 
                                                          





another.  But if you experience each, I may ask you:  ‘Did you enjoy those activities?  …  Did 
your experiences in each case have the same felt property—that of being enjoyable?’” (2006: 
103-111).  The other response, sometimes called “preference hedonism,” is to say (with 
Sidgwick) that what makes a mental state good for someone is that he desires it.11  On this 
second response, it is not a felt-quality that makes experiences good, but the “external” 
contribution of desire.      
B)  Desire-fulfillment accounts 
An alternative conception of well-being is to retain the focus on desire, as in preference 
hedonism, but then to reject the idea that we only desire certain mental states.  On this view, my 
well-being is to be equated with the actual fulfillment of my desires in the world—a view 
advocated by many twentieth-century utilitarians and those coming out of that tradition.  One 
reason for adopting a desire-fulfillment account over preference hedonism is simply that we 
seem to want things other than mental states.  I don’t just want to believe that I am loved, 
respected, and that I have achieved valuable things; I really want the world to be such that I am 
loved and respected and that I have achieved things of value.12  In one regard, then, desire-
fulfillment views are “less subjective” than mental state views: that is, my well-being is not 
understood simply as a subjective mental state, but rather as an objective state of the world.  In 
another regard, however, desire-fulfillment views are “more subjective” than mental state 
accounts (at least on hedonistic versions), since what my good is on the desire-fulfillment 
                                                          
11 Sidgwick (1907): 127-129; cf. also Parfit (1984): 493-494 and Griffin (1986): 9-10. 






account actually depends on what I happen to want.13  Thus, whether or not pleasure is my good 
depends on whether pleasure is what I desire.  In virtue of this, desire-fulfillment accounts may 
be “more subjective” than hedonistic accounts in a still further sense as well.  It is open to 
someone who holds a hedonistic account of well-being to hold rather narrow views about what 
will actually make people happy (Epicurus is an example), but that kind of monism about the 
good life is less plausible on a desire-fulfillment account. 
Is it the satisfaction of all of my desires that contributes to my well-being, or is it only the 
satisfaction of some restricted set of them?  There are three issues that I will discuss in more 
detail in 3.4, since they are relevant to the issue of paternalism: (1) whether my desires can be 
mistaken?; (2) whether every local desire should count, or only my more global desires?; and (3) 
whether future desires should count, or only my present desires?  A fourth problem is worth brief 
mention here:  Mental state accounts of well-being, as I said, can seem too narrow, since we 
seem to care about more than our own experiences.  But unrestricted desire-fulfillment accounts 
seem too broad.  Our desires spread themselves very broadly across the world and through time.  
Surely all of them do not impinge on our well-being.  Parfit gives the example of learning that a 
stranger I have met on a train has a serious disease.  I may have a strong desire that this stranger 
be cured.  Now suppose that years later, unbeknownst to me, the stranger is cured.  Has my life 
just improved?  That is hard to believe.  The problem is not just that I never know whether the 
stranger is cured or not.  Many people feel that, for example, the life of a woman who never 
knew that her husband kept a second family would be worse than she thought it was.  Nor is the 
                                                          
13 However, hedonism can do some justice to the idea that the subject determines his own good, in that it may be 
held that enjoyment is closely connected to what we want.  That is to say that I am unlikely to enjoy something 
unless I also desire it.  The close connection between enjoyment and desire suggests that the practical (as opposed to 
theoretical) difference between hedonism and desire-fulfillment theories is likely to emerge mainly in peripheral 





issue that the lives of others cannot impinge upon my well-being.  A parent’s life is typically 
made better or worse by the good or bad fortunes of her children.  The problem with the 
stranger-on-the-train example is that this person is never properly integrated into my life for his 
fortunes to really affect my well-being on any intuitive conception of what that involves.  To fix 
this problem, some writers suggest that we restrict those desires that impinge on our well-being 
to those that are “about our own lives” (Parfit 1984: 494).  That does not mean that my well-
being must be sharply demarcated from the lives of others, and there will be plenty of hard cases 
where it is difficult to say whether or not a desire is really about one’s own life or not.  But that 
vagueness is arguably true to reality: the boundaries of individual well-being are fuzzy and 
overlap more-or-less with that of others, depending on how closely their lives are integrated in 
my own. 
C)  Objective accounts 
Some philosophers say (with Aristotle) that it is a mistake to think that something is good for 
us because it is desired; rather, they say that when something is valuable or good, then that gives 
us a reason to desire it.14  We should attend, therefore, to what is objectively good (or bad) for 
people independently of their desires (and independently of what happens to put them in a 
particular mental state).  The simplest objective accounts of well-being are monistic.  A monistic 
theory might hold, for example, that the only good for human beings is submission to God, moral 
virtue, the perfection of human potential, or self-actualization, etc.15  More common today are 
                                                          
14 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1072a: “desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire.”  For contemporary 
views of this sort, see Finnis (1980): 69-73; Raz (1986): 137-145; Scanlon (1998): ch. 1. 
15 The only position familiar to me in the contemporary philosophical literature which comes close to being a 
monistic objective account of well-being is Hurka (1993).  Hurka argues that the human good is the development of 






pluralistic views.  Pluralistic conceptions maintain that a good life involves engagement with 
several different objective goods, which may vary depending upon the individual’s particular 
constitution.  Such goods may include self-determination, achievement, knowledge, friendship, 
aesthetic appreciation, and so on.  Pluralistic conceptions may also include “subjective” elements 
from our previous two accounts like desire-satisfaction, the absence of pain, happiness, and so on 
(Parfit 1984: Appendix I).  A strongly objective theory holds that people’s lives are better as long 
as they incorporate what is objectively valuable, whether people care about these objective 
values or not.  A more moderate version holds that (perhaps with the exception of biological 
needs) nothing can benefit a person unless that person endorses it as good.  For instance, even if 
having strong families ties were objectively valuable, it would not be good for someone who did 
not value them.  (I shall have considerably more to say about this in my discussion of the 
endorsement thesis at 3.2-3).   
Objective accounts seem to be committed to a “realist” account of value.  But we can get 
something very much like an objective account of well-being from a “quasi-realist” value theory.  
It may be held, for example, that value is the property something has when a person desires to 
desire it in ideal circumstances, e.g., with full imaginative acquaintance, full information, etc.  It 
may further be maintained that, in ideal circumstances, many things would be valued by 
everyone.  These, then, are quasi-objective values.16  This kind of quasi-objective account rather 
straddles the distinction between desire-fulfillment and objective accounts of well-being.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
claims that his is a theory of the good life, he denies that it is a theory of well-being.  For him, perfection of human 
potential is simply good; it is not good because it is good for the individual whose potential is perfected.)    





2.3  Two Atypical Arguments 
The main strategy of the welfarist approach is to argue that paternalism, though not 
impermissible in principle, tends to be counterproductive or ineffective in practice, at least with 
respect to ordinary adults.  But before I turn to the typical welfarist arguments, allow me to 
briefly discuss two atypical arguments against paternalism toward adults, both of which are in 
the welfarist spirit, but which do not perfectly fit my characterization of the main welfarist 
strategy.  These are what I call the “argument from distrust” and the “social benefit argument.”  
We find both of these arguments in Mill, but neither is much discussed in the contemporary 
philosophical literature on paternalism.  
A) The argument from distrust 
One argument simply casts doubt on the notion that sincere paternalism is a very common 
phenomenon at all outside philosophical discussions, but observes that pure domination and 
oppression are often cloaked in paternalistic cant.  For this reason, it is best to adopt institutions 
and rules that put each person in control of her own affairs and which rule out paternalism except 
(perhaps) in narrowly circumscribed cases.  Mill is well-known for having argued in On Liberty 
that each person is generally the best judge of his own interests, but it is less often noticed that in 
the same paragraph he also insists that each individual is generally “the person most interested in 
his own well-being” (IV.4).  And in The Subjection of Women he warns us to remember the 
“gratification of pride there is in power” and the “personal interest in its exercise” (I.8).  “It 
would be tiresome,” he writes in the same work, “to repeat the commonplaces about the 
unfitness of men in general for power” (II.4).  At first, it might seem as if this is a consideration 
of more importance for politics and law than for personal ethics.  But Mill insists that the danger 





over those who are nearest to him, with whom his life is passed, with whom he has most 
concerns in common, and in whom any independence of his authority is oftenest likely to 
interfere with his individual preferences” (SW: I, ¶ 8 / CW, XXI: 268).  Attacking paternalistic 
justifications for the subjection of women to men, he writes,  
Whether the institution to be defended is slavery, political absolutism, or the absolutism 
of the head of a family, we are always expected to judge it from its best instances; and we 
are presented with pictures of loving exercise of authority on one side, loving submission 
on the other—superior wisdom ordering all things for the greatest good of the 
dependents, and surrounded by their smiles and benedictions…. [But] laws and 
institutions require to be adapted, not to good men, but to bad (SW: II, ¶ 3; CW, XXI: 
287). 
If children, on the other hand, are to be entrusted to the authority of their parents, it is only 
because children are almost completely incapable of advancing their own interests and because 
ordinarily parents have a natural sympathy with the well-being of their children. 
The argument from distrust is an instance of what has been called “the liberalism of fear”—
the position that maintains that the best defense of liberalism does not rest on particularly deep 
philosophical foundations, but simply on the historical experience of what happens when power 
is not limited (Shklar 1989).  The argument is not a paradigmatic version of the welfarist 
approach as I characterized it above, since it does not show that cases of sincere paternalism, 
taken by themselves, tend to be ineffective or counterproductive.  Rather, it maintains that 
permitting paternalism toward adults is harmful overall because it opens the door to insincere 
paternalism.  It is, thus, a sort of rule-consequentialist argument:  it does not say that subjects of 
sincere paternalism are necessarily worse off for allowing paternalism toward adults, but that 





Certainly, the argument from distrust cannot be dismissed lightly.  No doubt paternalistic 
justifications are the most common rationalizations of oppressive institutions.  What better way 
to justify depriving another of power or control over her own affairs than to allege that it is for 
her own good?  On the other hand, it is difficult to evaluate the force of this argument in the 
abstract.  First of all, parents can also act insincerely, but we do not condemn parental 
paternalism for that reason.17  Moreover, insincerity is a pervasive problem with the exercise of 
power and not in the least limited to the issue of paternalism.  The same argument—that we 
ought to assume that those who will wield power will have bad intentions—is often leveled 
against the centralization of state power necessary for alleviating poverty or implementing social 
justice (cf. Hayek 1944: chs. 7, 10).  Finally, the argument is most convincing, not when we are 
talking about particular paternalistic limitations on freedom of choice, but rather with respect to 
wholesale subordination and disenfranchisement of groups of people (which is what Mill is 
specifically arguing against in The Subjection of Women and Representative Government).  It 
would seem, therefore, that while it would be foolhardy to dismiss the argument from distrust 
entirely, it would also be rash to accord it too much weight preemptively and in the abstract.      
B)  The social-benefit argument 
Another way to argue for the Liberal Outlook on Paternalism is to appeal to the wider social 
benefits arising from it.  That is, we are all better off for not interfering paternalistically in 
others’ lives, since a free society fosters experiments in living by which new and valuable life-
                                                          
17 Indeed, in the Principles of Political Economy, Mill writes: “Parental power is as susceptible of abuse as any other 
power, and is, as a matter of fact, constantly abused.  If laws do not succeed in preventing parents from brutally ill-
treating, and even from murdering their children, far less ought it to be presumed that the interests of children will 
never be sacrificed, in more commonplace and revolting ways, to the selfishness or the ignorance of their parents” 





practices are discovered.  Thus, the costs borne by those allowed to harm themselves are 
outweighed by the benefits to all from having new forms of life continually added to the fund of 
human experience (Mill, OL: III, esp. ¶ 10ff. / CW, XVIII: 267ff.).  However, since children have 
not yet learned from their predecessors’ experiences, their own experiments are less likely to 
avoid past pitfalls and contribute innovations.  By limiting the child’s freedom, we preserve for 
him his liberty as an adult, which is more likely to be used to increase our understanding of the 
good life.   
Although this argument appeals to the well-being of people in society generally, it does not 
appeal directly to the subject’s well-being.  It does not maintain that paternalism tends to fail in 
accomplishing its formal aim, but that even accomplishing it brings in train social costs that 
outweigh the benefit for the subject.  For that reason, the social-benefit argument does not quite 
fit my characterization of the “welfarist approach” to justifying the Liberal Outlook either.  
Standing alone, the argument also seems odd since the individual’s claim to liberty is traced to 
the interests of society, rather than to those of the individual.  This might seem like the wrong 
kind of reason, since it fails to account for the sense of personal resentment that people often feel 
when subjected to what they feel is unwarranted paternalism.  The argument might even seem to 
condone an injustice, in that the individual’s well-being is apparently sacrificed for that of the 
good of the wider community.18   
                                                          
18 However, from an historical perspective, it is probably better to look at this argument in a different light.  The 
great task for early liberalism was to show that individual liberty was not at odds with the public good, as was 
commonly assumed.  The social benefit argument is therefore aimed at showing that individual liberty is congruent 
with the public good.  By contrast, pure paternalism, which justifies restraints solely in terms of the subject’s own 
good, is really a very individualistic doctrine.  Indeed, once you have tried to justify conduct on paternalistic 





Moreover, while the general proposition that a free society is conducive to social innovation 
and progress is plausible, it seems like an exaggeration to maintain that this establishes a strong 
presumption against paternalism toward adults.  True, where some activity is largely untried and 
the outcome uncertain, human experience stands to gain from permissiveness.  But what of 
things which, in Mill’s own words, “have been tried and condemned from the beginning of the 
world until now; things which experience has shown not to be useful or suitable to any person’s 
individuality”?  Surely, as Mill anticipates, there “must be some length of time and amount of 
experience, after which a moral and prudential truth may be regarded as established,” and when 
common human sympathy requires preventing “generation after generation from falling over the 
same precipice which has been fatal to their predecessors” (OL: IV, ¶ 9 / CW, XVIII: 281).  The 
argument must be allowed to cut both ways, for and against liberty, as experience warrants.  
Mill’s only response is that society benefits from having the bad consequences of unwise 
conduct always in view to discourage imitation.  But whether imitation can better be discouraged 
through example or interference is an empirical question, and it is hard to see why the former 
should always cause the least suffering. 
2.4  Typical Welfarist Arguments:  Looking for Asymmetries 
On the typical welfarist approach, paternalism is objectionable insofar as the paternalist fails 
to accomplish his formal aim of promoting the subject’s good (or insofar as acts of that kind will 
tend to fail as a rule).  That there are such cases of failure is hardly surprising, since a person 
might well fail to promote his own well-being as well.  Indeed, it is a quite general fact about 
action that we sometimes fail to achieve our aims.  Therefore, if welfarist considerations are to 





range of cases concerning adults, but to a much lesser degree in cases concerning children, there 
is an asymmetry between P’s attempts to promote Q’s well-being (without Q’s consent or 
cooperation) and Q’s own attempts to do so.19  I shall discuss three kinds of argument for 
establishing that asymmetry in this chapter and the next.  Of course, many writers appeal to more 
than one argument or make a case that incorporates elements of multiple types. 
The most familiar argument tries to locate an epistemic asymmetry:  each person, it is said, 
typically knows where his own good lies better than anyone else does (2.5).  The second type of 
argument points not so much to the nature of well-being itself, but rather to one of its central 
elements, namely to personal autonomy.  Insofar as autonomy is a central element of well-being, 
it would seem to be difficult for others to promote a person’s well-being by infringing his 
autonomy (2.6).  The remainder of this chapter is devoted to exploring these two arguments.         
The third type of argument, which I explore in the next chapter, claims that the very nature of 
well-being makes it difficult for others to benefit adults paternalistically (3.1).  I will focus on 
two versions of this type of argument.  On one version, it is assumed that well-being consists in 
the participation in objectively valuable activities and relationships, but it is maintained that 
nothing can intrinsically benefit a person without his endorsement (3.2-3).  The second version is 
more radical: denying that any activity or relationship is objectively valuable, it maintains that 
nothing is intrinsically good for someone unless he desires it (3.4).  On both versions, the 
conclusion is the same: a person’s well-being is ultimately up to him, in that his well-being 
                                                          
19 Philosophers disagree as to whether people commonly aim to promote their well-being.  Scanlon (1998): ch. 3 and 
Raz (2004) think we seldom do, while Crisp (2006) takes the more traditional line that it is a common motive.  
Whether or not we aim to promote our own well-being, however, we do often aim to do things that have the 
consequence of actually promoting our well-being (even if that is not description of the consequence that features in 





depends on what he endorses or on what he desires.  Others typically cannot promote his well-
being without engaging his endorsement or desires, which usually means that they cannot 
promote his well-being without his consent.  And where there is consent, of course, there is no 
paternalistic interference (see 1.4).   
2.5  The Epistemic Argument 
We turn now to the first, and the most common, of the typical welfarist arguments for the 
Liberal Outlook.  The claim is that, unlike children, adults can generally be assumed to be the 
best judges of where their own good lies.  This is because adults have greater powers of reason 
and more experience of the world and of themselves than children do.  This is another of the 
arguments that Mill marshals in On Liberty.  As he puts it, “with respect to his own feelings and 
circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably 
surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else.”  Attempts to improve another person’s 
well-being—a person “of ripe years”—by ignoring or overriding his will have the tendency to 
interfere “wrongly and in the wrong place” (OL: IV, ¶¶ 4, 12 / CW, XVIII: 277, 283).  But 
because children lack both these powers of reason and this measure of knowledge, because they 
have not yet reached “the maturity of their faculties,” they are less competent to judge where 
their own best interests lie.  Thus, children will be better off if we put final authority for the 
protection and advancement of their interests in the hands of parents and other adults (OL: I, ¶ 
10; III, ¶ 3 / CW, XVIII: 224, 262). 
The epistemic argument is probably on the strongest ground if you assume a subjective 
conception of well-being, for then there is nothing to a person’s good beyond her own 





epistemic access to these facts about herself.  The argument is not without weight, however, on 
objective conceptions of well-being.  At least this is so if we assume both value pluralism and 
individual diversity: that is, that there are many different valuable activities and that there are 
ways of life which suit different individuals depending on their own particular personalities, 
characters, and internal constitutions.  In that case, the individual himself might well be 
presumed to be best placed to know which goods will and won’t suit him.20   
The usual objection to the epistemic argument is that it would actually permit more 
paternalistic interference than liberals like Mill suppose.21  People can, after all, have false 
beliefs about themselves.  And individuals can certainly have false beliefs about what will make 
them happy in the future or what they will desire in the future.  There is nothing unusual in 
hearing someone say something like, “I thought wealth and fame would make me happy, but…”  
And it is even more obvious that people can be wrong about the means most conducive to their 
ends.  I may have the correct belief that making a comfortable living will make me happy, but I 
may have very mistaken views about how to reach that goal.  Perhaps I am invariably drawn in 
by get-rich-quick schemes and consistently fail to apply myself to a career.  H.L.A. Hart (who 
accepted that a fair amount of “negative paternalism”22 is justifiable) complained that, “Mill 
carried his protests against paternalism to lengths that may now appear to us fantastic.”  Mill 
seems to assume that a person generally “knows what he wants and what gives him satisfaction 
                                                          
20 As Mill puts it, “To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed 
to lead different lives” (OL: III, ¶ 9 / CW, XVIII: 266).    
21 It must be remembered, however, that a writer like Mill does not present the epistemic argument alone, but as one 
component of a whole battery of arguments.  Criticisms of Mill often fail to take this fact into account.   
22 That is, paternalism aimed at preventing non-moralistic harms, especially pain and suffering.  The view is closely 
related to so-called “negative utilitarianism,” which does not try to promote pleasure, but only to prevent pain.  In 





or happiness” and that he “pursues these things when he can.”  But this, Hart claimed, simply 
doesn’t correspond to the facts of human psychology as we now see them, and that there has 
been “a general decline in the belief that individuals know their own interests best” (1963: 32-
33).23  Indeed, much work in behavioral and economic psychology lends support to Hart’s 
skepticism. 24   Nor was Sidgwick so sure that the epistemic argument condemned paternalism 
toward adults.  Reflecting on the restrictions placed on children’s freedom for their own good, he 
cautiously remarked that “it is, at least, not intuitively certain that the same argument does not 
apply to the majority of mankind in the present state of their intellectual progress” (1907: 275).  
The epistemic argument has also been charged with exaggerating how unique and inscrutable 
each of us really is.  “As a matter of fact,” writes Richard Arneson, “it is sometimes the case that 
persons other than the agent are in a better position to judge the individual’s present as well as 
future interests.” 
[It] is sometimes the case that the young adult’s psychiatrist, his parents, relatives, peer-
group friends, even passing acquaintances and back-fence neighbors have more insight 
into his true interests in the matter than the young adult himself has.  If it is a truism that 
people are very different from one another (and so often unable to judge one another’s 
interests), it is no less a truism that people are very much alike (and so sometimes able to 
make strikingly accurate judgments about what is best for another) (Arneson 1980: 486). 
                                                          
23 Hart’s much quoted (but somewhat unfair) conclusion is: “Mill, in fact, endows [the normal human being] with 
too much of the psychology of a middle-aged man whose desires are relatively fixed, not liable to be artificially 
stimulated by external influences; who knows what he wants and what gives him satisfaction or happiness; and who 
pursues these things when he can” (1963: 33).  I think Mill would respond by, first, conceding the individual’s 
fallibility with regard to his own good, but then emphasizing that the fallibility infects both sides.  As a rule, he 
would insist, the individual is still in a better position to judge his own interests than others, and he certainly is more 
likely to have his own interests at heart.  (This is why Mill offers the epistemic argument in conjunction with the 
argument from distrust—see 2.3.A).  Just as Hart sees Mill as a naïve optimist about individual rationality, I believe 
Mill would have regarded Hart as naïve (at least in this passage) about human motives in the exercise of power. 
24 The literature on common forms of irrationality and biases is vast, but many seminal articles are collected in 






In light of these objections, how strong ultimately is the epistemic argument for the Liberal 
Outlook?  That is difficult to say in the abstract; it is obviously an empirical question, and I will 
not pretend to be able to settle the question definitively here.  Certainly, one can see the kind of 
story that you would tell within a welfarist framework to justify the Liberal Outlook on epistemic 
grounds.  But you can also see how you could tell a different story within the same framework to 
arrive at a conclusion incompatible with the Liberal Outlook.  This may give the epistemic 
argument something of the look of a rationalization for a foregone conclusion.25  It is enough for 
our purposes to observe that if our opposition to paternalism seems more secure and less 
contingent than this empirical argument, then that suggests that the epistemic argument is not the 
sole source of that opposition. 
2.6  The Direct Contribution of Personal Autonomy to Well-Being 
The epistemic argument assumes that some course of action is in a person’s best interests, 
and then argues that the individual adult is in the best position to discern what that course of 
action actually is in his own case.  The next argument I want to discuss posits an “adverbial” 
connection between freedom and well-being.  It contends that the manner in which people live 
their lives is more important than the particular courses of action they pursue.  That is, in general, 
people tend to flourish when they are self-determining, or autonomous.  As Mill puts it, “If a 
person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying 
                                                          
25 This complaint is similar in spirit to Rawls’s “publicity” argument against utilitarian principles of justice:  “the 
vagueness of the idea of average (or total) well-being is troublesome.  It is necessary to arrive at some estimate of 
utility functions for different representative persons and to set up an interpersonal correspondence between them, 
and so on.  The problems of doing this are so great and the approximations are so rough that deeply conflicting 
opinions may seem equally plausible to different persons.  Some may claim that the gains of one group outweigh the 
losses of another, while others may deny it.  No one can say that underlying principles account for these differences 
or how they can be resolved.  It is easier for those with stronger social positions to advance their interests unjustly 





out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode” 
(OL: III, ¶ 14 / CW, XVIII: 270).  Paternalism is generally objectionable, then, because it 
interferes with self-determination, which is a central component of well-being.   
A) Conceptions of autonomy 
It is easy to get turned-around here unless we are careful in disambiguating different senses 
of autonomy.  Joel Feinberg alone lists fifteen senses of the word used in moral and political 
philosophy (1986: ch. 18).  Our word “autonomy” derives from the Greek word for ruling or 
governing oneself with one’s own laws.  It was originally a political notion: a city-state was 
autonomous if it ruled itself as opposed to being ruled from the outside.  That initially political 
notion was then extended to the individual.  In its most immediate sense, then, a person is 
autonomous when he in some sense rules or governs himself, as opposed to being ruled by 
something that is not his self.  Different conceptions of autonomy arise in large part because we 
take different views on the relevant sense of “the self,” on what it means to govern oneself, and 
on what kinds of agents or things might impede that self-government.   
It is tempting to say that autonomy, like the related concept of freedom, is best used in a 
contextual way.  That is, just as we should say that Q is free from someone or something to do 
something, we should always say that Q is autonomous vis-à-vis someone or something.  For 
instance, Jane is an autonomous woman because she is controlled by no man, or John is 
autonomous because he thinks for himself rather than uncritically accepting conventional 
wisdom.  While there is something correct about that suggestion, autonomy (like freedom) is not 
just a descriptive word; it is also an evaluative one.  To say that “x is free from y” is almost 
always to suggest that being without y is a good thing.  We speak of being free from oppression, 





or free from any prospect of satisfying our needs (cf. Wood 1990: 40-41).  Similarly, we tend to 
use the word “autonomy” not just to describe an agent’s independence from some foreign 
control, but further to say that this kind of independence is good, or that this is the kind of 
independence that really matters.  That is why the disagreements about what autonomy really is 
are not wholly confused; people are disagreeing about what kind of autonomy actually matters. 
Some conceptions of autonomy belong primarily to moral psychology and the philosophy of 
action.  For instance, for Kant, we are autonomous when our actions are determined, not by our 
inclinations alone, but by a law that we have imposed on ourselves  (G: 4:437-445).  For Harry 
Frankfurt, we are autonomous when we act on those desires that we desire to have, that we 
identify with, rather than those desires that we do not wish to act upon (1988a).  And for some 
philosophers, we are autonomous when we subject our values and beliefs to critical reflection (G. 
Dworkin 1988).  These conceptions of autonomy are not necessarily irrelevant to the ethics of 
paternalism or social philosophy generally,26 but they are not primarily conceptions of our 
autonomy vis-à-vis other persons.  
I now want to distinguish between three common ways of thinking about autonomy in 
political philosophy.  No doubt there are others, but these will suffice for our purposes.  On one 
view, autonomy is conceived of primarily as an individual’s right of non-interference against 
others; it is a zone of personal sovereignty, as I shall sometimes call it.  As Feinberg puts it, 
“Philosophers have long had an expression to label the realm of inviolable sanctuary most of us 
sense in our own beings.  That term is personal autonomy” (1986: 27).  As you would expect, it 
is this conception of autonomy that is central to what I have called the “sovereignty approach” to 
                                                          





justifying the Liberal Outlook on Paternalism.27  Mill also has some classic formulations of this 
idea (although he does not call it “autonomy”).  One passage in this vein comes from the 
Principles of Political Economy: 
[T]here is a circle around every individual human being, which no government … ought 
to be permitted to overstep: there is a part of the life of every person who has come to 
years of discretion, within which the individuality of that person ought to reign 
uncontrolled either by any other individual or by the public collectively.  That there is, or 
ought to be, some space in human existence thus entrenched around, and sacred from 
authoritative intrusion, no one who professes the smallest regard to human freedom or 
dignity will call in question: the point to be determined is, where the limit should be 
placed; how large a province of human life this reserved territory should include.  I 
apprehend that it ought to include all that part which concerns only the life, whether 
inward or outward, of the individual, and does not affect the interests of others, or affects 
them only through the moral influence of example (V.xi.2 / CW, III: 938).     
You might fairly ask what the difference is supposed to be between negative liberty and 
“autonomy” on this view.  Part of the answer, it seems, is just that negative liberty is often taken 
to refer to particular “instances” of non-interference, while writers employ the label “autonomy” 
to evoke the notion of the protected personal sphere.  Another part of the answer is that a person 
might autonomously assume certain restrictions on his liberty.  For instance, a person who joins 
the military has less liberty than someone in civil life, but his autonomy has not been infringed. 
This last idea of self-imposed restraints leads us to a second important conception of 
autonomy.  Personal sovereignty is both a conception of freedom and of restraint, in that the 
perimeter of another person’s sovereignty constitutes a limit on my freedom.  The classical 
liberal conception of personal sovereignty does not ask whether these limits are themselves self-
imposed.  The idea is that each person is free within his personal sphere.  Rousseau, however, 
thought we were not truly free, unless we could view those restraints as created or endorsed by 
                                                          
27 This is one aspect of what Rawls calls the “rational autonomy” of citizens, the liberty to pursue their own 





our own wills.  Only then could we think of ourselves as truly free men and women, who obey 
no one but themselves.  Only then would we be no less free in civil society than we would have 
been in a lawless state of nature, although we have now exchanged our natural liberty for 
political autonomy.28  Rawls appeals to a similar idea under the label “full autonomy”:  “full 
autonomy is realized by citizens when they act from principles of justice that specify terms of 
cooperation they would give to themselves when fairly represented as free and equal persons” 
(1993: 77).  For philosophers like Rousseau and especially Rawls, political autonomy is not 
substituted for personal sovereignty, but underlies it.  Each individual is personally sovereign 
within his own private sphere, and each is politically autonomous insofar as he wills (or can will) 
the political order that protects each individual’s personal sovereignty.     
The last conception of autonomy I want to distinguish thinks of autonomy, not primarily as a 
zone of control, nor as a person’s relation to limits on his freedom, but as a characteristic or ideal 
of a person’s life.  According to Joseph Raz, for example, “Autonomy is an ideal of self-
creation” (1986: 370): 
The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should make their 
own lives.  The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own life.  The ideal of 
personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, 
fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives.... Autonomy is opposed 
to a life of coerced choices.  It contrasts with a life of no choices, or of drifting through 
life without ever exercising one’s capacity to choose” (369, 371).   
Developing the same line of thought, Steven Wall characterizes personal autonomy as  
the ideal of people charting their own course through life, fashioning their character by 
self-consciously choosing projects and taking up commitments from a wide range of 
eligible alternatives, and making something out of their lives according to their own 
                                                          
28 Cf. Rousseau, SC: I.6.  Rousseau however does not use the word autonomie, but liberté.  See also the discussion 






understanding of what is valuable and worth doing.  Those who realize this ideal take 
charge of their affairs.  They discover, or at least try to discover, what they are cut out for 
and what will bring them fulfillment and satisfaction.  They neither drift through life, 
aimlessly moving from one object of desire to another, nor adopt projects and pursuits 
wholesale from others.  In short, autonomous people have a strong sense of their own 
identity and actively participate in the determination of their own lives (1998: 128). 
These writers are insistent that, by autonomy, they do not mean (like Feinberg) “a region or 
domain in which each person has a moral claim to be free to govern him- or herself” (Wall 1998: 
128).  Autonomy, rather, is a characteristic of a person’s life (or of a period of a person’s life).  
Someone might fail to live autonomously, in spite of the fact that his private “zone of control” is 
fully intact.  Living autonomously, on this view, is a matter of more-or-less and it may 
characterize some aspects of a person’s life and not others (e.g., I may see myself as having 
chosen my religious identity, but not ever having had a real choice about my occupation, or vice 
versa) (Raz 1986: 391; Wall 1998: 136-137, 183-189).  The value of an autonomous life may 
justify recognizing rights to a certain zone of personal sovereignty, but it is not respecting those 
rights themselves that is ultimately of value.  Rights of control or self-government are ultimately 
of instrumental value in that they help make autonomous living possible (Raz 1986: 407-412; 
Griffin 1986: ch. XI). 
B) Self-creation and well-being 
The argument that autonomy is a central element of well-being generally appeals to the third 
of these conceptions of autonomy: not autonomy as personal sovereignty or political autonomy, 
but autonomy as an ideal of self-creation.29  But why should an autonomous life in this sense 
                                                          
29 An argument which appeals to personal sovereignty (or perhaps political autonomy) as an intrinsic element of 
well-being would, once again, be a version of what I called the embedding approach, and therefore not a welfarist 





contribute to well-being?  Why should it be that people’s lives go better when people see their 
lives as having been their own creations in significant respects?  There are several possible 
explanations.  Perhaps self-creation is something that just about everyone would desire on 
reflection.  Or it may have something to do with what Rawls called the “Aristotelian Principle”: 
that “other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate 
or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater 
its complexity” (TJ: 496/374).  Mill strikes a similar chord in On Liberty:        
He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all of his faculties.  He must use 
observation to see, reasoning and judgement to foresee, activity to gather materials for 
decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to 
hold to his deliberate decision.  And these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in 
proportion as the part of this conduct which he determines according to his own judgment 
and feelings is a large one.  It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and 
kept out of harm’s way, without any of these things.  But what will be his comparative 
worth as a human being?  It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what 
manner of men they are that do it (OL: III, ¶ 4 / CW, XVIII: 262-263). 
Surprisingly, however, Mill’s explanation for the good of exercising our faculties is, at least at on 
the surface, less utilitarian than Rawls’s.  In this passage, Mill does not invoke the enjoyableness 
of exerting our practical capacities, but rather the apparently perfectionistic, objective good of 
our “comparative worth” as human beings.  The suggestion seems to be that there is more dignity 
in, or something more admirable about, the self-directed life, than one directed externally.  Or, 
alternatively, the claim may be that there is something intrinsically good about the development 
of human capacities that the autonomous life requires (cf. Hurka 1993: 148-158).  Finally, to 
consider one last explanation of the contribution autonomy makes to well-being, Steven Wall 
argues that autonomy is connected to the meaning of life:  By pursuing some projects instead of 
others, we fashion the shape of our lives, and thus, of ourselves as well.  In doing so, we impart 





who had no control over the course of her life, or who never tried to exert any control over it 
(1998: 147-150). 
These considerations regarding the direct contribution of autonomy to well-being suggest at 
least a general presumption against paternalistic interference with that autonomy.  But why 
shouldn’t the same presumption apply to children?  One suggestion is that we only develop the 
capacity to be autonomous with “the maturity of our faculties,” as Mill would put it.  First, young 
children lack the basic capacities for self-determination; they have only limited powers to 
imagine, set, pursue, and remain loyal to ends of their own.30  Furthermore, children need 
parental approval (and appropriate disapproval), and they tend to thrive under the rational 
authority and guidance of adults.  As their rational and volitional faculties mature with age, 
however, this dynamic gradually changes, and the person begins to value doing more things on 
her own and for her own reasons.31   
A second, more interesting argument points to the strongly holistic, “pattern-dependent” 
character of well-being.  On this view, the “atomistic” conception of well-being (characteristic of 
classical utilitarianism) is misguided in thinking that a good life is just the aggregation, the mere 
“totting-up,” of enjoyable moments.  Our well-being depends in large part on the pursuit of 
valuable and meaningful goals and relationships, and the value and meaning of these goals and 
relationships depends in large measure on the way they fit into the larger pattern of our lives 
(Griffin 1986: 34-37; Raz 1986: 288-294; 2004: 276-281).  J. David Velleman (2000) makes this 
point by emphasizing the importance of narrative in explaining how various episodes fit into our 
                                                          
30 The importance of these powers for autonomy is emphasized in Raz (1986): 372-373, 407-408.   






lives as whole.  Generally, patterns of episodes that make for a better, more satisfying life-story 
are better for us.  He has us imagine, for instance, the lives of two politicians that are virtually 
alike, except that Mr. A works for years in relative obscurity before coming to power, while Mr. 
B enjoys meteoric political success early in life, followed by a life in the political wilderness.  
Mr. A and Mr. B (let us assume) enjoy the same amount of political success and the same 
amount of toil out of the political limelight.  In spite of this apparent symmetry, it is natural to 
think that Mr. A’s life is better than Mr. B’s, precisely because the pattern of his life makes for a 
better story—that is, it is the kind of story we would want to live for ourselves.  (Tragedies make 
good stories for an audience, but are not likely to be stories we want to live through ourselves—
though it is perfectly intelligible that a person would prefer a tragic life to an unremarkable one).  
Likely, our judgment that Mr. A’s life is better than Mr. B’s rests on the idea that Mr. A’s toils 
were redeemed by his later success, while Mr. B’s were not.  That redemption imparts meaning 
to Mr. A’s toils that seems to be lacking in Mr. B’s.  Of course, it is possible that we should 
prefer the pattern of Mr. B’s life to Mr. A’s, but again that will likely be because we see 
something attractive in his life-story—perhaps the rare glory of success in youth and the elegiac 
cast of a long denouement. 
Velleman’s point, therefore, is similar to, though more general than, Rawls’s remarks in A 
Theory of Justice that it is generally rational to avoid “substantial swings up and down” in life 
and that “for the most part rising expectations over time are to be preferred” (TJ: 420-421/369).  
On  the narrative theory of well-being, Rawls’s remarks are best understood as claims within the 
“poetics of well-being.”  That is, just as Aristotle’s Poetics explains to us how tragic effect is a 
function of plot structure which cannot be understood except when we observe how the different 





life that tends to lead to happiness.  It may well be that Rawls’s tastes are too conservative for 
some.  Velleman helps make clear that insofar as we do disagree with Rawls, the appropriate 
mode of reasoning in this quarter is not decision theory (in which we are trying to maximize 
discrete moments of utility), but something like poetics or aesthetics.  Additionally, the narrative 
theory of well-being can help explain what is right about Rawls’s much controverted claim that a 
good life is one lived according to a plan and one “with a certain unity, a dominant theme” (TJ: 
420/369).32  The essential unity is not so much a carefully regimented plan, but a (perhaps loose, 
sometimes changing) narrative that makes sense of the major events of our lives by putting them 
into a certain relation to one another, as well as into relation with the future we anticipate.33    
What, then, does this holistic conception of well-being have to do with the relative 
importance of autonomy for adults and children?  This point has not been much explored by 
previous writers, but it is interesting to draw out the implications.  It is quite plausible that the 
freedom to pursue one’s goals and projects makes a greater contribution to well-being in the 
middle of a life than it does at its beginning.  After all, no one has full control over the beginning 
of his life.  So when we speak of autonomy as an ideal of self-creation, we obviously do not 
mean that one ideally fashions the shape of one’s life from birth.  We mean, rather, that at a 
certain point, one was able to take over the reins of one’s life and take a hand in directing its 
course from there, once it is already underway.  In this way, the period of restricted freedom in 
childhood can simply be understood (in narrative fashion) as a prelude or a preparatory stage of 
                                                          
32 For criticisms of Rawls’s idea of a life plan, see for instance, Slote (1983): chs. 1-2; Mackie (1984); Raz (1986): 
370; Larmore (1999).  For a more sympathetic take on Rawls’s idea, see Waldron (1993): 161. 





the life of mature activity to come.34  In this sense, the limited freedom of childhood and youth is 
potentially redeemed by the more expansive freedom of adulthood, whereas similar restrictions 
of our autonomy in middle age would not be so redeemed.35 
C) The compatibility objection 
This argument—that autonomy makes a direct contribution to our well-being, but that it 
matters more in our mature years than it does in youth—seems to me the best single welfarist 
argument for the Liberal Outlook.  The chief objection to it is that the exercise of self-
determination is not strictly incompatible with paternalistic restraints.  Paternalism and self-
determination only seem incompatible if we imagine those restraints dictating precisely what 
ends someone is to pursue, leaving the person few live options.  But paternalism may also simply 
erect hedges to protect people from certain known pitfalls and yet still leave each person a large 
field of options from which to choose.  Self-determination always proceeds from a range of 
options, and that range will always have externally opposed limits.  The application of Mill’s 
harm principle or Kant’s principle of equal freedom themselves reduce the range of options 
available, but we assume that self-determination is still possible within that range.  Why should 
further marginal reduction in the range of available options make the activity of self-
determination suddenly impossible, so long as a person is left an adequate range of choice-
worthy options—especially if the options eliminated are less choice-worthy than those that 
remain or if they undermine future opportunities for self-determination.  In these cases, 
                                                          
34 Cf. the somewhat tentative remarks from Joseph Raz, although he is not speaking here about autonomy: “Possibly 
different stages in people’s life contribute differently to their well-being.  A traditional view distinguishes between a 
preparatory stage in childhood and early youth, a stage of mature activity, and a stage of relative retirement.  
Possibly people’s years of mature activity count more (minute for minute, as it were) towards their well-being than 
the early or later stages” (2004: 277). 





paternalistic restraints seem to enhance, not undermine, the value of self-determination.36  This 
seems all the more true if, as Raz argues, autonomy has no value when it is exercised in pursuit 
of the bad.37  Call this line of thought the compatibility objection.  I shall now consider two 
responses to the compatibility objection, but I don’t think either of them can be wholly 
successful without leaving behind the spirit of the welfarist approach.   
The first response is to concede that the present argument cannot easily establish Mill’s hard-
line, laissez-faire anti-paternalism, but then to insist that taking that hard line is not essential to 
the Liberal Outlook.  After all, many liberals are willing to accept a fair amount of “negative 
paternalism” (which involves the prevention of non-moralistic harms and suffering—see 1.5).  
The importance of autonomy, thus, gives us an argument for a moderate, but not an extreme, 
liberal position on paternalism.  Call this the concessive response. 
But the compatibility objection cuts deeper than the concessive response allows.  Valuing the 
exercise of self-determination is also consistent with a moderate form of legal conservatism.  
Many conservatives would not subscribe to what Mill lampoons as the “Calvinist Theory of 
Life”: the theory holding that “All the good of which humanity is capable is comprised in 
obedience” and that “Human nature being radically corrupt… crushing out any of the human 
faculties, capacities, and susceptibilities, is no evil” (OL: III, ¶ 7 / CW, XVIII: 265).  Morally 
                                                          
36 Cf. the argument in Husak (1981): 35-38 and the concession in Hurka (1993): 152-156. 
37 “Autonomy is valuable only if exercised in pursuit of the good.  The ideal of autonomy requires only the 
availability of morally acceptable options” (Raz 1986: 381).  Robert George (1993: ch. 6), who follows Raz in this 
regard, thinks this plank clears the way for the permissibility of coercive moral paternalism, at least once we reject 
Raz’s own arguments against coercive paternalism.  I don’t want to insist on this idea, however, because I am not 
convinced that Raz is correct in this respect.  In fact, I find it more plausible that autonomy has some value even 
when it is exercised in pursuit of the bad or worthless.  Do we not sometimes admire the bold, autonomous wrong-
doer (e.g., Machiavelli’s portrait of Cesare Borgia in The Prince) more than someone who committed similar crimes 
simply because he lacked the wherewithal to act except as ordered (e.g., Arendt’s depiction of Eichmann in The 





conservative natural law theorists like Robert George and John Finnis, for instance, think that a 
life cannot be flourishing without “a measure of effective freedom,” which is necessary for 
realizing the basic good of being able “to bring one’s own intelligence to bear effectively … on 
the problems of choosing one’s actions and lifestyle and shaping one’s own character” (Finnis 
1980: 198).  But this is consistent, on their view, with trying to maintain, promote, and even 
coercively enforce perfectionist ethical standards.  According to George, “a sound perfectionism 
recognizes both that human flourishing is advanced by having a broad array of morally valuable 
choices and that a diversity of evil choices contributes nothing of practical value to human 
beings” (1993: 191).  Thus, while a conservative of this stripe values the exercise of autonomy, 
he also rejects “the liberal idea that there are strict moral norms … that exclude in principle 
moral paternalism and the use of coercion to prevent moral harm” (167).  To be clear, I am not 
commending Finnis and George’s conservatism; I am only claiming that their view seems 
consistent with a recognition of the importance of autonomy for well-being.  If that is correct, 
then we cannot defend the Liberal Outlook solely by appealing to the value of autonomy.38 
The second response to the compatibility objection is that it ignores how much people tend to 
chafe under restraints that are put in place for their own good.  This tends to make paternalistic 
restraints more harmful than beneficial.  When my liberty is limited to ensure others a like 
freedom, I recognize this limitation as a necessary consequence of giving equal regard to all.  But 
when I am protected against myself against my own will, I resent it:  I feel like I am being 
                                                          
38 Of course, Finnis and George’s conservatism only follows if their substantive value theory really is sound.  A 
liberal might respond by arguing that the things that Finnis and George think are valueless (like homosexuality) 
really have value.  The trouble with this strategy—at least in political philosophy—is that it would seem that a 
liberal society’s best hope is to aim at some kind of agreement or consensus about higher-order values (like the 
importance of autonomy or mutual respect) rather than about particular aspects of the good life.  Thus, even a writer 
like Raz, who claims to be a liberal “perfectionist,” has much more to say about the basic value of autonomy than 





disrespected or shown contempt, and these feelings may in turn damage my sense of self-worth 
(Raz 1986: 378, 410-411; Wall 1998: 133-135).  As a rule, the unhappiness that these subjective 
sentiments cause to people outweighs any benefits that might follow from paternalistic 
interference in personal liberty.  Call this the resentment response.   
There are three reasons why I think the resentment response fails to counter the compatibility 
objection.  First, it is quite possible that this resentment depends on the moral rules to which 
people are accustomed.39  In that case, that paternalism is objectionable in our society at all is 
simply a matter of convention,40 and perhaps a convention we should try to change.   
Second, the resentment response at most explains why coercion is objectionable, but not 
what is wrong with subtler forms of manipulation that the subject does not detect, since these 
would not cause any harmful subjective experiences.  Raz and Wall nonetheless object to such 
forms of manipulation because, as Raz puts it, this subjects a person to the will of another and 
“violates his independence and is inconsistent with his autonomy” (378).  Call this the 
“independence criterion.”  The independence criterion makes sense if we are talking about 
manipulation that wholly deprives a person of the capacity to shape his own life.  But what if the 
manipulation is more peripheral in character?  Or what if it simply dissuades the person from 
making certain choices, but leaves him free to choose amongst other options?  In this case, 
                                                          
39  A case in point:  Presently, according to a recent article in the New York Times, “Every Saudi woman, regardless 
of age or status, must have a male relative who acts as her guardian and has responsibility for and authority over her 
in a host of legal and personal matters.”  Recently, some Saudi women have campaigned for the right to move, act, 
and make decisions without the permission of a guardian.  One woman interviewed described Saudi women as 
“demanding to be treated as adults.”  But this has provoked a backlash amongst some conservative Saudi women.  
Rowdha Yousef started her own campaign, “My Guardian Knows What’s Best for Me,” which has collected more 
than 5,400 signatures to a petition “‘rejecting the ignorant requests of those inciting liberty’ and demanding 
“punishments for those who call for equality between men and women…”  According Ms. Yousef, “The image in 
the West is that we are dominated by men, but they always forget the aspect of love.”  Katherine Zoepf, “Talk of 
Women’s Rights Divides Saudi Arabia,” The New York Times, May 31, 2010.     





manipulation doesn’t seem wholly incompatible with a person’s autonomy—at least, if that is 
understood as a person being the “(part) author of his own life” (Raz 1986: 369).  Again, the 
independence criterion would make sense if we were thinking about autonomy as a kind of right 
of personal sovereignty, but (as we have seen) that is not the conception of self-determination 
that is best understood as making a direct contribution to our well-being (as Raz and Wall rightly 
observe).  If we object to manipulation on the basis of the independence criterion, therefore, we 
seem to be verging away from the spirit of the welfarist approach and toward the embedding 
approach, which makes personal sovereignty an ideal component of well-being (see 2.1).   
Third, and most importantly, the resentment response simply gets things backwards.  If a 
person resents being treated paternalistically, if she is indignant about being subjected to the will 
of another, then it must be because she recognizes some independent norm according which 
forbids paternalistic meddling.  Resentment, unlike mere dislike, is a moral attitude.  Like guilt, 
it assumes the recognition that a moral norm has been violated (Rawls, TJ: §74).  It would be 
more to the point, then, to investigate that norm directly, rather than focusing on the unhappiness 
that its transgression evokes.  If the norm is sound, then we should object to paternalism on the 





CHAPTER 3:  PATERNALISM AND INTERNALISM 
  ABOUT WELL-BEING 
3.1  Arguments from the Nature of Well-Being 
We are trying to understand the rationale behind the Liberal Outlook on paternalism: that 
there should be a strong presumption in practice against paternalism toward adults, but no strong 
practical presumption against paternalism toward children.  In the last chapter, we began 
exploring arguments for the Liberal Outlook that appeal to the subject’s well-being.  On the 
typical welfarist approach, paternalism is objectionable insofar as the paternalist fails to 
accomplish his formal aim1 of promoting the subject’s good (or will tend to do so as a rule).  
That we often fail to achieve our formal aims is, of course, a general feature of human action.  
What we are looking for, then, are arguments that explain why, when dealing with adults, there 
should be an asymmetry between P’s attempts to paternalistically promote Q’s well-being and 
Q’s own attempts to do the same (see 2.4).   
In this chapter, I consider two kinds of argument which claim that the very nature of well-
being makes it difficult for others to benefit adults paternalistically.  These arguments depend on 
what we may call “internalist” features of well-being.  Let us say that that an account of well-
being can be more “internalist” or more “externalist,” where an account is more internalist to the 
extent that what is good for Q depends on one or more of Q’s attitudes regarding what is good, 
                                                          
1 The paternalist’s formal aim is to promote the subject’s well-being or good.  His substantive aim is a thicker 





while an account is more externalist to the extent that what is good for Q is independent of Q’s 
attitudes regarding what is good.  For our purposes, there are three important kinds of attitudes: 
enjoying, desiring, and endorsing.  (Each of these attitudes should be understood to include its 
negative correlate as well.)  What is meant by enjoying and desiring is clear enough.  What it 
means to endorse something is best understood by contrasting it to desire and enjoyment.  St. 
Augustine found in himself libidinal desires, but (after early adulthood) he did not endorse, or 
approve, these desires and did not want to satisfy them.  When Augustine gave in to his libidinal 
desires, he may have enjoyed doing so, and yet he disapproved of the enjoyment—perhaps even 
loathing himself for enjoying what he believed to be base.  To endorse something is, therefore, 
more closely connected to the will than is desire or enjoyment.  We can desire and enjoy 
something in spite of ourselves, but we cannot endorse something in spite of ourselves.   
At the extremely internalist end of the spectrum of conceptions of well-being are views that 
identify Q’s well-being with one or more of Q’s actual attitudes: with what Q enjoys, desires, or 
endorses.  At the extremely externalist end of the spectrum are views that maintain that Q’s well-
being is wholly independent of Q’s attitudes, actual or idealized.  In the middle of the spectrum 
are views that identify Q’s well-being with Q’s more-or-less idealized attitudes (e.g., what Q 
would enjoy, desire, or endorse in ideal circumstances) and views that identify Q’s well-being 
with objective values which Q actually endorses. 
A wholly externalist view of well-being seems implausible.  A person’s well-being, as we’ve 
said, is what is good for her.  But for something to be good for Q, it seems like the good has to 
link up with Q’s attitudes, or with Q’s “subjectivity,” in some way or other, at some level.  This 
is not, however, a conceptual truth.  There is no contradiction involved in denying that Q’s good 





on any plausible account of well-being, there will be some “attitudinal asymmetry” between the 
subject and other agents—that is, Q’s well-being depends in a unique way on Q’s attitudes (and 
not on those of others).  But there is also some pressure pushing in the externalist direction, since 
we do not think that a person’s well-being is always and entirely up to him.  This is part of what 
explains why people can make mistakes about what is good for them.  And this, of course, is 
especially clear in the case of children.    
Typically, the more internalist the account of well-being, the harder it will be for P to 
promote Q’s well-being paternalistically.  But to what extent does this generalization provide the 
basis for an argument for the Liberal Outlook on Paternalism?  This will depend on the particular 
theory of well-being.  I discuss in detail two different arguments below.  The one to which I 
devote the most space is the subtle idea that, though well-being depends on participation in 
objectively valuable activities and relationships, nothing can benefit us unless we endorse it (3.2-
3).  Then, more briefly, I discuss the suggestion that the Liberal Outlook be defended simply in 
virtue of the logic of a desire-fulfillment account of well-being (3.4).  I do not devote a separate 
discussion to hedonistic accounts of well-being, but I say something about them at the end of the 
section on desire-satisfaction theories.       
3.2  Objective Value and Endorsement 
A)  The endorsement thesis 
Objective accounts of well-being hold that what is good for someone is at least partly 
independent of what he enjoys, desires, or values (see 2.2).  Since such accounts tend toward 





Many objective accounts however also have an important subjective element.  One way this 
could be the case is if enjoyment or desire-satisfaction were simply one part of our well-being, 
set alongside that part of our well-being that depends on our participating in whatever is of 
objective value.  But it is also possible that our subjective attitudes are partly constitutive of our 
capacity to benefit from whatever is of objective value.  Ronald Dworkin is one philosopher who 
has defended this constitutive view of the role of subjective attitudes in objective well-being.2  
On his view, “no component [of the good life] contributes to the value of a life without 
endorsement” (2000: 217).3  Let us call this the endorsement thesis: 
No objectively valuable component of a good life can contribute to the value of Q’s life 
without being endorsed by Q. 
The endorsement thesis gives an objective account of well-being an essential internalist aspect, 
and Dworkin claims that this view of what makes lives go well is the basis of an important 
argument for (what I call) the Liberal Outlook on paternalism.4  Dworkin thinks that the liberal 
can accept what he calls “volitional paternalism,” which is paternalism that “help[s] people 
achieve what they already want to achieve.”5  For instance, the “state makes people wear 
                                                          
2 The view is also explicitly defended by Will Kymlicka (1989; 1990) and (in perhaps a more modest version) by 
Joseph Raz (1986): 289-294; 1994. 
3 The argument originally appeared in Dworkin (1990), which is reprinted in a shortened version as Chapter 6 in 
Dworkin (2000).  I cite the Dworkin (2000) version here. 
4 Actually, Dworkin says that critical paternalism is inconsistent with what he calls “the challenge model” of the 
good life, of which the endorsement thesis is one part.  The challenge model maintains that the good life, like an 
athletic performance, consists in performing well in the face of the right challenge, where the right challenge is 
defined by certain parameters, including principles of justice (2000: 250-254).  Because the challenge model 
requires a conception of justice to fill out the idea of what is a good life for someone, it is really an example of the 
embedding approach, and so is not a pure version of the welfarist approach.  Here, I discuss only the part of 
Dworkin’s view that deals with the endorsement thesis, since that part is consistent with a purely welfarist argument, 
and since it is a more broadly shared idea than Dworkin’s broader challenge model of the good life (see the 
references in fn. 2). 
5 Dworkin leaves at least three crucial issues regarding volitional paternalism unclear.  First, it is unclear whether it 
is his position that P has sufficient reason to coerce Q to ф if Q already wants to ф, or whether it is also necessary 
that Q wants P (and perhaps has asked P, or would do so if he could) to use coercion to help him achieve his goal of 






seatbelts in order to keep them from harm that it assumes they already think bad enough to 
justify such constraints, even if they would not actually fasten their seatbelts if not forced to do 
so” (2000: 217, 268).6  But he maintains that the endorsement thesis is incompatible with most 
“critical paternalism,” which is to say, paternalism aimed at promoting what is objectively good 
for the subject regardless of whether or not the subject endorses it as good.  This is because the 
endorsement thesis “rejects the root assumption of critical paternalism: that a person’s life can be 
improved by forcing him into some act or abstinence he thinks valueless” (269).  Dworkin gives 
a few examples to motivate this idea.  One is the activity of religious devotion: even if religious 
devotion is an essential part of a good life, mere outward observance cannot have any ethical 
value if it is not endorsed by the practitioner from the inside (269).  Another involves personal 
relationships: “If a misanthrope is much loved but disdains the love as worthless, his life is not 
much more valuable for the affection of others” (217).  (The “much” in that last clause is a bit of 
a hedge, but let that pass).   
As I read it, Dworkin’s argument is strategically “open-textured” in an important respect.  
Although he claims that some things are of objective value, he does not try to defend liberalism 
by arguing for and against the value of particular pursuits and relationships.  Rather insofar as we 
agree about the centrality of subjective endorsement to well-being, it would seem that we don’t 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
necessarily want others to force them to do so.  Second, it is unclear whether it is a further necessary condition that 
what Q already wants is objectively valuable—or at least not objectively bad for Q.  (Presumably it is.)  Third, it is 
unclear just what the subject has to “already want” in order to justify paternalism.  Is it necessary that Q already 
wants to do the very thing that P paternalistically requires him to do, or is it enough that Q values some end which 
P’s paternalism promotes.  For instance, is paternalistic seatbelt legislation justified only if motorists generally want 
to wear seatbelts but find themselves irrationally not doing so, or is it sufficient that motorists value health and long-
life, which are ends that wearing a seatbelt happens to promote.  Ultimately, I don’t think Dworkin really has a 
worked-out theory of volitional paternalism.  He is best read as giving us an argument against critical paternalism 
however we ultimately resolve these questions regarding volitional paternalism. 






have to come to public agreement about those particular values, since trying to impose those 
values paternalistically would be ineffective or counterproductive.  In fact, although Dworkin 
does not do so, he might have made his argument even more ecumenical by couching the 
endorsement argument conditionally:  If there are such things as objectively valuable 
relationships and pursuits, then it is nonetheless true that nothing can improve a person’s life 
unless he endorses it.  This would have made the argument neutral between subjective and 
objective accounts of well-being.  This is the spirit in which I shall examine the endorsement 
thesis.  You may think that a strongly objective account of well-being is implausible.  But 
certainly some people believe that well-being has this pronounced externalist dimension.  
Therefore, it is at least of interest to know what arguments may be made to such people in favor 
of the Liberal Outlook.   
One disclaimer:  You might understandably be impatient in what follows with the seeming 
assumption on the part of the critical paternalist that he has some kind of personal access to true 
ethical standards that others apparently lack or willfully ignore.  I believe the reason the debate 
has this character may be explained as follows.  Liberal philosophers have been sensitive in 
recent years to the suggestion that their political philosophy depends on some form of skepticism 
about religion or the good life.  There are at least three sources of this sensitivity.  First, many 
liberal philosophers want to devise arguments that can be reasonably accepted by as many people 
as possible, including those who do claim to be certain about religious matters or as to what 
constitutes the good life.  Thus, it has seemed desirable to construct arguments for liberal 
positions that do not depend on a skepticism about personal life, which many people do not 
entertain.  Second, some philosophers—notably Dworkin—have been sensitive to the charge 





(Dworkin 2000: 237).  Therefore, philosophers like Dworkin have sought to show how liberal 
justice is actually a part of living well (cf. also Dworkin 2011).  Third, many philosophers have 
wanted to distance themselves from any kind of evaluative skepticism.  Virtually every 
philosopher wants to reject the popular but fallacious idea that global evaluative skepticism is a 
reason for embracing live-and-let-live mores (cf. Waldron 1993: 157-158).  Some philosophers 
have argued that standards of the right are inherently more knowable than standards of the good 
life—that somehow reasonable people can agree about what is just, but may differ on what is 
good.  This then is offered as an explanation as to why coercion is appropriate to enforce 
principles of justice, but not the standards of the good life.7  But establishing this epistemic 
asymmetry is not easy to do.  Therefore, it has seemed that the only alternative to skepticism is to 
accept that individuals can have access to true standards of the good life.   
This may, in fact, be a false dichotomy.  Instead of skepticism about the good, on the one 
hand, and individual self-certainty, on the other, perhaps we ought to explore the idea that access 
to objectively valid ethical standards can only be attained only by way of thinking together with 
other moral subjects.  That is, instead of relying solely on my own intuitions in reasoning about 
the good, I ought to give equal, or at least considerable, regard to the consciences of other 
subjects.  This is an idea we find in Hegel, Dewey, and more recently, in Habermas.  This third 
way seems to have made relatively little theoretical headway in contemporary Anglo-American 
                                                          
7 There is a wide literature on this topic.  The clearest statement of the asymmetrically skeptical view is Barry 





political philosophy, but it is worthy of further exploration.8  I do not, however, attempt that 
exploration here.  
∴ 
Now, to what extent does the endorsement thesis really justify the Liberal Outlook on 
paternalism?  The first thing to do in evaluating the argument is to get a clearer view as to why 
subjective endorsement should be so important to well-being.  Here it is useful to return to the 
paradigmatic example of religious devotion, since this makes evident how similar the 
endorsement argument is to one of Locke’s arguments for religious toleration.  In the Letter 
Concerning Toleration, Locke argued that people should not be compelled to embrace any 
religion, because such compulsion could not possibly achieve its object:   
For no man can, if he would, conform his faith to the dictates of another.  All the life and 
power of true religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is 
not faith without believing.  Whatever profession we make, to whatever outward worship 
we conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own mind that the one is true, and the 
other well pleasing unto God, such profession and such practice, far from being any 
furtherance, are indeed great obstacles to our salvation (Locke 1823, VI: 10-11). 
Religious observance, Locke argues, only has value for the individual if he is inwardly persuaded 
of its truth.  And since inward persuasion cannot be produced by external force, any attempt to 
use force to convert people will fail to accomplish its aim.  Dworkin’s argument is that virtually 
all valuable activities and relationships are like this.  They benefit you only if you perform them 
in the right spirit—in particular, only if you are inwardly convinced of the value of what you are 
doing.  Just as worship in the true religion is only valuable if it flows from inward faith, so too 
participation in objectively valuable activities and relationships only benefits a person if it flows 
                                                          






from his own convictions as to their value.  You cannot force someone to benefit from great art, 
or from valuable relationships, or from play and relaxation, if the person simply fails to see the 
purpose of any of these things.   
Notably, Kant made a rather similar argument in the Doctrine of Virtue.  He argued that 
ethical virtue, as opposed to the rules of right, cannot be externally imposed, since our ethical 
duties consist in acting for the right end, and “I can never be constrained by others to have an 
end; only I myself can make something my end” (MM: 6:381).  In particular, we cannot be 
externally impelled to perform our central duty to ourselves as rational beings: to perfect 
ourselves.  This, as Kant explains, is because “the perfection of another human being, as a 
person, consists just in this: that he himself is able to set his end in accordance with his own 
concepts of duty; and it is self-contradictory to require that I do (or make it my duty to do) 
something that only the other himself can do” (6:386).9   
In explaining why subjective endorsement has any importance at all, the reasoning above is 
convincing as far as it goes.  There certainly are many things that seem to be generally valuable 
but which cannot benefit a person absent the right subjective relation between a person and his 
activities.  For that matter, we may go further still.  In many cases, you cannot really even engage 
in an activity at all without performing it in the right spirit.  For instance, it is not just that you 
cannot benefit from friendship without endorsing it; you cannot even have a real friendship 
without some internal “endorsement” of its value.  But thinking about why subjective 
endorsement is important also suggests two ways that the endorsement argument against critical 
                                                          
9 There is this difference, however: Kant’s argument is not as open-textured as Dworkin’s; more of Kant’s own 
substantive theory of the good seems to be assumed in his argument.  Also it is worth remembering that, even if this 
argument from the nature of a person’s good were less telling than Kant assumes, he could still appeal to his primary 





paternalism is vulnerable to criticism, which I will take up in turn.  First, even if the endorsement 
thesis were true, paternalism might produce the requisite endorsement subsequently (3.2.B).  
Second, and more fundamentally, the range of cases in which subjective endorsement is crucial 
to well-being may be narrower than it first appears (3.3).   
B)  Paternalism and subsequent endorsement 
Suppose we accept the endorsement thesis:  No activity or relationship can contribute to the 
value of a particular person’s life without that person’s endorsement.  At first, it might seem as if 
this means that it will always be counterproductive to force people to do things that they do not 
already endorse for their own good.  But what if they came to subsequently endorse the activity 
after having been exposed to it paternalistically?  It is especially easy to think of examples of this 
from childhood.  Parents and educators often require children to participate in activities that they 
do not already endorse, with the aim that the children will come to recognize and endorse the 
value of the activity with time and experience.  I shall discuss this complex issue under two 
headings.  First, I examine the idea of subsequent endorsement itself; then I turn to the argument 
that some ways of bringing about subsequent endorsement in fact undermine the validity or 
genuineness of that endorsement. 
Subsequent endorsement:  It is important to recognize that endorsement is not the same as 
consent.  There are several things you may not do, morally speaking, without another’s consent.  
In ordinary circumstances, if Q’s consent is necessary to legitimate P’s action, then that consent 
must precede P’s act.10  It is not acceptable for P to go ahead and act without Q’s consent simply 
because, with time and experience, Q will come to consent to this kind of thing or even to this 
                                                          





very act.  (This is assuming, of course, that Q is competent to give consent at the time.)  Suppose 
there is a sulky adolescent who does not particularly like going on camping trips with his father.  
Before the next trip, the adolescent says, “Dad, I don’t consent to being brought along on the 
next trip.  Therefore, if you force me to go, you will have wronged me.”  Assuming that his 
father thinks that his son is competent to give and withhold consent to this kind of thing, he 
would be confused if he responded, “I know you don’t consent now, but that’s okay because you 
will someday.”  If the adolescent’s consent matters, and if he is competent to give or withhold it, 
then all that matters is whether he consents now; what happens later is irrelevant.   
But endorsement’s contribution to well-being is not like consent’s contribution to 
permissibility.  Suppose the adolescent says, “I do not endorse these trips, Dad, so they cannot 
possibly benefit me.”  It would not be confused if his father now responded, “I know you don’t 
endorse them now, but that’s okay because one day you will.”  There are two ways that the 
father’s response might be apropos.  First, in virtue of participating in these camping trips which 
he does not presently endorse, the adolescent may come to recognize the value of such trips 
when he is older.  In that case, the earlier unendorsed trips contribute to the boy’s well-being 
indirectly by preparing him to appreciate later the value of similar camping trips.  The second, 
more interesting possibility is that the earlier camping trips, unendorsed at the time, will be 
endorsed later and will therefore retrospectively make a direct contribution to the son’s well-
being.  One way this could be true is that, years later, the son is able to see things in those 
experiences that he could not see at the time.  For instance, at the time, the adolescent may have 
valued spending weekends watching television or playing computer games more than spending 
time with his father.  Years later, however, (perhaps after the father has passed away) the son 





the time, and he is glad that he had not been permitted to fritter away his time at home merely 
entertaining himself.11  
 Dworkin is not unaware of the possibility of subsequent endorsement.  Thus, he concedes 
that the endorsement thesis does not literally rule out all critical paternalism, since 
the defect … in paternalism can be cured by endorsement, provided that the paternalism 
is sufficiently short-term and limited so that it does [not]12 significantly constrict choice if 
the endorsement never comes.  We know that a child who is forced to practice music is 
very likely later to endorse the coercion13 by agreeing that it did, in fact, make his life 
better; if he did not, he has lost little ground in a life that makes no use of his training 
(2000: 269).  
What is surprising is that Dworkin does not realize that, in principle, this opens up a considerable 
gap in his argument against “critical paternalism.”  Do we really accept that adults may be 
forced, like children, to participate in intrinsically valuable activities with the hope that they will 
come to endorse these on their own after a short while?  Are the only moral constraints on 
                                                          
11 This is similar to the idea about the relation between narrative and well-being defended in Velleman (2000) which 
I discussed in 2.6. 
12 The insertion of “not” seems necessary to capture the sense of Dworkin’s point. 
13 Let me register one quibble here:  Dworkin says that the child may later come to endorse the coercion employed 
to get him to practice piano.  But whether the child ever comes to endorse the coercion seems beside the point given 
Dworkin’s argument.  That might be what matters on a consent-based theory of paternalism.  But what should 
matter on Dworkin’s welfarist argument is whether the child comes to endorse playing the piano when he is older.  
Although I admit it is likely that a person who later came to endorse playing the piano would also endorse having 
been forced to practice it, the latter is not necessary.  As an adult, the individual may come to endorse the value of 
playing piano, and yet still believe that his parents were wrong to force him to practice, when that is not what he 
cared about at the time.   
Consider this analogy: One day my house is burglarized and my television is stolen.  At first, I am devastated, 
because there is nothing I enjoy more than watching television.  But then after a couple of weeks not having a 
television, I discover how much more time I have to engage in more valuable and rewarding activities.  A year later, 
I say that having lost my television was one of the best things that ever happened to me.  But that doesn’t mean that I 
subsequently condone or endorse the burglary.  I can still regard that act as unwarranted.  I would not say: “Actually, 
the burglar was right to steal my television, because that ended up making me happier in the long-run.”   
Would it change my attitude if I found out that this was a paternalistic burglar whose sole motive was to promote my 
long-term well-being?  That might mitigate my judgment, but I wouldn’t be compelled to endorse the theft just 
because I ended up endorsing the consequences.  I may seem to be fussing excessively over a minor careless slip on 
Dworkin’s part, but if I am right, this is a part of Dworkin’s general tendency to make the endorsement argument 





paternalism that the coercion not last too long and not be too disruptive to the rest of the person’s 
life?   
 This point is not lost on Robert George, a critic of philosophical liberalism and a proponent 
of moral paternalism.  He observes that “Dworkin’s basic concept of (subsequently) ‘endorsed 
consent’ would seem to have considerable potential as a warrant for a variety of paternalistic 
laws rooted in a judgment that the proscribed activity is morally wrong” (1993: 107).  Indeed, it 
is worth noting just what kind of constraints Dworkin is proposing.  He is saying that, while 
future endorsement is necessary for something to contribute to the subject’s well-being, future 
endorsement is not necessary to justify the paternalistic intervention:  what matters is that if the 
endorsement never comes, the intervention was not too long or too disruptive.  Is it necessary 
that (as the passage suggests) the paternalist has good reason to believe that the subject will one 
day endorse the intervention?  It is not clear why there should even be that requirement.  Why 
shouldn’t a paternalist force the subject to participate in some activity (as long as the intervention 
were neither too long nor too disruptive), knowing full well that the prospects for future 
endorsement are small, so long as the potential good that could come with endorsement would be 
very great?  And by the same token, if the likelihood of future endorsement were extremely high, 
and the potential contribution to well-being were great, then why shouldn’t that justify 
paternalistic interference of comparably longer duration and greater disruptiveness (cf. George 
1993: 108).  Please note that I do not say that such paternalism would really be a good idea all 
things considered.  I am simply pointing out that it isn’t the endorsement thesis that rules it out.  






 Perhaps it will be insisted that there are important differences in the psychology of children 
and adults which explain why the strategy of seeking subsequent endorsement is more likely to 
work in the former case than in the latter.  We find Thomas Hurka arguing along just these lines:   
Habituation often works with children and is therefore desirable for them.  Our schools 
force children to experience music, literature, and athletics in the often justified hope that 
they will later come to choose these pursuits for themselves.  The same tactic is less 
effective with adults, who usually have fixed values and interests and are therefore harder 
to lead to new ones.  What is more, they tend to resent directives about their private lives 
and to obey them at best grudgingly:  Their attitude at the start of habituation is precisely 
not ripe for developing intrinsic choosing (1993: 155). 
There are two points to be extracted from Hurka’s remarks.  First, he suggests that, because the 
values and interests of adults are more fixed, they are harder to change by habituation than the 
more malleable values and interests of children.  We can accept this claim as true in large part.  
However, because it is only a generalization, it has a peculiar implication.  There are some 
impressionable adults after all.  May these people be treated like children?  You might try to 
block that conclusion by resorting to a form of rule-consequentialism.  Because human morality 
must be governed by easy-to-apply rules, it is sensible to treat all adults as if they have fixed 
values and interests that would make methods of paternalistic habituation ineffective or 
counterproductive.  This might explain why we have a duty to generally refrain from treating 
adults paternalistically with the aim of securing their subsequent endorsement, but (at least 
absent further argument) it does not readily explain why the particular impressionable adult, for 
whom paternalism could secure subsequent endorsement, has been personally wronged or has a 
personal complaint against the paternalist.  Is his grievance that, though paternalism was not 
counterproductive or ineffective in his case, we should have assumed that it would be? 
 This is connected to the second point.  Hurka says that adults, in any case, tend to resent 





malleable enough for paternalistic habituation to work on them.  But resentment is a moral 
attitude.  Unlike mere frustration or anger, resentment is a response to a perceived wrong.  If 
adults resent interference with their liberty or private lives, that must be because they perceive 
that some wrong has been done to them.  We would do better, then, to attend directly to the norm 
that explains their resentment, rather than to the psychological consequences of their resentment 
(see 2.6.C).14 
 Genuine endorsement:  Dworkin tries to control the damage that subsequent endorsement 
can do to his argument against critical paternalism by insisting that there are constraints on the 
ways that “genuine endorsement” can be brought about.  Immediately following the piano 
example, Dworkin writes: 
In any case … endorsement must be genuine, and it is not genuine when someone is 
hypnotized or brainwashed or frightened into conversion.  Endorsement is genuine only 
when it is itself the agent’s performance, not the result of another person’s thoughts being 
piped into his brain (269). 
And in another place he makes much the same point at more length: 
We must distinguish acceptable from unacceptable circumstances of endorsement.  The 
distinction, as we know from the history of liberal theories of education, is a difficult one 
to draw, but any adequate account of acceptable circumstances would, I believe, include 
the following proposition.  We would not improve someone’s life, even though he 
endorsed the change we brought about, if the mechanisms we used to secure the change 
lessened his ability to consider the critical merits of the change in a reflective way.  
Threats of criminal punishment corrupt rather than enhance critical judgment, and even if 
                                                          
14 To this line of argument, one might reply that we should not place much trust in moral attitudes like resentment.  
After all, people can resent things that they shouldn’t.  A controlling husband may resent his wife’s attempt to get a 
job, for example.  But there are two responses to that reply.  First, though we should not accept the norms people 
recognize uncritically, we should examine them.  Second, and more to the point, if the norm doesn’t deserve our 
endorsement, then we should generally ignore a person’s misguided resentment based on that norm.  If, for example, 
the controlling husband is wrong to resent his wife’s decision to look for employment, then we shouldn’t be much 
concerned with the unpleasant subjective experience that his resentment causes him.  Similarly, if people are 
completely misguided to resent our paternalistic interference, then perhaps we shouldn’t pay much heed to the 
unpleasantness of their resentment.  (If you resist my claim in the last sentence, I would suggest it is probably 






the conversions they induce are sincere, these conversions cannot be counted as genuine 
in deciding whether the threats have improved someone’s life (218). 
There is one strand of thought in these passages that I think we can readily assent to.  That is, we 
can agree that endorsement is not genuine if it is not really internalized and sincere.  If a person 
is simply acting as if he endorses something, in order to fool others or even himself, then he will 
not be able to engage in the activity or relationship in the proper spirit, which is necessary in 
order to integrate that component into his life in a valuable way.15 
 But in the second passage Dworkin also suggests a stronger idea: that even “sincere” 
endorsement might fail to be genuine if it came about in the wrong way.  This is harder to 
understand—partly because Dworkin does not explain just what sincere endorsement entails.  
Suppose it means that the person is indeed now whole-hearted in his endorsement of the activity 
or relationship, in spite of the heavy-handed way in which he was induced to acquire that 
attitude.  We can imagine that someone’s consent that was acquired in this heavy-handed way 
might be invalid.  But, remember, endorsement does not play the same role as consent.  
Endorsement’s primary role is in integrating something into a person’s “conception of the good”; 
its primary purpose is not to grant permission.   
 One possibility is that Q’s questionably induced but sincere endorsement of x will not benefit 
Q, if x is objectively valueless or bad.  But we do not need to appeal to endorsement at all 
(genuine or otherwise) to make that point.  Therefore, Dworkin presumably has in mind a case in 
which, ex hypothesi, x is objectively valuable, Q sincerely endorses x, and yet because Q’s 
endorsement is not genuine in some respect, x does not actually promote Q’s well-being.   
                                                          
15 Steven Wall is therefore mistaken in contending that Dworkin’s endorsement argument does not rule out 





 In the second passage, Dworkin seems to be relying on the following argument: 
1. A change in a person’s life, even if sincerely endorsed, cannot be for the better if the 
change lessens his ability to consider the critical merits of the change in a reflective 
way. 
2. Coercive methods (especially criminal punishments) corrupt rather than enhance 
critical judgment.  
 ∴   3.   Coercive (or at least criminal) paternalism cannot make a person’s life better.  
I don’t think that this argument is without significant exceptions.  Let’s consider objections to 
premise (1) first, and then consider the limits of premise (2). 
  You might accept premise (1) for three reasons.  (a) First, you might think that critical 
reflection is simply independently valuable, and that, other things equal, we are always worse off 
if our capacity for it is impaired.  Dworkin, however, has given us no argument for the 
independent value of critical reflection.  More to the point, other things aren’t always equal.  If 
the value of critical reflection is independent of the beneficial change it induces, then why 
couldn’t it ever be the case that the change was in fact beneficial enough to outweigh the loss in 
capacity for critical reflection.   
 (b) A more attractive, second suggestion for accepting premise (1) is that critical reflection is 
somehow partly constitutive of genuine endorsement.  That is, we might make the following 
claim about critical reflection:  
  (CR)  For x  to benefit Q (where x is an objectively valuable activity or relationship): 
(i) It is necessary that Q endorses x,  
(ii) but also necessary that Q endorses x for good reasons;  
(iii) however, we can only endorse x for good reasons by critically reflecting 
on the reasons why we came to embrace x.   
We are assuming for now that condition (i) is indeed necessary.  If (i) is necessary, then arguably 





social status), then it is plausible to think that I cannot benefit from the intrinsic good 
characteristic of friendship, until I endorse it for the right reasons.  The connection between (ii) 
and (iii), however, seems harder to establish.  We might say that x cannot really be good for me, 
unless it could stand up to my critical reflection.  But that is virtually the same as saying that x 
must really be objectively good, which we assumed at the outset.  If I am to benefit from x, is it 
necessary that I am actually capable of, or in fact actually carry out, this critical reflection?  
Both suggestions are implausible, since it appears that people can benefit from things that they 
never critically reflect on.16  To take an uncontroversial example, loving parental relationships 
are central to the well-being of children, and though these could stand up to critical reflection, 
the child herself is incapable of engaging in this critical reflection.   
 (c) This leaves a third reason for subscribing to premise (1): the possibility that, while critical 
reflection is not necessary for genuine endorsement, genuine endorsement is not possible if 
endorsement comes about as a change which leaves a person less capable of critically reflecting 
on the change than he had been before.  However, I suspect that the development of strong 
attachments and commitments to people, organizations, activities, or projects is a common 
counterexample to that hypothesis.  Critical reflection seems to require taking up a somewhat 
detached point-of-view.  No doubt this reflective detachment is a matter of more-or-less, not all-
or-nothing.  But when we are emotionally attached or committed to something, it is harder to 
achieve as much critical distance as we would be capable of otherwise or prior to forming the 
attachment or commitment.  Someone who has devoted the last twenty years of his life to a 
                                                          
16 For a more sophisticated examination of this theme, one may refer to the discussion of Hegel’s views on critical 





political party might find it harder to honestly take up a detached evaluative point of view on that 
party than he would have had prior to that commitment. 
∴ 
 If the preceding criticisms are sound, then premise (1) of CR looks shaky as a general 
proposition.  But premise (2)—that coercive methods corrupt rather than enhances critical 
judgment—is not without exceptions either.  In the kind of case that I think Dworkin has in 
mind, someone has held certain considered religious or ethical convictions, and then these 
convictions have changed out of fear or social pressure—not on the basis of good reasons.  We 
can agree that, in those cases, the threat of sanction has reduced the person’s capacity for rational 
reflection.  But Dworkin’s piano example seems to show that, at least in the case of children, 
mild coercion can also induce habits that, over time, make the person more appreciative of 
valuable activities, and in a more reflective way.  Similarly, if there is anything right about the 
“classical” view, bad habits can corrupt a person’s critical judgment too, such that coercion 
which preempts the formation of, or breaks, those bad habits, could have the total effect of 
preserving or improving someone’s judgment.17  Again, this kind of paternalism seems common 
with respect to children.  The extent to which this kind of paternalism is possible toward adults 
is, ultimately, an empirical question, which I won’t try to settle definitively.  This question of 
judgment is likely to divide liberals and conservatives, but it at least suggests that the 
                                                          
17 This is Robert George’s position: “If the suasion of a paternalistic law could serve as a strong disincentive to 
engage in [an] activity [“that is sufficiently seductive and habituating to corrupt a practitioner’s ability to guide 
himself with practical reasonableness”], and if a period of abstinence from the activity served to weaken powerful 
habits, emotional pulls, and the like, which contribute to an individual’s indulgence in the activity, the law would 
seem to serve a valuable purpose.  It ultimately would help the individual to make self-constituting choices against 
the immoral conduct, even if initially his abstinence was motivated solely by respect for the law or fear of its 





endorsement thesis does not, by itself, lead to the Liberal Outlook on paternalism; one has to add 
several further empirical theses. 
3.3  Endorsement and Well-Being 
A)  Is endorsement always necessary? 
 If the endorsement thesis is sound, it does rule out some kinds of paternalism.  As I’ve said, 
the prospects look dim for attempts to force someone against his will to benefit from great art, 
valuable relationships, or play and relaxation.  But, as I argued in the last section, given the 
possibility of subsequent endorsement, the endorsement thesis still permits more paternalistic 
interference with a person’s autonomy than the Liberal Outlook would seem to allow.   
Now I turn to the more fundamental question:  whether the endorsement thesis is truly sound.  
We can readily grant the plausibility of a weak version of that thesis: that there are some 
components of the good life which cannot benefit a person unless she endorses them.  The 
example of religious devotion seems paradigmatic in this respect.  Most of us revolt at the idea 
that a person could be benefited by being forced to engage in religious practices (even assuming 
they are intrinsically good) that the person does not, and in fact will never, endorse.  But we have 
to ask whether it is safe to generalize from that case.  Are all “components” of the good life like 
religious worship in this respect?     
 First of all, acts that contribute to our physical well-being do not seem to require 
endorsement.  One need not endorse exercise, a healthy diet, or the kicking of a bad habit (like 
smoking) to benefit from them.  People who cannot afford to pay the “sin taxes” on tobacco and 
quit simply because of its exorbitant price need not endorse quitting smoking to benefit from it.  





my view.  Plato and Aristotle thought that musical training was important, not primarily for its 
own sake, but because of the way it shaped and elevated a person’s character.18  To gain that 
benefit, it would presumably not be necessary to value that musical training itself, nor even to 
recognize its educational contribution.  It may be replied to these suggestions that the 
endorsement thesis only applies to intrinsic goods, things desirable for their own sake, like health 
and good character, not to those goods and activities that are instrumental in procuring what is 
valuable for its own sake.  Therefore, the latter forms of paternalism should really be classified 
as “volitional,” not “critical,” paternalism, because they help people accomplish ends they 
already endorse (or will endorse later).  We may concede that reply,19 but notice that this shows 
that the category of volitional paternalism is extremely broad.  Paternalism is permissible on this 
principle, not only to force me to do some particular thing that I already want to do anyway (e.g., 
I want to save for retirement, but fail to do so on account of hyperbolic discounting), but also to 
force me to do something that I don’t want to do simply because it promotes some value or aim 
that I happen to endorse (e.g., I may care about my life and yet not want to quit smoking).  It is 
easy to miss the difference between these two ideas at first, but the second permits far more 
paternalistic interference than the first.20 
 It would also seem that it is not necessary to endorse avoiding or abstaining from what is bad 
for that abstention to benefit you.  (From the foregoing, it is obvious that abstaining from 
                                                          
18 Plato, Republic, Bk. III;  Aristotle, Politics, Bk. VII.  A similar line of criticism of the endorsement thesis, which I 
have benefited from, is developed by Wall (1998): 189-197.  
19 Though some would insist that our physical and mental health is good for us even if we do not value or endorse it.  
For this view, see Finnis (1980): 86-87; Raz (1986): 290; George (1993): 106. 
20 If it is true, as some have held, that human beings do not differ much in the particular intrinsic and instrumental 
values they hold, but primarily in the way that they organize these values into particular hierarchies and priorities, 
then unrestricted “volitional” paternalism would justify just about any kind of paternalism, except perhaps that 
which required people follow a particular religious creed.  On the extent to which we share most values, but differ in 





something is not necessary to benefit you instrumentally; we are now concerned with the 
question as to whether the abstention must be endorsed for it to benefit you intrinsically).  It 
turns out that this is a complex issue and the rest of section 3.4 is devoted to working through it.  
I shall first state the prima facie argument for thinking that abstentions need not be endorsed to 
be intrinsically beneficial; then I will consider two ways of responding to that argument (section 
B).  My rejoinder to the second of these replies leads to our consideration of a further argument, 
the “substitution argument,” which I take up in section C.  And that, in turn, leads to yet another 
argument, “the argument from ethical integrity,” addressed in section D.   
Throughout it is important to remember that we are assuming for the sake of argument that 
doing certain things can be objectively good or bad for a person independently of that person’s 
own judgments about them.  If this seems implausible to you, recall that it is at least of some 
interest to know what arguments can be made to someone who does hold that view. 
B) The argument from abstention 
First, then, the argument for thinking that an agent’s abstaining from what is bad need not be 
endorsed to be beneficial to him.  The endorsement thesis gives us a necessary condition for 
something’s contributing to a person’s well-being:  If Q is to (intrinsically) benefit from 
participating in the objectively valuable activity or relationship, x, then it must also be the case 
that Q endorses x.  The endorsement thesis does not give us a sufficient condition; it does not 
say that x is good for Q, just as long as Q endorses x.  On Dworkin’s view, objective value and a 
person’s subjective attitudes work together in the constitution of what is good for the person.  
Now suppose that x is not objectively valuable; it is bad or worthless.  Whether or not Q 
endorses x, then, x cannot make Q’s life better.  Therefore, Q is probably better off not engaging 





prevents Q from engaging in x could benefit Q.  Putting the argument that way, we have not so 
much denied the endorsement thesis, as we have shown that paternalistically requiring someone 
to avoid or abstain from what is bad is consistent with that thesis.  In other words, the 
endorsement thesis generally speaks against forcing people to engage in what is valuable, but it 
does generally speak against forcing people to avoid what is bad.  If that is correct, then once 
again the endorsement thesis would permit considerably more paternalism than it at first appears 
to, and (if unsupplemented with other arguments) probably more than is consistent with the 
Liberal Outlook.  Call this the argument from abstention. 
 First reply: One way to reply to the argument from abstention is to reject one of its 
assumptions about the nature of value.  There are at least two ways of thinking about activities 
and relationships that are not objectively valuable and participation in which cannot benefit a 
person.  On the first view, such activities and relationships are worthless, but they are not 
positively bad in an intrinsic way—though of course they may exact significant opportunity 
costs.  That is to say, participation in what is worthless does not actually make a person’s life go 
worse, except insofar as he is wasting his time.  On a second, more traditional view, participating 
in what is bad can actually be intrinsically detrimental to a person’s well-being.  To see the 
difference, consider two common negative views about loveless sex (which is not to deny that 
there are positive views as well).  On one view, loveless sex is typically worthless, but not 
harmful to people.  On the second view, loveless sex is not only worthless, it is positively 
detrimental to people’s well-being; their lives go worse for engaging in it.21  The argument in the 
previous paragraph seems to assume the second view: that there are some things that are 
                                                          





intrinsically bad for people to engage in.  But this assumption could be resisted.  It may be held 
that nothing is intrinsically bad in this positive way; some things are just worthless compared to 
others.  (Of course, it is important not to restrict our attention to the example about loveless sex 
here.)   
 If the first view is right, if nothing is positively bad for us to participate in, then the argument 
that we could be benefited by being required to abstain from what is bad loses much of its force.  
Looked at in this way, the disagreement comes down to a substantive debate about the nature of 
the good and the bad.  Taking the first of these two views allows one to resist some kinds of 
paternalism on welfarist grounds, but that substantive position about value does not follow from 
the endorsement thesis.  It requires further premises drawn from value theory.  This is important 
because it shows that the strategic open texture of the endorsement argument (that is, its 
remaining agnostic about the nature of particular values) cannot deliver strong liberal 
conclusions.  Unsupplemented, the endorsement thesis seems to be consistent with paternalism 
aimed at preventing people from exposing themselves to “moral harms.”22 
 Second reply: There is second way of trying to reject the argument from abstention, which is 
the one that Dworkin appears to prefer.  Dworkin grants, at least for the sake of argument, that 
there are activities and relationships that are positively and intrinsically detrimental to people’s 
well-being.23  However, when he says that Q must endorse a “component” of the good life for it 
to benefit Q, he understands “components” to cover both valuable activities and relationships as 
well as abstentions from what is bad or worthless.  This is why he claims that the endorsement 
                                                          
22 On moral harms, see Feinberg (1990): esp. chs. 28 and 30. 
23 For instance, for the sake of argument, Dworkin grants the social conservative the premise that “an active 





thesis “rejects the root assumption of critical paternalism: that a person’s life can be improved by 
forcing him into some act or abstinence he thinks valueless” (217, emphasis added).  In brief, the 
issue comes down to this.  The argument from abstention posits an asymmetry between engaging 
in what is valuable and abstaining from what is worthless or bad: while endorsement is necessary 
to benefit from engaging in a valuable activity, endorsement is not necessary to benefit from 
avoiding a harmful activity.  Call that the engagement/abstention asymmetry.  If this asymmetry 
exists, then the endorsement thesis has virtually no application to harm-preventing paternalism, 
but is restricted to limiting benefit-conferring paternalism (see 1.3).  The present response, which 
someone like Dworkin might avail himself of, is to deny that this asymmetry exists and to 
maintain that abstaining from what is bad can no more benefit you without your endorsement 
than can engagin in what is good.  I shall now mention three reasons to think, pace Dworkin, that 
there is, in fact, an engagement/abstention asymmetry.24 
 (i) First, you might think that it is bad to live unjustly, whether or not one endorses avoiding 
injustice the unjust aspects of one’s life.  Therefore, one would be better off being forced to 
abstain from injustice and to live within the bounds set by justice, even if one did not endorse 
that abstention.  Call this the moralistic thesis.  It depends on a particular way of thinking about 
the relation between justice and well-being, which will not be accepted by everyone, but which 
happens to be defended by Dworkin himself.  The moralistic thesis would be denied by two 
positions.  One of these holds that a person’s good is entirely independent of his acting justly (a 
                                                          
24 “Abstention” and “abstinence” are Dworkin’s words.  Sometimes these words connote a kind of intentional and 
deliberate avoidance, as when we say that someone is “practicing abstinence” toward alcohol or sex.  (We might not 
say that a person unable to afford a drink is abstaining from alcohol.)  I intend to use these words in a more neutral 
way, however, in which abstinence from x just means not doing or not engaging with x, intentionally or otherwise.  
If you think that abstention necessarily implies that one avoids something voluntarily, then substitute the word 





view held by many utilitarians, for example).  The second of these holds that acting justly is a 
part of a person’s good, but that for this to be so, one must act out of good will and for the right 
reasons.   
But there is a third position available:  Dworkin denies that justice imposes external limits on 
the good life.  If justice did impose such limits, then my life might have been better if I didn’t 
have to be just.  For instance, if I didn’t have to respect the demands of justice, which require 
that everyone gets their fair share, I might be able (were I favorably situated) to do more of the 
things that I want to do and have more of the things I want to have.  On Dworkin’s view, justice 
instead sets the normative parameters on a good life.  The idea of normative parameters is 
familiar from athletic competitions.  A great defensive team is one that prevents the other team 
from scoring within the parameters set by the rules of the game.  These rules do not limit the 
permissible bounds of a good defensive performance; they help define what playing defense is.  
(It would be confused for a coach to complain, “These pesky rules really tie our hands: we could 
be a great defensive team if only we were allowed to poison the other team’s water.”)  
Interestingly, an athlete’s performance can be tarnished by running afoul of the parameters of the 
game even if the transgression is unintentional.  (An athlete’s record-breaking performance 
would be tainted, if accomplished under the influence of steroids administered by a misguided 
trainer, even without the athlete’s knowledge of the offense.)  Dworkin thinks that we should 
take a similar view about the relationship between justice and the good life.  A good life is one 
that responds in the right way to the right challenge, and that challenge is partly defined by the 





of resources, even when we are not individually to blame for the injustice of our society.25  By 
the same token, then, someone who fortuitously lives out her life in a just society, even if she 
would prefer to be a privileged person in an unjust society, nonetheless leads a better life in that 
respect, since she faces the right challenge.26  She might be better off still if she endorsed living 
justly, but in this case, her endorsement really does seem to have merely additive, not 
constitutive, value.  If Dworkin is right about justice as a parameter on the good life, then, this is 
one thing that doesn’t have to be endorsed for it to make someone’s life go better.  Dworkin 
might object that parameters on the good life are not the same thing as components of the good 
life.  Call them what you like, abstaining from injustice makes your life go better on Dworkin’s 
view even without your endorsement of that abstention.27   
 But let us allow that the moral parameters on a good life are a special case and not strictly 
speaking an objection to the endorsement thesis.  In any case, the contribution of justice to the 
good life is peripheral to the subject of paternalism, since restricting a person’s freedom to 
implement justice is not usually paternalistic in intent.  (Though it might be if the paternalist 
happened to care much more about the well-being of the unjust person than that of the people he 
might wrong.)  So let us turn, now, to the second reason to think that there is an 
engagement/abstention asymmetry.   
                                                          
25 “If living well means responding in the right way to the right challenge, then someone’s life goes worse when he 
cheats others for his own unfair advantage.  It also goes worse when, even through no fault of his own, he lives in an 
unjust society, because then he cannot face the right challenge whether he is rich, with more that justice allows him 
to have, or poor, with less.  That explains why, on the challenge model, injustice, just on its own, is bad for people” 
(Dworkin 2000: 265).  (The “challenge model” is Dworkin’s name for his account of the good life). 
26 Dworkin does not explicitly say this, but I do not see how he could possibly deny it, given his avowal of the claim 
in the previous sentence. 
27 In his most recent work, Dworkin seems to have distanced himself from the moralistic thesis: “We might be able 
to construct a conception of the good life such that an immoral or base act would always, or almost always, make the 
agent’s life finally a worse life to lead.  But I now suspect that any such attempt would fail….Though I was once 





(ii) This argument works by, first, identifying a possible rationale for thinking that 
engagement and abstention are in fact symmetrical with respect to the importance of 
endorsement and then trying to undermine that rationale.  Here then is the possible rationale:  
You might think that endorsement is necessary for either engagement or abstention to be 
valuable, if you thought that the only thing that matters (or, at least, what is a precondition for 
anything else mattering) from a moral or ethical point of view is a person’s intentions and 
convictions—not primarily his actions.  Thus, if a person abstains from doing what is wrong, but 
does so against his convictions and only because doing what is wrong has been made impossible, 
then from a moral or ethical point of view, his abstention has no moral or ethical worth, and 
therefore, cannot make his life go better.  Let us call this the good-will thesis.  (There is some 
tension, of course, between the good-will thesis and the moralistic thesis discussed just above, 
but someone might consistently maintain that the moralistic thesis applies only to parameters of 
the good life, while the good-will thesis applies only to components of the good life.)   
Now, to argue for the engagement/abstinence asymmetry we need to find reasons to cast 
doubt on the good-will thesis.  But, note, to do that I do not need to deny that there are some 
cases in which abstentions do need to be endorsed for them to be intrinsically valuable for a 
person.  One obvious example of an abstention where endorsement is crucial is a religious fast.  
It is a part of the concept of fasting that it is done voluntarily and in a certain spirit.  Similarly, it 
seems perverse to us to force a person to refrain from practicing his religion for his own good.  
We tend to think that what matters is a person’s religious convictions, not the actions he 
performs, and we think (perhaps a little optimistically) that a person’s genuine convictions are 





meaningless if they are not endorsed.  The question is the extent to which we may safely 
generalize from those cases.   
 Here is my primary response to the good-will thesis:  Even if it is true that moral worth 
depends wholly on a person’s intentions, it does not seem as if the “ethical value” constitutive of 
a good life has the same nature.   That is, even if my act of abstaining from what is bad is not 
morally creditable to me, that abstention may nonetheless be good for me.  Suppose that I have a 
base longing to watch real gladiatorial games just like the Romans used to do.  Regretfully, from 
my point of view, the law does not allow the staging of gladiatorial games.  We can agree that 
my abstention from watching such games therefore has no moral worth, but my life may still go 
better if I do not actually indulge my bloodlust.  There is a considerable difference in the quality 
of a life in which I occasionally regret that I cannot be a gladiatorial spectator and one actually 
spent enthusiastically watching men fight one another to the death.  It is hard to believe that my 
character wouldn’t be more coarsened and debased in the latter case.   
Certainly parents assume that this is true of children.  Suppose a boy tells his mother that he 
would like to watch a grisly horror film.  His mother refuses on the grounds that such movies are 
base and that decent people should not entertain themselves by watching even simulated sadistic 
slaughter.  She will not, I suspect, be convinced by the boy’s plea, “But, Mother, any harm the 
movie could do to me has already been done simply by my earnest desire to watch the film in the 
first place!  So it is pointless to prevent me from watching it for my own good.”  While it is true 
that in this case no moral worth accrues to the boy for his not seeing the horror film, it is still 
quite possible that the abstention benefits him.  What other reason could there be for preventing 





no reason why the same logic shouldn’t apply to adults as well: abstaining from what is bad, can 
make our lives go better, even if we would do what is bad if we had our druthers.   
 (iii) My response to the good-will thesis once again relies on the idea that there could be 
activities or relationships that are not only valueless, but actually positively detrimental to our 
well-being in an intrinsic way.  One could therefore resist my response, as before, by rejecting 
that conception of value.  But to do so requires, also as before, invoking a substantive theory of 
value which does not follow from the endorsement thesis.  The third argument for the 
engagement/abstinence asymmetry, however, is independent of any particular substantive theory 
of value (though of course it relies, as the endorsement argument itself does, on the existence of 
objective value).  This argument simply points to the opportunity costs involved in engaging in 
what is worthless.  Even if spending my time in worthless activities is not positively harming me 
in a direct way, I might still be better off if those worthless options were not available to me, 
since even if I do not endorse their unavailability, I might nonetheless spend my time doing 
something that is more worthwhile.  Call this the substitution argument.  Let us now turn a more 
careful examination of this argument. 
C)  The substitution argument 
 It may be useful at this point to remind ourselves of where we are in the train of argument.  
We are examining Dworkin’s endorsement thesis—that  no objectively valuable component of a 
good life can contribute to the value of Q’s life without being endorsed by Q.  While this may 
rule out forcing people to do things that are objectively valuable, it appears not to rule out 
forcing people to refrain from things that are objectively bad.  I called this the “abstention 
argument.”  Dworkin denies this.  He says that abstaining from what is bad cannot benefit a 





third of these is the “substitution argument”:  by preventing someone from doing something that 
is bad or worthless, we free him up to pursue something else he does endorse, even though he 
would prefer to do the thing forbidden.  Since endorsement cannot make an objectively bad or 
worthless thing valuable, then the subject is presumably better off being forced to do something 
else he endorses which is valuable.   
 To his credit, Dworkin considers this possibility.  He has us imagine that the monastic life of 
religious devotion is a wasted one, and that for this reason we abolish religious orders.   
Citizens who might have spent their lives in orders will then lead other lives with other 
experiences and achievements they find valuable, even though … they will think these 
lives worse than the life they were denied.  Someone who would have spent his life in 
monastic orders might, for example, take up a life in politics that is eminently successful 
and valuable to others in ways that he agrees make his life a better one (270).28   
Now the question is whether this politician (let’s call him Quinsby) has benefited by our forcing 
him to abstain from a worthless life of religious devotion.  Of course, Dworkin stacks the deck 
against his opponent by testing our intuitions on so implausible and draconian an example.  Even 
if we are skeptical of traditional religion, most of us think that valuable lives are possible within 
those worldviews—indeed, religious faith probably makes possible forms of life unavailable in a 
secular context.  But let all of that pass and consider the issue on the possibly artificial 
hypothesis that the religious life, as such, really is worthless.   
                                                          
28 Better than what?  Dworkin doesn’t make that clear.  In fact, Dworkin does not say that the life of religious 
devotion is worthless, but (somewhat ominously) that “people in power think that a life of religious devotion is 
wasted” (269).  But this confuses issues.  If we are trying to decide whether a person benefits from abstaining from 
the religious life, then it is irrelevant what people in power think.  On the assumption that some things really are 
objectively valuable, what matters is whether the religious life really has value or not.  As Raz observes, “the fact 
that the state considers anything to be valuable or valueless is no reason for anything.  Only its being valuable or 
valueless is a reason” (1986: 412).  The fact that the people in power believe that the religious life is worthless 





 First, we have to distinguish two cases.  In one case (i), in the world in which Quinsby 
became a politician, he never actually formed the desire or aim of leading a religious life, though 
counterfactually he would have formed that aim, had religious orders been in existence.  It seems 
that Quinsby really would be better off in this kind of case where he never formed the intention 
to do what is worthless.  This suggests that the endorsement thesis is not inconsistent with 
attempts to shape the “moral environment” to influence the formation of people’s preferences in 
the first place.29  But Dworkin has in mind the other kind of case: (ii) one in which Quinsby 
actually has formed the intention to join a religious order, but has now been prevented from 
doing so by the abolition of religious orders.  Dworkin suggests that it is hard to believe that 
Quinsby has really been benefited by our preventing him from wasting his life:  “how can the life 
he led be better when he goes to his grave thinking it has been worse?  In what sense was a life 
more successful that left its owner bitter, believing that he was leading a false, distorted life, at 
war with his own ethical sense?” (270)   
 Let’s try to separate out the argument from the rhetoric here.  The second sentence might 
lead you to believe that we are to imagine that Quinsby never endorsed the substitute life even as 
a second-best.  So we should distinguish between two further cases.  In one, (iia) Quinsby 
                                                          
29 In fact, Dworkin does object to this kind of “cultural paternalism” (as he calls it), which would deliberately restrict 
people’s options in life, but his objection does not rely on the endorsement thesis.   
Dworkin contends that an initial equality of resources is the best interpretation of what it means to treat all citizens 
with equal concern and respect, since this makes the actual distribution of wealth depend equally on the economic 
decisions of each person.  In this way, the “true costs” of each person’s ambitions and projects are revealed by the 
market (2000: ch. 2).  But for the costs to truly reflect the ambitions of each person, it is necessary that liberty only 
be restricted to secure the conditions of equal initial market power.  This means that state paternalism aimed at 
eliminating or manipulating the costs of some options would interfere with the equal influence that each individual 
should have in shaping the opportunities available in civil society (ch. 3).  Living well, then, is to be understood as a 
skillful performance within these parameters (ch. 6).   
However, because paternalism is ruled out by a principle of equal liberty, and because the good life is understood as 
a skillful performance within parameters set by that principle, this is not really a welfarist argument at all; it is 





endorses his life as a politician, believes it is valuable, but doesn’t believe it was the best life for 
him.  In the second, (iib) Quinsby never endorses his life at all and thinks it worthless.  
Assuming that the religious life would not have been positively, intrinsically detrimental to 
Quinsby, and was only worthless in the neutral sense, we can grant that in case (iib), Quinsby has 
not benefited from the substitute life.  But that is not the interesting question, since we are not 
presently claiming that a person’s central life projects can benefit him without his endorsement.  
We want to know whether Quinsby can benefit from having avoided the wasteful life, even if he 
did not endorse having avoided it.  So the interesting case is the first one: where Quinsby does 
endorse his life as a politician, but goes to his grave thinking that it was not the best life for him 
and that the life that was objectively valueless—the life in a monastery—would have been better 
for him.   
 Now, to further examine case (iib), let’s distinguish three different possible worlds.  In the 
actual world, W, Quinsby spends his life in politics, thinks it was a valuable life, and yet goes to 
his grave thinking that the life of religious devotion would have been better for him.  Now are 
there are two possible but non-actual worlds in which Quinsby spends his life in religious orders.  
In one such world, Z1, in spite of the fact that ex hypothesi the religious life is worthless, he 
never comes to appreciate this fact.  In the second world, Z2, after spending much of his life in 
religious orders, he comes to recognize that his life was wasted, and that he would have been 
better off spending his life in politics.  Now suppose that had we not prevented Quinsby from 
entering religious orders, this would have set Quinsby down the path to world Z2.  I think it is 
obvious that Quinsby is better off in W than in Z2.  In both worlds he is going to go to his grave 





believed that his life had some value in it.  So whether or not Quinsby goes to his grave in world 
W thinking that the religious life would have been better for him is really a red herring.   
 The more interesting question is whether Quinsby would have been better off in world W had 
the counterfactual world been Z1.  That is, would Quinsby be better off living the second-best life 
of a politician, in spite of going to his grave thinking the religious life would have been better for 
him (W), or would he be better off living the life he believes to be the most valuable, but which 
in fact is not valuable at all (Z1)?  We might think that Quinsby is better off in Z1 than he is in W, 
if we accept the view that a person’s good is simply a pleasant or contented state of mind.  That, 
however, is out of tenor with the externalist aspect of the objective conception of well-being that 
the endorsement argument relies on.  I see no way to maintain both that the religious life is 
worthless (which is the hypothesis we are working with) and that Quinsby is better off leading 
the religious life than he would be leading a life that is truly valuable and which Quinsby regards 
as second-best.   
Presumably Quinsby himself in world Z1 would agree with the conditional proposition that 
the religious life is not the best life for him if the religious life really is objectively valueless.  
How could he do otherwise?  He would agree with Paul in First Corinthians, “[I]f Christ has not 
been raised [from the dead], then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain … If for this 
life only we have hoped in Christ, we are of all men most to be pitied” (1 Cor. 15:14, 18 RSV).  
True, Quinsby in Z1 denies that the antecedent of that conditional actually holds.  But, again, he 
presumably believes that it is the actual truth of the antecedent that would make his life 





D)  The argument from ethical integrity 
 To block a conclusion of this sort, Dworkin appeals to a further notion he calls “the priority 
of ethical integrity” (PEI), the idea that no life can be better for a person than the life which fits 
his own convictions of the best life for him: 
Someone has achieved ethical integrity, we may say, when he lives out of the conviction 
that his life, in its central features, is an appropriate one, that no other life he might live 
would be a plainly better response to the parameters of his ethical situation rightly 
judged….If we give priority to ethical integrity, we make the merger of life and 
conviction a parameter of ethical success, and we stipulate that a life that never achieves 
that kind of integrity cannot be critically better for someone to lead than a life that does. 
(270) 
PEI is a much stronger claim than the endorsement thesis.30  The endorsement thesis only says 
that our endorsement of an activity is necessary for it to be good for us.  Suppose Q endorses 
both of the mutually exclusive options A and B, though he values A more than B.  Suppose, 
however, that A is objectively worthless, while B is objectively quite valuable.  It is consistent 
with the endorsement thesis that Q’s life would go better engaging in option B than A (since B 
meets both conditions of objective value and endorsement, while A fails the first condition).  But 
presumably this is not consistent with PEI, insofar as Q continues to believe that A is more 
valuable than B.  It might seem as if PEI completely undermines the objective aspect of well-
being that the endorsement argument assumed, because the life that PEI says is best for Q is just 
whatever life Q is convinced is the best life for him.  But this is not quite correct.  This is 
because Q would still have been better off valuing B more than A.   
                                                          
30 In other writings, Dworkin refers to a similar idea under the name of “moral independence” (1986: ch. 17).  In his 
most recent work, ethical independence or integrity seems to have assumed a central place, and there is little reliance 
on the endorsement thesis (2011: esp. 211-213).  There is a trade-off here.  Dworkin’s more recent arguments are 
less vulnerable to the criticisms I have been making, but they are also less ambitious, in that their premises about 





Let me spell that out:  Assume that Q endorses both A and B in both of the possible worlds 
Z1 and Z2, but that in Z1 Q values A more than B, while the opposite relation obtains in Z2.  
Assuming that A is worthless and that B is valuable, PEI says that Q is better off pursuing A in 
Z1 and pursuing B in Z2.  But PEI is consistent with Q being better off in Z2 than he is in Z1.  
Objective value, therefore, can still play a role in Q’s deliberations about which pursuit will lead 
to a better life for him, although no one else can make Q better off by preventing him from 
leading the life that he thinks best. 
 The priority of ethical integrity is most convincing when interpreted narrowly such that it 
only applies to a person’s deep convictions about the central features of his life.  But then that 
leaves aside the peripheral features of a person’s life and those that he lacks deep convictions 
about.  Robert George, for instance, thinks that PEI, while perhaps true, “has little application to 
most kinds of conduct that sensible moral paternalists seek to discourage.”  The relevant question 
is “whether one can fundamentally benefit a person or improve his life by ‘compel[ling] him to 
live in ways contrary to ambivalent or unreflective opinions, or to powerful passions,’”31 to 
which George thinks the answer is clearly ‘yes.’  So, even if we grant the priority of ethical 
integrity, this does not seem to rule out controversial cases of critical paternalism as such.32   
 The deeper question is whether PEI is even true when we are dealing with a person’s 
convictions about the central features of his life.  Again, it is easy to grant that “ethical integrity” 
(in Dworkin’s sense) has considerable value.  Suppose the religious life has objectively valuable 
aspects, even though (because of false metaphysical beliefs) it is considerably less valuable than 
                                                          
31 George (1993): 107, quoting Christopher J. Wolfe. 






the political life.  It is quite plausible to me that Quinsby could still be better off living the 
religious life than the political life, if he was convinced that the religious life was the more 
valuable.  But should we accord it the apparently absolute priority that Dworkin recommends.  I, 
for one, don’t see the appeal of the doctrine in so strong a form.  That is, if we are stipulating that 
the political life is highly valuable and that the religious life is wholly worthless, and if we are 
assuming that Quinsby thinks both of them valuable, although he (mistakenly) values the 
religious life more than the political life, I just cannot see how the religious life really would 
really be better for Quinsby than the political life.  Insofar as we think that the less valuable life 
is the better one for the person, I think we must be assuming that the less valuable life is not 
wholly worthless or (what would be worse) positively bad.  Then it is easier to understand how 
the importance of ethical integrity can tip the scales in the other direction and make the 
objectively less valuable life the better one for a particular person to lead.       
E)  Summary 
 Let me sum up this complex discussion of the endorsement argument.  We have been 
considering the idea prominent in many liberal writers that, even if some things are objectively 
better for people than others, and even if people are not always the best judges of their own good, 
it is nonetheless the case that nothing can make a person’s life go better, unless he endorses that 
thing.  This idea is often offered as the basis for the liberal’s opposition to paternalism toward 
adults.  A careful examination, however, shows that the endorsement argument is considerably 
weaker than it is generally represented as being.  First, even if it is true that nothing can benefit a 
person without her eventual endorsement, that does not rule out using paternalistic means to 
cause the person to sincerely endorse that thing (as in Dworkin’s piano practice example).  





would shy away from such tactics in the case of adults.  But the endorsement argument itself 
does not explain that asymmetry.  Second, the endorsement thesis only applies, at most, to 
intrinsic goods; things can benefit people in instrumental ways without their endorsement.  That 
leaves open a very wide berth for paternalistic interference.  Third, while it is plausible that 
people can only intrinsically benefit from engaging in certain activities if they endorse them, it is 
much less plausible that people can only benefit from avoiding certain activities if they endorse 
avoiding them.  My discussion does not show that the importance of endorsement to well-being 
has no implications for the Liberal Outlook on Paternalism.  In general, I agree that the 
significance of endorsement does tend to support the Liberal Outlook; I simply deny that it can 
fully account for the Liberal Outlook’s general opposition to paternalism toward adults.   
3.4  Paternalism and the Satisfaction of Desire 
You might think that liberal anti-paternalism would be on the firmest ground if we refused to 
even crack the door to objective value and insisted that the only source of well-being is the 
individual’s own desires.  As Griffin observes, this has been one important part of the appeal of 
the desire-based approach to well-being: “both philosophers and social scientists have been 
powerfully drawn to it because it leaves no room for paternalism; if actual desires determine 
distributions, consumers are sovereign and agents autonomous” (Griffin 1986: 10).33  On 
reflection, however, the logic of any reasonable desire-fulfillment theory can provide, in itself, 
very little support for the Liberal Outlook.   
                                                          
33 Griffin himself does not endorse this rationale: “it just confuses two quite different ideas to adopt the actual-desire 





The simplest desire-fulfillment account says that a person’s well-being consists in the 
satisfaction of his actual present desires.  Prima facie, at least, this view does seem to rule out 
most opportunities for paternalism.  If your well-being consists in getting what you presently 
want, then how can I benefit you by restricting your freedom and therefore by preventing you 
from getting what you want.  An initial fissure opens up, however, from the fact that we often 
want conflicting things.  Someone wants both to smoke and to quit smoking.  Where does this 
person’s real well-being lie?  One answer is that a person most wants to do whatever he has the 
strongest inclination to do, and that a person always acts on his strongest inclinations.  This 
would indeed successfully block virtually all opportunities for paternalism, but the cost is a 
completely implausible conception of well-being, for this makes it impossible for a person to 
ever act contrary to his own true interests.  Furthermore, this view, while technically preserving 
the anti-paternalism of the Liberal Outlook, fails to explain the other half of the Liberal Outlook: 
why paternalism toward children is permissible.  We may take it as a desideratum of any 
plausible theory that it can explain how it is possible that paternalism toward children can at least 
sometimes benefit them.           
If we wish to preserve the idea that well-being consists in desire-fulfillment, then it is 
unavoidable that the desires be restricted in various ways.  First, we are going to have to do away 
with the idea that a person’s good is determined by his most intense desires at the moment.  
How, then, are we to handle conflicting present desires?  The most plausible suggestion is that 
we should attend to the hierarchical structure and nature of our desires.  I not only desire to do 
particular things, I desire to have particular desires.  A person may both desire to smoke and 





“identifies” with.  In that case, satisfying the desire to smoke will not really contribute to that 
person’s well-being at all (Griffin 1986: 14-15, 34-37; Parfit 1984: 496-499). 
Our desires reveal a second kind of structure as well: that of means and ends.  Many of the 
things we desire are not desired for their own sake, but for the sake of something else.  Suppose 
Q desires x and y, but desires x for the sake of y.  If obtaining x won’t actually bring Q his object, 
y—or worse, actually makes it impossible to obtain y—then naturally we should say that x won’t 
actually contribute to Q’s well-being.  Moreover, many desires that are not strictly instrumental 
are nonetheless conditional, and we can be wrong about whether or not these conditions hold.  
Romeo wanted to die, not in order to accomplish something else, but because he thought that the 
following condition held: Juliet is dead.  But that condition did not really hold: Juliet was not 
dead.  Therefore, Romeo would have been better off not fulfilling his desire to die.  Nevertheless, 
unless I only have one global, intrinsic desire, the structure of desires will not arbitrate between 
all conflicting desires.  At some point, the brute strength of these fundamental desires “in a cool 
hour” will have to resurface to determine which of these most contributes to my well-being. 
Attending to the structure and nature of a person’s present desires helps to explain some of 
the ways that a person may fail to act in his best interests.  From weakness of will, a person may 
give in to a particularly intense local desire which is inconsistent with his more global or second-
order desires.  Or a person may fail to grasp the best means to his end.  A person may also fail to 
comprehend how a particular action will impact his other desires.  For instance, a person may 
have the correct belief that another drink will make him feel better now (which is one thing that 
he wants), but fail to recognize how that drink will make him feel hung-over at work the next 
day (though he has a strong desire not to feel that way).  These points help explain how 





have poor impulse control and inaccurate knowledge about the best means to their ends, and 
these facts will often give rise to instances in which adults can benefit children by restricting 
children’s freedom to act as they would.  But, of course, adults too may fail to grasp the best 
means to their ends or fail to act on their second-order desires.  The logic of the desire-
fulfillment gives us no particular reason not to interfere with adults in these cases.  It might be 
said that adults are likely to have a global desire not to be interfered with in most circumstances, 
but that is true of some children as well—especially of adolescents—and we often override such 
desires when they are held by minors.  One also might be tempted to say, further, that insofar as 
children do not have the capacity to reflect on their first-order desires and form second-order 
volitions, they lack a basic requisite for autonomy (Frankfurt 1988a), and that this explains why 
paternalism toward children is permissible.  Though this is a promising line of argument (to 
which we will pay more attention in the next chapter), it does not really seem to be an argument 
rooted in considerations of well-being.  If my well-being just consists in the fulfillment of my 
desires, then why should I need second-order desires at all.  True, if I happen to have second-
order desires, then these will be more central to my well-being than my first-order desires.  But if 
I don’t have any second-order desires, then it would seem that (on the present account) my well-
being just consists in the satisfaction of my first-order desires.   
Much paternalism toward children is motivated by a still further consideration, however, 
which is that we know that a child’s desires will change over time.  What Parfit dubs the “present 
aim theory,” which says that a person’s good is to be identified with the satisfaction of the 
desires he happens to hold at that moment, is (as Parfit argues) completely incredible (1984: 





not just a person’s present desires, but his future desires as well.34  Little Oliver may not care 
much about his inheritance now, but that doesn’t mean that it won’t matter to him very much 
when he is older.  Similarly, many things the child does, or doesn’t do today, will have a great 
influence on the chances of fulfilling his future desires.  Responsible parents, therefore, often 
deny children’s present freedom to do as they please in order to ensure that children can lead 
satisfying lives as adults.  Children also often fail to accurately imagine the satisfaction they will 
really get in the future from the fulfillment of some desire.  As Sidgwick observes, what appears 
good to us now, “may turn out a ‘Dead Sea apple,’ mere dust and ashes in the eating” (1907: 
110).  Finally, as we have observed in the context of the endorsement argument, the desires a 
child will have later, or as an adult, are partly under the control of parents.  The child may not 
have any desire to play piano now, but he may well develop that desire as he gets older if he is 
made to practice piano as a child.  These facts about the way that desires change over time help 
to make sense of how, even on a desire-fulfillment account, it is possible to benefit children 
paternalistically.   
But, once again, these same facts also make room for the possibility of successful 
paternalism toward adults.  We needn’t exaggerate the point, of course.  The desires of adults 
will generally change less drastically and less predictably than those of children, and they are 
harder to manipulate.  And yet, this is a matter of degree, and the desires of some adults are 
considerably less stable and more vulnerable to manipulation than those of others.  Does that 
variance in disposition correspond to how permissible it is to treat different adults 
                                                          
34 I shall leave aside here the puzzle as to whether a person’s well-being depends on his past desires.  Brandt (1979) 
gives the example of  “a convinced sceptic who has rebelled against a religious background wants, most of his life, 
no priest to be called when he is about to die.  But he weakens on his deathbed, and asks for a priest.  Do we 





paternalistically?  It may also be insisted that, unlike children in many cases, adults often are in a 
better position to know their future desires and what will really satisfy them than anyone else.  
But this simply leads us back to the epistemic argument again: the logic of a desire-fulfillment 
account itself does very little to rule out paternalism.   
I will not devote a separate discussion to the argument that hedonism about well-being makes 
paternalism practically impossible, since many of the points made about desire-satisfaction 
accounts apply mutatis mutandis to those accounts as well.  The central point is that people can 
obviously be wrong about what will give them pleasure in the future.  More interestingly, people 
may even be wrong about the amount of enjoyment they are getting from something at the 
moment.  A person may try to deceive herself, for example, as to how much she enjoys her job, 





CHAPTER 4:  RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
We are looking for a justification of the Liberal Outlook on paternalism, which supposes that, 
at least in practice, there is a strong presumption against treating adults paternalistically, but no 
such strong presumption against treating children that way (see 1.5).  In the previous two 
chapters, I have been examining what I have called the “welfarist approach,” which argues that 
paternalism wrongs the subject only when the paternalist fails (or will tend to fail) to accomplish 
his formal aim of promoting the subject’s good, or well-being (see 2.1).  The suggestion, then, is 
that paternalism toward children is much more likely to accomplish its formal aim than is 
paternalism toward adults. 
I begin this chapter, in section 4.2, with a discussion of the idea that seems to be missing 
from the welfarist approach: respect for autonomy.  This idea is at the heart of what I have called 
the “sovereignty approach” (see 2.1).  In section 4.3, I examine the central challenge facing the 
sovereignty approach in the company of Sidgwick.  In section 4.4, I broach the leading 
interpretation of respect for autonomy, which I call “respect for agency” or “the agency 
approach,” and consider its strategy for dealing with “Sidgwick’s Challenge.”  Then, in sections 
4.5 and 4.6, I explore two families of arguments for the Liberal Outlook that belong to the 
agency approach.  Finally, in section 4.7, I explain why I think the agency approach cannot be 
the whole explanation of the Liberal Outlook.  This prepares the way for my own interpretation 





4.2  Benevolence and Respect 
A) The idea of respect for persons 
One recurring objection that I have leveled against the welfarist arguments in the previous 
two chapters is that they permit more paternalism toward adults than seems consistent with the 
Liberal Outlook.  This is essentially an argument from “reflective equilibrium.”  The suggestion 
is not the methodologically unsound one that the welfarist accounts must be wrong, since they 
have implications we are hesitant to accept, but rather the more modest idea that, insofar as these 
arguments do have counter-intuitive implications, we have good reason to press further in our 
search for plausible arguments that might underlie our everyday moral views.  Of course, our 
everyday views could be misguided, but it is hard to see where else we can begin. 
I now wish to register a second objection to the welfarist approach, which is that (by itself) it 
gets the phenomenology of our practical reasoning wrong.  Even if purely welfarist accounts 
could be sufficiently massaged in order to squeeze out a plausible justification for the Liberal 
Outlook on paternalism, these arguments would still tend to distort the nature of the 
considerations we actually appeal to when we reason about treating people paternalistically.  
Welfarist arguments suggest that, when we are torn about whether or not it is right to treat 
someone paternalistically, we are essentially facing a difficult technical question:  we know that 
we want to do whatever will make the person “happiest” in the long run—or best promote his 
well-being—but we are simply unsure as to which course of action is the best means to that end.  
Will the person be better off in the long run if I interfere with his choice (perhaps without his 
knowledge)—or if I leave him to make his own decision?  Perhaps this is how we think when we 
are dealing with a child or even an adolescent, but I don’t believe it really captures the whole of 





paternalist is torn between two different kinds of duties which arise from very different moral 
attitudes.  On the one hand, he cares for the other’s happiness or well-being.  But, on the other 
hand, he respects the other’s autonomy, his authority over his own life—an authority which is 
not forfeited simply because the paternalist could make the subject better off by constraining his 
freedom of choice.  Even where a person is not the best judge of his own interests, we typically 
think that he is nonetheless the final judge—at least within a large range of cases.  It is the 
bypassing of that authority that constitutes the most direct objection to paternalism.  Call this 
idea respect for autonomy.  I maintain that it is at least a prima facie objection to the welfarist 
approach that it doesn’t recognize respect for autonomy as an independent moral consideration.  
On the other hand, this is precisely the attraction of the sovereignty approach:  it seems to do 
justice to our sense that respect for autonomy is significant beyond its contribution to well-being.   
Perhaps this intuitive appeal to the place of respect for autonomy in our practical reasoning is 
persuasive by itself.  But someone might object that we shouldn’t put much trust in brute appeals 
to intuition.  We need to explain why respect for autonomy has the significance we intuitively 
feel it to have.  It is hard to know whether this challenge can be met.  After all, how would we 
explain why well-being matters?  However, I want to at least try to meet the challenge by 
explaining how respect for autonomy is a part of the more fundamental idea of respect for 
persons.  This will not be a deductive argument.  Instead, the aim is to show how respect for 
autonomy fits into a larger picture of morality in an attractive way.  The argument will bear 
obvious resemblance to those familiar from the works of Kant and other social contract writers, 
but I will expound it without trying to attribute it in detail to anyone in particular.  Part of the 





somewhat novel way, and so I don’t want the discussion here tied too closely to the 
interpretation other writers give to it.  
Although I believe that it is correct to think that showing respect for autonomy is a part of 
respect for persons, we have to be careful not to fall into making bad arguments.  We should be 
particularly wary of moving too quickly from respect for a person’s autonomy to respect for that 
person.  We often use the word “respect” simply to mean the act of observing some right or 
claim.  Thus, to respect Mr. Calhoun’s right to own these slaves is simply to recognize that Mr. 
Calhoun is entitled to a bundle of legal prerogatives, powers, protections, etc. regarding his 
control over these other human beings.  But it should be obvious that, if we refuse to respect Mr. 
Calhoun’s right to own slaves (along with that of every other would-be slaveholder), then we are 
not being disrespectful to Mr. Calhoun in any important moral sense.  Evidently, then, using 
“respect for x” language does nothing to show that respecting x is a part of respect for persons.  
We need to say more about what respect for persons consists in, if we are to make any headway 
in showing the connection to respect for autonomy. 
Sometimes respect for persons is understood to signify the recognition that certain 
characteristics of others make moral demands on our actions, and thus that we cannot simply 
treat them however we like.  This notion sometimes travels under the name “recognition 
respect,”1 and it is one way of interpreting the Kantian notion that we are always to treat others 
as ends and never merely as means (Darwall 1977).  In this spirit, we might say that treating 
someone with respect means never using someone “like a piece of furniture or a tool” 
                                                          
1 Recognition respect is contrasted with appraisal respect, which consists in the assessment of the quality of 
character traits or, more broadly, esteem of someone or something in general.  Thus, it is supposed that we are to 
morally respect someone as a person (recognition respect) even if we think that they are not a very good person 





(Korsgaard 1996c: 297).  And, indeed, Kant glosses respect in this way in The Doctrine of 
Virtue:  “The duty of respect for my neighbor is contained in the maxim not to degrade any other 
to a mere means to my ends (not to demand that another throw himself away in order to slave for 
my end)” (MM: 6:450).  Therefore, we might want to say that respect involves recognizing that 
others are of non-instrumental, unconditional value.   
Some Kantians suggest that paternalism fails to show respect in just this sense.  Onora 
O’Neill, for instance, suggests that coercion or deception of competent adults, even for their own 
good, generally involves treating them “as mere props or tools in our own projects” (1985: 259).  
But in cases of paternalism, this seems to stretch the idea of using a person like a tool beyond all 
commonsense recognition.  To treat someone paternalistically consists in restricting her freedom, 
or bypassing her autonomy, for her own good and for her own sake.  But we don’t typically care 
for a tool for its own sake.  (When we do care for them, it is generally because we want them to 
last for our own sake).  Think about it this way:  When you force a child to go to school, you 
plainly treat the child paternalistically, but it seems wrong to say that you are treating the child 
like “a mere prop or tool” or “a piece of furniture” in your own project—much less that you are 
demanding that the child throw himself away in order to slave for your end.2  Similarly, then, 
while treating competent adults like children may be wrong, it can’t be the same as treating them 
like things.  Perhaps someone will suggest that we use the term “treating someone as a thing” as 
a pure term of art, which means nothing more than treating someone in a way inconsistent with 
the requirements of morality.  But in that case we would have to surrender the rhetorical force 
                                                          
2 Of course, the child’s good is your end in a sense.  But likewise, when I use coercion to prevent A from harming B, 
B’s good is my end.  It would be just as misleading in this latter case to say that I have used A as a mere tool or 





contained in the ordinary idea of not using or treating others as things.  I don’t think we should 
do that.3   
Rather than say that paternalism is morally objectionable because it involves treating others 
as mere tools or things, which seems false, perhaps we should say that it is objectionable because 
it is inherently contemptuous.  That seems to bring us closer to the intuitive idea of what is 
objectionable about treating an adult like a child.  The objection is that paternalism is somehow 
incompatible with the basic equality of individuals.  I think that this, too, is on the right track, but 
I don’t think it is possible to maintain that paternalism toward adults is necessarily expressive of 
contempt, or of any other attitude except benevolence (which on my account is true by 
definition, see 1.2-3).  The difficulty is that all kinds of actions can be expressed with or without 
contempt, and it is very hard to pick out particular kinds of treatment that are inherently 
expressive of the actor’s contempt.  No doubt it is possible for paternalism to be expressive of 
contempt.  But we might also express contempt for others, not by interfering with them for their 
own sake, but by leaving them alone and remaining aloof from them, as if their well-being did 
not really matter as much as our own.  By the same token, paternalism—and particularly 
moralistic paternalism—can be understood as taking the equal moral worth of others seriously, 
and thus, as expressive of the profoundest respect (cf. Finnis 1987; George 1993: ch. 3).  It is 
hard to argue that such professions must be in bad faith.   
Instead of looking for what is objectionable about paternalism merely in the subjective 
attitude of the paternalist, we would do better, I think, to pay closer attention to the 
characteristics of persons that make respect for autonomy a moral requirement.  In other words, 
                                                          





why does recognition respect give rise to respect for autonomy?  One popular answer is that what 
is definitive of being a person is having the capacity to freely set ends and prescribe rational 
rules of conduct for oneself.4  Therefore, we cannot respect persons without showing respect for 
their capacity for self-determination, or in other words, respect for their autonomy.  This 
suggestion gets us part of the way toward where we want to go.  I believe it is correct to say that 
any plausible moral theory is going to have to show due regard for our capacity for independent 
practical reasoning.  But this doesn’t quite get us to the stronger sense of “respect for autonomy” 
that constitutes a standing (even if sometimes defeasible) objection to paternalism.  This is 
because what deserves respect in the highest degree may not be just any arbitrary outcome of a 
person’s practical reasoning, but only those outcomes that are themselves rational or reasonable.  
Only rational and reasonable deliberation, it may be maintained, is really expressive of the 
dignity of humanity.  Therefore, a part of respecting others as persons is to help them deliberate 
in a distinctively human way—rationally and reasonably—even if this means paternalistically 
overriding some of their irrational or unreasonable choices.  This, if you will, is the Aristotelian 
or Thomist way of filling out the notion of respect for persons.  It is best articulated by Robert 
George:       
To treat persons with equal respect, I suggest, is to act from an appreciation of their 
value as persons, as unique loci of human goods, possessing the rational capacity for self-
determination by free choice, but subject to being deflected from full reasonableness in 
choosing not only by mistakes in judgment, but also by habits, weakness of will, and 
unintegrated feelings, desires, and other emotional factors.  Governments are obliged to 
show equal respect to persons qua persons, not to all of the persons’ acts and choices.  
Viewed in this way, respect is neither the equivalent of concern nor the equivalent of 
non-interference.  And treating people with equal respect is neither merely caring about 
their well-being (in any sense less than their full integrated human flourishing) nor 
                                                          
4 Because Kant thought this capacity central to being a person, he called it our “humanity.”  See Kant, G: 4:437 and 





simply refraining from interfering with all of their self-regarding acts and choices (1993: 
102). 
B)  Equal practical authority 
If we want to flesh out a rival conception of respect for persons—one in which respect for 
autonomy (as I have described it above) is more central—I think we do best to emphasize the 
place of equality in respect.  In a broad sense, to show (recognition) respect is, as we have seen, 
to show due regard for something and to act in a way fitting to the thing.  In this sense, we can 
respect animals in that we can recognize (say) how their capacity for pleasure and pain should 
guide our humane treatment of them.  But, as persons, to show respect for other persons seems to 
involve something more:  it seems to involve a recognition of our fundamental equality.  This 
fundamental equality, I would argue, consists in more than our equal moral worth:  that what 
happens to one person matters from a moral point of view just as much as what happens to any 
other person.  It even consists in more than the very important recognition that practical 
reasoning and self-determination are central to personhood.  Also central to our fundamental 
equality is our equal practical authority.  The idea I have in mind is prevalent in the social 
contract tradition, but it is perhaps best captured by Locke, when he describes our natural state of 
equality as one “wherein all power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than 
another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, 
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, 
should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection” (2T: II.4).  By 
invoking the notion of a person’s authority, what I mean is that, within a certain domain or 
“jurisdiction,” what confers a special status on the outcome of a person’s deliberation is its 





Compare the legal authority of a government:  within a certain jurisdiction (and perhaps 
within certain bounds of reasonableness), what makes something a law is not whether the law is 
rational or reasonable, but whether it was issued through the proper channels by the legitimate 
government.5  My claim, then, is that the practical activity of others deserves our respect, not in 
virtue of its rationality or reasonableness, but just in virtue of its having its source in a moral 
equal.  To limit the other’s exercise of autonomy, even if for his own good and with the best and 
purest of intentions, is nonetheless a failure to respect this fundamental equality, in that it 
oversteps the equally parsed jurisdictional boundaries that separate his authoritative zone of 
control from my own.6  I submit that recognition of this equal practical authority is integral to the 
best interpretation of what it means to respect others as free and equal persons.7  Of course, 
where interests are shared or conflict, we have to work out forms of “shared jurisdiction.”  
Because my subject is paternalism, I have said nothing about how this shared jurisdiction is to be 
conceptualized.  But a natural way of thinking about the moral root of democracy is that it is a 
way of sharing our equal authority over matters that are of mutual interest and over which no one 
has exclusive personal sovereignty.  Thus, to deny a person a voice in the government of his 
                                                          
5 Of course, philosophical questions about the nature of law are far more complicated than that description lets on, 
but the point is clear enough, I think, for my analogy to be understood. 
6 See also Kant, MM: 6:229-233.  On the analogy between paternalism and political usurpation, see Korsgaard 
(2008b).   
7 It might be objected that there is a gap in my argument.  For even if respect for the equal practical authority of 
others is a part of respect for persons, it does not follow that each person has jurisdiction or authority over himself.  
Perhaps everyone has an equal authority over everything and over everyone else.  This idea might take two forms.  
First, everyone might have the license to act however he likes, without any duty to respect the equal license of others 
(roughly, as in the Hobbesian state of nature).  Or, second, everyone’s equal authority might range over everything 
and everyone, but only be capable of being exercised jointly.  Thus, everyone would have a duty to obey the will of 
all in all things.  Although each of these views is consistent with everyone having equal practical authority, neither is 
attractive as a moral conception.  The first seems wholly implausible as an interpretation of respect for persons, 
since it lacks any distinctively moral content; it is rather the denial that there are any moral requirements on anyone.  
The second, though a coherent moral conception, is unattractive because it fails to do justice to the facts that human 
agency comes bundled in separate, independent, person-sized units, and that human beings seem to have a special 





basic interests is wrong because it fails to recognize that his practical authority is equal to that of 
everyone else.  Even if his interests would be better protected without his having a say, it is 
nonetheless his right as an equal to have that say.  In this way, we see that the non-instrumental 
justification of democracy is the same principle as that underlying the non-welfarist objection to 
paternalism.  
What emerges from this is a picture of morality that is at least dualistic in its foundations.8  
One pillar of morality is grounded in the attitude of benevolence or care, which is a moral 
attitude oriented toward the good or well-being of others.  But trying to reduce all of morality to 
considerations of benevolence, even if only at a fundamental level, is in my view a mistake.  We 
also recognize the unconditional value of others as free and equal persons by respecting their 
autonomy and their equal authority as independent human beings.  Because there are (at least) 
these two different ways of recognizing and appropriately responding to a person’s unconditional 
value, it is possible to fail to treat a person as morality requires out of a sincere but one-sided 
concern for the other person as an end in herself.9 
Of course, it bears reminding that it is possible to bring this notion of respect for autonomy 
within an expansive objective account of benevolence and well-being.  We might, for instance, 
simply stipulate that our respect for Q’s right to control his affairs is itself one ideal constituent 
of Q’s good, regardless of whether that control tends to promote Q’s subjective satisfaction, and 
regardless of how that control tends to impact the rest of Q’s life.  And we could further stipulate 
                                                          
8 If not more fragmented than that.  See Nagel (1979). 
9 Although I will not try to draw the connections and distinctions, my views here have been particularly influenced 
by the discussions of love (or care, or benevolence) and respect in O’Neill (1985); Darwall (2002; 2006); and 






that the good of controlling one’s own affairs always, or almost always, outweighs the promotion 
of other elements of well-being.  It should come as no surprise that there are different ways of 
carving up in theory what are essentially the same kinds of practical relations; nor should we get 
too hung-up on what are really little more than stylistic variants of the same philosophical 
outlook.  It seems to me more useful and perspicuous to separate out respect for the autonomy 
others from care for their well-being, and it is notable that the more influential authors who do 
ground the moral importance of autonomy in well-being deny that it is respect for the right of 
control that is intrinsically valuable.10  However, I am willing to concede that the notion of well-
being is fluid enough (especially when detached from subjective satisfaction) to accommodate 
my conception of respect for autonomy.  Such a view is what I have called above the 
“embedding approach” (2.1). 
C)  The case against the welfarist approach 
In sum, I have offered two kinds of argument against the welfarist approach to justifying the 
Liberal Outlook on paternalism.  The first kind of argument, which occupied the last two 
chapters, was essentially an argument from reflective equilibrium.  I claimed that the best 
welfarist arguments, standing on their own, seem to permit more paternalism than liberal 
commonsense would allow.  To be sure, that does not mean that such intuitive notions are right 
and that the welfarist arguments are wrong.  But a mismatch between our initial intuitions and 
the implications of our arguments gives us cause to look further for a different justification of our 
intuitions.  The second kind of argument maintains that the welfarist approach fails to do justice 
to the ways we actually reason about whether or not to treat people paternalistically.  That is, 
                                                          
10 This is very clear in Griffin (1986).  I believe that the same is true of Raz (1986) and of the elaboration of the 





even if we are confident that we can benefit someone by treating him paternalistically, we still 
seem to think that there important considerations against doing so.  Respect for autonomy seems 
to be morally important beyond autonomy’s contribution to well-being.  Finally, I have tried to 
say something about why respect for autonomy is morally important.  I have argued that respect 
for autonomy is a part of respecting others as free persons, who are not only of equal moral 
importance to one another, but who also have equal practical authority as one another.  It is 
overstepping this equal practical authority, then, that makes it illegitimate to bypass another’s 
autonomy, even when doing so would be beneficial to him.  
4.3  Sidgwick’s Challenge 
The alternative to the welfarist approach, the “sovereignty approach,” does take the idea of 
respect for autonomy seriously.  As I suggested at the beginning of Chapter 2, the challenge for 
the sovereignty approach is to explain why, given the duty of respect for autonomy, paternalism 
is ever permissible, as commonsense suggests that it is.  And in particular, the sovereignty 
approach must account for why paternalism toward children should be generally more 
appropriate than paternalism toward adults.  This challenge was essentially the argument that 
Sidgwick gave for rejecting what he called an absolute “Right to Freedom,” which is to say, one 
not grounded in utility.  While Sidgwick allowed that the principle that “no one should be 
coerced for his own good … commends itself much to my mind,” he believed that, on reflection, 
only the principle of utility could explain the reasonable limitations we place on the right to 
freedom, since “no one would gravely argue that this ought to be applied to the case of children, 
or of idiots, or of insane persons.”  This, for Sidgwick, is the thin end of the wedge.  If we ask 





“idiots,” and the insane, we must find that the principle of freedom only applies when “human 
beings are sufficiently intelligent to provide for themselves better than others would provide for 
them” (this is the “epistemic argument” we explored in 2.5).  And, if that is right, then the 
principle of freedom “would present itself not as absolute, but merely a subordinate application 
of the wider principle aiming at the general happiness or well-being of mankind” (1907: 274-
275).  Although the welfarist approach is vulnerable to the criticisms just rehearsed above, it 
does at least have an account for distinguishing cases of permissible and impermissible 
paternalism.  If the sovereignty approach cannot explain why paternalism should ever be 
permissible—especially paternalism toward children—then, on balance, the welfarist approach 
will probably look far more plausible.   
An initial move that a proponent of the sovereignty approach might want to make is to 
distinguish between a fundamental and an absolute duty to respect autonomy.  A duty (or right) 
is fundamental if it is not derived from another principle.  A duty (or right) is absolute if it is 
indefeasible.  These two characteristics might, but need not, go hand-in-hand.  In classical 
utilitarianism, they tend to go together: there is only one fundamental (non-derived) and absolute 
(exceptionless) moral duty: “promote the general happiness.”  Other moral principles, like “tell 
the truth,” “do not steal,” and “show gratitude” are neither absolute nor fundamental.  They are 
not fundamental because their ultimate rationale is that observing these principles will tend to 
promote the general happiness.  And the derived status of these subordinate principles explains 
why they are not absolute (or exceptionless): if the rationale for generally telling the truth is that 
this tends to promote general happiness, then there seems to be no good reason for telling the 





Perhaps it is for this reason that Sidgwick makes the error of thinking that he can show that a 
duty is not fundamental if he can show that it is not absolute.  He argues that since there are 
exceptions to the principle of freedom—cases where considerations of utility limit the 
application of the principle of freedom—that shows that the principle of freedom is ultimately 
subordinate to the principle of utility.  But that does not follow.  To give one instance, I can 
consistently maintain that keeping promises is a fundamental but non-absolute duty.  I may think 
I should keep my promises, even when doing so will lead to somewhat less happiness all around 
(even taking into account remote effects).  That shows that I do not think that the duty to keep 
promises is simply derived from the duty to promote happiness.  But, on the other hand, 
accepting that the duty to keep promises is fundamental does not mean that I am committed to 
keeping my promises come hell or high water (cf. Williams 1973: 90-91).  There will be cases 
where the costs of keeping a promise seem unreasonable.  Although I have promised to be home 
for the holidays, I might think it is reasonable to break that promise to care for a very sick friend.   
Here is one way to think about non-absolute, fundamental duties.  For something to be a duty 
is inter alia for it to exclude certain other grounds for consideration (Raz 1975).  When I have a 
duty to keep a promise, I am not to decide on the basis of what will make me happiest or even 
what will lead to the most overall happiness.  These grounds are excluded.  But this exclusion 
may only operate across a certain range of cases.  The duty to keep promises is not overridden 
whenever breaking the promise would lead to more happiness, but there may be certain 
exceptional cases beyond the normal range where considerations of utility do override the non-
utilitarian principle to keep promises (cf. Fried 1978: 13-17 and Kamm 2007: 30-31).  
Allowing that the duty to respect autonomy is not absolute helps deal with Sidgwick’s 





bypassing a person’s freedom does not mean that it is always wrong no matter the consequences.  
Someone might consistently hold that generally autonomy should not be overridden to protect or 
promote a person’s well-being, but that in catastrophic cases—in order to prevent a person from 
killing or crippling himself, for example—paternalistic restraints are warranted.  Indeed an even 
subtler account is possible.  In Chapter 1 we considered different forms of paternalism: legal 
restraint, coercion, manipulation, deception, etc.  Perhaps each of these modes sets different 
thresholds for permissibly overriding autonomy.  It may be that legal restraint or coercion are 
only justified in truly catastrophic cases, whereas the threshold for permissible manipulative or 
deceptive paternalism is much lower.   
To what extent does rendering the duty to respect autonomy non-absolute help with our 
central concern: the justification of paternalism toward children?  Certainly there are cases where 
abstaining from paternalistic intervention with children seems catastrophic enough to outweigh a 
concern with autonomy, as in cases where the child’s action endangers life or limb.  But this 
would not account for the pervasiveness of the paternalism that we practice toward children.  For 
instance, making rules concerning the child’s diet, bedtime, and everyday activities, while 
perhaps good for children, do not seem to be plausibly construed as catastrophic, exceptional 
cases.  Therefore, it is not just that children stand to benefit more from paternalism than adults; it 
seems that the threshold for paternalistic intervention is considerably lower in the case of 
children.  Whatever is wrong with paternalism in general, just doesn’t seem to be as wrong with 
respect to children.  That is not something that the distinction between absolute and fundamental 






Instead of arguing that respect for autonomy is limited by external considerations, like 
catastrophic harm, a different approach is to show that respect for autonomy can somehow limit 
itself.  There is a large family of arguments which proceeds roughly in this spirit.  To respect a 
person’s autonomy, it is supposed, is to respect another’s free choices.  As one author puts it, 
“This means that in every action, we are to respect others as choosers even if we disapprove of 
the choices they make.  As such, there is no general permission to make other people’s choices 
for them simply because they are not likely to choose well on their own” (Schapiro 1999: 719).  
But the standing obligation to respect a person’s choices does not apply when the “choice” 
cannot be attributed to an accountable agent.  This might be for two kinds of reasons.  First, 
sometimes a person does not realize what he is really about to do, and would not want to so act if 
he did realize it.  Preventing someone from doing what they don’t really want to do does not 
seem to really violate a person’s self-direction.  In these cases, we might say that the action is not 
really the agent’s genuine choice.  I shall call these “arguments from involuntariness.”  The 
second group of reasons is this:  some human beings—like young children—seem to lack the 
basic rational capacities constitutive of agency.  Therefore, here we do not even have an 
accountable agent, and so we cannot have a duty to respect the subject’s agency.  I shall call 
these “constitutive arguments.”   
Because both kinds of argument turn on questions about agency—whether a choice is 
expressive of agency or whether the actor is a full agent at all—I call this whole family of views 
“respect for agency.”  In the next two sections (4.4 and 4.5), I will explore both sorts of 
argument.  In doing so, I will draw on a number of authors to offer composite accounts that 
present what seem to me the strongest versions of these arguments.  Then, in the following 





of the Liberal Outlook either.  This sets the table for me to argue in Chapter 5 that respect for 
agency is not the only possible interpretation of the broader ideal of respect for autonomy, and 
that a different interpretation is better suited to explaining some aspects of paternalism toward 
minors.  
4.4  Arguments from Involuntariness 
Arguments from involuntariness maintain that the duty of respect for agency does not require 
us to respect the apparent “choices” of a person who is about to do something he does not really 
intend to do.  For example, Mill argues that we do not really infringe a person’s liberty when we 
prevent him from walking onto a bridge that, unbeknownst to him, is about to give way, “for 
liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river” (OL: V, ¶ 
5 / CW, XVIII: 294).  Joel Feinberg explains the rationale of the position this way: just as the 
liberal harm principle permits us to protect a person from the harmful choices of others, the same 
rationale licenses us to protect a person from his own “‘nonvoluntary choices,’ which being the 
genuine choices of no one at all, are no less foreign to him” (1986: 12).  Feinberg suggests that 
there are ultimately two grounds for regarding someone’s act or assent to something as 
insufficiently voluntary for it to be truly his own: (a) He didn’t really know (or understand) what 
he was doing,” and (b) “He couldn’t help it” (316).  I shall consider these cognitive and 
volitional failures in turn in sections (A) and (B), and then, in section (C), briefly discuss some of 
the different causes of these failures.   
A)  Cognitive failure 
The most straight-forward cases in which a person’s action is foreign to his genuine will 





example, once again, is paradigmatic.  If a man is about to walk across a bridge that he doesn’t 
know to be dangerously unsound, and if there is no time to warn him of the danger, then does 
respect for the man’s agency require that I let him continue on his way toward his own peril?  
That seems perverse.  Surely it is perfectly compatible with respecting the man’s agency to 
forcibly restrain him from stepping onto the bridge until I can make the danger known to him.  In 
fact, restraining him seems to be a part of respecting his agency.  If he doesn’t really know what 
he is about to do, then the action isn’t really his choice at all.  Only after he knows the condition 
of the bridge does it seem that he is really in a position to make his own choice about whether to 
take the risk or not.  Once he has made a choice with his “eyes wide open,” then respect for his 
agency requires that I let him go his own way, even if the choice seems unwise.  If the person is 
temporarily in a state that makes it impossible for him to understand what he is doing (maybe he 
is intoxicated), then I might have to restrain him until he really can understand the consequences. 
Although restraining the man appears consistent with respect for agency, it is (in spite of 
Mill’s description of the case) still an interference with the man’s liberty in a sense.  That is 
because the action of crossing the bridge isn’t fully involuntary either, as it might be if he were 
being blown across it by a powerful gale.  That would be so involuntary a movement as not even 
to be an action; if we restrained him then, we wouldn’t be interfering with his liberty at all.  In 
the original version of the bridge example, however, the man is acting voluntarily under one 
description (stepping onto the bridge) and involuntarily under another description (about to risk 
drowning).  That means that if we restrain him, there really is a sense in which we are preventing 
him from doing something for his own good.  In that regard, our restraint is paternalistic.  But at 
the same time, we are preventing the man from risking a harm he doesn’t really intend to take.  





But this seems puzzling:  Every action has innumerable act descriptions, and no one ever 
consciously intends to perform all of them.  So paternalism cannot be warranted whenever I am 
about to act involuntarily under some description.  Part of the solution to the mystery is this: it is 
a necessary condition for warranted interference that there must be good reason to believe that 
the new information would change the person’s mind about the action he is about to perform.  
Thus, I should not restrain a man about to unwittingly walk across a bridge that happens to be the 
second-oldest in Calaverous County (but perfectly safe for all that), since there is no reason to 
think this would change his mind about crossing the bridge. 
On this principle, another constraint on permissible paternalism, naturally enough, is that 
interference is generally only justified when it is the least restrictive or intrusive option.  The 
bystander cannot indulgently tackle and restrain the pedestrian when a simple word of warning 
would do.  Furthermore, we must keep in mind that very often the restraint is more undesirable 
than the unintended consequences.  If I see a stranger at a concession stand about to put 
mayonnaise on his hotdog, I have good reason to think this is a mistake, since it is an unusual 
condiment for hotdogs.  But I wouldn’t be warranted in knocking the mayonnaise packet out of 
his hand even if there were no time to warn him of the impending danger.  When the “danger” is 
slight enough, people would usually prefer to suffer the consequences of their mistakes than be 
interfered with.  In order for interference to be justified, then, one needs to have good reason to 
believe that a person would welcome the interference.  One way to think about this is to consider 





is just a way of thinking about what a person would want for himself, if only he knew what we 
know now.  We should not think that it is just like ordinary consent, only somehow retroactive.11 
Of course, most of the time, no one knows for sure how particular actions will turn out.  In 
these cases, the leading question is whether the subject understands the risks he is taking, and 
whether we know what they are any better than he does.  If we don’t have any knowledge that he 
lacks, then generally paternalism is unwarranted on the present view.  In some cases, a person 
may have a very good understanding of the general risks involved in his action, but for some 
reason we have additional knowledge about this particular case.  This additional knowledge 
could warrant paternalistic interference.  The question is not whether the subject has taken due 
care, but whether he would act as he now intends if he knew what we know. 
From the foregoing, then, we arrive at the view that paternalistic interference is generally 
consistent with respect for agency when we have good reason to believe: (i) that a person is 
about to do something out of ignorance; (ii) which he wouldn’t do if fully informed of the 
relevant facts; (iii) that there is no less restrictive way of informing of the relevant facts; and (iv) 
that the person, if fully informed, would prefer the interference to the consequences of his 
mistake.  Of course, knowing what someone else knows and would prefer can be difficult, so we 
are simply forced to act on the best evidence that is available to us.  With close acquaintances, 
we often have a rough idea of what they would and wouldn’t do voluntarily and when they 
would and wouldn’t welcome interference.  With strangers, we have to rely on assumptions 
about what the average person would believe and prefer.  For this reason, we often appeal to the 
                                                          





standard of what the reasonable “man on the street” would want or prefer.  But this is only a 
heuristic, not a normative standard.   
To mitigate the difficulties and dangers this potential interference causes, we create 
institutions and abide by conventions that make these assumptions public knowledge.  People are 
assumed to know what they are doing when they buy stock, but doctors are not to assume that 
patients understand a treatment without being explicitly briefed.  Sometimes we also delegate the 
responsibility for oversight over a particular domain to special parties (e.g., we expect our 
physicians to oversee our health, not our neighbors).  These measures not only make justified 
paternalism more effective, but reduce the risks of unwarranted interference, abuse, and the 
compromise of privacy.  Sometimes pragmatic considerations make policies and laws less 
flexible than would be warranted in principle.  For example, in principle (on this view) we 
should only make sure that prospective swimmers fully understand the risks of a dangerous 
riptide before allowing them in the water.  Nevertheless, a flat prohibition on swimming might 
be justified, since failing to warn an unwitting swimmer would be far worse than the 
inconvenience to the few willing to take the enormous risk. 
Let me now make a few further remarks fleshing out the ways that cognitive failure does 
(and does not) justify paternalism on the present view.  Sometimes ignorance and defective 
beliefs absolve a person of responsibility for the consequences of his actions, whereas when a 
person should have known better but acts negligently, his ignorance does not absolve him of 
responsibility, or at least does not do so entirely.  When we want to know whether someone is 
accountable for the consequences of his action, it is not enough to ask whether he actually 
foresaw the consequences, because we think a person can be negligent when he unintentionally 





paternalistic interference is, likewise, only justifiable when a person is ignorant of unforeseeable 
consequences.  On this view, respect for autonomy and accountability are essentially flip-sides of 
the same coin (cf. Arneson 1980).  This does not seem to me to be an attractive position.  For 
instance, we typically think a person’s accountability for an accident is not fully absolved when 
he acts under intoxication.  And yet, it might still be appropriate to paternalistically interfere with 
the intoxicated person to prevent him from causing a serious accident to himself, even if absent 
our interference he would have had no one to blame but himself.12  So it seems better to say that 
paternalism can be justified, even when the person would have been responsible or accountable 
for the consequences of his action.    
One might ask how this argument from ignorance differs from the welfarist “epistemic 
argument” considered previously in section 2.5.  Certainly, the two arguments are similar.  One 
difference is that they assume different burdens of proof.  The epistemic argument assumes that 
it is generally right to promote another’s well-being.  However, since people are usually the best 
judges of their own good, it is typically best not to intervene against their will.  The argument 
from ignorance, on the other hand, assumes that interference with another’s choices is generally 
wrong.  However, interference may be justified if a person’s ignorance causes him to do 
something he does not really intend to do.  The more fundamental difference, though, is that the 
epistemic argument appeals to the concept of a person’s good, while the argument from 
ignorance appeals to the non-voluntary character of his action.  Therefore, whether the two 
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should have known,” we reply).  But if a person playfully illustrates the game of Russian roulette with a fully loaded 
six-shooter, it utterly vitiates the voluntariness of his actions to show that he doesn’t know the gun is loaded, and 





arguments are flip sides of the same coin depends on the relationship between a person’s good 
and voluntary action.  If, like Socrates, you think no one does what is bad for himself voluntarily, 
then the two arguments would come to the same thing.   
Another point to make is this: If the argument from ignorance is going to ground a liberal 
theory of paternalism, then it seems that we are going to have to assume a rough fact/value 
distinction.  Thus, it is ignorance of facts about the empirical world that threatens to undermine 
the voluntariness of an action, not ignorance of values.   Suppose a daredevil attempts to ride his 
unicycle blindfolded across what everyone knows to be a dangerous bridge.  We could not 
defend our interference with him on the grounds that, owing to his ignorance of the value of his 
life and the worthlessness of such sophomoric feats, his choice is alien to his “true self” or 
genuine will.  We would then presumably be guilty of what Isaiah Berlin warned us of: of 
bullying people in the name of respect for their “real selves” (1967: 157). 
Furthermore, some departures from rationality may in fact be best understood as rooted in a 
person’s values.  The gambler or romantic is not just a person prone to making mistakes; rather 
his central values are inconsistent with an overly precise calculation of risks, inconsistent with 
the actuarial Lebensphilosophie.  In this vein, Richard Arneson insists that “rationality, in the 
sense of economic prudence, the efficient adaptation of means to ends, is a value which we have 
no more reason to impose on an adult against his will for his own good than we have reason to 
impose any other value on paternalistic grounds” (1980: 474).  A good respect-for-agency 
account requires, then, something like the distinction between global and local preferences 
invoked in some desire-fulfillment theories of well-being.13  That is, it is not always enough to 
                                                          





ask whether this local decision was well-enough-informed to be voluntary.  We also have to ask 
how this local decision is related to a person’s general values and overall character.  For a person 
who seldom takes risks, an apparently careless decision may invite paternalistic interference, 
while such interference may be inappropriate if the same decision were made by a well-known 
rake.14 
Though it is ignorance of empirical facts, not of values, that justifies paternalistic 
interference on the present view, it may be appropriate, as Feinberg suggests, to say that 
voluntariness can be undermined, not only by a lack of mere “cognitive awareness” of the 
consequences or risks of a particular course of action, but also by the lack of a sufficiently 
visceral or emotional appreciation of them (Feinberg 1986: 121, 135).  Thus, if people are to 
make a truly voluntary decision to smoke, it may not be enough that they are told in a cool 
intellectual way about the risks; it may also be necessary that they are exposed to gruesome 
pictures and testimonials of people suffering from tobacco-related illnesses.  While there is 
surely something right about this idea, it is also puzzling in a number of ways.  First, insisting on 
this requirement may somewhat narrow the fact/value distinction, especially if you think that full 
imaginative acquaintance is one way we recognize values (cf. Lewis 1989).  Presumably it would 
be necessary to allow that there are a number of reasonable ways of appreciating the same facts.  
For instance, it may be fitting to ensure that would-be mountain-climbers really comprehend 
what they are getting themselves into, but it seems illiberal to assume that no reasonable person 
could think the hardships and dangers involved are worthwhile.  Second, it is not clear that full 
visceral appreciation of the possible consequences always makes one’s action more voluntary.  
                                                          





To travel by air with one’s “eyes wide open,” it seems sufficient that one has a cool 
understanding of the extreme statistical unlikelihood that one’s plane will crash; we don’t think 
that it is also crucial for people to be shown grisly photographs of the human remains of air 
disasters.15  I won’t try to solve these puzzles here; it is enough to have pointed out that this is 
one part of the account that still has some rough edges. 
All of these considerations seem to make clearer why we treat children more paternalistically 
than adults.  For the most part, adults are presumed to know what they are doing and to prefer 
interference only in exceptional circumstances.  Children’s ignorance of the world and of 
themselves is much more pervasive, and thus, they are more likely to act in ways that don’t 
reflect their true intentions.  Sometimes, like adults, they simply lack relevant information, and 
this defect can be easily remedied.  But in other cases their lack of understanding is far more 
profound and is impossible to remedy immediately.  Young children lack the capacity to reason 
abstractly and to imagine the future, so they cannot understand risk or long-term consequences.  
Although children may not acquire any qualitatively new reasoning capacities after the age of 
about twelve, they may still lack sufficient comprehension for their actions to reflect genuine 
agency.  For one thing, children simply haven’t been around long enough to know very much 
about the world and what opportunities there are to choose from.  And even when children are 
capable of a purely intellectual understanding of the consequences of their actions, they may lack 
the imaginative visceral comprehension we discussed above.  Nor have they had time to get to 
know themselves yet, and children who are still in the process of rapid physiological 
development have very little ability to understand what they will value and desire in just a couple 
                                                          






of years.  These considerations seem to justify treating a child somewhat as we would a normally 
competent person with temporarily compromised capacities, in that we should often prevent 
them from making weighty decisions until they are really in a position to understand the choice 
(cf. Lipson and Vallentyne 1991).  When a decision must be made, it seems best to decide in a 
way that keeps the child’s future options substantially open, so that he can exercise his own 
agency when he is able.16 
B)  Compulsion and volitional failure 
Acting out of ignorance is not the only way that our actions fail to reflect our genuine 
agency.  Sometimes when we feel compelled to act, we don’t feel like the action was really our 
own to make.  In such circumstances, we say “I had no choice.”  The most direct cases are those 
involving coercion and other forms of external pressure.  Cases of direct coercion raise questions 
for paternalism insofar as we must decide when a person’s consent to a transaction or to 
another’s act should be considered valid.  Often our judgment about these cases turns on whether 
the allegedly coercive threat was wrongful.  If so, then consent usually isn’t binding; otherwise, 
it is.  Harder cases are those where party A takes advantage of party B’s difficult circumstances.  
As an egregious example, A offers to help B out of her difficult financial situation if B agrees to 
donate a kidney.  In these cases, we ask whether A seems to be taking “unconscionably” unfair 
advantage of B, and whether B is forced to do something that we feel no one ever ought to be 
forced to do (like sell her sex or her organs).  Working out particular cases is intricate, and much 
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depends on background views about distributive justice, what sorts of power people are entitled 
to wield in coming to agreements, what choices are so personal as to be protected from being 
made under pressure, and so on.  Because of the child’s vulnerable condition—physically, 
emotionally, and economically—we tend to be less tolerant of their choices being made under 
coercive pressure and duress than we are in the case of adults.  One way of handling this is to 
withhold powers of contract and consent from minors and to appoint guardians to oversee their 
interests and exercise those powers in the minor’s name (see 1.4.C). 
More elusive is the category of inner compulsion.  We often say that a person suffering from 
a chemical addiction or strong neurotic compulsion “couldn’t help himself,” or that a person was 
“overcome” by a strong passion.  These cases of volitional failure are puzzling because the 
person seems to know what he is doing in the most immediate sense and yet he still acts in ways 
that seem foreign to him (at the moment or perhaps later).  Broadly, there seem to be two kinds 
of inner compulsion.  In cases akin to a frenzy, the person is “out of his right mind” and his “true 
self” (that is, his settled dispositions) seems temporarily absent.  These cases closely resemble 
those of ignorance and can be treated in the same way.  For instance, suppose there is a frustrated 
writer who has worked himself into a fury and is about to throw the only copy of his manuscript 
into the roaring fireplace.  We would probably say that his friend is warranted in seizing the 
manuscript and running off until the writer’s frenzy has subsided, since this is what we expect 
the writer in a calm state would want.  Although we would surely restrain a child in a tantrum if 
he was about harm himself, cases of frenzy seem to shed little light on the special status of 





The other category encompasses cases of weakness of will including addiction and neurotic 
compulsion.  In these cases, the person’s true self still seems to be present, but impotent to 
overpower the alien desire (cf. Loewenstein 1996).  Severe cases of weakness of will sometimes 
mitigate responsibility and can vitiate the validity of consent.  However, it seems to rarely 
warrant actively restraining a person’s liberty without prior consent.  This is because, since the 
true self is still present, we assume it is still in the person’s power to authorize us to “bind him to 
the mast” (like Odysseus amongst the sirens) if that is his true will (Elster 1984; 2000).  Young 
children have weak impulse control and little ability to defer instant gratification.  This is 
commonly said to be one factor that justifies paternalistic restraint (G. Dworkin 1972: 76; 
Archard 2000: ch. 4).  This is not unreasonable, but one might wonder why we don’t first require 
the child’s prior consent.  Perhaps it is because weakness of will is combined with other agency-
reducing factors, like an inability to understand the consequences of giving into temptation. 
C)  Forms of cognitive and volitional failures 
Some cognitive and internal volitional failures are “one-off” events.  A simple mistake or 
isolated episode of frenzy or weakness of will are examples.  Others are due to incapacities.  An 
incapacity, in this sense, is a relatively stable defect or imperfection in a person’s reason or will 
that impedes normal adult functioning.  The notion of an incapacity is teleological.  Neither a 
blind person nor a jellyfish can see, but only the blind person suffers from an incapacity, since 
not-seeing is an imperfection in human beings, but not in jellyfish.  Senility, retardation, 
immaturity, and some mental illnesses can be classified as cognitive incapacities.  A serious 
chemical addiction or a powerful neurotic compulsion may be instances of volitional 





Some incapacities are sufficiently temporary that it is worth giving them the special label of 
“impairments.”  These are not just defects judged from the species-standard of normal 
functioning, but are deviations from the individual’s own normal state.  “Normal,” here, also 
denotes a teleological notion; it is not to be understood statistically.  A drunkard may spend more 
time intoxicated than sober, but his “normal” state in the present sense is nonetheless his sober 
state.  As in that example, the most familiar impairments are drugged states, but that is just one 
form of an altered mental state, which can have other causes (like a high fever).  More 
expansively, Feinberg also includes as temporary impairments “the moods, emotions, passions, 
and pains whose demands on our attention can be so peremptory in their several ways that we 
are, while under their influence, utterly distracted from whatever business may be at hand” 
(1986: 321).  In addition to simple temporary impairments, there are also dispositions which 
make us prone to impairments that regularly come and go.  I’ll call these “chronically alternating 
impairments.”  Probably the best examples are bouts of mental illness (like severe depression or 
schizophrenia) that go through cycles of dormancy and acuteness.     
Inexperience, gross ignorance, and naiveté perhaps deserve a special category of their own 
that we can call “broad-based content deficits.”17  Broad-based content deficits are unlike 
incapacities and impairments because they are concerned with content rather than functioning.  
However, like impairments and incapacities, and unlike simple isolated mistakes, broad-based 
content deficits dispose an agent to cognitive failures across a wide range of cases.  For instance, 
a person who has very little knowledge of the world outside her nursery is likely to often act 
without fully understanding what she is doing.  Of course, there is no sharp distinction between 
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an isolated content-deficit (as in the bridge example) and a broad-based content deficit, but in 
practice it is nonetheless an important distinction, since the latter, but not the former, might seem 
to justify taking a generally paternalistic attitude toward a person. 
As the bridge example makes clear, arguments from involuntariness are not formulated 
solely in order to justify paternalism toward children.  They aim to provide a general theory of 
permissible paternalism, which can (hopefully) deal with children as one instance.18  In one 
sense, therefore, the present argument for treating children more paternalistically than adults 
does not appeal to any special kind of justification.  The reasons for treating children 
paternalistically are ultimately the same in form as those for treating adults paternalistically: 
paternalistic interference is appropriate when children are about to act in some way they don’t 
really intend because they don’t really know what they are doing or because they can’t help 
themselves.  This might, at first, seem to suggest that the argument from involuntariness cannot 
really explain the status-distinction between children and adults.  It suggests that the difference 
between adults and children is simply one of degree, and that seems to miss some important 
qualitative difference.19  On the present argument, however, there is a qualitative difference in 
what tends to cause adults and children to act involuntarily.  In adults, these causes tend to be 
occasional (e.g., occasional mistakes or fits of passion).  Consequently, paternalistic interference 
should usually have a narrow, “surgical” character, pinpointing the particular cognitive and 
                                                          
18 Feinberg (1986), for example, only turns his focus to children on page 325 of a 374-page text on paternalism and 
even then only for about eight pages.  (Admittedly, children do receive some peripheral treatment prior to that 
point.) 
19 Cf. Schapiro (1999): “It is tempting to conceive of the adult-child distinction purely as a matter of degree because 
this picture supports the intuition that there is a continuous path from childhood to adulthood.  And there is an 
obvious sense in which such a path exists…. But if the task is to illuminate the content of these concepts as status 
concepts, the idea of greater and lesser degrees of cultivation cannot be the whole story…. To attribute a status 
concept is to draw something like a distinction in kind, and our question is about the meaning of concepts as they 





volitional failures.  The causes of involuntary action in children, however, lying as they do in 
general incapacities and broad-based content deficits, tend to dispose children to acting in 
substantially involuntary ways across a wide variety of situations.  Consequently, paternalistic 
treatment of children is not just narrowly targeted at particular involuntary acts (like preventing 
the child about to drink the detergent under the sink), but takes the much more general form of 
controlling and structuring the child’s environment and filtering the kinds of choices that they 
will face. 
4.5  Constitutive Arguments 
The arguments from involuntariness hold that paternalism may be permissible when an agent 
does not really know what he is doing, or when he is subject to some form of compulsion.  The 
second group of arguments cut deeper.  These maintain that an actor may lack certain capacities 
that are constitutive of full human agency.  Not being a full agent in the first place, we have no 
duty to that actor to respect his agency.  I will discuss two versions of this argument.  One 
appeals to a subject’s lack of moral agency.  The other appeals to a lack of agency in a broader 
sense.  
A)  Moral agency 
One venerable argument for restricting the child’s liberty is that the child is not to be 
entrusted with full freedom until he is capable of recognizing in reciprocal fashion the rights of 
others and his duties to them.  Until then, the child is not a full member of the moral community 
and lacks the rights attending to that status.  This is what Locke meant in saying that children are 
under the authority of their parents until the age of reason: “The freedom … of man, and liberty 





him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he left to the freedom of 
his own will” (2T: II.63).  One of the duties of parents therefore is to raise children so that they 
develop the capacity to know and abide by this law.       
In the Second Treatise, Locke makes this sound like a very intellectual process:  like teaching 
someone the axioms of geometry.  But Locke’s considered view is much more realistic than that.  
In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he holds that knowledge of practical principles 
must “produce conformity to action, not barely speculative assent to their truth” (ECHU: 1.3.3).  
Someone who “knows” in a theoretical way that the proposition “Lying is wrong” is true, but 
who doesn’t feel bound by the rule, doesn’t really know it in the practical or moral sense.  
Therefore, making children reasonable involves helping them to internalize moral principles in 
habits of virtue, especially the fortitude to master their inclinations.  Thus, not unlike Kant, 
Locke tells us that “the foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this, that a man is able to 
deny himself his own desires, cross his own inclinations, and purely follow what reason directs 
as best, though the appetite lean the other way” (STCE: 33).  The goal of moral education, then, 
is to instill in children “Habits woven into the very principles of his nature; and not a counterfeit 
carriage, and dissembled outside, put on by fear” (STCE: 42).  Only someone “used to submit his 
will to the reason of others, when he is young” will learn how to “submit to his own reason, 
when he is of an age to make use of it (STCE: 36).  Similar stories can be told with slight 
differences in a variety of philosophical idioms:  for instance, as the process of instilling moral 
principles, or shaping a superego, or awakening in the child a conscience, a moral sense, or sense 
of justice.20       
                                                          





It might seem that this argument is not genuinely paternalistic, inasmuch as the aim is to 
ensure the recognition of the moral interests of others, and not those of the child.  Insofar as the 
parent must prevent the child from harming or wronging others before he is governed by his own 
conscience, the objection is sound.  But it is in the child’s interests to become a moral being.  
This, anyway, is the way Locke looked at it.  He argued that “To turn [the child] loose to an 
unrestrained liberty, before he has reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of 
his nature to be free; but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and to abandon him to a state as 
wretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as theirs” (2T: II.63).  This passage could be 
interpreted to mean that it is in the interests of people to be able to govern themselves in society 
so that they do not have to be suppressed by others like wild animals.  Or (not incompatibly) it 
could be understood to mean that a prerequisite for a distinctively human life is the capacity to 
live in community and relationships structured by law and reciprocity.  This, however, means 
that such restraint is only paternalistic insofar as it is educative.  Thus, preventing the child from 
harming his sibling is paternalistic insofar as it teaches the child the proper way to act, but it is 
not paternalistic insofar as it simply protects the sibling.   
Modern versions of the argument appealing to moral agency sometimes subscribe to the 
stage theories of moral development articulated by writers like Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1969; 
Colby and Kohlberg 1987), and Rawls (TJ: ch. VIII).  We cannot go into the differences between 
these theories here, but since Kohlberg’s is the most empirically studied, it can serve as an 
exemplar.  In the roughest outline, Kohlberg posits a progressive developmental trajectory in 
moral thinking that is characterized by three successive perspectives that the self takes toward 
the moral expectations of society.  At the pre-conventional level, moral rules are external to the 





conventional level, the person has internalized social expectations and wants to see himself and 
to be seen by others as conforming to these expectations.  And at the post-conventional level, the 
person recognizes the possibility of questioning and evaluating the validity of conventional 
social expectations in light of mutually acceptable general principles and is motivated to act on 
those principles.21  Kohlberg understood these levels to be increasingly sophisticated and mature 
forms of moral reasoning and thought of moral education as properly aimed at furthering this 
process of development (cf. Power et al. 1989).  
B)  Reflective agency 
According to a second kind of constitutive argument, what children lack is not just a moral 
conscience, but more generally any reflective and relatively stable evaluative framework.  Such 
an evaluative framework is central to two fundamental aspects of the reflective agency typical of 
personhood:  our sense of having the freedom to choose on the basis of reasons which of our 
inclinations to will and act upon; and our sense of having a distinctive character with aims and 
principles that endure the changes in our momentary feelings and desires.  I will enter into this 
subject by considering the ideas of reflection and free will, and then explain how these are 
connected to valuing, character, and temporally extended agency.  I shall then explain how the 
lack of this reflective and temporally extended agency will might justify paternalism toward 
children.    
                                                          
21 Kohlberg further divided each level into two stages, the latter incorporating a more de-centered or generalized 
perspective than the former.  At the pre-conventional level, a person initially gives no regard to individual 
perspectives and conceives of moral rules as imposed by powerful authorities (Stage 1), but later recognizes the 
relativity of different perspectives and conceives of moral rules as pragmatic arrangements for pursing his own 
interests (Stage 2).  At the conventional level, a person thinks of moral rules as rooted in the roles and expectations 
of small, interpersonal associations (Stage 3), but later considers these roles from the point of view of society as a 
whole (Stage 4).  At the post-conventional level, a person critically evaluates personal norms in the light of general 
moral principles (Stage 5), but later assesses the validity of these principles themselves insofar as they could be 





 (i) Reflection and free will:  On the simplest model of action, we always act on our 
strongest desires.  But this model does not conform to our experience.  Although we do often 
find ourselves with conflicting desires of varying intensities, we feel ourselves to be capable of 
reflecting on and standing back from these desires, and in the normal case, we have the power to 
endorse one or the other (independently of their visceral intensities) as our true will.  In this 
sense, our practical reason seems to rule over our desires (as Plato, for one, thought) (cf. 
Korsgaard 2008a).  One way to put this is to say that fundamental to mature human agency is 
having the capacity to form effective “second-order volitions,” in which we will to act on a 
particular “first-order desire.”  This is something we assume that (at least most) nonhuman 
animals lack.  A being who doesn’t care about which first-order desire he acts on (perhaps 
because he can’t reflect on them) is what Frankfurt calls a “wanton,” and he suggests that, like 
animals, very young children are wantons (1988a: 16).  As such, the “will” of the wanton lacks 
the hierarchical structure that the will of a “person” possesses.  It is this structure of the will that 
is central to our experience of ourselves as free agents, whose actions are not merely determined 
by drives or instincts.22  Of course, we are also familiar with cases where our first-order volitions 
are too strong for us to resist them.  These are the cases of inner compulsion reviewed in the last 
section, which (again as Plato thought) we tend to experience as a lack of true freedom.  But 
even being capable of weakness of the will requires a kind of reflective distance on, and at least 
partial freedom from, our various inclinations.  
                                                          
22 Cf. Rousseau’s remarks in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality: “It is, then, not so much the understanding 
that constitutes the specific difference between man and the other animals, as it is his property of being a free agent.  
Nature commands every animal, and the Beast obeys.  Man experiences the same impression, but he recognizes 
himself free to acquiesce or to resist” (Rousseau 1997a: 141).  Cf. also Kant’s parallel remarks in “Conjectural 





(ii) Valuing:  This reflective and hierarchical structure of the will seems to be essential to our 
ability to value and endorse things—or as I shall sometimes say, make “strong evaluations” 
(Taylor 1985).  Mere preferences or first-order desires can be brute, in the sense that there is no 
accounting for them.  For example, someone might have sudden cravings to bite something, like 
a broom handle.  Though there may have been some explanation for why he has these cravings, 
the cravings themselves seem to neither have, nor need, any particular rationale.  One need not 
crave something for a good reason.  Valuing something, however, is a reflective endorsement of 
a desire for something.  Because valuing depends on reflection, valuing always has a rational or 
intelligible aspect that mere preferences or desires may lack (cf. Raz 1999).  If our friend said 
that he valued the biting of broomsticks, then we would be puzzled, because we would have a 
hard time seeing why that was something worth doing.  But if our friend then explained, “I just 
have a craving to bite broomsticks, and I think that it is good to satisfy my cravings,” then we 
would understand that what he really valued was not biting broomsticks per se, but satisfying 
whatever cravings he happened to have.  At least some endorsements, it is worth pointing out, 
will be principle-dependent in that they refer to desires the objects of which cannot be described 
without referring to a principle.  For instance, someone might desire not just to help his friend, 
but to do that which will satisfy the principle of promoting the greater good (cf. Rawls 1993: 82-
83). 
(iii) Identity and character:  Valuing and endorsement seem to be closely bound up with 
the self-conception of an adult.  When I value something, I often “identify” with what I 
reflectively endorse.  This is especially true of those central values and goals, or “ground 





and others call “a conception of the good.”23  The sculptor, for example, does not just like his 
craft; he does not simply prefer it to other activities.  His valuing of this activity is a large part of 
what makes him who he is.  He finds it difficult to say something about himself without 
reference to his engagement with this value.  To capture this, Frankfurt says that in identifying 
with some volitions rather than others, a person “constitutes himself,” in the sense that he 
decides what is central to his conception of his self and what is cut off as accidental, or even as 
external and alien.24  Indeed, a person may understand those desires incompatible with his values 
as entirely separate from his true self; such a desire is “not merely assigned a relatively less 
favored position but entirely extruded as an outlaw” (Frankfurt 1988d: 170).  St. Paul expresses 
this idea vividly in his Epistle to the Romans, when he writes, “I delight in the law of God, in my 
inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind and making me 
captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members” (Rom., 7.22-23, RSV).  In this passage, 
Paul understands his endorsement of God’s law as central to his true self, while those desires that 
are in conflict with the law seem external or alien to who he really is.  Insofar as he fails to act in 
accordance with the values and endorsements that he understands to be central to who he really 
is, Paul thinks of himself as enslaved to his desires and untrue in his actions to himself.   
Christine Korsgaard (drawing on a different passage from Romans) makes a similar point: 
When you deliberate, it is as if there is something over and above all of your desires, 
something which is you, and which chooses which desire to act on.  This means that the 
principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being 
expressive of yourself.  To identify with such a principle or way of choosing is to be, in 
St Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself (1996g: 100).   
                                                          
23 Rawls (1993): 19. The term “ground projects” is from Williams (1981). 
24 There is some danger in this kind of account of imagining that the self is more unified, more transparent, and more 
“wholehearted” in its valuing than it really is.  A fuller discussion would have to take into more careful 
consideration the issues of ambiguity, ambivalence, and volitional opaqueness than I do here.  For some insightful 





Korsgaard has called this idea of an identity rooted in values and principles a “practical identity,” 
and I will adopt this terminology as well.  Korsgaard understands a person’s practical identity as 
drawing on both her conception of what is valuable in life as well as her sense of what is right.  
Thus, a person’s conscience is typically a part, though not the whole, of her practical identity.  
Moreover, a person’s practical identity may be quite complex and even conflicted.  As Korsgaard 
puts it, “You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member 
of a certain profession, someone’s lover or friend, and so on” (101).  Kwame Anthony Appiah 
(2006) is especially insightful on this point.  He stresses the way that practical identities, 
particularly in the modern world, are often partially overlapping, partially integrated, but also 
partially conflicting.  Much of the drama of ordinary modern life consists in the ways that we try 
to negotiate these partial identities, say, as a does the person who thinks of himself at once as 
Christian, an intellectual, a gay man, an African-American, and a cosmopolitan. 
In children, however, practical identities seem to play little or no role in their self-
conceptions.  A textbook on child psychology draws the following useful picture, emphasizing 
the link between reflective agency and the nature of the child’s self-definition: 
Preschool children tend to define themselves mainly in terms of physical attributes, 
possessions, overt behavior, or preferred activities (I have a cat named Twinkie.  I like to 
swim).  At around 7 or 8 children are more aware of their private selves, of their unique 
emotions and thoughts, and begin to shift to more abstract self-descriptions.  In addition, 
this is a period when social comparison and concern with competencies are rising (I’m 
the fastest runner in my gym class).  Adolescents present a more organized, complex, and 
abstract view of themselves.  It is as if they are trying to build an integrated personality 
theory to describe their motives, feelings, and thoughts.  In this period there is also an 
emphasis on self-control and self-direction, in making choices, having intentions, and 
striving toward long-term goals and on controlling behavior, thoughts, and actions. 





It would seem that the child who conceives of herself in terms of her physical attributes and 
favorite activities is going to have relatively little in the way of material for forming second-
order volitions.  As a consequence, it will be difficult for her to stand back from or resist her 
immediate desires.  However, even a slightly older child who conceives of herself as “polite” or 
“a good helper” will probably have sufficient standards to decide what she wants to desire in at 
least certain domains.  At first, this normative self-conception is probably in large part a result of 
instruction, imitation, and feedback from parents and others.  The six-year-old thinks of herself 
as “a good helper” because that self-conception has been encouraged and reinforced by her 
parents.  Later on, her self-conception becomes more an artifact of her own constitution and 
validation and, therefore, more genuinely her own (although, no doubt, still also partly a product 
of the opinions and recognition of others).       
(iv) Temporally-extended agency:  Because strong evaluations are reflective and are 
endorsed on the basis of reasons, and not on mere caprice, they have a kind of stability and 
endurance that simple desires and cravings often lack.  This is why it is possible for our practical 
identities to play such a large role in constituting the apparently enduring “substance” of the self.  
And this is part of why adults have more stable preference structures than children.  This 
stability, and my recognition of that stability, is a part of what helps me identify with my future 
self.  Again, the hierarchical nature of the will helps me think of myself as an enduring entity, 
self-identical across time (cf. Noggle 2002).  Both of these aspects of agency, the dimensionality 
of strong evaluations and temporal extension, make possible the formation of long-range 
intentions, plans, and projects.  I do not simply value the same things this week as I did last 
week.  I also commit myself to projects that themselves extend through time, and in doing so, I 





maintaining a marriage or partnership, pursuing a career, developing a skill, or promoting a 
cause (cf. Bratman 1987).  And insofar as I identify myself with a goal-directed project, I 
necessarily think of myself as projecting into the future, and this further reinforces my 
identification with my future self.    
But the relationship between temporally extended agency and reflective evaluation is a two-
way street.  It is partly by experiencing and remembering the changes in her passing desires that 
a person comes to see herself as an entity that underlies and endures these changes.25  And this, 
in turn, is part of what makes possible the standpoint of reflective distance on my particular 
desires.  I recognize that I may not desire later what I desire now; but I will still be myself; thus, 
I am different than my passing desires.  And this distancing seems necessary if I am to be 
capable of second-order evaluations of my first-order desires.26   
(v)  Reflective agency and paternalism:  It seems correct to say that there is a qualitative 
difference between the types of agency characteristic of young children and adults.  But how 
does this difference explain why paternalism toward children is so much less objectionable than 
paternalism toward adults?  One strategy is to invoke the child’s less extended time horizons.  
Children lack the prudence to look after, or even care about, their future selves.  Thus, adults can 
provide a kind of “surrogate prudence” for the child.  According to Robert Noggle, this is “the 
source of a kind of prudential authority of parents: the child ought to obey the (competent) 
                                                          
25 Cf. Noggle (2002):  “The experience of living through the radical changes that characterize childhood allows her 
to appreciate the fact that her present desires are not absolutely fixed, and that her future interests will be just as 
much as her own as her present ones.  The experience of not wanting now what she desperately wanted before 
affords the adult some ‘reflective distance’ on her own current desires.  This in turn allows her to appreciate the 
wisdom of at least some preference-neutral prudential planning, like keeping one’s options open, developing a wide 
variety of skills and capacities, and storing up goods that will be useful for a wide variety of purposes” (103). 
26 If either of these aspects of the will is primary—dimensionality or temporal extension—then perhaps it is really 
the initial temporal extension made possible by memory that is prior.  But once the two aspects of agency are “off 





parent simply because it is in her interest to obey the directives of a person who is manifesting 
prudence on her behalf if she cannot do so herself” (2002: 103).  This way of putting it makes it 
sound as if we are dealing with a cognitive failure that leads the child to act in ignorance of her 
future good.  In that case, this seems to be another version of the argument from involuntariness 
(see 4.4.A).   
Tamar Schapiro suggests a different explanation.27  She likens childhood at one point to 
mental illness.  She reasons that we may be justified in paternalistically interfering with a friend 
who is about to do something in a very depressed state, which we do not think is expressive of 
her genuine will.  The depression is “an alien force [that] has taken over her deliberative 
capacities, undermining their representative function, so that they no longer speak for her.”  “By 
the same token,” she argues, “the only justification of paternalism towards children … is one that 
characterizes childhood as something like an alienating condition” (2003: 585).  Therefore, 
insofar as children have not yet developed a stable deliberative framework, they are “not yet in a 
position to govern themselves, [and] they need to be protected from their own … wantonness.  In 
so protecting them, we protect them not only from themselves but from the workings of their 
animal nature, which in the early stages of life tends to have the upper hand…” (590).  Or, as she 
puts it in another essay, “Paternalism is prima facie wrong because it involves bypassing the will 
of another person….But if the being whose will is bypassed does not really ‘have’ a will yet, if 
she is still internally dependent upon alien forces to determine what she does and says, then the 
objection to paternalism loses its force” (1999: 730-731).  This makes it sound as if the 
justification for treating children paternalistically is similar to that which justifies our preventing 
                                                          





the frenzied writer from throwing his manuscript in the fire (see 4.4.C).  But I think this is a 
misleading characterization.  Because the writer (or the depressed friend) already has a practical 
identity in place, it does make sense to describe some of his desires as “alien” to his true self.  
But if the child does not yet have a practical identity, then none of his desires can be alien to him.  
Unlike an adult suffering from volitional failure, the child will be “at home” in his wantonness. 
Perhaps Schapiro’s point is that wantonness is alien, not to the child’s present self, but to the 
child’s true nature as a rational being; the child is not yet what he ought to be, or is not yet the 
higher kind of agent that he can become.  Moreover, human beings cannot flourish except as 
reflective agents.  Given the way we have evolved, living well as non-rational animals is simply 
not a possibility for us.  But neither do we arrive by instinct at what we are destined to become.  
Rather it is only by discipline and example that parents awaken in children a sense of their 
nascent capacity to stand back from, to resist, and to choose on the basis of reasons amongst their 
immediate motivations (cf. Hegel PR: 174A).  In that case, the purpose of parental paternalism is 
not just to protect the child from his “alien desires,” but to help the “child pull herself together as 
an agent” by establishing a stable practical identity (cf. Schapiro 1999).28   
While this would explain why paternalism toward children is vitally important for the child’s 
future well-being as a human agent, it does not really explain why such paternalism is consistent 
with respecting the child’s agency.  After all, even if the child lacks the reflective agency 
distinctive of mature human beings, she does presumably possess the simple agency necessary 
for acting intentionally and engaging in short-term instrumental reasoning.  Why is it only, or 
                                                          
28 In my view, Schapiro has neglected to sufficiently distinguish the protective and educative aspects of paternalism 






especially, reflective agency that warrants respect?  The best explanation, I think, will invoke the 
connection between reflective agency and identity.  Beings incapable of reflective agency can 
still find restraint frustrating, as is evident in the case of non-human animals and infants.  
However, because these beings do not have a conception of self from which their actions flow 
(or their more important ones anyway), they do not experience an affront to their dignity and 
equality when their judgment or agency is overruled or bypassed for their own good.  This gives 
paternalism toward children a wholly different character than paternalism toward adults. 
4.6  The Limits of the Agency Approach and the Competence Problem 
I believe that both versions of the agency approach—the arguments from involuntariness and 
the constitutive arguments—shed light on why the choices of young children have a different 
moral status than that of adults.  The question is whether they provide the whole justification of 
the Liberal Outlook.  In particular, we should ask whether they can justify paternalism toward 
older children and adolescents, who are certainly capable of forms of deliberation and self-
government absent in young children. “Childhood, of course, is not all of a piece,” as Feinberg 
observes, and reasonably enough, most agency theorists suppose that adolescents should be 
treated less paternalistically than young children.  For instance, Feinberg tells us that “as the 
child gradually acquires all the relevant capacities, he should ideally come into possession, as he 
goes along, of all the corresponding … liberties, rights, powers, and liabilities” (1986: 326).  Or 
again, Onora O’Neill instructs parents to adapt their treatment of their children “to a constantly 
altering set of capacities for autonomous action,” to be aware that “choices which cannot be 
made at one stage can at another,” and that “autonomy develops in one area of life and lags in 





themselves as agents all at once.  In play, children “try on” different identities and experiment 
with being different kinds of person.  Similarly, Schapiro argues that adolescents, who we think 
of as “characteristically ‘in search of themselves,’” are engaged in a more earnest kind of play 
inasmuch as they tend to identify themselves “in a rather intense but provisional way with peer 
groups, celebrities, political movements, athletic activities, lovers, and the like” (1999: 733). 
Now it is certainly true that conceptions of agency can be formulated in more and less 
demanding ways, and it is probably possible to devise standards of agency to which most 
adolescents do not measure up.  For instance, it may be argued that a person cannot act in a truly 
voluntary way insofar as he miscalculates risk, acts impetuously, or without an emotional 
appreciation for the consequences.  Or one might claim that full membership in the moral 
community requires achieving the sort of moral autonomy associated with a post-conventional 
“morality of principles.”  Or finally, it might be said that to have a fully developed will, one must 
have a strong sense of one’s own identity and commitments.   
One difficulty with any such argument is that the observed differences between adolescents 
and adults may actually be caused by our current social practices.  For example, some argue that 
youths tend to be less responsible than adults primarily because they are given, and are expected 
to take on, less responsibility.  This, notice, is similar to the argument that early feminist writers 
made about the alleged inequality of women’s capacities.  In The Subjection of Women, Mill 
wrote: “I deny that any one knows, or can know, the nature of the two sexes, as long as they have 
only been seen in their present relation to one another….What is now called the nature of women 
is an eminently artificial thing…” (SW: I, ¶ 18 / CW, XXI: 276).  Striking the same tone, 
Richard Farson claimed that “[A]s long as we deprive the child of his right to self-determination 





But a more fundamental objection is that many adults who now enjoy full autonomy would 
not measure up to these demanding standards either.  Adults, too, take irrational risks, act on 
their passions, and fail to fully appreciate the consequences of their actions.29  Likewise, some 
adults lack firm commitments or a strong sense of their own identities, or are still “in search of 
themselves.”30  And yet you seldom hear it argued that the liberty of adults should be restricted 
insofar as they lack a strong and stable sense of who they are or what they stand for.  Finally, one 
of the most consistent findings of the Kohlbergian research program is that post-conventional 
moral reasoning is actually uncommonly attained or employed by adults.  Kohlberg himself 
found in his twenty-year longitudinal study that “Subjects scored as postconventional … 
represent about one-sixth to one-eighth of the sample from the mid-twenties on” (Colby, 
Kohlberg, et al. 1983: 47).31 
So we must draw the conclusion that if rational or agential capacities are to ground the basic 
freedom and equality of adults as members of an inclusive liberal society, then the threshold of 
attainment had better be “not at all stringent” (TJ: 506/443).  Or, as Kohlberg and coauthors put 
it, “As long as we are willing to treat those age eighteen and older equally, we must be willing to 
                                                          
29 Millstein and Halpern-Felsher (2002) offer evidence that, contrary to conventional wisdom, adolescents are on 
average more risk averse than young adults.  On the passions, or “visceral factors,” see Loewenstein (1996).  On the 
difficulties that ordinary adults have in forecasting their future affective states, see Wilson and Gilbert (2003). 
30 Erikson’s theory of identity is the inspiration for most empirical research of identity formation (see his 1968).  
The most influential way of operationalizing Erikson’s approach is the framework proposed by James Marcia (1966; 
1980), consisting in four possible identity statuses:  identity-foreclosed (unquestioned commitments), identity-
diffuse (lack of strong commitments), identity-moratorium (searching for commitments), and identity-achieved 
(autonomously embraced commitments).  On identity-formation, see Côté and Levine (2002); Alsaker and Kroger 
(2006); Côté (2006).  For further discussion of empirical research on post-conventional reasoning, see Lapsley 
(1996): 77-82. 
31 The empirical rarity of post-conventional thinking is considered by some to be a serious problem for Kohlberg’s 
theory.  If Kohlberg’s strict definition of post-conventional thinking is relaxed, it may be more common (cf. Rest et 
al. 1999 and Gibbs 2003), but still far from universal in the adult population (Thoma 2006): 79.  Some moral 
psychologists outside the Kohlbergian tradition are even more pessimistic about genuine moral reasoning in all age 





adopt a minimalistic definition of the competence necessary for moral personhood”  (Power et al. 
1989: 29).  And if the capacity for agency is to justify treating adolescents differently than adults, 
then naturally we have to hold adolescents and adults to the same standard.  Given the logic of 
the agency approach, “it seems discriminatory to deny to ‘children’ … rights which they would 
have if they were over that age and in possession of the capacities they already possess” 
(Campbell 1992: 18). 
Could we nonetheless find a threshold that would reliably distinguish adults from middle and 
late adolescents (ages 14-18)?  The relevant evidence from psychology seems to suggest not.  In 
his general review of the literature in Adolescent Psychological Development, David Moshman 
concludes:  
I am not aware … of any form or level of knowledge that is routine among adults but 
rarely seen in adolescents.  On the contrary, there is enormous cognitive variability 
among individuals beyond age 12, and it appears that age accounts for surprisingly little 
of this variability … Research simply does not support categorical distinctions between 
adolescents and adults in rationality, morality, or identity … The distinction between 
adolescence and adulthood is more a matter of cultural expectations and restrictions than 
of intrinsic psychological characteristics.  With the understanding that development is not 
limited to childhood, adolescence may best be conceived of as the first phase of 
adulthood. (2005: 143). 
Nor is Moshman the only researcher to come to this conclusion.  According to Daniel Keating, 
“By middle adolescence (14 to 15 years) most individuals make decisions in ways similar to 
adults—although it should be noted that adults’ decision making also suffers from a host of well-
studied biases and distortions” (1990: 73; cf. Kuhn 2009).  Regarding identity-formation, 
Alsaker and Kroger observe that “large percentages of individuals are seemingly entering adult 
life without exploration of and commitment to identity-defining roles and values on their own 
terms” (2006: 106; cf. Côté and Levine 2002).  And Kohlberg and his co-authors report that 





stages of autonomous judgment in terms of their reasoning about justice and the good life.  Most 
are scored at the midpoint of these developmental scales.”  They conclude that conventional 
adherence to interpersonal social norms mediated by the “Golden Rule” (or stage 3) should be 
taken as the minimal baseline for mature moral thinking.  “[And since] some children reason at 
stage 3 as early as age ten and most are at least in transition to stage 3 by junior high school, we 
would be hard put from a purely cognitive standpoint to regard high school students as ethically 
incompetent” (Power et al. 1989: 29; cf. Lapsley 1996: ch. 4).   
This research suggests that the problem is not the oft-cited but relatively manageable one that 
the capacities constitutive of agency are a matter of degree and that there is no reason to draw a 
line just here or just there. That would not be a serious difficulty, since we know it is often 
necessary to make pragmatic decisions about how to carve up vague boundaries (cf. Korsgaard 
1996d).  The problem is that the extent of variability in the two populations prevents us from 
saying that adults as a rule possess capacities for agency to any degree that adolescents as a rule 
lack.    
The agency theorist might reply that even if age is only imperfectly correlated with the 
capacity for agency, it is nonetheless the best criterion available, given that institutions need 
easy-to-apply standards and that individualistic testing of capacity would be cumbersome, 
unreliable, and ripe for abuse (Feinberg 1986: 326; Archard 2004: 85-91).  But this reply would 
be more convincing if there were only statistical outliers in both populations, rather than the 
absence of a strong correlation of age and agential capacities past early adolescence.  In other 
contexts, liberals would never tolerate using proxies (like race, sex, or class) to restrict liberty on 





autonomous do not really have a claim to that status in their own right, but are only afforded it 
out of convenience. 
Another reply is that our practice is conscientiously conservative: we time the beginning of 
adulthood to coincide with the development of the minimal capacities in those who are the 
slowest to develop within the normal range.  That way it is safe to assume that almost everyone 
has developed the necessary capacities with the onset of majority.  And what’s three or four 
years for those who develop more quickly?  Notice, first, that this response (like the previous 
one) could only justify the policy of large, unwieldy institutions; parents generally can tailor 
their conduct to their children’s individual capacities.  Second, even as an institutional policy, 
this response is hard to square with the liberal’s usual assumptions about the burden of proof in 
justifying paternalism.  Rawls, for example, says that “paternalistic intervention must be justified 
by evident failure or absence of reason and will” (TJ: 250/ 218), and Gerald Dworkin claims that 
it would be “better 10 men ruin themselves than one man be unjustly deprived of liberty” (1972: 
84).  If these views are sound, then what explains why we place the burden of proof on the other 
side when we are dealing with adolescents? 
Some argue that paternalism toward adolescents can be justified because it protects and 
promotes their future autonomy or “open future.”32  I am sympathetic to this argument, but the 
agency theorist cannot make independent appeal to it.  If the subject is judged to lack the 
capacities for agency now, then the agency theorist may argue that paternalistic authority should 
be exercised to maximally preserve and enhance the person’s future choices.  But if the subject is 
                                                          
32 See, for example, Power et al. (1989): 30 and Freeman (1983; 1997).  A general freedom-promotion justification 
for paternalism (i.e., one not limited to minors) is made in G. Dworkin (1972) and Regan (1974).  The latter 





already capable of making his own choices, then the logic of the agency approach would rule out 
this essentially consequentialist argument.  As Feinberg puts the position,  “When a mature adult 
has a conflict between getting what he wants now and having his options left open in the future, 
we are bound by our respect for his autonomy not to force his present choice in order to protect 
his future ‘liberty’” (1980: 127).  Now I have just been assuming that the freedom-promotion 
argument refers to future opportunities, but there is a second version which argues that 
paternalism is justified when people are at risk of undermining their future capacity for agency.  
A typical example involves a person abusing a dangerous drug.  Agency theorists will disagree 
about whether this is a valid justification for paternalism (cf. Korsgaard 2008b).  But even if this 
second version of the argument is accepted, it will not justify most paternalism toward 
adolescents, which plainly seems oriented toward preserving their future opportunities, not 
merely toward the preservation of their future minimal capacity for agency. 
A final possibility is to follow the agency arguments where they lead and accept a revisionist 
conclusion: perhaps adolescents become adults morally speaking at an earlier age than we 
thought and cannot legitimately be treated differently (cf. H. Cohen 1980).  But this is not an 
attractive option.  Even if adolescents are capable of making their own choices, that doesn’t 
mean that they are always best off doing so.  After all, there is a lot more to the agential 
capacities of rationality, self-control, self-understanding, and moral reasoning than the minimal 
thresholds necessary for independence as an adult in a liberal society.  Surely the aims of 
parenting and education are more ambitious than raising minimally competent individuals.33  A 
                                                          
33 Cf. Ackerman (1980), who suggests that paternalistic authority over children is only justified insofar as it is 
necessary to keep them out of prison later in life: “The task, in short, is to design a set of behavioral limitations over 
a citizen’s entire lifetime which promise to minimize the overall weight of special restrictions imposed upon him” 





more attractive view is that a good start in life fosters abundant capacities for self-government 
and prepares a person to live well.  But the agency approach suggests that parents and institutions 
should give up all authority over adolescents as soon as they have attained the minimal capacities 
for adult life.  Agency theorists typically only evade these odd conclusions by implicitly holding 
adolescents to higher standards than adults are held to, which seems—on their own 
assumptions—unfair.   
This leads us to what I believe is a fundamental tension in liberal thought.  When we 
articulate the grounds for a person’s free and equal status in a liberal society, we latch onto 
minimal standards of rationality that are as inclusive as possible.  But our educational ideals have 
a perfectionist cast: to raise the young so that they develop as fully possible their potential for 
human personality and responsible citizenship.34  These two parts of the Liberal Outlook 
inevitably clash in raising adolescents, since people naturally reach the threshold for minimal 
competence long before our more ambitious educational ideals can be realized.  Call this the 
Competence Problem.   
Can we resolve the Competence Problem without giving up on respect for autonomy?  I will 
argue in the next chapter that we can, if we recognize the moral significance of age, or stage of 
life.  The basic idea is that if age itself is a morally relevant characteristic, then we can explain 
why we subject adolescents and adults to different standards.  In order to make that argument, 
                                                          
34 Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is exemplary of the kind of educational perfectionism I 
have in mind: “Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening 
of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”  I assume that some of these perfectionist aims may be 
pursued by the state, while others (especially those connected to religious conceptions) should be left to parents and 
private associations.  Hence, the educational perfectionism I have in mind need not be inconsistent with the liberal 





however, I shall have to offer a different interpretation of respect for autonomy, which I call 










CHAPTER 5:  ON BECOMING AN ADULT 
The Moral Significance of Stages of Life 
5.1  A Summary of the Foregoing 
Central to the liberal social outlook is the value of personal autonomy: the right of each 
person to pursue his own good in his own way on fair terms with others.  This makes the liberal 
wary of restricting a person’s freedom for his own good.  Our very word for this—
“paternalism”1—suggests that, while characteristic of the way fathers treat children, it is not a 
fitting way of treating other adults.  But what justifies this apparent “double standard” of the 
Liberal Outlook?2  What is it about becoming an adult that justifies bestowing the status of 
autonomy and moral independence on a person?  Or, to borrow Tamar Schapiro’s pithy 
formulation, “What is a child, such that it could be appropriate to treat a person like one?” (1999: 
715). 
This is the question we have been exploring over the previous four chapters.  In order to 
make this chapter capable of standing alone, I summarize in this introductory section the main 
points made in the foregoing, before offering my own account.  Beginning in section 5.2, we 
                                                          
1 I shall say that “P acts paternalistically toward Q if and only if P intentionally restricts Q’s freedom of choice in 
order to promote (what P believes to be) Q’s good, or well-being.”  P’s perception of Q’s good may include Q’s 
“moral well-being.”  Paternalism here is not to be understood as limited to legal paternalism; after all, most 
paternalism toward children is of an informal character.  Moreover, not all paternalism is “coercive” in a narrow 
sense.  P may treat Q paternalistically by restricting and filtering Q’s opportunities and choices, by issuing to Q 
authoritative commands, by withholding from Q certain legal or normative powers (like that of contract), and by 
manipulating or deceiving Q in a way that undermines Q’s capacity to make her own choices or form her own 
judgments.  See Chapter 1, esp. the very end of 1.4.D. 





pick up the argument from where we left it at the end of the previous chapter.  (Readers who feel 
they need no summary may skip to that point).      
A) The welfarist and sovereignty approaches 
A good place to begin is simply by asking what it is that ever makes paternalism 
objectionable.  After all what could be wrong with promoting another person’s good?  On one 
view, which I call the “welfarist approach,” paternalism is objectionable, not in principle, but 
when it is counterproductive at really promoting a person’s well-being.3  On the most common 
welfarist argument, it is argued that we usually cannot benefit adults paternalistically, because 
people “of mature faculties” tend to be the best judges of their own good.4  As Mill puts it, 
“[W]ith respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has 
means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else.”  
Paternalism, therefore, is likelier than not to interfere “wrongly and in the wrong place” (OL: IV, 
¶¶ 4, 12 / CW, XVIII: 277, 283).  Or, more subtly, we may say that even where a person is not 
the best judge of his own interests, his judgment is nonetheless usually proficient enough that the 
harms to come from interference will likely outweigh any benefits.  And this suggests a natural 
justification of paternalism toward children.  That is, because of children’s imperfect powers of 
reasoning, and because of their lack of experience of the world and of themselves, children are 
not very good judges of their own well-being, and they often do stand to benefit from 
paternalism.  
                                                          
3 I assume that, on the welfarist approach, a person’s good, or well-being, is defined without reference to “the right.”  
Having autonomy rights may instrumentally promote well-being on this view, but cannot directly constitute well-
being.  See 2.1. 





One familiar objection to this line of argument is that it only leads to liberal conclusions on 
unrealistically optimistic assumptions about how wise and prudent “the most ordinary man or 
woman” tends to be.  Accepting that it is justifiable to restrict children’s freedom for their own 
good, Sidgwick cautiously remarked that “it is, at least, not intuitively certain that the same 
argument does not apply to the majority of mankind in the present state of their intellectual 
progress” (1907: 275).  Even if we grant that adults are generally the best judges of their final 
ends, much work in behavioral and economic psychology suggests that irrationality in 
instrumental reasoning in adults is not only common, but predictable in many ways, and that 
suggests that intelligent paternalism need not always be self-defeating (see Chapter 2).  
The more important objection is that the welfarist approach mischaracterizes the intuitive 
moral significance of autonomy.  When you are trying to decide whether to treat someone else 
paternalistically, you feel torn between two different kinds of duties.  You not only care for the 
other’s well-being, but you respect the other as an equal.  To respect another as an equal is more 
than just appreciating that the person’s well-being is as important as that of anyone else; it also 
involves recognizing (what I call) his equal practical authority.  This means respecting his 
“jurisdiction” or “sovereignty” over his own person and what regards chiefly himself.5  Practical 
authority, unlike prudence or wisdom, is a “content-independent” notion.  Roughly speaking, 
what makes something a law within a certain jurisdiction is not the wisdom or reasonableness of 
the law (at least within certain limits), but that it was a genuine act of the legitimate governing 
authority.  Likewise, then, another person’s self-determination commands our respect, not 
                                                          
5 Of course, each person’s authority over himself is limited by the equal authority of others over themselves.  This 
raises questions regarding how to demarcate a sphere of self-regarding authority and how to work out principles of 
shared authority when the interests of several parties are at stake.  I sidestep both of these issues here, since I am 





because the person is conducting himself reasonably or prudently, but because the other person 
has a certain authority as our moral equal.  Even when the person is not the best judge of his own 
interests, we nonetheless recognize him as the final judge, at least across a wide range of cases.  
Interference with his legitimate domain of control is, therefore, a kind of usurpation, an 
overstepping of our own legitimate equal authority.  This Respect for Autonomy may be 
understood either as an absolute constraint on promoting or protecting another person’s well-
being or as a “threshold-constraint,” one that outweighs welfarist considerations across a certain 
range, and does not itself derive from welfarist considerations, but which can give way in 
extreme cases.  Positions that recognize the intrinsic moral significance of respect for autonomy 
belong to what I call the sovereignty approach (see 4.2). 
B)  Respect for agency 
But the sovereignty approach looks too strong at first.  We don’t think paternalism is always 
wrong—especially with respect to children.  We need to explain why some cases of paternalism 
are consistent with respect for autonomy.  The most common way of doing this is what I call the 
“agency approach” (this being one version of the sovereignty approach).  The agency approach 
interprets respect for autonomy as the duty to show “respect for agency,” which is to say, as the 
duty to respect the choices of other agents.  As Schapiro puts it, “This means that in every action, 
we are to respect others as choosers even if we disapprove of the choices they make.  As such, 
there is no general permission to make other people’s choices for them simply because they are 
not likely to choose well on their own” (1999: 719).  The challenge, then, is to explain how 
apparently reasonable cases of paternalism can ever be permissible, if we are not to appeal to the 





argue that the prima facie obligation to respect a person’s choices does not apply when the 
“choice” cannot be attributed to an accountable agent. 
This might be for two kinds of reasons.  First, sometimes a person does not realize what he is 
really about to do, and would not want to so act if he did realize it.  Preventing someone from 
doing what he doesn’t really want to does not seem to really violate a person’s self-direction.  In 
these cases, we might say that the action is not really the agent’s genuine choice.  I shall call 
these “arguments from involuntariness.”  The second group of reasons is this:  some human 
beings—like young children—seem to lack the basic rational capacities constitutive of agency.  
Therefore, here we do not even have an accountable agent, and so we cannot have a duty to 
respect the subject’s agency.  I shall call these “constitutive arguments.”  Let me briefly describe 
both kinds of argument in a little more detail.       
Arguments from involuntariness:  Arguments from involuntariness say that respect for 
autonomy does not require us to respect the “choices” of a person who is about to do something 
he does not really intend to do—typically out of ignorance or some “blinding” passion.  For 
example, respect for a man’s autonomy should not prevent us from restraining him from walking 
onto a bridge that unbeknownst to him is about to give way (OL: V, ¶ 5 / CW, XVIII: 294).  Just 
as the liberal harm principle permits us to protect a person from the harmful choices of others, 
the same rationale licenses us to protect a person from his own “‘nonvoluntary choices,’ which 
being the genuine choices of no one at all, are no less foreign to him” (Feinberg 1986: 12).  
Although this is a general argument for paternalism, it is often invoked to justify the special 
status of children, since their undeveloped powers of reason and general inexperience of the 
world and of themselves make them especially prone to acting in ways that they do not 





bridge unawares whose simple, isolated mistake can be readily revealed to him, the incapacities 
typical of childhood affect voluntary choice quite generally and cannot easily be remedied except 
by letting the child grow up.  This is supposed to explain why paternalism toward children has a 
special character (see 4.4). 
Constitutive arguments:  Constitutive arguments claim that we simply have no duty to 
respect the “autonomy” of people who lack the basic rational faculties constitutive of autonomy, 
or agency.  One venerable argument focuses on the child’s lack of conscience, or moral agency.  
The child is not to be entrusted with full freedom until he is capable of recognizing in reciprocal 
fashion the rights of others and his duties to them.  Until then, the child is not a full member of 
the moral community and lacks the rights attending to that status.  This is what Locke meant in 
saying that children are under the authority of their parents until the age of reason: “The freedom 
… of man, and liberty of acting according to his own will, is grounded on his having reason, 
which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far 
he left to the freedom of his own will” (2T: II.63).  One of the duties of parents therefore is to 
raise children so that they develop the capacity to know and abide by this law.6 
Modern versions of this moral agency argument sometimes appeal to the stage theories of 
moral development articulated by writers like Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1969, Colby and 
Kohlberg 1987), and Rawls (TJ).  Since Kohlberg’s is the most empirically studied, let us focus 
                                                          
6 It might seem that the moral agency argument is not genuinely paternalistic, inasmuch as the aim is to ensure the 
recognition of the moral interests of others, and not those of the child.  However, this is not the way Locke looked at 
it.  He argued that “To turn [the child] loose to an unrestrained liberty, before he has reason to guide him, is not the 
allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free; but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and to abandon him to a 
state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as theirs” (2T: II.63).  This passage could be interpreted to 
mean that it is in the interests of people to be able to govern themselves in society so that they do not have to be 
suppressed by others like wild animals.  Or (not incompatibly) it could be understood to mean that a prerequisite for 





on it.  Kohlberg posits a progressive developmental trajectory in moral thinking that is 
characterized by three successive perspectives that the self takes toward the moral expectations 
of society.  At the pre-conventional level, moral rules are external to the self, and the person is 
motivated to act to avoid punishment or bad consequences.  At the conventional level, the person 
has internalized social expectations and wants to see himself, and be seen by others, as 
conforming to these expectations.  And at the post-conventional level, the person recognizes the 
possibility of questioning and evaluating the validity of conventional social expectations in light 
of mutually acceptable general principles and is motivated to act on those principles.  Kohlberg 
understood these levels to be increasingly sophisticated and mature forms of moral reasoning and 
thought of moral education as properly aimed at furthering this process of development (see 
4.5.A). 
A second version of the constitutive argument claims that children do not have a will in the 
sense of possessing a reflective and relatively stable evaluative framework.  Such a framework 
seems to be central to two fundamental aspects of personhood:  our sense of having the freedom 
to choose on the basis of reasons which of our motivations to will and act upon; and our sense of 
having a distinctive character with aims and principles that endure the changes in our momentary 
feelings and desires.  Since one way of putting this is to say that children lack a mature “practical 
identity,”  call this the practical identity argument.7  Tamar Schapiro, for example, argues that to 
have a will is to have a character structured by central practical principles.  It is possession of 
                                                          
7 On “practical identities,” see Korsgaard (1996g).  Also relevant here are Korsgaard’s essays on paternalism 
(1996b) and self-constitution (2008a).  The present argument can be worked out in slightly different ways in a 
variety of philosophical idioms, invoking the notions of a “capacity for a conception of the good” (Rawls, TJ; 1993), 
the capacity for second order desires and volitions (Frankfurt 1988a), or the capacity for character-forming “ground 
projects” (Williams 1981).  Noggle (2002) draws on all three ideas in explaining the difference between children 





this normative framework which allows a person to act, not at the whim of her strongest 
inclinations, but in a deliberate and authoritative way by deciding which of her first-order 
motivations to endorse or reject as truly her own (1999, 2003).  “Conscience” in the moral sense 
is typically one part of this framework.  Only by establishing this authority over our inclinations 
do we constitute ourselves as rational agents and establish our authority vis-à-vis others.  As 
Schapiro puts it, “Paternalism is prima facie wrong because it involves bypassing the will of 
another person…But if the being does not really ‘have’ a will yet, if she is still internally 
dependent upon alien forces to determine what she does and says, then the objection to 
paternalism loses its force” (1999: 730-731).  Naturally, children do not come into the world 
with this normative perspective already in place.  Through discipline and example, parents 
awaken in children a sense of their nascent capacity to stand back from, to resist, and to choose 
on the basis of reasons amongst their immediate motivations.  But children cannot constitute 
themselves as agents all at once.  In play, children “try on” different identities and experiment 
with being different kinds of person.  Similarly, Schapiro argues that adolescents, who we think 
of as “characteristically ‘in search of themselves,’” are engaged in a more earnest kind of play 
inasmuch as they tend to identify themselves “in a rather intense but provisional way with peer 
groups, celebrities, political movements, athletic activities, lovers, and the like” (1999: 733).  
(For a more complete discussion, see 4.5.B).   
C) The Competence Problem 
Both versions of the agency approach shed light on why the choices of children have a 
different status than those of adults.  The question is whether they provide the whole justification 
of the liberal outlook.  In particular, we should ask whether they can justify paternalism toward 





children.  Now conceptions of agency can be formulated in more and less demanding ways, and 
it is probably possible to devise standards of agency to which most adolescents do not measure 
up.  For instance, it may be argued that a person cannot act in a truly voluntary way insofar as he 
miscalculates risk, acts impetuously, or without an emotional appreciation for the consequences.  
Or it might be said that to have a fully developed will, one must have a strong sense of one’s 
own identity and commitments.  Or, finally, one might claim that full membership in the moral 
community requires achieving the sort of moral autonomy associated with a post-conventional 
“morality of principles.”   
 But many adults who now enjoy full autonomy would not measure up to these standards 
either.  So we must draw the conclusion that if rational or agential capacities are to ground the 
basic freedom and equality of adults as members of an inclusive liberal society, then the 
threshold of attainment had better be “not at all stringent” (Rawls TJ: 506/443). And if the 
capacity for agency is to justify treating adolescents differently than adults, then naturally we 
have to hold adolescents and adults to the same standard.  Could we nevertheless find a threshold 
that would reliably distinguish adults from middle and late adolescents (ages 14-18)?  The 
relevant evidence from psychology seems to suggest not.  For example, in his general review of 
the literature in Adolescent Psychological Development, David Moshman concludes:  
I am not aware … of any form or level of knowledge that is routine among adults but 
rarely seen in adolescents.  On the contrary, there is enormous cognitive variability 
among individuals beyond age 12, and it appears that age accounts for surprisingly little 
of this variability … Research simply does not support categorical distinctions between 
adolescents and adults in rationality, morality, or identity … The distinction between 
adolescence and adulthood is more a matter of cultural expectations and restrictions than 
of intrinsic psychological characteristics.  With the understanding that development is not 
limited to childhood, adolescence may best be conceived of as the first phase of 





Perhaps, then, we should accept a revisionist conclusion: that adolescents become adults 
morally speaking at an earlier age than we thought and cannot legitimately be treated differently.  
But this is not an attractive option.  Even if adolescents can make their own choices, that doesn’t 
mean they are typically better off doing so.  After all, there is a lot more to the agential capacities 
of rationality, self-control, self-understanding, and moral reasoning than the minimal thresholds 
necessary for independence as an adult in a liberal society.  Surely the aims of parenting and 
education are more ambitious than raising minimally competent individuals.  A more attractive 
view is that a good start in life fosters abundant capacities for self-government and prepares a 
person to live well.  But the agency approach suggests that parents and institutions should give 
up all authority over adolescents as soon as they have attained the minimal capacities for adult 
life.  Agency theorists typically only evade these odd conclusions by implicitly holding 
adolescents to higher standards than adults are held to, which seems unfair.   
 This leads us to a fundamental tension in liberal thought.  When we articulate the grounds for 
a person’s free and equal status in a liberal society, we latch onto minimal standards of 
rationality that are as inclusive as possible.  But our educational ideals have a perfectionist cast:  
to raise the young so that they develop as fully possible their potential for human personality and 
responsible citizenship.  These two parts of the Liberal Outlook inevitably clash in raising 
adolescents, since people naturally reach the threshold for minimal competence long before our 
more ambitious educational ideals can be realized.  Call this the Competence Problem (see 4.6).   
5.2   Age and Reason 
Can we resolve the Competence Problem without giving up on the ideal of respect for 





versions of the welfarist and agency approaches concur in holding that the fact that children are 
younger than adults, or at an earlier stage of life, is in itself a morally irrelevant difference.  The 
real justification for treating children more paternalistically than adults is simply that children 
lack the full capacities for, or facility in, mature practical reasoning (which I will refer to 
collectively as “Reason”).8  The  most common versions of the welfarist approach argue that 
children lack the facility in practical reasoning to adequately promote their own well-being, 
while those of the agency approach argue that children lack the practical capacities necessary for 
exercising the fully mature agency which commands our respect.  On both views, ideally, 
individuals should be treated as adults when they attain the necessary facility in reasoning or 
rational capacities.  Age only matters secondarily insofar as it is correlated with this acquisition 
of Reason.  Locke states this “Standard View” succinctly: “[W]e are born free, as we are born 
rational: not that we have actually the exercise of either: age that brings one, brings with it the 
other too” (2T: II.61).  David Archard articulates the same basic idea at greater length: 
 [A] distribution of rights on the basis of age alone would be unfair.  It would be morally 
arbitrary and unjust to deny children rights merely because they were younger than 
adults.  It would be as arbitrary and as wrong as denying rights to humans who were 
shorter than average, had fewer hairs or lower pitch of voice than others … [But] the 
denial of rights to children is not based solely on age.  It is done on the basis of an alleged 
correlation between age and some relevant competence.  The young are denied rights 
because, being young, they are presumed to lack some of the capacities necessary for the 
possession of rights. (2004: 85).9 
                                                          
8 My use of “Reason” is intentionally vague and expansive, so as to preserve the ambiguity between more classical 
conceptions of reason, which broadly encompass understanding, insight, good deliberation, and self-control, and 
more contemporary conceptions of reason, which emphasize formal capacities for deduction, inference, the 
discovery of the best means to a given end, etc.  Different versions of the Standard View appeal to different 
conceptions of Reason.   
9 Cf. Houlgate (1979): “It is true that age is not a morally relevant difference justifying differences in treatment 
under the law.  But the capacity for rational choice is” (274); Henley (1979): “[O]nce the child is capable of rational 
deliberation, and once he has internalized the prohibition against violence, there is no legitimate authority to educate 






Nor is the Standard View confined to academic discussions.  To take the most prominent 
example, in the landmark House of Lords case Gillick v. West Norfolk, Lord Scarman interpreted 
an “underlying principle” of the common law to be that “parental right yields to the child’s right 
to make his own decisions when he reaches a sufficient understanding and intelligence to be 
capable of making up his own mind on the matter requiring decision.” He concluded that this 
makes legal age limits unfair if determination of individual capacity is feasible.10   
Contrary to this Standard View, I will argue that age, in itself, can be a morally relevant 
consideration in the justification of paternalism.  Or, more precisely, since I will claim that the 
moral relevance of age is “coarse-grained,” that a person’s stage of life can be morally relevant.  
Of course, a person’s stage of life is not the only thing that matters.  My claim is simply that two 
people can have all of the same general psychological attributes—the same practical capacities 
and competencies, the same share of rationality, prudence, knowledge, and commonsense—and 
yet the mere fact that one person is at the beginning of a life and another in the middle of one can 
sometimes justify treating the younger person more paternalistically than the older one.  
Furthermore, I will argue that it is only by recognizing the moral relevance of age11 that we can 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that it could be the basis for dividing the human community into two unequal classes of person?  The philosophical 
tradition offers a standard answer to this question.  The answer is that children, unlike adults, are as yet lacking in 
reason and are therefore unfit to govern themselves until they reach the age of reason” (578).  See also Schrag 
(1977); Wringe (1981): 104; Freeman (1997): 34-35; and Brighouse (2002).     
10 Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority (1986) AC 112.  The case dealt with providing 
contraceptives to minors against the express wishes of parents.  Cf. Eekelaar (1986): “The significance of Lord 
Scarman’s opinion with respect to children’s autonomy interests cannot be over-rated.  It follows from his reasoning 
that, where a child has reached capacity, there is no room for a parent to impose a contrary view, even if this is more 
in accord with the child’s best interests” (181). 
11 By “moral relevance of age,” I shall always mean its intrinsic moral relevance for thinking about autonomy and 
paternalism.  I have never seen this thesis defended, although some defend the moral relevance of age in distributive 
contexts (for critical discussion, see McKerlie 1989), especially in the distribution of scarce medical resources (cf. 





do justice to both the moral ideal of respect for autonomy and our perfectionist educational ideals 
and resolve the Competence Problem. 
5.3  Autonomy as Life-Authorship 
Whether an action is really the choice of an accountable agent does seem to have a direct 
bearing on whether the action commands our respect, and this makes “respect for agency” an 
appealing way of interpreting the ideal of respect for autonomy.  On the other hand, it is not 
clear, at first, how a person’s age could have any significance for our duty to respect autonomy.  
As long as we take an abstract and atomistic view of autonomy—as the freedom to make 
individual choices at particular moments in time—then age is bound to seem arbitrary.  The 
relevance of age only comes into focus when we take a more concrete and holistic view.  In 
particular, we should think of one important aspect of autonomy as the self-determination which 
consists in a person’s authority over the kind of life she makes for herself.  A person exercises 
this authority by making choices concerning the temporally extended projects and roles that 
structure and give character to her life.  This may be characterized metaphorically as having 
“authorial control” over the course of one’s life.12  Paradigmatically, life authorship refers to the 
kind of self-determination that lies behind the question, “What am I doing with my life?”.  In this 
frame of mind, a person asks herself questions like: “Is this really the person I want to build a life 
with?”; “Do I want to start a family?”; or “Should I keep trying to make a go of it in this career?” 
                                                          
12 I am borrowing this metaphor from Raz (1986), where personal autonomy is described as the ideal that people 
“should make their own lives,” and the autonomous person the “(part) author of his own life” (369).  My conception 
of life authorship however differs somewhat from Raz’s conception of autonomy, as I will explain below.  See esp. 





Why does this global perspective on self-determination deserve special emphasis?  After all, 
we seem to frame goals for different lengths of time.  Perhaps some people want to plan out their 
whole lives, but others may have shorter temporal horizons and prefer projects of shorter 
duration (cf. Calhoun 2009).  One response is that settling on a direction in life is important, 
since it is only by committing to a few life projects that we make our lives meaningfully “about 
something.”  But whether that is true or not, the more fundamental response is that the question 
of “what to do in life” is forced on us in the modern world by the fact that we have choices about 
many of the major social roles we perform.13  In particular, we have choices about the careers 
and occupations to pursue, whether to enter into a committed relationship like marriage, whether 
to become a parent, and the extent to which we concentrate on some of our roles over others.  
For a great many people, at least some of these roles do last the better part of a lifetime and are 
the most meaningful pursuits in their lives.  But even for those seeking fulfillment elsewhere, 
their social roles usually play a critical part in structuring and conditioning the kinds of lives they 
lead.  To fill out the life-authorship conception of autonomy, let’s consider more closely just how 
social roles shape the character of a life.  To do so, it will be profitable to draw on some of 
Hegel’s insights into how the institutionalized social world is related to the lives and identities of 
individuals. 
A) Social roles and the character of a life 
The idea of a “social role” is hard to pin down precisely, but we have a grasp on the notion of 
one’s occupation or job, or one’s status as a parent or spouse, as roles or institutionalized social 
                                                          
13 Cf. Giddens: “In a world of alternative lifestyle options, strategic life-planning becomes of special importance.  






niches, that we do not simply create, but which we occupy and participate in.  The basic idea of a 
role in this institutional sense, as Hegel suggests, is that of playing a distinct part in a larger 
organized whole (PR: 145).  Sometimes we think of a person’s role in terms of the specifically 
defined tasks, rights, and responsibilities he has within a particular association or organization.  
But we also think about roles in terms of conventionalized functional contributions a person 
makes to society.  Being a carpenter, for example, is a role in the second sense, even if not in the 
first.  Similarly, one continues to fill the role of “teacher” in the second sense even as one moves 
from position to position.14 
Our social roles affect the kinds of lives we lead both by shaping the patterns of our lives and 
the kinds of people we become.  The first way our roles shape the pattern of our lives is by 
structuring our routine activity.  We don’t wake up each morning having to decide afresh what to 
do; our roles serve as practical frameworks that define more or less precisely our routine tasks 
and responsibilities.  These frameworks guide us in different ways: some provide external 
incentives, some are enforced by the expectations of others, and some are internalized as 
intrinsically reason-giving.  Moreover, our roles create various constraints on what else we can 
do, whether by simply taking up our time, by determining our income or using up our resources, 
or by creating special obligations to avoid conduct incompatible with our roles.15 
                                                          
14 Hegel tends to think of familial and civic roles in the first sense (PR: 158, 258 + R), and occupational roles in the 
second (PR: 187, 189, 201), but both senses seem to have broader application.  On Hegel’s idea of the 
institutionalized social world (or Sittlichkeit) as a rational system or organized whole, see Wood (1990: 195-200) 
and Neuhouser (2000: ch. 4).   
15 It is a significant virtue of Hegel’s social thought that he recognized the importance of these quite different forms 
of motivation: see, for instance, PR: 187, 199 on external incentives; PR: 164A, 207, 244-245 on social 
expectations; and PR: 148, 162-166, 173, 257, 258 + R, 324 on internalized norms.  On conduct incompatible with 





Because we tend to perform our major social roles for significant portions of our lives, and 
because our present station affects our future opportunities, our roles also shape the pattern of 
our lives as a whole.  That our roles have this character is not just a contingent fact, but arises 
from the nature of their social functions.  For instance, although we can socialize some aspects of 
childrearing, there is every indication that children need stable relationships with a few devoted 
adults.  Similarly, the nature of work encourages long-term commitment, since all but the lowest 
paid work demands specialization, rewards experience, or requires other significant investments.  
Although we may move from job to job, we tend to settle into occupational tracks, since there 
are significant costs associated with switching tracks, and since those who do not specialize 
usually have their options limited for them.  These aspects of parenting and work in turn 
encourage  relationships to aspire to permanence.  First, because planned parenting is usually 
undertaken as a long-term joint venture between partners, would-be parents typically intend their 
partnerships to last indefinitely.  Second, if people are going to allow a relationship to affect their 
decisions about career or finances, they often want some assurance of its stability.  In addition, 
most people simply need the trust and recognition that comes from another person who is 
committed to them—who will “always be there.”  But to truly accept this commitment obliges us 
to reciprocate it.  Of course, marriage is not the only form such reciprocal commitments can take, 
but it is a dominant model for them in our culture.16 
                                                          
16 The relation between commitment and freedom is one of the central themes in the Philosophy of Right.  Hegel 
persistently critiques the negative “freedom of the void” which thinks of freedom as the absence of all limitations 
(see esp. PR: 5-15, 149).  For Hegel, a person’s freedom is only actual when is freely committed to particular 
valuable ends (PR: 7A, 12), such as to particular friends and family members (PR: 7A, 158+A, 162, 175+A), to a 
particular line of work (PR: 207A), and to a particular community (PR: 268). But at the same time, Hegel does not 





Besides shaping the pattern of our lives, our social roles also shape us as persons.  Since our 
roles do so much to determine our everyday activity, they tend to develop some of our traits and 
potentialities over others.  Nor is this limited to the development of “occupational skills,” since 
the traits, capabilities, even ethical qualities that we develop in our work and relationships (for 
better or worse) tend to affect our whole personality to some degree.  Moreover, the amount of 
leisure our roles allow us determines how much opportunity we have to develop ourselves in 
other directions.17  
A second sense in which our roles shape us as persons is by informing our identities or self-
conceptions.  As Hegel saw, one way our social roles are formative is that they provide us with 
final ends or obligations that bind us from the inside: that is, they furnish us with ends and 
obligations that, far from being externally imposed, give our lives meaning and substance.  In 
this regard, a role may furnish a person with one part of her practical identity.18  Familial roles 
are paradigmatic of this, as are occupational roles invested with the ethical content of a vocation 
or calling.  But many people take more instrumental attitudes toward their particular line of work 
than talk of practical identities suggests.  Nevertheless, these occupational roles almost always 
shape a person’s “social identity,” his standing in society, or “public face.”19  Perhaps the most 
obvious way they do so is by assigning a person (and his or her household) to a position of 
greater or lesser prestige in the class structure.  But Hegel correctly realized that social identities 
                                                          
17 These are important themes in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations.  The influence of habit on character is stressed at 
Bk. I, ch. XIV, pp. 16-17, a thesis then applied to the characters of the major economic orders (Bk. I, ch. XI, Pt. iii, 
conclusion, pp. 284-288) and to the effects of manual labor (Bk. V, ch. I, pt. iii, pp. 839-842).  Hegel draws on 
Smith’s discussion of social orders at PR: 203-205 and emphasizes the formative role of work at PR: 187, 197.    
18 Cf. Hegel, PR: esp. 147, 154, 158, 162, 166; PH: 23-24; EM: 514.  I have benefited from the discussion of these 
matters in Neuhouser (2000): 97-98.  See also Wood (1990): 196-198 and Hardimon (1994). 
19 Although Hegel recognized the importance of practical and social identities, he was not scrupulous in 
distinguishing the two.  Also, to be clear, I do not suggest that our social roles exhaust the content of our identities, 





are not purely hierarchical.  Different occupational roles also have qualitatively different 
characters and usually offer the occupant “recognition in his own eyes and in the eyes of others” 
for different kinds of accomplishment and contributions (PR: 207, 253).  Thus, a person may 
identify with the special character of his occupation (e.g., as a tough miner or as a trustworthy 
clerk) and win self-esteem for doing his job well, without the particular ends of his work having 
much ethical significance for him.  Finally, Hegel located a more fundamental kind of status that 
occupational roles confer on their occupants, which is the basic dignity of being a contributing 
member of society—someone who is “pulling his own weight.”  The importance of having the 
dignity of a viable social identity is most evident in cases where it is threatened or undermined, 
as by long-term unemployment or homelessness (PR: 244-245).  Maintaining this viable social 
identity as a productive member of society typically is a part of a person’s practical identity, 
even when his particular occupational role is not.20      
B) Respect for life authorship 
Having observed how social roles define the character of a life, let’s return to our discussion 
of autonomy.  The lives of the overwhelming majority of people in every society are shaped by 
their social roles.  The modern liberal idea of life authorship is that people should be able to 
exercise control over the kinds of lives they lead by having choices about the main occupational 
and familial roles they perform.  This is a holistic notion in that it begins with the character of a 
life as a whole, not with the character of individual choices.  It does not assume that a person’s 
                                                          
20 The traditional women’s roles of wife and mother (especially in societies where the household is not the main site 
of production) have historically been analogous to male occupational roles insofar as they have given women a 
viable social standing and esteem for their contributions.  However, these roles usually required a degree of ethical 
internalization uncharacteristic of many male occupational roles.  Hegel, like many of his contemporaries, accepted 
the separate, complementary (albeit unequal) spheres of men and women as natural and rational (cf. PR: 165-166).  I 





control over her life is complete—that other people’s choices or chance events do not leave their 
indelible marks as well.  Neither does it suggest that we decide the extent to which we succeed in 
all of our undertakings.  Nor still does it imply that there are no roles that we are simply born 
into.  Naturally, we are born into our first families as sons and daughters, brothers and sisters.  
And these roles do not necessarily completely dissolve when we become adults; we may 
understand ourselves as having special duties throughout life that arise from these roles.  All the 
same, it is characteristic of the modern family that the claims of our first family weaken with 
maturity and do not strictly govern the kinds of lives we make for ourselves as adults.   
There is more to life authorship than performing social roles, as other projects may define our 
lives as well.  But since our roles typically constrain our other activities (if in no other way than 
by limiting our time and resources), it is in no small part by having control over our roles that we 
have the freedom for project-pursuit generally.  Moreover, it is chiefly the existence and 
prominence of social roles that forces us to take up the perspective of what we want for our lives 
as a whole.  If the only choices were short-term engagements, easily entered and exited, then we 
wouldn’t need to think about what to do with life.  The horizon we worried about would be 
roughly equal to the time necessary for participating in the options available.  It is because some 
of our options, like careers and family, require so much of a lifetime to pursue, that we are forced 
to think about life as a whole.  This in turn affects the character of all the choices available to us.  
To pursue many short-term activities and relationships in the middle of life can carry the cost of 
making it more difficult to ever participate in those roles that require most of a lifetime.  
The idea of life authorship could inform our moral outlook in two ways.  We might say that 
people lead better lives when they actively take charge of their affairs and shape the kinds of 





this view, life authorship is a central component in a theory of well-being.21  On the other hand, 
we could think of respect for life authorship as one aspect of the more general idea of respect for 
autonomy.  I will pursue this second tack.  Recall that respect for autonomy is the duty to 
recognize the equal practical authority of others and their special “jurisdiction” or “sovereignty” 
over themselves—their right to be the final judges over their own affairs, even if they are not the 
best judges.  Respect for life authorship, in turn, is the duty to recognize in others the authority 
to make their own choices about the kind of life to lead, especially with respect to the major 
social roles they undertake, whether or not their choices are actually conducive to their well-
being.  In short, respect for life authorship requires that we recognize a kind of ownership in each 
person over the course of her own life.  This requires more than negative duties of non-
interference, since as a society we cannot respect a person’s authority over her own life if we 
haven’t enabled her to make real choices concerning it.  Thus it is necessary to foster the 
capacities in youth that will enable them to make life choices as adults, and to maintain the social 
conditions—like access to education, good jobs, and birth control—that ensure an adequate 
range of options for exercising life authorship.  Nevertheless, respect for life authorship does 
have a strongly negative character in that it is not concerned that people actually do take charge 
of their lives, but only that people have the social space and capabilities to do so.22  Providing 
this opportunity is important, furthermore, not because the self-determined life is the good life 
                                                          
21 This is the way that autonomy fits into the liberal perfectionism of Raz (1986), Hurka (1993), and Wall (1998).  
Wall is particularly clear:  “[Personal autonomy] is the ideal of people charting their own course through life, 
fashioning their character by self-consciously choosing projects and taking up commitments from a wide range of 
eligible alternatives…. Those who realize this ideal take charge of their affairs.… They neither drift through life … 
nor adopt projects and pursuits wholesale from others…. For most people [autonomy] is … a central component of a 
fully good life.  However well their lives may go, if they do not realize this ideal to some substantial degree, they 
will fail to live a fully good life” (1998: 128, 130). 





(although that may be so), but because in an affluent society where life authorship is generally 
possible, such provision is a part of respecting the equal practical authority of others.   
Because I have characterized both respect for agency and respect for life authorship as 
conceptions of the more general concept of respect for autonomy, the question arises as to the 
relationship between the two conceptions.  Do they compete with one another or are they 
complementary?  This is an important question, but I will defer discussing it until the end of the 
next section. 
5.4  The Moral Significance of Age 
A) ‘Having your life ahead of you’ 
Having articulated the idea of respect for life authorship, we are in position to see the moral 
significance of age.  Everyone will agree that a person’s chronological age, in and of itself, has 
no direct bearing on her ability to make individual choices.  Therefore, if we interpret the duty to 
respect autonomy along the lines of respect for agency—as respecting a person’s ability to make 
individual choices—then age will certainly seem irrelevant.  But suppose we interpret Respect 
for Autonomy as respect for life authorship:  Since people of different ages stand in different 
relations to their lives as a whole, a person’s age can affect how essential liberty presently is for 
making her life as a whole her own.  To put it roughly at first, temporary restrictions on a 
person’s freedom in the first years of life (including adolescence) do not undermine that person’s 
ability to make a life on her own terms, since “her whole life lies ahead of her”; there is plenty of 
time to take on life-defining roles and projects in the future.  Similar restrictions in the middle of 
a life, however, would interfere with life authorship, since if a middle-aged person is ever going 





Before elaborating on that argument, let me say something about age and stages of life.  The 
moral significance of age depends on its relation to the normal lifespan.  Therefore, if the normal 
lifespan doubles in the future, the moral status of (say) twenty-five might be different than it is 
now, since that age would occupy a different relative position in a complete life.  A second point 
is that, although age lies along a continuum, its moral significance may be coarse-grained.  That 
is, we might distinguish between the moral significance of broad stages of life—like the 
beginning, middle, and end of life—but not between the ages that fall within those stages.  In 
fact, the only claim that I shall make here is that there is a morally significant difference between 
“the beginning of a life” and “the middle of a life.”  Whether there are other stages of life that 
have special moral significance, like the end of life, I shall not attempt to determine.  That a 
continuous property may have coarse-grained moral significance should come as no surprise.  
Those who think that moral status is grounded in rational capacities or competencies for agency, 
after all, hold the same, since they think that greater or lesser facility in reasoning is morally 
irrelevant past some minimal threshold.  Similarly, I am arguing that stages of life, like capacities 
or competencies, can be understood as “range properties,” properties that apply in equal measure 
to all to whom they apply (like a point’s property of being interior to a circle) (Rawls, TJ: 
508/444).  Thus, a 30 year-old and a 40 year-old may equally be in the middle stage of life.  To 
understand why the beginning and middle of a life should be range properties in this sense, we 
have to return to the argument for their moral significance.  
Consider first the person in the middle of a life.  For her, there is no time like the present.  
She needs independence and control over her affairs now if she is going to have the ability to 
make her life her own.  She requires the freedom to decide which roles to participate in, how to 





pursuits to engage in.  Furthermore, since carrying out many roles and projects requires 
continuous attention, it is important that her control and independence itself be continuous; even 
relatively short interruptions of control can greatly disrupt a person’s ability to lead her life on 
her own terms.  Consequently, denying a person liberty in the middle of a life is generally 
inconsistent with respecting her autonomy.  (Admittedly, minor paternalistic restrictions aimed at 
preventing harm, like the requirement to wear a seatbelt, may not interfere with a person’s ability 
to lead her own life.  But we are concerned here chiefly with the restrictions typical of 
adolescence, which are much more intrusive, pervasive, demanding, and moralistic, and which, 
thus, would be burdensome in the middle of a life.)     
But things are very different at the beginning of a life.  Then someone can still look forward 
to making his life his own in the future.  Although it is in adolescence that most people first 
acquire the minimal practical capacities sufficient for leading adult lives, they do not yet have 
those lives in place.  And instead of granting adolescents the liberty of immediately integrating 
themselves into adult roles as soon as they are minimally capable of doing so, it is possible to 
treat adolescence as a sort of officially enforced “moratorium” on taking up adult 
commitments.23  During this moratorium, adolescents are required to remain integrated in the 
paternalistic formative institutions of the family and the school which they inhabited as children 
in order to better prepare them for taking on adult roles later.  In denying the adolescent the 
liberty to make certain kinds of choices that adults can make, and in requiring him to remain in 
the formative institutions of youth instead of immediately assuming an independent status, we 
are plainly limiting the adolescent’s liberty for what we believe to be his own good.  What makes 
                                                          
23 On adolescence as a moratorium on adult commitments, see Erikson (1968): 155-58.  I say “officially enforced” 
moratorium, because many people continue to delay making major life choices in young adulthood, and are even 





this paternalistic moratorium consistent with the duty to respect autonomy is that it comes at the 
beginning of a life—before a person has integrated himself into the roles that define adult life, 
and with the understanding that he will acquire full independence and control over doing so in a 
few years.  For this reason, it does not usurp his equal practical authority to lead a life of his own 
making.  Turning that full control over to the adolescent now or in a few years will not make him 
less the author of his life as a whole.   
It might be objected that it just obfuscates things to say that the paternalistic moratorium does 
not really interfere with the adolescent’s “autonomy over a complete life.”  Wouldn’t it be more 
accurate to say that we respect a person’s autonomy to make major life decisions during some 
periods of life and not during others?  This is a serious objection, since my argument claims that 
paternalistic restraints at the beginning of a life do not really interfere with a person’s self-
determination (properly understood).  I contend, however, that we distort the moral significance 
of paternalism at different stages of life if we don’t look at it in the context of a complete life.  
This is because the meaning or significance that a particular episode has for a person depends, 
not just on its “intrinsic” characteristics, but also on how the person understands that episode to 
fit into the narrative arc of her whole life.  My claim, then, is that a period of limited but growing 
freedom at the beginning of life, which is oriented toward preparing a person for the 
independence of adulthood, is readily interpreted as one integral part of a life whose overall 





paternalistic moratorium at the beginning of a life, is significantly shaped by the meaning of the 
whole, the complete autonomous life.24  
Moreover, this is not simply one possible interpretation of the paternalistic moratorium.  It is 
a part of the “cultural script” of becoming an adult in our culture.  When we construct narratives 
about our lives, we draw on cultural scripts that define the conventional phases, events, and 
transitions of life.  Certain aspects of these scripts may be more or less specific to different 
genders, ethnic groups, classes, religious groups, sexual orientations, and so on.25  But the 
paternalistic moratorium of adolescence is one widely shared part of the life script in our culture.  
It is commonly understood that it is simply a normal part of life that one is not permitted to fully 
integrate into the adult world or make certain major life choices until reaching a conventional 
age like eighteen or twenty-one.26  But there is never any doubt that the adolescent’s life, looking 
forward, is his own to lead.  Because adolescence is publicly recognized as a normal stage of life, 
adolescents do not typically understand paternalistic restraints to be a form of disrespect for their 
status as free and equal persons, although many may well chafe under those restraints and be 
impatient for their independence.  The paternalistic moratorium of adolescence, therefore, has a 
very different character than paternalism that restricts a person’s freedom to make choices about 
her roles and projects in the middle of a life—the stage of life when such choices need to be 
                                                          
24 Cf. Raz (2004): “The significance of each episode, if any, depends on its relations to others, in light of the 
direction the person whose life it is gave to his or her life.  The relevance and meaning of other episodes is 
determined by reference to that pattern” (278).   
25 Habermas and Bluck (2000): 750-751; Appiah (2005): 21-23. 
26 Although that particular script for adolescence may understandably have less salience where adult prospects are 
bleak, for then it might seem as if there is little to be gained by observing the moratorium.  This suggests that the 
justification of paternalism for adolescents is not entirely separate from questions of social justice.  I discuss equality 





made, if they are to be made at all.  But this moral difference lies merely in the temporal position 
of these stages of life, not in any difference in the subject’s capacity for Reason. 
B) Objections and replies 
Let me try to clarify my view by anticipating some objections and clearing away some 
misunder-standings.  First, someone might object that I am exaggerating the difference between 
my account and the Standard View, for what I am doing is really offering a more expansive 
conception of Reason.27  That is, according to this objection, what I have done is to insist that we 
think about a person’s ability to pursue complex projects over a complete life, instead of just 
confining our attention to a person’s ability to make isolated choices.  My argument seems to be 
that while adolescents are as capable of making isolated choices as adults, they are not as capable 
as adults of planning and pursuing long-term projects and commitments.  I do think this is 
important, and I agree that this is only a version of the Standard View; but it is not my argument.  
After all, there is a great diversity in the capacity of adults to make and abide by long-term plans 
as well.  My claim is that so long as adults have a minimal capacity to make their own choices, 
they must be allowed substantial autonomy to do so.  But we do not have to employ the same 
minimalist standard with respect to minors.  We can appropriately hold them to more demanding 
standards than we expect all adults to meet.  This makes my view very different than the 
Standard View, which offers a single standard of reasoning capacity for explaining the 
differences in the ways we treat adults and minors.  I claim that the differences in stage of life 
justifies applying different standards. 
                                                          
27 In fact, this objection has been raised by many people.  I thank Taylor Carman in particular for convincing me that 





I will be asked whether we may permissibly treat an adolescent paternalistically who is fully 
capable of making very responsible choices about her complete life.  That is, this adolescent is 
not just as responsible as the least responsible of adults, but as responsible as the most 
responsible of adults.  The first thing to consider is whether we could really benefit this 
adolescent by denying her full autonomy.  If we could not, then there is not even a paternalistic 
reason to restrict her freedom.  Since exercising our capacity for self-direction is a component of 
our good (see 2.6), I think that—other things equal—an extremely responsible adolescent ought 
to have the same freedom as adults have.  (The only paternalistic reasons for restricting her 
freedom that could hope to be legitimate would have to appeal to the sorts of pragmatic 
institutional and epistemic considerations discussed above.)  This, however, does not mean that 
age is not morally relevant after all, for when we are dealing with less than fully responsible 
individuals, and when we expect paternalism could be beneficial, we weigh the importance of 
Respect for Autonomy differently depending on the person’s stage in life.28 
Finally, since I have said that the moral relevance of age depends on the normal life-span, I 
will be asked how my argument applies to minors who are terminally ill or otherwise have very 
short life expectancies.  First, to repeat, paternalistic restrictions on freedom are only justified in 
principle when we think that they will really be beneficial for the subject.  That’s a conceptual 
                                                          
28 Perhaps this analogy will be helpful.  There are three men, Tom, Dick, and Harry.  Tom and Dick are Black, 
Harry is white.  Tom and Harry and accused of the same crime in virtually identical circumstances.  Dick (Tom’s 
brother) is accused of no crime.  The jury sentences Tom, the Black man, to prison and Harry, the white man, only 
to probation.  Tom complains that he has been treated unequally because of his race.  The verdict is defended on the 
grounds that Dick is Black too and we have not sentenced him to prison; therefore, race played no role in our 
decision.  Plainly, the logic is fallacious.  Age is playing a similar role in my argument as race plays in the 
deliberation of the jury—except of course I do not think that “age” in this context constitutes invidious 
discrimination.  True, age itself does always completely settle the question as to how we ought to treat a person.  But 






truth that follows from the definition of paternalism (see 1.2).  For example, if we thought that 
the only good reason to make children study rather than let them play was due to the good it 
would do them as adults, and we had a child who we knew would never live to adulthood, then it 
would be perverse to make her study nonetheless.  Since whatever form of a good life a 
terminally ill child is capable of will likely differ from that possible for people with normal life-
spans, we will have good reasons to treat her case differently.  Now suppose we are dealing with 
a terminally ill adolescent, who has reached the minimal threshold of reasonableness to which 
we hold adults, but who wants to make a decision that we think is not best for her.  What does 
my account recommend?  In one sense, my view is hard to apply to cases of this sort, since they 
concern people who have little chance to pursue the sorts of extended projects central to my 
conception of life-authorship.  But suppose we think the adolescent has one or two years left to 
live and she wants a chance to make what she can of that time.  It seems like a virtue of my 
account that it recommends that she ought to be given the autonomy of an adult, not because she 
is more reasonable than her peers, but because of where she stands in the context of her complete 
life.  Cases where we expect someone who is now an adolescent to die in mid-adulthood from a 
genetic disease are harder cases to decide in practice, but that is just because they are boundary 
cases, not because they raise any special conceptual problems for my account.  I think that the 
life-authorship view provides an attractive framework for thinking about such hard case  in that it 
highlights the importance of life-span, instead of focusing solely on decision-making capacity. 
Of course, some children unfortunately have their lives cut short unexpectedly.  They shall 
have no doubt sacrificed some present pleasures for future rewards never to be reaped.  But this 
is a risk endemic to all human existence.  I would not spend my time writing if I knew this was 





things I want to accomplish, and my life would likely be the worse for it.  We take the same 
reasonable risks with children.  This should remind us, however, not to think of childhood solely 
as a period of preparation for adulthood.  Children have a right to have good lives as children—
their childhoods should not be sacrificed to adulthood.29     
C) The virtues of the life-authorship account 
In recognizing the moral significance of age, we can capture some of the insights of the 
welfarist and agency approaches, while avoiding their shortcomings.  One appeal of the agency 
approach is its recognition of the importance of Respect for Autonomy.  But it is implausible to 
think that all we care about is that children grow up to be accountable agents.  We also want 
young people to learn how to make choices that will lead to happy and fulfilling lives—and this 
is the appeal of the welfarist approach.  At most the agency approach can allow such welfarist-
oriented paternalism only as long as the child is unaccountable for her choices.  It therefore rests 
on the unlikely premise that young people attain the capacities for agency and an acceptable 
measure of practical wisdom and understanding at the same time.  This problem is often 
obscured because agency accounts tend to elide the difference between ideal and minimal 
agential capacities.  But this is a crucial distinction.  Since the capacities constitutive of agency 
admit of degree, and since normal adults show considerable variability across these dimensions, 
we have to employ very modest standards if we want the possession of agency to ground the 
normal adult’s status as a full free and equal member of society.  And yet we want to foster more 
                                                          
29 Cf. Rousseau’s Emile: “Be humane with every station, every age, everything which is not alien to man… Love 
childhood; promote its games, its pleasures, its amiable instinct….Fathers, do you know the moment when death 
awaits your children?  Do not prepare regrets for yourself in depriving them of the few instants nature gives them.  
As soon as they can sense the pleasure of being, arrange it so that they can enjoy it, arrange it so that at whatever 
hour God summons them they do not die without having tasted life” (Bk. II, p. 79).  I have seen a number of 





than minimal agential capacities in the young—we want children to grow up to be highly 
competent at navigating the many choices the modern world throws their way, to have a strong 
sense of who they really are and what they care about, and to be well-equipped to reason morally 
in a pluralistic world bounded by no single set of traditions.   
The deep problem bubbling up here—the Competence Problem—is that our perfectionist 
educational aims are in conflict with the minimalist standards that are supposed to ground equal 
social status.  Liberals find themselves in a bind, because they neither want to embrace the 
“tutelary state” of Plato that values virtue above liberty (Macedo 1990: 98), nor give up on the 
ambitious and progressive educational goals that have long been a part of the liberal social vision 
(cf. Dewey 1916).  It is easy to overlook this tension when we focus on young children, since 
they clearly do lack the minimal competence for independence.  But adolescents naturally reach 
the threshold for minimal competence considerably before our more ambitious educational ideals 
can be realized.  The solution to the Competence Problem is to recognize that our educational 
perfectionism is properly bounded, not by some particular developmental outcome—as almost 
everyone has assumed—but by a set period of time.  Thus we may permissibly use paternalistic 
means to promote our perfectionist aims up until a person reaches a certain age, like eighteen.  
The idea is to prepare the young person as well as possible for adult life.  After the person 
reaches that age, however, she attains the full status of adulthood, as long as she has the 
necessary minimal competence.  In this way, we prevent our perfectionism from posing a danger 
to the liberty of adults, while at the same time preventing our liberalism from deflating our 
educational perfectionism.   
The life-authorship account also explains what is right about the “open future” argument.  





adults to preserve their future freedom, and yet maintain that the situation of adolescents is 
special in that they have “not yet reached the time in their life cycle when they are expected to 
make crucial choices that will define their identities” (Power et al. 1989: 30).30  Furthermore, 
since it is probable that no society—and especially no democratic society—could function if 
adolescents were generally cut loose from adult authority as soon as they attained the minimal 
competence necessary for adulthood, the life-authorship account helps us reconcile the 
socialization needs of the community with the liberty rights of the individual by confining 
coercive socialization to the beginning of life.   
At just what age does someone become an adult?  One suggestion is that we become adults 
when we reach maturity and come to the natural end of development (cf. Burtt 2003).  Indeed, 
this is one way to understand what Mill might have meant by the “maturity of faculties” (OL: III, 
¶ 3 / CW, XVIII: 262).  But development by most measures lasts well into what we now consider 
adulthood.  For instance, there has been much focus in recent years on the fact that the brain 
continues to develop into the mid-twenties, though there is as yet little real understanding as to 
how these neurological changes relate to behavior (Johnson et al. 2009; Kuhn 2009).  And study 
of moral reasoning and identify-formation suggests that, given the right environments, advances 
in these domains can continue well into the third and even fourth decades of life, if not later.31  
Even if we could settle on a satisfactory definition of maturity, there is no reason to assume a 
                                                          
30 Though Power et al. (1989) articulate the life-authorship position perfectly in this single phrase, they do not 
follow through with the idea, but instead appeal the general idea of promoting future autonomy. 
31 Discussing moral cognition, Colby et al. (1983) reported that subjects “show substantial development occurring 
into young adulthood—between 29 and 33” (49).  On identity-formation in adulthood, see Côté and Levine (2002), 
Côté (2006), and Tanner (2006).  Erikson (1968) thought that development must be understood as continuing 
throughout the “life cycle” and in fact as defining its contours.  Of course, some of this depends on how we define 
“development” versus “psychological growth” or “learning.”  Development is often understood as a universal and 
invariable sequence of changes, where no stage can be skipped if further development is to take place.  But from a 





priori that people should not be treated like adults until they reach the end of development.  That 
the brain continues to develop into the mid-twenties is not by itself even a prima facie argument 
for delaying the age of majority.  Indeed, there is a case for thinking that people ought to attain 
their full autonomy rights before development ends, since autonomy might be conducive to 
healthy development. 
On the life-authorship account, we can allow that when young people are admitted as full 
members of the community is largely conventional.  The age of majority may permissibly be set 
higher or lower, or in a staggered fashion, according to what suits the healthy and autonomous 
integration into the adult world.  For instance, because people are now taking longer to marry, 
start families, and become financially independent from parents, some social scientists have 
argued for recognizing “emerging adulthood” (ages 18-25) as a new stage in the normal life 
cycle (Arnett and Tanner 2006).  If this trend were to continue, we can imagine society coming 
to treat this age group more paternalistically than full adults.  On the life-authorship account, this 
would not necessarily be objectionable, since it would only lengthen the preparatory period at the 
beginning of a life.  The primary question would be whether the change would generally promote 
better lives. 
One virtue of this moderate conventionalism is that, unlike most versions of the agency 
approach, the life-authorship account is not embarrassed by the fact that the child’s developing 
capacities are shaped by the existing social world.  The agency approach tends to treat the child’s 
developing capacities for agency as an independent variable, to which our social practices should 
be adapted.  This is of course an unrealistic picture.  But when the agency theorist does 
acknowledge that different social environments can differently affect the child’s rate of 





children’s capacities for agency as rapidly as possible.  And yet there is no good reason to 
assume that growing up as quickly as possible is the best kind of childhood: indeed, 
commonsense suggests that ideal development proceeds at a more leisurely pace.    
Also, although paternalism is typically understood as a restriction of liberty, observe that 
there is a sense in which paternalism toward minors affords them a kind of freedom not enjoyed 
by adults: the freedom from having to make commitments and decisions with serious, long-term 
consequences.  Of course, this freedom is not absolute, but it is nonetheless important for 
thinking about adolescence.  Some hold that, because the adolescent is “in search of herself,” her 
freedom to make irreversible decisions should be limited.  While there is some truth to that, we 
might also reverse that proposition.  The phase of self-exploration we associate with adolescence 
is not a wholly natural phenomenon, independent of supporting social institutions.  One reason 
why adolescents do not have a more definite sense of who they are is because they are not yet 
integrated into any particular adult social roles which are so crucial to shaping our practical and 
social identities.  As the social psychologist Jennifer Tanner observes, “[I]t is at the end of the 
era of possibilities and exploration that the self consolidates around a set of roles and beliefs that 
define a relatively stable adult personality.  The life events research suggest that this 
consolidation into an adult self is reflected in the significance of establishing careers, getting 
married, and becoming parents during these first years of adulthood” (2006: 24).  By setting 
aside a period of life after the basic adult capacities have developed, but before a person is 
permitted to take on adult roles and responsibilities, we actually create the social space necessary 
for adolescents to imagine different futures for themselves and the opportunity to explore various 





possible forms of self-exploration and autonomous identity-formation that would otherwise be 
much rarer. 
D) Life authorship and agency 
Let me now turn to an issue I have skirted so far.  I said that respect for life authorship is 
“one aspect” of the more general ideal of Respect for Autonomy.  But what precisely does that 
mean?  Is respect for life authorship supposed to replace the more common interpretation of 
Respect for Autonomy, respect for agency?  That would be surprising, since it seems like people 
should have authority over relatively trivial personal matters as well as over major life choices.  
But if respect for life authorship does not replace respect for agency, then it is not clear that the 
above argument really can justify paternalism toward adolescents, for even if such paternalism 
does not interfere with their life authorship, it still does interfere with their exercise of agency. 
The solution to this puzzle is to see that, while respect for life authorship does not replace 
respect for agency, the former duty conditions the strength of the latter in different ways at 
different stages of life.  That one duty can condition the strength of another is familiar in other 
contexts.  For instance, on a common view, one aspect of special relationships, like family ties or 
friendships, is that they intensify the stringency of our ordinary moral duties: it is wrong to insult 
anyone, but it is particularly wrong to insult your parents; it is generally wrong to break your 
word, but it is particularly wrong to break your word to a sibling or best friend.  There is a 
similar relationship at work between life authorship and agency.  
Upon attaining the status of adulthood, not only does one acquire the authority to make 
choices about adult roles, but one’s choices in general also acquire a new, more robust moral 





come to possess full moral standing does not depend solely on intrinsic psychological facts 
concerning the individual, but on his relationship to the community, i.e., whether he has been 
inducted as a full member.32  But this conventionalism is limited by the fact that the individual 
does have a natural right, in virtue of his personhood, to become a full member of the community 
sooner or later.   
What kind of standing, then, do the choices of adolescents have, assuming they are 
minimally competent?  This is best approached by comparing adolescents with children.  There 
are two main reasons for deferring to the choices of children.  First, it is often best for their 
present well-being.  Even young children can have insights into their good not available to 
others, and having one’s will actively frustrated is almost always disagreeable.  Second, part of 
fostering agency lies in giving the child opportunities to make choices for herself and in treating 
the child in some contexts as if she were already an accountable agent.  Is there any further 
reason to defer to the choices of adolescents?  Yes:  that an adolescent wills something is itself a 
reason for deferring to that choice—even setting aside the choice’s effect on his well-being or 
future autonomy.  So the duty to respect agency is not without weight in connection to 
adolescents.  But, until the young person reaches the age of majority, the duty of adults to respect 
his choices is typically outweighed by the duty to prepare him for a good life.  This is what 
justifies retaining the adolescent in the paternalistic formative institutions of the family and the 
school and trying to prevent him from unnecessarily narrowing his future opportunities.  
                                                          
32 This has some resemblance to an argument in Korsgaard (1996b) to the effect that an agent’s accountability need 






5.5  Applications  
A)  Youth and disability 
One important implication of the life-authorship account is that it makes clear the significant 
moral difference between adults with mental disabilities and minors.  The Standard View would 
lead you to believe that, for example, a normal thirteen-year-old and an adult with the same 
capacity for Reason ought to enjoy the same liberties, and that any paternalistic restraints that 
can be justified with respect to one, can likewise be justified with respect to the other.33 I believe 
this assimilation is misguided.   
Some of those who also reject that assimilation argue that the crucial difference between 
disabled adults and children is that the children are still developing and “have not yet reached 
their physical and mental maturity and should be partially defined by the fact that their 
development toward adulthood is still in progress” (Burtt 2003: 255; cf. also Purdy 1992).  As a 
consequence, disabled adults and children have different needs.  There is some truth to this, but 
as I argued above, it is not clear just when “development” ends, and it certainly isn’t at the 
currently recognized ages of majority of eighteen or twenty-one.  But, more importantly, this 
argument suggests that the only reason why we should treat children differently than mentally 
disabled adults is because children can benefit from more paternalism than adults can.  But this is 
essentially to return to the welfarist argument discussed in Section II, which is empirically 
questionable and fails to recognize the intrinsic moral importance of Respect for Autonomy.     
                                                          
33 Cf. Vallentyne (2000): “[F]or moral purposes, it is mental childhood that matters, and … such childhood should 
be understood as non-agenthood, that is the non-possession of a robust capacity for reflection upon, and 
modification of, beliefs, desires, and intentions.  Hence, I shall include non-agent chronological adults (for example, 





Because it is important that people have the autonomy to lead their own lives, we should be 
reluctant to treat adults paternalistically, and when it is necessary to do so we should generally 
employ the least restrictive feasible alternative.  Furthermore, in assessing the competence of 
disabled adults, it is not sufficient to determine how they would fare on their own under current 
social arrangements.  Just as concern for autonomy makes it necessary to ask how we can make 
public spaces and media more accessible for adults with physical disabilities, so too we must ask 
how we can make the social world more navigable for people with mental disabilities.  For 
instance, instead of simply concluding that a person lacks the capacities for making competent 
autonomous decisions, we should ask whether it is possible for the person to make her own 
decisions by “lending” the person the capacities of others.  One way to do this would be to assign 
to the disabled person state-funded assistants trained to help their principals understand the 
choices facing them.  Then we could enable the at least some of the disabled to assume the 
authority to make their own choices in life, even when others are convinced that they were not 
making the best possible decisions (Nussbaum 2006: 195-199; cf. also Wikler 1979).  
But it is not necessary to take the same attitude toward minors.  The life-authorship account 
emphasizes that to be a minor is not just to be an imperfect Reasoner; it is to be at the threshold 
of life.  Because the first years of life can be understood as a preparation for, and one normal part 
of, a complete self-directed life, it is not necessary to always seek the least restrictive alternative, 
nor to always apply the same standards or burdens of proof that we would apply to adults with 
comparable capacities.  Instead, it is appropriate that the minor’s freedom, both in law and in the 






Of course, this does not mean ignoring the actual capacities that young people possess, since 
the kinds of liberties and environments that will be beneficial depends crucially on the actual 
abilities that young people have.  Nor does it imply that adolescents should not enjoy broad 
freedoms, in the family, in the schools, and in law.  Indeed, it is hard to deny that the transition to 
the full autonomy of adult life is best handled in a gradual fashion.  What the life authorship 
account tells us is that the schedule for emancipation should be timed primarily with reference to 
considerations of the young people’s best interests.  This is not incompatible with recognizing 
the adolescent’s “right to be wrong” in particular cases.  The point is that the justification of 
adolescent rights—at the level of rules, not individual cases—appeals primarily to the tendency 
of those rights to promote adolescents’ well-being in general, even though we also give great 
weight to non-consequentialist arguments in the justification of the autonomy rights of adults.  If 
an adolescent cannot really benefit from a certain form of paternalism, then it is obvious that 
such paternalism is unjustified in her case.  In that sense, the young person’s age is not, by itself, 
a sufficient reason for restricting her freedom, but this simply follows from the inner rationale of 
a paternalistic justification.  The life-authorship account tells us that, given the paternalistic 
treatment in question would not be self-defeating, a difference in age is then a sufficient reason 
for treating a young person more paternalistically than someone who is at a later stage of life.  
Furthermore, observe that we are focusing here on the authority of adults over children and are 
leaving aside questions about the division of authority between parents and the state.  Obviously, 
the welfare interests of children confer on them certain rights against their parents which warrant 
limiting parental discretion.  For example, parents do not have a right to beat their children, or 





long run.  On the same grounds, parents may not have the right to attempt to coercively “cure” 
their children of homosexuality or to interfere with their freedom of expression.34  
To illustrate the reasoning recommended by the life-authorship account, consider the 
question as to how large a part high-school students should have in making decisions about 
curriculum, school governance, and discipline.  Some favor democratic or participatory 
education because they think it pedagogically superior or crucial for cultivating democratic 
virtues (Gutmann 1987: 88-94).  Others, however, argue that since adolescents are typically at 
least minimally competent, these consequentialist or perfectionist considerations are really 
secondary.  Just as justice and respect require democratic forms of government, so too do they 
require democratically organized education (Power et al. 1989; Coleman 2002).35  On the life 
authorship account, we can concede that considerations of respect offer some reason for favoring 
participatory education in high schools, but we need not treat this as conclusive or of paramount 
importance, as we would if we were talking about how to govern people over the course of their 
entire lives.  Instead, because we are dealing with a limited period of time at the beginning of a 
life, we can reasonably attribute the greatest weight to considerations about what on the whole 
promotes students’ future good.   
B) Forced, momentous decisions 
Finally, let me consider an apparent problem in applying the life-authorship account.  The 
argument I have defended is that paternalistic restrictions at the beginning of a life, which delay 
the ability of a rationally competent young person to integrate into the adult world, do not 
                                                          
34 The rights of parents vis-à-vis other adults are addressed in Chapter 10.  
35 Though it is hard to see why the proper conclusion is not that all compulsory education for adolescents 





undermine that person’s authority over her life as a whole.  Considered from the perspective of a 
complete life, a person who is independent by thirteen or fourteen will not typically be more the 
author of her life than someone who becomes independent at eighteen or twenty-one.  But this 
argument might seem to depend on it being the case that all of the choices that a minor might 
make can be delayed until adulthood.   
What, then, are we to say about “forced, momentous” choices—choices which cannot be 
delayed and which will have  dramatic implications for the young person’s future life?36  For 
instance, we cannot simply put off the decision about what to do about a teenager’s pregnancy.  
Likewise, certain kinds of life, like that of an Olympic gymnast or classical musician, must 
typically be begun well before adulthood.  In these cases, it seems inadequate to say that, by 
denying the young person full authority to make her own decisions, we are simply delaying her 
freedom to assume authorship over her life, since the decision that has to be made now will do so 
much to determine the contours of that life.  Does respect for life-authorship, then, require us to 
defer to the minimally competent adolescent’s decision in such cases as if she were an adult?  
Practically speaking, of course, it will often be the case that deferring to the minor’s considered 
decision is the best thing for her, even when her decision seems unwise in substance, given that 
in many cases the bad consequences to come from a young person’s decision will be less serious 
than those that will come from frustrating her resolution.  But we are interested here in the 
question of principle. 
It is initially tempting to admit that it follows from the logic of the life-authorship account 
that a forced, momentous decision does generally constitute an exception to the legitimacy of the 
                                                          





paternalistic moratorium of adolescence.  In these cases, it seems that respect for life-authorship 
does require us to defer to the adolescent’s decision, whether we think it good or bad.  But if we 
consider the issue more carefully, we will recognize that so wide an exception is in danger of 
swallowing up the distinctive character of the life-authorship account.  If any decision that will 
potentially affect the minor’s future in a significant way counts as a momentous decision, then 
virtually all important decisions concerning the minor will count as momentous.  Recall that one 
of the driving intuitions behind the life-authorship account was that we want a child’s upbringing 
to make a positive contribution to her prospects for a good life.  If we say that a minimally 
competent adolescent must have the authority to make all decisions that will significantly shape 
her future life, then we will have drained the life-authorship account of most of its force.    
To deal with this problem, I propose that we make a distinction between two classes of 
forced, momentous decisions: (a) those that simply close off particular opportunities (while still 
leaving many open ones), and (b) those that positively and narrowly determine some important 
aspect of the young person’s life or that so restrict the young person’s future opportunities such 
that she will lack an adequate range of options for a genuinely self-directed life.  A paradigmatic 
example of class (a) is the adolescent who wants to train for Olympic gymnastics.  There is no 
reason to deny that this is genuinely a forced, momentous decision.  But if the adolescent is 
denied this opportunity, although she will have lost one life option, she will retain a large range 
of such options to choose from.  Class (a) cases, I suggest, should not be regarded as exceptions 
to our general rule that the freedoms of competent adolescents may be tailored to their best 
interests.  Class (b) cases, on the other hand, should be regarded as exceptions, since in these 





competent adolescent’s decisions deserve the same respect as those of adults.  Paradigmatic of 
class (b) are decisions like whether to carry a pregnancy to term.37     
What is the rationale for this distinction?  All childhoods open up some opportunities and 
close off (or place obstacles before) others.  In this sense, then, every childhood has momentous 
consequences.  A theory of autonomy that held that a person’s future may not be prejudiced by 
her origins would be completely untenable.  We therefore need a more modest view of what it 
means to have authority over the course of one’s life.  Let us say therefore that life authorship is 
not inconsistent with the absence of particular opportunities which others may have (something 
that seems inevitable), but that it does require that each person have an adequate range of 
options upon reaching the “point of departure” of adulthood, such that the person can accurately 
see herself as capable of shaping her life through her choices about which roles and projects to 
pursue.  The larger significance of this distinction is that we can allow the propriety of recent 
legal trends in recognizing the rights of competent adolescents over certain forced, momentous 
decisions (like whether to carry a pregnancy to term), without thereby undermining the more 
general justification for paternalism toward adolescents.38 
This of course raises the crucial question as to what counts as an adequate range of options.  
I cannot fully address this question here.  It would, after all, lead us far afield from the argument 
that stage of life can be a morally relevant reason for paternalistic treatment.  But making a few 
                                                          
37 These are important practical questions, and both have come before the U.S. Supreme Court.  There is a series of 
cases addressing the question as to whether minors have a constitutional right to an abortion without parental 
consent or notification.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  In Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 
U.S. 205 (1972), the Supreme Court granted Amish parents the right (on first-amendment grounds) to take their 
children out of formal education at age fourteen in opposition to the compulsory school-attendance law which 
required attendance until age sixteen.  The question of the child’s right to resist parental wishes in this regard was 
ignored by the Court’s opinion, but broached by J. Douglas in his dissent. 





remarks about the kind of answer to be more fully developed in later chapters will help us see 
how to deal with the problem of forced, momentous decisions.39  First, an account of an adequate 
range of options cannot be purely quantitative: some options are more valuable to have than 
others (e.g., occupational choice versus brand choice), and a variety of different kinds of options 
is more valuable than many options of the same sort.  We therefore need to rely on at least a 
“thin” theory of human flourishing to judge what kind of mix of options it worth having.  This, 
notice, is not equivalent to the welfarist claim that autonomy itself is only valuable insofar as it 
promotes well-being.  Consider the analogy:  A theory of justice needs at least a thin theory of 
the good to know what is worth having, but that does not imply that justice itself is only valuable 
because it promotes well-being.     
On the view I endorse, an adequate range of  options will offer opportunities that enable 
people to develop to varying degrees their valuable, basic human capacities.40  The basic human 
capacities I have in mind include capacities for knowledge and understanding; for aesthetic 
appreciation (including contact with nature) and artistic production; for religious/spiritual 
activity; for participation in intimate relationships, community, and the wider culture; for raising 
children; for productive work; and for play.41  This kind of account cannot be generated from an 
evaluatively neutral conception of human nature: discerning which human potentialities are 
relatively trivial (like the ability to make funny noises) and which make no claim on us for moral 
                                                          
39 I take up the question of adequacy again in Chapters 10 and 14.  
40 This is the position defended by Raz (1986): 373-377 and Wall (1998): 141-144. 
41 The precise content of that inventory is debatable, of course.  Accounts of this general sort are developed by 





reasons (like the potential for cruelty) requires making evaluative claims.42  Though the account 
of the human good cannot be value-neutral, a “thin” theory of the good does strive to be 
culturally ecumenical.  The working assumption is that it is possible to identify a wide range of 
cross-cultural human goods, and that cultures will differ from one another chiefly in the 
particular ways they realize these goods and in the way they integrate and order them.  An 
adequate range of options, then, need not provide opportunities for every instantiation of 
developing our basic human capacities, but it will provide options that permit the realization of 
every capacity in one way or another.  For example, adequacy does not require the opportunity 
for learning the piano, but it should include the opportunity for developing musical talents of 
some kind.43   
5.6  Conclusion: ‘Our Common Humanity’ 
The prevailing idea that a person’s age cannot be a morally relevant characteristic can be 
traced to a very deep idea in the liberal tradition: that our moral status and fundamental rights are 
owed to us, not on the basis of conventional, superficial, or “contingent” characteristics (like 
class, race, or sex), but rather on the basis of our common humanity.  One great task of liberal 
thought therefore has been to explain what this common humanity could consist in given the 
apparent diversity of human beings.  Here there are two great traditions.  The utilitarian tradition 
conceived of our common humanity as consisting in a distinctively human capacity for happiness 
                                                          
42 Hurka (1993) attempts to develop an account of human flourishing from an ethically neutral conception of human 
nature, but to my mind it is effectively critiqued in Kitcher (1999).  I essentially agree with Nussbaum’s views in 
this respect; see her (2000): 83. 
43 I borrow this point from Wall (1998): 142.  There will no doubt be difficulty in deciding how to carve up these 
basic capacities.  For instance, is it sufficient to have opportunity to develop some artistic abilities, or must one have 





and suffering.  The social contract tradition located our common humanity directly in our 
capacity for reason, morality, and self-direction.  Both of these traditions have been pivotal in 
shaping the modern, secular understanding of human beings as moral equals and in breaking 
down conventional status distinctions.  But the status distinction between children and adults 
seems to call for explanation rather than dissolution.  In their attempts to offer this explanation, 
liberals naturally turn back to their respective accounts of our common humanity.  Thus, the 
subjection of children to adults is understood either as based on the child’s lack of prudence or 
lack of rational agency.  One theme of this essay is that both traditions have taken an overly 
abstract and timeless view of what our common humanity consists in.  We should recognize that 
an essential part of our common humanity is the temporal structure of a life.  While liberalism is 
properly committed to equal respect for persons, this need not mean that people have to be 
treated in the same way during each stage of their lives.  What matters is being treated as a free 











PART II:  THE MORAL BASIS OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Introduction and Overview 
In virtually all societies, parents are recognized as holding certain special legal and moral 
rights regarding the upbringing of their children.  But we disagree about the strength and content 
of parental rights, and sometimes even about who ought to have parental rights.  In part, such 
controversy is endemic to any attempt to mark out rights and prerogatives.  If we can manage to 
disagree about how much authority individuals ought have over themselves (the problem of Part 
I), then we are bound to disagree about how much authority parents ought to have over their 
children.  But controversy about parental rights is also a function of historical social change.  
Problems of political and social theory are usually most acute in periods of transition, and in 
Western democracies over the last fifty years, the institution of the family has changed far more 
than have, for example, the major branches of government.  It is often said that since 
approximately the mid-nineteenth century, we have been moving from a paradigm of the family 
that is so deferential to parental authority that children are treated almost like a form of property 
to one that is child-centered and is highly solicitous of children’s independent interests and rights 
against their parents.  Indeed, it is now widely accepted that children have a right to be protected 
by the state from parental abuse, exploitation, and neglect.  States perform this role of parens 
patriae through a variety of means which include making education and medical care 
compulsory, regulating child labor, using public schools and social workers to monitor children’s 





much discretion parents ought to have over the upbringing of their children—and what exactly 
constitutes abuse, exploitation, and neglect—are matters that are bound to generate controversy, 
especially in societies marked by cultural and ideological diversity.  
As I have suggested, we disagree not only about the content of parental rights, but also about 
how they ought to be assigned.  This question arises, in part, in connection to the conditions 
under which children may be removed from their parents.  Is it sufficient to show that the 
children would fare better if separated from their parents, or is it necessary to show that 
permitting the parents to keep their children would result in grave harm to their children?  The 
assignment of parental authority is also complicated by changing forms of the family and by new 
reproductive technologies (like gamete donorship and surrogate pregnancy), which complicate 
the very idea of a natural or biological parent.  Still another impetus behind the question about 
the assignment of parental rights is the decline of the patriarchal family and other strictly 
gendered conceptions of parenthood.  We no longer subscribe to the view that, in case of divorce 
or separation, the father always retains custody over his legitimate issue, nor to the view that the 
mother is the natural caretaker of children in their “tender years.”  To settle custody disputes, we 
now typically appeal to the child’s best interests.  But what kind of principle is the child’s best 
interests?  Is it merely a tie-breaker we use when two parents have equally good prior claims to 
custody?  Or is it a more radical, general principle for deciding who should have custody?  If 
grandparents could show that a child would fare better in their care than in that of her parents, 
then is that a sufficient reason to award custody to them?  What if the neighbors made a similar 
claim?  Or people in a more prosperous country?  (Think about cases where people from the 
developed world try to adopt orphans from disaster-stricken third-world countries, even though 





Similarly, we can ask about the role of the child’s-best-interests standard in determining the 
relative authority over children of parental guardians versus other adults who have contact with 
children, like teachers.  On a traditional understanding, the authority over children of other adults 
is a power delegated by parents; such an individual stands, as Blackstone explains, “in loco 
parentis and has such portion of power of the parent committed to his charge … as may be 
necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed” (CLE: I.xvi.2).  On this view—at 
least within certain limits—parents are like small-scale sovereigns, who appoint other adults as 
ministers to carry out their will, and, as such, these “ministers” are without any independent 
authority.  But today some philosophers prefer to think about the relation between parents and 
other care-givers on the model of coordinate separated powers, none of which is strictly 
sovereign over the others.  The specifics of the separation of powers is to be determined in an 
instrumental fashion (primarily) by considering what best serves the interests of children.  On 
this view, we might even want to revise our concept of a parent, so that it includes “any adult 
who has a continuing obligation to direct some important aspect (or aspects) of a child’s 
development, [such that] a child can have several such parents, including those who actually 
produced the child, relatives, tutors, day-care workers, and schoolteachers” (Blustein 1982: 140). 
When we have disagreements about the content or assignment of moral rights—or about the 
legal rights that people ought to have—we are forced to turn to an account of the moral rationale 
of those rights.  For instance, when Europeans of the seventeenth-century disagreed about the 
rights possessed by kings, they debated whether royal authority was like a personal possession 
that the monarch inherited from his ancestors and which was ultimately conferred by God, or 
whether it was a power conferred by the people, entrusted to the monarch to promote the good of 





parental rights, we need to explore the possible justifications those rights might have.  Are 
parental rights akin to property rights?  After all, we speak of my house and my child.  Or are 
parental rights like the rights exercised by a mayor, which have been entrusted to him by the 
community to protect the interests of the governed? 
In Chapters 6 through 8, I shall explore some of the possible philosophical foundations of 
parental authority—particularly in the company of John Locke and some of his immediate 
predecessors, like Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf.  As any survey of the contemporary literature 
will attest, the influence of Locke’s account of parental authority is quite unique.  Many 
contemporary philosophers take Locke’s account as their starting point or inspiration,1 while 
others have borrowed Lockean ideas (like self-ownership or the rights of producers over their 
products) to develop their own accounts on the origin or nature of parental rights.2  However, no 
discussion of Locke in the literature on parental rights, considers his position as a contribution to 
the sophisticated debate about parental authority throughout the seventeenth century.  But I 
believe that this is to miss much of what makes Locke’s own position most interesting.  Because 
philosophers in this period were seriously concerned with the relation between political and 
paternal power, the nature of parental authority received an unparalleled scrutiny by some of the 
best minds of the century.  Every major natural law theorist felt obliged to devote a chapter to the 
subject.   
As I see it, this was a conversation that began with Grotius’s simple claim that “generatione 
jus acquiritur parentibus in liberos”—that is, that “it is by generation that parents acquire rights 
over their children.”  Grotius, as we shall see, does relatively little to explain this thought, but it 
                                                          
1 For example, Blustein (1982); Arneson and Shapiro (1996); Brennan and Noggle (1997); Archard (2004). 





did much to exercise later philosophers.  Some, like Filmer, took this to mean that men cannot be 
born free, because we are subject to those who have begotten us.  Others, like Hobbes, thought 
the claim made no sense: “as if it were self-evident,” he complained, “that what I have generated 
is mine.”  Still others, like Pufendorf and Locke, tried to explain how Grotius’s claim was partly 
true, but far from the whole picture.   
In Chapters 9 and 10, I turn to more modern conceptions of parenthood, especially those that 
emphasize the value love and intimacy.  Hegel was the first major philosopher to give these 
values a central place in his conception of the family.  However, quite in contrast to Locke, 
Hegel has been almost entirely neglected by the contemporary literature.  Since I believe Hegel 
has much to contribute to the contemporary conversation, I turn first, in Chapter 9, to the 
contemporary intimacy-based accounts of parental rights.  Then, in Chapter 10—the most 
important chapter of Part II—I turn to an extended exploration of Hegel’s conceptions of the 
family and parenthood. 
∴ 
Although Chapter 10 makes many references back to previous chapters of Part II, it may be 
read by itself.  A reader looking for the most important parts in Chapters 6 through 9 is directed 
to:  6.5.C and 6.5.D (on the relation between parental rights and property rights); 8.4 and 8.6 (on 
the Lockean fiduciary account of parental authority and its limits); and 9.3 and 9.4 (on the 







CHAPTER 6:  GENERATION, CREATION, AND PROPERTY 
6.1  Grotius on Generation 
A) ‘generatione jus acquiritur parentibus in liberos’ 
We use the terms “parent,” “mother,” and “father,” to name both biological relations and 
social or moral ones.  When we speak of parental rights, we are plainly speaking, in the first 
place, of the social or moral relationship.  That the biological relationship, as such, does not 
logically imply parental rights is evident from the fact that no one would attribute parental rights 
to flies or spiders or to any creature that does not at least actively raise its young—and typically 
not to any non-human animal at all.  But, all the same, one might think that there is a good 
reason why we have just one word for the two relationships.  Perhaps parental rights amongst 
humans beings are somehow grounded in the procreative act.  This has often been understood to 
have been the view of Hugo Grotius in On the Rights of War and Peace (1625).1  Although 
Grotius in fact says very little about how generation gives rise to parental rights, it is worth 
examining how his suggestion fits in with his general account of what belongs exclusively to 
each person by natural right. 
                                                          
1 Grotius is sometimes regarded as the first “modern” moral philosopher because he sought to detach natural law 
theory from medieval scholasticism.  His most famous remark in this connection is his contention that natural right 
exists by the nature of things, particularly human nature, and that what is right and wrong would be no different 
“though we should even grant, what without the greatest wickedness cannot be granted, that there is no God, or that 





Grotius maintains that God originally gave the earth and its resources to mankind in 
common.  In this original state, each person had a right to his own person and to what was 
immediately in his physical possession, but could not claim property in something he did not 
immediately hold.  That is, he could not have true ownership, or what Kant would later call 
“intelligible possession” (MM: 6:245-2549).  Grotius illustrates this point with an example from 
Cicero: “Though the theatre is common for anybody that comes, yet the place that everyone sits 
in is properly his own” (RWP: II.ii.2).  Or to give another example, you would wrong me if you 
tried to take out of my hands a fish I had caught, but I could not claim as my own a fish still 
swimming in the lake, since it is not actually in my physical possession.  This state of affairs 
persisted so long as men lived in a primitive state in which they could satisfy their needs by 
living off the land without cultivation.  With the introduction of arts like agriculture, however, 
men came to have an interest in excluding others from land they had cultivated, which they could 
not always physically possess.  Unlike Locke, Grotius does not imagine that such title could be 
established merely by mixing one’s labor with what was originally unowned.  After all, since the 
chief consequence of possession is exclusion of others, acquisition of property generally 
prejudices the interests of others.  Private ownership, therefore, cannot come about through 
unilateral action, but only by consent of those affected.  More particularly, Grotius maintains that 
men gave tacit consent to the convention that first seizure establishes title (RWP: II.ii). 
Now we turn ahead a couple of chapters and Grotius proposes to tell us that it is possible to 
have a right, “not only over things, but over persons too.”  Many of these rights also come about 
by consent—in particular, by the consent of the person over whom the rights are exercised.  It is 
in this way that husbands acquire rights over their wives, promisees over promisors, sovereigns 





acquired, not by consent, but through forfeit.  Thus, a person (or even a whole people) can forfeit 
his liberty and become a slave by some criminal act.2  These forfeit cases are not far removed 
from those involving consent, however, since here too the right is created by a voluntary act of 
the person over whom the right is held.  With the exception of a person’s rights over himself, 
therefore, virtually all rights according to Grotius come about by consent or by some other 
voluntary act.  Against this background, then, Grotius’s contention that it is “by generation” that 
parents acquire rights over their children is somewhat remarkable.  Here alone something 
external to the person is acquired by a unilateral act.  Indeed, insofar as procreation need not 
even be undertaken intentionally, we might hesitate to call this biological process an “act” at all.3 
As we shall see shortly, many later writers understood Grotius to be offering an account as to 
how parents acquire rights of authority vis-à-vis their children.  But it may well be that Grotius 
only meant to be explaining why rights over children vest in the biological parents, instead of in 
other adults.  In any case, even if he only intended to explain the assignment of parental rights in 
terms of generation, he says very little to explain the connection.  He only says that “none but 
parents [i.e., the biological parents] are naturally entrusted with this charge,” and that “paternal 
authority be so personal4 and annexed to the relation of the father, that it can never be taken from 
                                                          
2 Who acquires the right over the criminal?  Grotius is not specific, but presumably it is the person or state that is 
wronged.   
3 Cf. Locke: “What father of a thousand, when he begets a child, thinks farther than the satisfying of his present 
appetite?  God in his infinite wisdom has put strong desires of copulation into the constitution of men, thereby to 
continue the race of mankind, which he doth most commonly without the intention, and often against the consent 
and will of the better” (2T: I.54).  See also a similar passage in Pufendorf, LNN: VI.ii.4. 
4 By “personal,” of course, Grotius does not mean “intimate,” but “pertaining to a particular person,” in the way that 
a “personal crime” is a crime committed by an individual in his own capacity, rather than as a public office-holder or 
member of an army.  Likewise, then, paternal authority is attendant to the relation of being a biological father to a 
particular child.  (In fact, this “paternal” authority is actually more properly designated “parental” authority, since 
Grotius grants that it is held by both the mother and the father; it is only when their commands come in conflict that 





him and transferred to another” (RWP: II.ii.5).  He may have simply been following the 
precedent of Roman law, as his treatise is generally modeled on the ancient legal “textbook”, the 
Institutes of Roman Law.  In that treatise, Gaius writes that “a man has power over his own 
children begotten in civil wedlock” (§55).  Grotius may also have simply been following what 
seemed like commonsense.  After all, we do seem to treat the act of procreation as a title over 
children.  In any case, Grotius was unconcerned to offer any explicit explanation of how the act 
of generation could confer rights.  
B) The seasons of life 
What Grotius is more interested in explaining is the content and duration of parental rights 
over children—as well, perhaps, as their fundamental justification.  In this connection, he 
influentially distinguishes between three stages or “seasons” of life:5  that in which the child 
lacks the use of his reason; that in which the child has attained his use of reason, but is not yet 
economically independent and still forms a part of the parental household; and that in which the 
child is capable of supporting himself and leaves the household.  Parental authority has a 
different character in each of these stages.  In the first stage, children “being like the brutes, need 
to be educated and conducted by the reason of another.”  In a note, Grotius observes that 
Maimonides had held that “at that age children belong to their parents, in the same manner as 
their other possessions.”  As Grotius does not register any objection to this characterization, but 
rather cites it in support of his own view, we may presume that he essentially concurs with it.  
However, he clearly rejects the view of the Roman law that children cannot own property in their 
                                                          
5 Grotius’s three seasons can be found, for example, in Pufendorf, LNN: VI.ii.vii-xi and WDM: II.iii.5-6 and Tyrrell 
PNM: I, 18-20.  Locke seems to allude to Grotius’s framework when he says that paternal power “terminates at a 





own name and that parents may destroy their children or sell them at will.  In passing, it is worth 
noting that we find a very similar view in Thomas Aquinas.  Aquinas is considering whether it is 
just to remove a child from unbelievers and baptize him into the Christian faith, since that would 
seem to be like saving the child’s life—only in this case from the eternal death of damnation.  
Aquinas, however, answers that this would be unjust:   
So long as man has not the use of reason, he differs not from an irrational animal; so that 
even as an ox or a horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use 
them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a son, before 
coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care.  Hence it would be contrary to 
natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from 
its parents' custody, or anything done to it against its parents' wish  (ST: II-II, Q. 10, 
a.12). 
In the second stage, according to Grotius, although children are as capable as their parents of 
acting as moral agents, they continue to owe obedience to their parents so long as they live in the 
parental household, but this only concerns actions that “concern the state of the Father’s and 
Mother’s family,” and “only because it is but just, that what makes a part of the whole, should 
conform itself to the interest of the whole.”  This is arguably the most interesting part of 
Grotius’s account of parental right.  Many philosophers simply distinguish between two stages of 
life:  that of a person’s minority, when due to his lack of reason, the child is not yet his own 
master, and that of the person’s majority, in which having the full capacity of reason, he is his 
own master.6  Grotius, however, thinks of the household in a more holistic and Aristotelian way 
as a kind of association held together by common interests (cf. NE: VIII.12; Politics: I.2).  
Therefore, as long as children continue to rely on the family, they owe the family, as directed by 
the heads of household, their obedience.   
                                                          
6 Cf. for example, Aquinas, ST: II-II, q. 10, a. 10 and Locke, 2T: II.55, 58.  This is also the view of most 





Kant seems to have held a somewhat similar view, although he does not explain the rationale 
as well as Grotius does.  According to Kant, if children have reached their majority but remain 
within the household, then they are subject to the authority of their parents, not as parents, but as 
heads of household (MM: 6:282).  Philosophers today often find the importance that Kant places 
on economic independence unattractive (cf. Schapiro 1999), but I think it may in fact be 
enlightening to see a significant part of the authority that parents have over older adolescents and 
“emerging adults” (i.e., ages 18-25) still living at home, not as essentially paternalistic, but as the 
right of the heads of household to require everyone to do their parts for the common good of the 
household.7 
So, in these first two seasons of life parental authority is made to depend on the child’s lack 
of moral and economic independence.  In the third stage, once the child has moved out of the 
parents’ household, he is “at his own disposal.”  Out of natural affection, respect, and gratitude, 
the grown child continues to owe his parents honor and deference, but no longer obedience 
(RWP:  II.ii.1-6).  This was an important move, and one that Pufendorf and Locke would follow.  
Some writers had understood the Biblical injunction to “honor thy father and thy mother” to 
command a certain amount of obedience throughout life.8  After all, adult children evidently 
continued to obey their fathers in the period of the Biblical patriarchs and a similar practice was 
followed in ancient Rome.  Moreover, many political theorists had understood this 
commandment to enjoin obedience to the sovereign, who was, literally or figuratively, a father to 
                                                          
7 To put it in colloquial terms, this is roughly the argument that “As long as you’re living in my house, you’ll obey 
my rules!”  To be clear, I am not saying that parents retain no paternalistic authority over older adolescents.  That 
would be inconsistent with what I maintained in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.  I only say that it is a mistake to 
assume that all parental authority is paternalistic in nature 





his country.9  And Christian authors could not very well argue that the commandment to honor 
thy mother and father applied only to children, and that hence grown children were freed of all 
obligation to their parents, for Christ had explicitly denied this in the Gospels.10  So, instead, 
Grotius argued that there was a difference in what minor and grown children owed to their 
parents.  As minors, children owed their parents a perfect duty of obedience, while grown 
children owed their parents only the imperfect duty of deference—but a duty nonetheless.  
Because the deference is owed out of gratitude, kindness toward parents is not merely an 
undeserved gift.  But, as Locke would later explain, it is also unlike the duty of obedience, 
because it cannot be exacted by compulsion; it “puts no scepter into the father’s hand, no 
sovereign power of commanding” (2T: II.69, cf. II.66; cf. Pufendorf LNN: VI.ii.12).     
From the preceding, we can see that the original acquisition of parental right has a curious 
place in Grotius’s philosophy in two respects.  First, his suggestion that “parents acquire rights 
over their children by generation,” besides being woefully underdeveloped, seems to swing 
freely of his quite plausible account of the content and duration of parental authority.  And 
second, parental right is the only right over an external thing (inclusive of rights over other 
persons) that does not come about by means of the consent or some other voluntary act of those 
whose liberty is directly prejudiced by the existence of the right.  Later seventeenth-century 
philosophers—like Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke—would be dissatisfied with Grotius’s 
                                                          
9 Cf. Filmer, Patriarcha; James I, Trew Law of Free Monarchies in Wooton (1986); and the discussion in Schochet 
(1975). 
10 Cf. Mark 7:8-13 (KJV): “For laying aside the commandment of God, ye hold the tradition of men, as the washing 
of pots and cups: and many other such like things ye do. And he said unto them, Full well ye reject the 
commandment of God, that ye may keep your own tradition. For Moses said, Honour thy father and thy mother; and, 
Whoso curseth father or mother, let him die the death: But ye say, If a man shall say to his father or mother, It is 
Corban, that is to say, a gift, by whatsoever thou mightest be profited by me; he shall be free.  And ye suffer him no 
more to do ought for his father or his mother; Making the word of God of none effect through your tradition, which 





argument from generation.  In De Cive (1642), for instance, Hobbes complained that “Those who 
have attempted in the past to assert the dominion of a father over his children have only come up 
with the argument of generation, as if it were self-evident that what I have generated is mine” 
(DC: IX.1).   
Their discomfort may have arisen in part from a growing appreciation of the gap between is 
and ought, between facts and norms.  It was just not altogether clear how a brute physical fact 
like generation could confer moral rights.  Philosophers of the seventeenth century naturally 
differed as to how wide this gap was,11 but the general problem was probably best articulated by 
Pufendorf.  “Moral entities,” he explains, can neither simply be identified with “natural entities,” 
nor can they be understood as proceeding from the principles of natural substances; in other 
words, contrary to the view of the Aristotelians, ends are not imminent in the natures of things.  
On the contrary, moral entities –paradigmatically laws—are imposed by the will of intelligent 
creatures, human or divine (LNN: I.i.4).  Thus, when Pufendorf turns to the question of property, 
he whole-heartedly agrees with Grotius that first seizure alone cannot account for the origin of 
property rights:  “Upon supposition that all men had originally an equal power over things, we 
cannot apprehend how a bare corporeal act, such as seizure is, should be able to prejudice the 
right and power of others, unless their consent be added to confirm it” (LNN: II.iv.5).  But of 
course much the same objection applies to the suggestion that the bare corporeal act of 
generation could bestow parental “dominion.” 
In this chapter and the next two, I will look at three kinds of responses to Grotius.  In the 
remainder of this chapter, we consider an attempt to make sense of the argument from generation 
                                                          
11 For instance, as we shall see, I think Locke is torn on this issue, and in some passages, especially when he relies 





on analogy with God’s authority over his creation and with a laborer’s right over his product.  
The approaches in the next two chapters involve rejecting, downgrading, or reinterpreting the 
moral significance of generation.  In the Chapter 7, we look at the attempt—particularly in 
Hobbes—to assimilate parental rights to the presumably less problematic voluntarist paradigm of 
contractual rights.  In Chapter 8, we consider Locke’s strategy of deriving parental rights from 
the interests of children. 
6.2  The Argument from Creation 
When Pufendorf addressed the subject of paternal power in his major treatise, Of the Law of 
Nature and Nations (1672), he dutifully began with consideration of Grotius’s account.  But 
arguably he added something of a twist in the interpretation: “The origin of this power, Grotius 
and most writers refer to the act of generation, by which the parents do, in some measure, 
resemble the divine Creator, whilst they make a person really exist, who before had no being” 
(LNN: IV.ii.1, emphasis added).  Grotius had not explicitly offered that rationale for thinking 
that generation conferred rights on the natural parents,12 but we have seen why Pufendorf 
thought that Grotius needed more of an argument to explain how generation could be as 
normatively significant as Grotius had alleged.  Note that by comparing parental authority to that 
of God over his creation, Pufendorf seems to be interpreting Grotius as offering a theory for the 
ultimate justification of parental authority—not just an argument for its assignment to some 
individuals rather than others.  Pufendorf’s fundamental objection to this comparison is that it 
                                                          
12 Unless we count this remark in the Preliminary Discourse: “Amongst men, parents are as so many gods in regard 
to their children.  Therefore the latter owe them an obedience, not indeed unlimited, but as extensive as that relation 
requires, and as great as the dependence of both upon a common superior permits” (XV).  This is the sense that Jean 
Barbeyrac gives to this sentence in the notes to his edition of De jure belli ac pacis, but he could have borrowed this 





betrays “very low and unworthy thoughts of the infinite majesty of heaven, to conceive that the 
same species of sovereignty is enjoyed by God and man” (LNN: IV.ii.1).   
In the Two Treatises of Government (1690) Locke essentially agrees with Pufendorf, but 
Locke’s discussion of this issue has attracted a great deal more attention in our day.  Of course, 
this is mainly because Locke is now a much more canonical philosopher than Pufendorf.  But 
Locke’s treatment of this question is genuinely more interesting than Pufendorf’s for two 
reasons.  First, the question about the nature of paternal authority had become more pressing in 
the wake of Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriacha (1680), which had been received as the official 
exposition of the crown’s own view of royal power (Laslett 1960: 32).  And second, and more 
importantly for us, given Locke’s other philosophical commitments, it might seem as if he would 
have a hard time denying that parents have rights over what they have created.  
It is in the course of his critique of Filmer that Locke directly addresses the argument from 
creation.  According to Filmer, there are two opinions about the origin of government.  On one 
view, held by writers like Grotius, “Mankind is naturally endowed and born with freedom from 
all subjection, and at liberty to choose what form of government it please” (Filmer 1949: 53).13  
“The other opinion denies any such general freedom of our forefathers, but derives the power of 
kings from the original dominion of Adam” (71).  But the first view, Filmer thinks, is absurd, for 
“Every man that is born, is so far from being free-born, that by his very birth he becomes a 
subject of him that begets him” (232).  In fact, Filmer argues that the “natural dominion of Adam 
may be proved out of Grotius himself, who teacheth that ‘generationae jus acquiritur parentibus 
                                                          
13 The writings quoted include Patriarcha and Observations Concerning the Originall of Government, and 
Observations Upon Aristotle’s Politiques.  I have cited them in Laslett’s 1949 edition, as these page numbers are 





in liberos’” (71).14  Again, Filmer is plainly reading Grotius as offering a full justification for 
parental authority—not just for the assignment of parental authority to the procreators.  As 
Filmer sees it, Grotius was on the right track; he just failed to grasp that this paternal authority is 
absolute, extending even to life and death, and does not naturally give way as the child matures.  
In other words, according to Filmer, paternal power was originally absolute sovereignty: “a son, 
a subject, and a servant or a slave, were one and the same thing at first” (188).  And this 
patriarchal sovereignty over children, he alleges, to be the “fountain of all regal authority,” for 
Adam’s authority has been passed down through the generations from the days of Adam and 
Noah to the kings of the seventeenth century (57).   
Now Locke asks, reasonably enough, why we ought to believe Filmer’s assertion that 
begetting a child gives the father absolute power over the child.  Observing that Filmer has little 
to say on this point, Locke entertains the following argument:  perhaps “fathers have a power 
over the lives of their children, because they give them life and being.”  One way to understand 
this argument is that, as Sidgwick would later put it, “persons who would have no life at all but 
for me cannot fairly complain that they are not allowed more than a certain quantity” (1907: 
326).  In a limited respect, this is not an implausible argument.  Suppose I have inherited a 
congenital disease, which my father also suffered from, and which will lead to my death around 
the age of forty.  It may well be that in this circumstance I have no legitimate complaint against 
the lifespan I have been given, since I was owed nothing.15  Moreover, if my genetic code is 
essential to who I am, as many philosophers think, then any child of my parents that lacked my 
                                                          
14 “It is by generation that parents acquire rights over children” (RWP II.v.1). The passage from Filmer is quoted by 
Locke at (2T: I.50).  
15 This, of course, is related to the “non-identity problem.”  See Parfit (1984): ch. 16.  See also the interesting 





genetic disease would not have been me.   But this is rather different than, first, having been 
given life by my parents, and then, in a second act, having had that life taken away by them.  
Locke sees this and makes a fitting reply:  “I answer, that everyone who gives another anything, 
has not always thereby a right to take it away again” (2T: I.52).  In fact, we might be tempted to 
put that point even more strongly:  there is a powerful presumption against the donor having any 
right to take away again a gift from the recipient. 
But Locke is unwilling to rest content with that reply, for he does seem to want to locate 
God’s authority over us in the fact that we are his “workmanship.”  As he puts it in First 
Treatise, “he is King because he is indeed Maker of us all” (2T: I.53).  Making this point in his 
early Essays on the Law of Nature (1664), Locke suggests that it is as evident that “all things are 
justly subject to that by which they have first been made,” as that a person can submit himself to 
another’s will by contract (ELN: VI, 117-118).16  He invokes the same idea at the beginning of 
the Second Treatise, adding that being God’s workmanship makes us his property:  “Men being 
all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one 
Sovereign Master, sent into the world by his order and about his business, they are his property, 
whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure” (2T: II.6).17  
Since Locke holds that property is “for the benefit and sole advantage of the proprietor,” and that 
in its use, an owner “may even destroy the thing that he has property in,” it seems to follow that 
                                                          
16 These early essays contain what is by far Locke’s most systematic account of the natural law.  In using them to 
interpret Locke’s later writings, they must be treated with some care, of course.  In spite of the promptings of 
friends, he refused later on to publish them.  Von Leyden (1991) speculates that this is because Locke worried that 
certain ideas in the Essays on the Law of Nature were incompatible with the mature theoretical philosophy set out in 
the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). 
17 Cf. also the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, where Locke suggests that morality might be placed 
“amongst the sciences capable of demonstration” if erected on the foundation of the “idea of a supreme being, 





God’s ownership in us gives him the right of life and death over us (2T: I.92).  Indeed, in the 
Essays on the Law of Nature, Locke asks “who will deny that the clay is subject to the potter’s 
will, and that a piece of pottery can be shattered by the same hand by which it has been formed” 
(ELN: IV, 105).18  Locke makes a similar remark in the present context, allowing that someone 
who has given life to that which as yet has no being, “might indeed have some pretense to 
destroy his own workmanship” (2T: I.53).  So if children can be regarded as the workmanship of 
their parents, perhaps Locke really is committed to the view that parents hold absolute power 
over their creation.   
Many have thought that Locke’s labor theory of property acquisition is also implicated here.  
If children are the fruit of their parents’ labor, then why aren’t they the property of their parents?  
Robert Nozick, for instance, suggests that Locke has this problem: 
Locke must discuss Filmer in detail, not merely to clear the field of some alternative 
curious view, but to show why that view doesn’t follow from elements of his own view, 
as one might suppose it did.  That is why the author of the Second Treatise goes on to 
compose the First… Ownership rights in what one has made would seem to follow from 
Locke’s theory of property….  [So] Locke must explain why parents don’t own their 
children (1974: 287-288). 
With respect to property, Locke holds that “Justice gives every man a title to the product of his 
honest industry,” so long as the producer has not alienated that title by contract, used raw 
materials that belonged to someone else, or worsened the situation of others in the appropriation 
of originally unowned materials (2T: I.42; II.27-34).  Locke’s idea seems to be this:  Since 
“every man has a property in his own person,” it follows that “the labor of his body, and the 
work of his hands … are properly his.”  When a person labors on a physical thing, he joins his 
                                                          





labor to that thing.  It follows then that anyone who takes a thing that has been mixed with my 
labor takes something that is mine (II.27-29).  But if creators and producers generally have rights 
over their creations and products, then why shouldn’t biological parents, as re-producers, 
likewise have rights over their offspring?  After all, most of the difficulties concerning Locke’s 
theory of appropriation involve the question as to when appropriators worsen the situation of 
others.19  But, as Susan Moller Okin observes, supplied with sperm, “a fertile woman can make a 
baby with no other resources than her own body and its nourishment”:  
This example of production, in fact, is unique in not involving the complications of most 
other cases.  A human infant originates from a minute quantity of abundantly available 
and otherwise useless resources.  Thus, there can be little dispute over how much of the 
product comes from the added value of the labor and how much from the original 
resources (Okin 1989: 83).20 
How, then, does Locke explain why parents do not own their children as something they 
have made and given life to?  Locke appears to argue that, although parents might claim absolute 
power over their children if they were truly the parents’ workmanship, parents have not, as a 
matter of fact, really created children in the requisite way: 
How can he be thought to give life of another, that knows not wherein his own life 
consists?....  Can any man say, he formed the parts that are necessary to the life of his 
child?  Or can he suppose himself to give the life, and yet not know what subject is fit to 
receive it, nor what actions or organs are necessary for its reception or preservation?  (2T: 
I.52) 
According to Nozick, Locke’s “argument seems to depend upon the view that one owns 
something one makes only if one understands all parts of the process of making it.”  However, 
Nozick complains that this is very unsatisfactory: “By this criterion, people who plant seeds on 
                                                          
19 Cf. Nozick (1974): 178-182 and G.A. Cohen (1995): ch.3.  Some, however, like Waldron (1988): ch. 6, object that 
Locke’s argument is not even coherent. 
20 I should be clear, Okin does not accept this proprietarian conception of parental rights.  Her remarks are made in 





their land and water them would not own the trees that then grow.”  But Locke surely would 
want to say that people owned the trees they planted, even if they didn’t understand all the 
natural processes involved in their growth.  Indeed, cultivation is the paradigmatic form of 
mixing one’s labor with the earth.  So Locke is faced with a dilemma:  either we can own almost 
nothing, or else he has not given us any reason why parents do not own their children.  Other 
interpreters—for example, Lawrence Becker—have come to a similar conclusion: “It seems 
unlikely that anything will be found in the nature of the labor involved in conception, gestation, 
birth, and nurturing which will distinguish it sufficiently from the labor involved in cultivating a 
garden to justify using the latter in a Lockean argument but forbidding the use of the former” 
(1976: 657).   
Nozick also considers two other arguments Locke might make to explain why parents don’t 
own their children as property and finds each wanting.  Locke cannot argue that human beings 
are not the sorts of things that can be owned, since (as we’ve seen) he explicitly says that human 
beings are owned—by God.  Nor can he argue that God’s prior ownership in human beings 
excludes our ability to own them, since God owns everything and that argument would make 
human ownership of any part of Creation impossible (Nozick 1974: 288-289).  What should 
someone who is of a “Lockean persuasion” regarding a person’s entitlement to the product of his 
labor—like Nozick himself21—say about this problem?  Nozick can’t say that people cannot be 
owned as property, since he (unlike Locke) expressly allows a person to sell himself into slavery 
(1974: 331).  Presumably, what Nozick would say is that parents cannot initially own their 
                                                          
21 For instance, Nozick maintains that “Whoever makes something, having bought or contracted for all other held 





children, even though they made them, since children own themselves, in virtue of their 
(potential) personhood.22 
6.3  Locke on the Nature of Creation 
Nozick, however, has misunderstood Locke on this point—as, indeed, have most of his 
readers in our day.  Nozick assumes that, for Locke, the rights of a creator are similar to the 
property rights of ordinary producers.  On this reading, God’s property in human beings is 
simply a special application of the rights of producers to the fruit of their labor.  But, if I am 
right, this is far from Locke’s view.  Locke assumes, though does little to explain, a theological 
conception of creation that was firmly established in the older natural law tradition, especially as 
worked out by Thomas Aquinas.23  God’s creation, as we shall see, grounds the natural law.  To 
speak of God’s “property rights” over creation is really a way of referring to God’s status as law-
giver, the source and determinant of the natural law.  Locke’s labor theory of original property 
acquisition, on the other hand, is part of the content of the natural law.  Its status as a law 
depends on understanding God’s purposes in creation.  Therefore, God’s creation and ordinary 
human labor exist on totally different planes in Locke’s thought.  Someone who genuinely 
creates is the one who determines the purposes which govern the created thing’s existence.  As a 
lawgiver, the creator is bound by no higher law.  In sections 53-54 of the First Treatise, Locke is 
                                                          
22 For an interpretation of Nozick along these lines, see J. Cohen (1992).  On the concept of “self-ownership” in 
Nozick, see G.A. Cohen (1995). 
23 The following interpretation was suggested to me by Sparks (1991).  Sparks argues that “the central doctrines of 
Locke’s politics have a theological basis, a doctrine of Creation similar to the Thomist one,” but he does not actually 
connect Locke’s position to particular arguments in Aquinas.  Although it is probably an exaggeration, there is some 
truth to Sparks’s remark that “Locke has a strong claim to be considered a major figure of scholasticism in its period 
of decay”—at least if we limit our attention to his natural law theory.  Sparks’s main mistake is to assimilate the 
labor theory of appropriation to the doctrine of creation.  I maintain, once again, that these operate at wholly 





not engaged in a futile attempt to distinguish between kinds of making that do and do not ground 
property rights.  Rather, Locke is arguing that, since parents are not the creators of their children, 
they must respect the purposes that our true Creator has for human beings.      
The best evidence for this reading comes from Locke’s explanation of what it would mean 
for someone to “give Life and Being” to a child: 
To give Life to that which has yet no being, is to frame and make a living creature, 
fashion the parts, and mold and suit them to their uses, and having proportioned and fitted 
them together, to put into them a living soul.  He that could do this, might indeed have 
some pretense to destroy his own workmanship.  But is there any one so bold, that dares 
thus far arrogate to himself the incomprehensible works of the Almighty?  Who alone did 
at first, and continues still to make a living soul, he alone can breathe in the breath of life.  
If anyone thinks himself an artist as this, let him number up the parts of his child’s body 
which he hath made, tell me their uses and operations, and when the living and rational 
soul began to inhabit this curious structure, when sense began, and how this engine which 
he has framed thinks and reasons (2T: I.53). 
There are three themes in this key passage—especially in the first sentence—that I wish to 
highlight.  First, there is the idea of creating something which had previously had no being.  
Second, there is the emphasis on the purposes and uses of the parts of the body.  And third, there 
is the reiterated importance placed on “the living soul.”   
Let us begin with the idea of giving life and being “to that which has yet no being.”24  Locke 
refers not to the act of merely giving new form to matter that already exists, but to creation ex 
nihilo.  To see this fully, it helps to turn to the more complete discussion in Aquinas, the rough 
                                                          
24 Pufendorf, recall, had used the very same language in describing what he took to be Grotius’s view: “The origin 
of this power, Grotius and most writers refer to the act of generation, by which the parents do, in some measure, 






outlines of which I believe Locke accepts.25  “To produce being absolutely,” Aquinas explains, 
“not as this or that being, belongs to creation.”  But if that is what creation is, then “it is absurd to 
suppose that a body can create, for nobody acts except by touching or moving; and thus it 
requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary 
to the very idea of creation.”  Given that there must be a first cause, Aquinas concludes “it is 
manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone” (ST: I, Q. 45, a. 5).  Locke is making a 
similar point here:  Mere mortals do not have the power to impart being.  It is only this 
theological conception of creation that makes sense of Locke’s insistence that God not only 
created us “at first,” but “continues still to make a living soul.”  Locke here refers to the 
metaphysical doctrine that creatures cannot endure by their own power, but need to be kept in 
existence by God’s creative power.26  Ordinary artifacts, on the other hand, bear no comparable 
relation to their producers.27   
That we do not create ex nihilo in ordinary production seems straightforward enough.  As 
Aquinas puts it, “when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he 
makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works 
from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the action 
of nature” (ST: I, Q. 45, a. 2).  But someone who believed in an immaterial soul might think 
                                                          
25 Locke cites Aquinas on the eternal law in the first of the Essays on the Law of Nature.  Both in the Essays and in 
the Two Treatises, Locke draws on Book I of Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, which is steeped in 
scholastic natural law. 
26 Cf. Aquinas, ST: I, Q. 104, a.1. 
27 Locke may be alluding to this idea in the Second Treatise when he observes that we are “made to last during 
[God’s], not one another’s pleasure.”  He certainly invokes it in his Essays on the Law of Nature in an argument 
which echoes Descartes’s Meditation III: 
“If man were the maker of himself, able to give himself being, then he who could bring himself forth into 
the world of nature would also give himself an existence of everlasting duration….After the case has been 
put thus it necessarily follows that above ourselves there exists another more powerful and wiser agent who 





procreation is rather different, for by begetting a child, a new soul seems to come into existence.  
In a way, Locke accepts that claim.  But he insists that the power that creates the child’s soul 
belongs to God alone.  God uses parents as his instruments in perpetuating the human race (2T: 
II.66); in begetting children, parents are not the causes, “but the occasions of their being” (2T: 
I.54, emphasis added).28  Making the same argument, Locke’s friend James Tyrrell described 
parents as the “subordinate causes” of their children’s production (PNM: I, 16).  In taking this 
line, Locke and Tyrrell are following a long tradition which includes Pufendorf, who held that 
“He that begets a Son, hath no power to make him be conceived, to make him be born, to make 
him live: Whence it appears, that he is not so properly the author of his son’s being, as the 
instrument” (VI.ii.4).29  It may be that Locke emphasizes the creation of the soul in particular 
because it seems so evident that it is beyond the power of corporeal beings to fashion something 
immaterial.30  A hundred years later Kant would appeal to a similar argument in the Metaphysics 
of Morals (1790), though stressing now the child’s nature as a free being: parents “cannot 
destroy their child as if he were something they had made [since]…it is impossible to form a 
concept of the production of a being endowed with freedom through a physical operation” (MM: 
6:280).31      
                                                          
28 Cf. also Aquinas: “the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause” (ST: I, 
Q. 45, a. 5). 
29 Quoting the early church father, Lactantius, Divine Institutes V.18.  William Ruddick puts this idea very nicely: 
“Traditionally, conception has been counted as procreation.  Procreators, like proconsuls, are deputies for a higher 
authority and therefore do not enjoy a creator’s control” (1979: 126).  The point is valid, in spite of the fact that the 
Oxford English Dictionary does not confirm that etymology for procreation.    
30 In a similar argument, Pufendorf refers us to Christ’s admonition, “Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot 
kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell” (Matthew 10:28; LNN IV.2.4. fn. a).  What 
is insinuated, I take it, is that the soul is beyond the reach of human beings either to destroy or create. 
31 Locke and Kant differ, of course, in their understandings of lower nature.  For Kant’s person-centered moral 
philosophy, there are parts of nature that lack any intrinsic moral status.  For Locke’s theological ethics, no part of 





Now, given that creation is different in kind than mere artifact production, what is the moral 
significance of that difference?  On the Thomistic view, to create a thing—to give it being—is to 
impart to it a nature, form, or essence.  This nature is understood teleologically in terms of the 
thing’s proper ends or characteristic activity.  These ends or functions, in turn, are understood to 
lay down the laws governing a things activity and its proper place in creation.  In living things, of 
course, a thing’s nature, or form, is its soul.32  Locke explicitly invokes this Thomistic 
conception of the eternal law governing creation in his early Essays on the Law of Nature: 
All things observe a fixed law of their operations and a manner of existence appropriate 
to their nature.  For that which prescribes to everything the form and manner and measure 
of working is just what law is.  Aquinas says that all that happens in things created is the 
subject-matter of the eternal law, and, following Hippocrates, ‘each thing both in small 
and in great fulfilleth the task which destiny hath set down’, that is to say nothing 
deviates even an inch from the law prescribed to it (ELN: I, 87). 
Just how well these Aristotelian ideas fit together with Locke’s mature theoretical philosophy is 
difficult to say.33  Apparently he thinks Aristotelian forms are of no use in natural philosophy.34  
But I believe it is undeniable that some version of the doctrine of Aristotelian forms (perhaps 
never fully worked out) continued to inform his moral philosophy in the Two Treatises.35 
                                                          
32 Aquinas, ST: I, Q. 76, a.1; Q. 103, a. 5; I-II, Q. 91, a. 6; Q. 93, a.1.  This basic picture is also laid out clearly in a 
text that Locke knew well, Richard Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1594):   
“[T]hings natural which are not in the number of voluntary agents … do so necessarily observe their certain 
laws, that as long as they keep those forms which give them their being, they cannot possibly be apt or 
inclinable to do otherwise than they do; seeing the kinds of their operations are both constantly and exactly 
framed according to the several ends for which they serve, they themselves in the meanwhile, though doing 
that which is fit, yet knowing neither what they do, nor why: it followeth that all which they do in this sort 
proceedeth originally from some such agent [i.e., God], as knoweth, appointeth, holdeth up, and even 
actually frameth the same” (I.iii.4, emphases added). 
33 For example, see ECHU: III.iv.  See also the discussion in Waldron (2000: ch. 3). 
34 The first chapter of Locke’s Elements of Natural Philosophy  is entitled “Matter and Motion,” and in his chapters 
on plants and animals no reference at all is made to forms, souls, or even natures (1823, III: 303 ff.).   
35 Cf. von Leyden (1991): “In my view, Locke tended in his later years to regard the notion of a law of nature as a 






Recognizing this Aristotelian heritage sheds further light on why Locke places such emphasis 
on the form and purposes of the human being in our key passage from the First Treatise.  God’s 
purposes in creation constitute the foundation of the natural law, the moral law by which rational 
beings are to govern themselves.  And we can discover these purposes by investigating nature.  
Locke makes this argument most clearly in the Essays on the Law of Nature:    
What is to be done by us can be partly gathered from the end in view for all things.  For 
since these derive their origin from a gracious divine purpose and are the work of a most 
perfect and wise maker, they appear to be intended by him for no other end than his own 
glory, and to this all things must be related.  Partly also we can infer the principle and 
definite rule of our duty from man’s own constitution and the faculties with which he is 
equipped.  For since man is neither made without design nor endowed with no purpose 
with these faculties which both can and must be employed, his function appears to be that 
which nature has prepared him to perform (ELN: IV, 105). 
Because we human beings do not truly create anything—including the children we beget—we 
are obliged to seek out and respect the Creator’s purposes regarding all creation.  From this 
follows the natural law governing persons and personal property.  It is because the proper 
purposes of all things are determined by God that all creation is spoken of (metaphorically, I 
would argue)36 as his “property.”      
6.4  Locke on Persons and Property 
How do we know the content of the natural law regarding persons and property?  Locke 
follows Aquinas in thinking that, because our Creator is good and his creation good, “those 
things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
think, is to be found in difficulties he had in reconciling the notion of this law with some of his mature doctrines.  
For instance, the development of his hedonistic views and his philosophy of language in the Essay had made it 
difficult for him to attempt a full exposition of natural law or even to believe in it wholeheartedly” (6). 





good” (ST: I-II, Q.94, a.2).37  Locke tells us that “The first and strongest desire God planted in 
men, and wrought into the very principles of their nature being that of self-preservation” (2T: 
I.88).  This inclination is described as a “principle of action” implanted by God.  “Reason, which 
was the Voice of God in him, could not but teach and assure him, that pursuing that natural 
inclination he had to preserve his being, he followed the will of his Maker” (I.86).38  It follows 
then that each person is morally “bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station willfully” 
                                                          
37 Locke’s acceptance of this tenet is clear from both the previously quoted passage from the Essays on the Law of 
Nature and numerous passages to be discussed below from the Two Treatises.  Of course, neither Aquinas nor 
Locke believe that whatever happens to appear good to us at any time is actually to be pursued.  What appears to be 
good is not always actually good.  What Aquinas and Locke mean is that our inclinations are not fundamentally 
perverse in their nature or objects.   
38 This might sound as if Locke is saying that there are innate practical principles—a doctrine explicitly denied in 
both the Essays on the Law of Nature and the Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  But it is possible to read 
Locke charitably here, such that his natural law theory is not in direct conflict with his epistemology on this point.  
Locke allows in the Essay that there are “natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men; and that from the very 
first instances of sense and perception, there are some things, … that they incline to and others that they fly” 
(ECHU: I.iii.3).  What Locke denies is that there is innate knowledge of moral principles—that justice must be done, 
that promises are to be kept, and so on.  Moral principles always “require reasoning and discourse, and some 
exercise of the mind, to discover the certainty of their truth” (ECHU: I.iii.1).  And in the above passage from the 
First Treatise (I.86), Locke does not say that our inclination directly teaches us our duty, but that by reasoning we 
recognize, as God’s workmanship, that it must have been God’s will that we pursue this strong natural inclination to 
self-preservation, which was implanted in us by our Creator.   
Locke occasionally appears to appeal to innate practical principles when he speaks of moral laws—such as the 
natural right to punish criminals—as “writ in the hearts of all mankind” (2T: II.11).  Laslett accuses Locke of 
inconsistency on this score—cf. his note to II.11.  But this language must be placed in the proper context.  Locke is 
simply positioning himself in the tradition of Christian natural law by appealing to the famous passage from Romans 
(esp. 2:15) in which Paul appeals to a moral law that can be known without direct revelation.  Although Paul may 
sound like an innatist, Locke thinks that only the faculty of reason is innate.  To speak of the law written on our 
hearts in this sense is only a way of referring to conscience.  In this respect, Locke’s position is at one with 
Pufendorf’s:   
“The Law of Nature is to be drawn from man's reason flowing from the true current of that faculty, when 
unperverted.  On which account the holy Scriptures declare it to be written in the hearts of men, Rom. ii. 
15….  Yet here we by no means think it necessary to maintain that the general laws of nature are innate, or 
imprinted, as it were, upon men’s minds, from their very birth, in the manner of distinct and actual 
propositions….Although we reject the notion of those innate propositions, yet the knowledge of the Law of 
nature is truly and really imprinted on human minds by God, as he is the first mover and director of 
them…That phrase in Romans ii.15 which is urged so hardly by some authors, is certainly figurative…” 
(LNN: I.iii.13).  
Admittedly, Locke invites confusion on this score, because he sometimes speaks of laws as written or inscribed on 
the hearts of men to refer specifically to the innatist doctrine which he rejects (ELN: II, 88-95; ECHU: I.iii.8).  But 
Locke does not think that Scripture contains a false theory of moral epistemology.  It is only a case in which 





by destroying himself (II.6).  But of course we cannot preserve ourselves without means of 
subsistence.  Therefore, Locke concludes that, if it is the will of God that man preserve himself, 
it must also be the will of God that man has   
a right to make use of those creatures, which by his reason and senses he could discover 
were serviceable thereunto.  And thus man’s property in the  creatures, was founded upon 
the right he had, to make use of those things, that were necessary or useful to his being 
(2T: I.86; cf. II.25-26).   
When Locke says that we have a right to make use of those creatures which reason and sense 
discover to be serviceable to us, his meaning is not limited to the obvious fact that these faculties 
teach us the ways in which different parts of creation may be useful to us.  Reason also teaches 
us that man’s right over creation extends only so far as it is really serviceable to him; that is, it 
teaches that “Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy” wantonly (2T: II.31).  What 
follows, then, is that man is not to destroy “any creature in his possession, but where some nobler 
use, than its bare preservation calls for it” (II.6).   
But how do we know when destroying another creature really is for a nobler use?  After all, 
other living things have just as strong an inclination for self-preservation as ourselves.39  Locke’s 
explanation goes like this.  Creation assumes the form of a great chain of being, reaching from 
the baser and less perfect up “by easy steps and a continued series” to the nobler and more 
perfect (ECHU: III.vi.12).40  At the apex of the chain of being is the most perfect being of all, 
                                                          
39 Cf. Aquinas: “every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature” (ST: I-II, Q. 94, a. 
2). 
40 Cf. “[W]hen we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think, that it is suitable 
to the magnificent harmony of the universe, and the great design and infinite goodness of the architect, that the 
species of creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us toward his infinite perfection, as we see 
they gradually descend from us downwards: which if it be probable, we have reason then to be persuaded, that there 
are far more species of creatures above us, than there are beneath; we being in degrees of perfection, much more 
remote from the infinite being of God, than we are from the lowest state of being, and that which approaches nearest 





God; but man occupies the highest rung in the corporeal world, and “it is the understanding that 
sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion, which 
he has over them” (ECHU: I.i.1).  Therefore, when rational beings use non-rational creatures for 
their benefit, they are putting them to a nobler use than their bare preservation admits of.  But to 
torment creatures inferior to us out of malice or for no reason at all, as children sometimes do, is 
to destroy God’s creation to no good purpose (cf. STCE: 116).  Therefore, although we have 
permission to use and even destroy parts of lower creation for our benefit, our authority over 
property is not absolute.  Even with respect to the inferior orders of creation, our prerogative is 
constrained by God’s will. 
Now Locke, as is well-known, uses the word “property” in both a narrower and a wider sense 
in the Two Treatises.  In its narrower sense, “property” signifies solely property in “external 
things” (as Kant would put it)—what Locke calls “estates”—or simply property in the colloquial 
sense.41  In the wider sense, property is inclusive of life, liberty, and estates (2T: II.123).  Locke 
calls life, liberty, and estates property because, as he sees it, they all share in the essential nature 
of property, which is that which “without a Man’s consent … cannot be taken from him” 
(II.194).  In the above block quotation (I.86), however, Locke means property in the narrow 
sense.  In fact, this passage is the key to understanding the philosophical difference between 
property in the narrow and wide senses.  Since it is dominion over things inferior to man and his 
ends, property in the narrow sense can be destroyed for the proprietor’s comfort and benefit 
(though not for no reason at all).  But a person is not authorized to destroy himself, or to totally 
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have their estates in money” (1823, IV: 11).  Similarly, in the Second Treatise, Locke says that, though a sergeant 






alienate his freedom.  He is, rather, “bound to preserve himself, and is not to quit his station 
willfully” (II.6).  And, since he has no absolute power over himself, he may not deliver himself 
into the absolute power of another either (II.23).  Therefore, although a person has property in 
his person and liberty, in that he has dominion over these things and in that no one may take 
these things from him without his consent, he does not hold them as mere things, which can be 
destroyed for his own capricious ends. 
If we have dominion over the inferior creatures because the faculty of our understanding 
makes us nobler and more perfect than them, then we must also recognize our fundamental 
equality with other human beings, “there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the 
same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of 
the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst the other without subordination or 
subjection” (2T: II.4).  That is, discovering that we have been furnished by our Creator with the 
same faculties, we cannot assume that God has intended or authorized any of us “to destroy one 
another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours” 
(II.6).  This, then, is a further respect in which sense and reason reveal certain things to be 
serviceable to us.  We are taught which creatures are equal to us in worth or nobility and 
therefore are not intended to be serviceable to us.  From this, it follows that we are not only to 
preserve ourselves, but when it does not conflict with our duty of self-preservation, we are to 
“preserve the rest of Mankind.” 
As Kant would later stress, property is not a relation between persons and things, but 
between persons regarding things (MM: 6:260-261).  The very concept of personal property in 
external things, then, presupposes the moral status of other persons.  (That is why there is no 





purpose of property, then, is to enable persons to use things for their own benefit while 
respecting one another as moral equals who have claims against one another.  Hence, for Locke, 
there can be no question of one person of belonging to another as his property.42  It is in this 
context that we must understand Locke’s labor theory of original appropriation.  God has given 
the Earth to “Mankind in common,” and yet ultimately we only benefit from the earth by using it 
individually (especially in consumption).  So we are faced with the question:  How is it possible 
to take things out of the common stock while respecting the rights of our moral equals?  Whether 
satisfactory or not, that is the sole question that Locke’s labor theory of property acquisition is 
supposed to answer.  Since children are persons for Locke and not a part of that original common 
stock that can be individually appropriated, the “making” of children is entirely orthogonal to the 
whole purpose of Locke’s theory of property in external things.  Therefore, contrary to the 
opinion of many of Locke’s interpreters, we can see that Locke can consistently deny that 
“making” children gives parents property rights in them, while also holding that we are the 
“property” of our Maker and that we can acquire originally unowned things by mixing our labor 
with them.  
6.5  General Remarks on the Rights of Parents, Property-holders, and Children 
A)  The ownership of persons 
To summarize our discussion of Locke:  Creation imparts to a thing its nature and being, and 
therefore, its purpose as well.  Because we human beings are not creators in that sense, we must 
                                                          
42 Locke allows that a lawful conqueror may treat captives as slaves, but this is only the continuation of the state of 
war.  Thus, the captive is not morally bound by the condition of slavery.  If any agreement between the conqueror 
and the captive is made, the state of war ceases, and so must the state of slavery,  “since no man can, by agreement, 





respect the purposes of the true Creator with respect to all of creation.  The purpose of property 
in external things is to permit rational beings to benefit from the use of the lower orders of 
creation while respecting the moral equality of one another.  Children cannot possibly be the 
property of their parents, because, being endowed with the same natures as their parents, it is 
evident that children and parents are moral equals and that the Creator did not intend the good of 
one to be subordinate to the good of the other.  Ultimately, then, Locke’s explanation as to why 
parents do not own their children is not so different than the one I attributed to Nozick.  Simply 
put, human beings may not use one another as mere means.  True, Locke embeds this in a larger 
theological picture, but otherwise the basic moral outlook is much the same.   
However, in at least one important way, Locke’s view is more complex than Nozick’s.  For 
Nozick, I am my own master in the same way that I am master over my possessions.  I own 
myself just as I own my shoes.  Therefore, just as I can transfer to you my ownership rights over 
my shoes, I can transfer to you my ownership rights over myself as well (1974: 331).  But since 
Locke distinguishes between the kind of property that I can hold in “inferior nature” and the kind 
of “property” that I hold in myself, talk of “self-ownership” is misleading.  The distinction 
between these two kinds of mastery, or dominion, is nicely drawn by Kant, who holds a view 
quite similar to Locke’s:     
An external object which in terms of its substance belongs to someone is his property 
(dominium), in which the owner (dominus) can, accordingly, dispose of as he pleases (ius 
disponendi de re sua).  But from this it follows that an object of this sort can be only a 
corporeal thing (to which one has no obligation).  So someone can be his own master (sui 
iuris) but cannot be the owner of himself (sui dominus) (cannot dispose of himself as he 
pleases) – still less can he dispose of others as he pleases – since he is accountable to the 
humanity in his own person (MM: 6:270). 
This explanation, common to Locke and Kant, as to why children cannot belong to their 





wing libertarian Hillel Steiner.  Steiner seems to face a problem similar to Locke’s.  Since 
Steiner thinks we own ourselves (in Nozick’s sense), he also thinks that we own the fruits of our 
labor if we own all of the factors of production.  Unlike Locke, however, he does not think that 
we can appropriate something originally unowned simply by mixing our labor with it, as that (in 
his view) would not leave others with as much and as good as they had before.  Since it looks as 
if parents own all of the “factors of production” that go into making a child, Steiner worries that 
this means that parents own their children.  And this threatens to undermine his initial premise 
that we own ourselves.   
Fortunately, Steiner discovers that parents do not own all of the factors involved in 
reproduction.  “Suppose … I steal a drawing you’ve made of Boadicea revolting against the 
Romans and, before returning it, I replicate it with my photocopier.  Would we say that the fact 
that photo-copier, copy-paper and labour used are all mine gives me an unencumbered title to 
that photocopy? … I think the answer must be ‘no’” (1993: 247).  We do not have full ownership 
over the copy unless we also own the original.  Now living organisms are also the product of a 
process of replication.  Therefore, parents only own their children if they already own the DNA 
from which their children’s DNA is replicated.  Where did they get that DNA?  From their 
parents of course.  And where did they get it?  From their parents, and so on and so on.  If we go 
back far enough, then we eventually find that this genetic material came from creatures that were 
not persons at all.  Not being persons, they could not own anything.  Therefore, our genetic 
material is replicated from something that originally had no owner—it was a natural resource.  
But since merely copying something does not make one its owner, we cannot claim full 
ownership over our own genetic material.  Therefore, we do not own all the factors of production 





whole community has some claim to them.  Hence, the community is not prohibited from placing 
limitations on the ways that parents dispose of their children. 
In a sense,  Steiner defends a view not altogether different than the one Nozick imputes to 
Locke.  True, Steiner does not claim that parents do not really make their children, but he does 
argue that there is something about the way that children are made that prevents parents from 
owning them.  I doubt that Steiner has had many converts to his view, but it is instructive to see 
some of the reasons why this kind of argument is bound to fail.  First, the argument does not tell 
us that the community must place limitations on the ways that parents can manage their 
children—only that it is permissible to do so.  But intuitively, we have an obligation to protect 
children, not just a liberty to do so.  Another implausible implication of Steiner’s view appears to 
be that, until relatively recent discoveries in evolutionary and molecular biology, we could not 
have known that parents did not own their children.  It also has the unsettling science-fiction 
consequence that if brilliant genetic engineers or computer programmers one day managed to 
create intelligent life without copying existing genetic material, then they would own that being.  
But surely, when we watch science fiction films, we intuitively feel that the ownership of 
intelligent androids is a form of unjust slavery.  Closer to present-day reality, Steiner’s view 
implies that people have no greater moral right to destroy their own frozen embryos—or even 
gametes—than they do to destroy their ten-year-old child.43  Few bioethicists would be willing to 
bite that bullet.   
It is also doubtful whether Steiner’s argument even works.  The reason I do not own a 
photocopy of the sketch you have drawn is because we think that property in ideas and artwork 
                                                          






extends to the type, not just the token.  It would not be worth much for the music composer to 
have property in his personal score, but not over copies of it.  (As composers before copyright 
laws unfortunately discovered.)  But it is not at all evident that, when something is copied from 
nature, the copy does not belong to the person who made the copy.  Would Steiner say that 
Monet did not originally own his paintings of water lilies, since he did not own the pond in 
which they floated?  Or that Ansel Adams did not own his photographs of the Rocky Mountains 
because he failed to secure ownership over the originals first?  Finally, why couldn’t a similar 
argument be used to explain why we do not even own our own bodies, given that their substance 
comes from originally unowned natural resources?  If I eat a fish out of the sea, which surely no 
one owned, have I forfeited some of my self-ownership rights, insofar as that unowned thing has 
been incorporated into my body?  If I have not, then why can’t genetic material become a part of 
me just as other kinds of matter can?           
B) Equality and potentiality 
What significance does Locke’s view have for a philosopher today who does not want to take 
on board Locke’s theological or metaphysical premises?  If we jettison the theological 
conception of creation, first of all, then the whole idea that a creator has absolute authority over 
the thing he creates loses most of its rationale.  Of course, by the same stroke we undermine the 
very philosophical basis for human equality, and even for morality itself, on Locke’s view (cf. 
Waldron 2000: chs. 3-4, 8).  But presumably there are other ways of thinking about the 
metaphysics of morals and the basis of human equality.  If not, then all of secular moral and 
political philosophy rests on a mistake.  
It is worth noting, however, that even if there are alternative ways of grounding human 





young children with adults than do contemporary philosophers who assume a naturalistic 
worldview.  To illustrate, consider the case of Rawls.  Like Locke, Rawls thinks that human 
beings are morally equal in virtue of their common capacities to act rationally and reasonably, 
which is to say their capacities to pursue their own good and to act in accordance with moral 
principle.  But “capacity” is ambiguous between the actual possession of some “faculty” and the 
potential for developing that faculty.  Rawls wants to say that either sense of rational capacity is 
sufficient for establishing our fundamental moral equality: 
A being that has this capacity, whether or not it is developed, is to receive the full 
protection of the principles of justice.  Since infants and children are thought to have 
basic rights (normally exercised on their behalf by parents and guardians), this 
interpretation of the requisite conditions seems necessary to match our considered 
judgments.  Moreover, regarding the potentiality as sufficient accords with the 
hypothetical nature of the original position, and with the idea that as far as possible the 
choice of principles should not be influenced by arbitrary contingencies.  Therefore it is 
reasonable to say that those who could take part in the initial agreement, were it not for 
fortuitous circumstances, are assured equal justice (TJ: 509/445-446). 
Locke, of course, would agree with Rawls’s conclusion: children have the same basic moral 
status as their parents because they too are born with a rational nature.  But Locke has a good 
story to tell about why the potential for rationality is sufficient to ground that basic moral 
equality:  that children are born capable of becoming rational reveals that it is God’s intention 
and will that this development should actually take place.  Obviously, Rawls will want to tell a 
different story, but does he have one?   
That treating the child’s potential for rationality as sufficient for moral equality better 
conforms to our considered judgments seems a weak argument.  If we had an argument that 
independently established the conclusion that conformed to our considered judgments, then that 





already happen to hold isn’t enough to explain the moral significance of the disjunctive property 
rational-or-potentially-rational.  To see this, take the racist who finds that the property of having 
white skin pretty well conforms to his considered judgment about who has moral worth.  Even he 
will feel pressure on reflection to explain why this property is morally significant—e.g., that 
white people are more intelligent, more civilized, more sensitive, etc. (cf. Williams: 1976). 
What does Rawls mean when he says that regarding potentiality as sufficient for equality 
accords with the idea that as far as possible the principles of justice should not be influenced by 
“arbitrary contingencies” or “fortuitous circumstances”?  He might mean this.  Rational beings 
are moral equals and the point in time at which they develop these rational capacities is morally 
arbitrary.  Therefore, the child’s future interests should be given the same protection as the 
current interests of adults.  Otherwise we would be privileging those born sooner over those born 
later.  This is akin to Rawls’s argument concerning justice to future generations.  And, indeed, it 
is a good argument for showing that children who will actually develop rational capacities have 
the same moral status as those with already-developed capacities.  But a child may not develop 
these capacities.  He might not be allowed to live that long, or he may be sufficiently injured that 
he cannot develop these capacities.  Nothing that Rawls says explains why children have equal 
moral status when their very opportunity for developing their rational capacities is put into 
question.     
One conclusion that you might draw from this is that our current attitude toward the moral 
status of infants and young children is really just the vestige of the older theological picture, the 
foundations for which are cut away by a fully secular outlook.  A few philosophers have been 
willing to accept this.  Notably, Fichte, though denying that children were the property of their 





might still choose to prohibit infanticide for public policy reasons.)44  More recently, Jan 
Narveson has defended a similar view, except that he goes further in allowing that children are 
the property of their parents (1988: 272).  And, of course, there is the well-known difficulty for 
liberals in explaining the moral distinction between abortion and infanticide (Tooley 1972).  I do 
not want to even try to tackle this problem here.  Hopefully, a secular account can be constructed 
to explain the moral status of children in an intuitively satisfactory way.  Perhaps the mistake lies 
in seeking to ground moral status in our capacity for rationality in the first place (cf. Nussbaum 
2006).  After all, that also raises problems with respect to adults with severe cognitive 
disabilities.  My modest aim here is to show how Locke’s understanding of creation connects to 
his understanding of the moral significance of the potential for rationality. 
C) Persons and property as organizing ideas 
If we do subscribe to a thesis of basic human equality, then we can avail ourselves of a view 
about the relationship between persons and property not unlike Locke’s.  And if we also accept 
the equal moral status of adults and children, then a Lockean account can help clarify what is at 
stake in denying that children are the property of their parents.  Let me explain.   
The idea that children might be owned by their parents has a curious place in the 
philosophical literature.  Most philosophers are quick to concur with the commonsense view that 
parental rights are not a species of property right.45  But, even though many philosophers express 
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concern that proprietarian conceptions of parenthood continue to haunt our thinking,46 few are 
very explicit as to what it would mean if children could be owned.  Usually the suggestion seems 
to be that, if children were a form of property, then there could be no limits on parental authority.  
But property rights often have limitations placed on them too, so the existence of limitations 
cannot settle the question.  Edgar Page presses this point effectively: 
Can we be … confident that presently acknowledged parental rights are not property 
rights? … Such rights still give parents a fundamental control over their children.  It is 
not absolute control, but the so-called absolute control traditionally associated with 
property rights was never quite absolute…. For example, cruelty to animals is forbidden, 
even if the animals are one’s own property, and a prohibition on killing them would be 
possible without it affecting their status as property.  There are restrictions on uses of 
land, bans on exporting or destroying works of art, and limits on the number of people 
who may live in a house of a given size, and so on.  So even though parents may not now 
use, sell or dispose of their children as they wish, and therefore have less than absolute 
control over them, that alone will not show parental rights are not property rights.  The 
rights they have give them considerable control and arguably as much as owners have 
over some other forms of property (Page 1984: 192-193).  
Part of the difficulty cropping up here is that our concept of property is no longer as 
determinate as it once was, so it is hard to decide which forms of control constitute ownership.  
Wesley Hohfeld (1919) argued that modern legal interests—like trusts, options, escrows, futures, 
and corporate interests—could not be adequately described with a term so blunt as “rights” to 
property.  Instead, he showed how such interests could be analytically decomposed into more 
basic legal relations, like claims, duties, privileges, powers, liabilities, and immunities.  Soon 
jurists began to look at property, not as a single right, but as a whole bundle of legal incidents, 
which could be taken apart and put back together in any number of ways.  In the most influential 
such analysis, A.M. Honoré (1961) decomposed the traditional concept of liberal ownership into 
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eleven separable legal incidents: (1) the right to exclude others, (2) the liberty to use, (3) the right 
to manage (e.g., grant access or use to others), (4) the right to the income of the thing, (5) the 
right to any capital generated, (6) immunity from undue expropriation, (7) liability to 
expropriation to cover debts, (8) rights of transmission (e.g., sale, gift, rent, etc.), (9) absence of 
term (i.e., title does not lapse as in a lease), (10) prohibitions against use harmful to others, (11) 
the owner is the ultimate residuary of terminated lesser interests (e.g., when a lease terminates, 
the rights enjoyed by the lessee revert to the owner).  Whether the details of Honoré’s analysis 
are satisfactory is not our concern here.  The point is that any such analysis problematizes the 
notion that there is a definite essence of property rights or that any one incident implies the other.  
While these are the “standard incidents” of ownership, Honoré emphasizes that none of them are 
individually necessary for someone to be designated as the owner of a particular thing.   Thus, 
someone may “own” a house, and yet because it is on the historic register, lack the right make an 
addition to it.  Or again, someone may acquire the rights to profit from the exploitation of certain 
natural resources (like oil fields), but risk being expropriated by the government, if the “owner” 
delays in bringing the resources to market.  Given this “reductionist” view of property, perhaps 
there is no reason not to think of parental rights as a highly regulated form of property 
ownership.  After all, a few of the incidents of property seem to apply to parental rights as well.  
On this view, parents would exercise property rights over their children, except as constrained by 
the rights or interests of their children.47  
But if we did think of parental rights as a circumscribed form of ownership, then we would 
be letting our technical sophistication obscure the basic organizing ideas of property and 
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persons, which philosophers like Locke bring to our attention.48  These organizing ideas do not, 
by themselves, establish all of the detailed moral rules concerning particular kinds of property or 
particular stations persons may occupy, but they do provide us with a rough, easy-to-understand 
template of the kind of behavior that is appropriate with respect to each category of entity.  It is 
only in virtue of these basic organizing ideas that ordinary people can navigate the world without 
constant consultation of lawyers or moral philosophers.  Further, these organizing ideas are not 
merely heuristics, like the rule that poisonous snakes usually have triangular heads.  These 
organizing ideas do their work by tapping into the basic moral relationship between persons and 
property.  That is, once again, that the purpose of property is to permit rational beings to use 
external things while respecting one another as moral equals.  And for this reason, it is a sort of 
moral category error to treat persons—including children—as property.  I do not say it is a 
conceptual error.  There is no logical contradiction in the notion of human slavery.49  I am only 
saying that the proper understanding of the moral basis of property morally excludes persons 
from the category of things that can be owned.   
D) How parental rights are like property rights 
There is one important way in which parental rights are rather like property rights, which 
was probably best appreciated by Kant.  Traditional jurisprudence had distinguished between 
rights in rem and rights in personam.  But these terms were ambiguous.  Blackstone, for 
example, tells us that jura personarum are “those which concern and are annexed to the persons 
of men” while jura rerum are “such as a man may acquire over external objects, or things 
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unconnected with his person.”  And Blackstone proceeds to structure the first two parts of his 
Commentaries accordingly.  The first part concerns such subjects as the rights of subjects, the 
rights of King and Parliament, the rights of husbands and wives, the rights of parents, and the 
rights of masters over servants.  The second part addresses property rights.   
But more often rights in rem are understood to be rights that hold against the world generally, 
while rights in personam are rights that hold exclusively against particular individuals.50  
(Henceforth, I will always speak of rights in rem and in personam in this second sense.)  Most 
rights over things, especially property rights, are rights against the world.  If I have a right to this 
book, then no one may take it from me.  And indeed, many rights “over” other persons, like 
rights conferred by contracts and torts, are held only against particular individuals.  My right that 
you perform your end of our bargain confers a duty on you, but no duty on a third party to enable 
you to follow through on that obligation.  Quinsby’s right that Perkins compensate him for a car 
accident in which Perkins was at fault does not impose a duty on Roxy, a bystander.  However, 
some rights over persons do seem to be held against the world.  One example is my right to 
personal security, which is a right I hold over my own person, but which is held against the 
world.  Another example is a parent’s right to protect her child against the interference of others.   
Kant organized his Doctrine of Right so as to sort out this confusion.  Everyone has an innate 
right to be his own master (at least, upon reaching the age of reason), and from this follows not 
only rights to liberty, but also rights to personal security.  This innate right is a right in rem, but 
not a right over anything external to myself.  As we have seen, some philosophers do assimilate 
my authority over my own person to self-ownership.  But we have also had occasion to observe 
                                                          





that, because Kant holds that each person is accountable to the humanity in his own person, he 
denies that being one’s own master (sui iuris) is the same as owning oneself (sui dominus).   
All other private rights (as distinct from the rights of the political community as a whole and 
its officers and representatives) are rights over something external, of which there are three 
categories, according to Kant: 
1. Rights to things (Sachenrecht) or ius reale 
2. Rights against a person (personliches Recht) or ius personale 
3. Rights to a person akin to rights to a thing (dinglich-persönliches Recht) or ius realiter 
personale         
The first two are just the traditional categories of property rights and contract rights.  Kant’s 
innovation is the third category—the rights to a person akin to rights to thing, or as I shall call 
them, “rights in rem over (other) persons.”  In this category, Kant places the traditional status-
based rights of married persons, of parents, and of masters over their servants.  The rights of 
spouses, parents, and masters, on Kant’s view, both resemble and differ from property rights. 
Rights in rem over persons resemble property rights in that they are rights over something 
external, which are held against the world.  The aspect of this that Kant most often emphasizes is 
the fact that if a spouse, or child, or servant runs away, then the right-holder is justified in 
demanding that others bring that person back under his control.  But this is only an example; in 
various legal codes there may be other rights rem over persons as well.  For instance, Blackstone 
describes common-law actions by which a husband can collect damages from another man if the 
latter committed adultery with his wife; by which a father may collect damages from someone 
who has married his child as a minor and without his consent; and by which a master may collect 





his contract (CLE: III.viii).  In this way, the rights conferred by the law of status are analogous to 
property rights over things.  If someone takes something that belongs to me, then I can demand it 
be returned.  And if something of mine is used without my permission or damaged, then I may be 
able to collect damages. 
One possibility, then, is to regard human beings as “things” that can be owned, at least for 
some legal purposes.  This seems to have been the bent of Roman law.  But, like Locke, Kant 
wants to distinguish sharply between the categories of persons and property.  For Kant, we are 
accountable to persons, while we can dispose of property more or less as we please.51  This leads 
to at least two fundamental differences between rights in rem over persons and property rights.  
The first difference is that, unlike typical property rights, these status rights are not alienable at 
will.  You cannot sell or give away your spouse, child, or servant.  Nor can you abandon your 
spouse or child; even a servant cannot simply be discarded like a thing, but rather must be given 
notice before dismissal.  The second difference is that, while all of these relationships involve 
some kind of “use” of the other person—and in that sense resemble property rights—the 
permissible “uses” are highly circumscribed, so as to be consistent with the person’s status as an 
end.  Thus, we can only use another’s sexual attributes for our pleasure, if we have at the same 
time given the use of ourselves to the other.  While parents may manage their children—and 
thus, amongst other things, grant to other adults access to their children (like teachers or 
doctors)—this must be directed to the child’s education and development.  And while masters 
may employ the services of their servants, they may not “use them up,” as if they were mere 
things.   
                                                          
51 Cf. Hegel: “What is immediately different from the free spirit is, for the latter and in itself, the external in general 





Ultimately, Kant’s category of rights over persons akin to rights to things never really caught 
on in jurisprudence.  Part of the reason for this may be the general decline of importance of 
domestic status relationships and the ascendency of contract.  As Sir Henry Maine famously 
observed, the modern world has witnessed “the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the 
growth of individual obligation in its place.  The individual is steadily substituted for the Family, 
as the unit of which civil laws take account.”  In this regard, modernity has been characterized by 
“a movement from Status to Contract” (1864: 163, 165).  The status of servant, for instance, has 
been entirely assimilated to a contractual relationship, and therefore, typically confers only rights 
in personam, not rights in rem.  An employee may be sued for breach of contract, but typically 
you cannot sue the party that hired him away, as if he had stolen something from you.  The 
marriage relationship, it is true, has not completely lost its character as a relation of status, but it 
as well has moved significantly in the direction of a contractual relationship.  Most rights now 
associated with marriage are rights that spouses hold against one another (e.g., in case of 
divorce), not against third parties.  One reflection of this is that many people today find very 
offensive the notion that a husband might sue another man for damages incurred from the latter’s 
adulterous affair with the former’s wife—as if a husband literally owned the wife and her 
sexuality.52  But in spite of the advances of the contract paradigm, the parent-child relationship 
continues to be one which is conceived of as a form of status.  Parents, as we have seen, continue 
to hold rights, not only against their children, but against third parties.  And in that sense—as 
                                                          
52 In what now appears a somewhat amusing passage that highlights the property-like character of marriage, 
Blackstone records that “the husband is also entitled to recover damages in an action on the case against such as 
persuade and entice the wife to live separate from him without a sufficient cause.  The old law was so strict in this 
point, that if one’s wife missed her way upon the road, it was not lawful for another man to take her into his house, 
unless she was benighted and in danger of being lost or drowned; but a stranger might carry her behind him on 
horseback to market to a justice of the peace for a warrant against her husband, or to the spiritual court to sue for a 





rights in rem over something external—parental rights do resemble property rights more than 
most other rights with which we are now familiar.   
6.6  Conclusion 
This chapter began with Grotius’s claim that it is “by generation that parents acquire rights 
over their children” and the puzzle as to how the bare act of begetting can confer rights over 
one’s issue.  This claim, I said, is ambiguous between two meanings.  It might mean that children 
are not free because they owe obedience to those who have begotten them.  Or it might mean 
that, since children need caretakers, those who gave birth to them have a right to be those 
caretakers.  Most philosophers have read Grotius as making the first claim: presumably on the 
view that parental rights are either akin to the rights of creators or producers.  But neither of 
these views seems compatible with Grotius’s more compelling idea that children are the moral 
equals of their parents and attain their liberty as a matter of course with maturity.  This, however, 
is not obviously an objection to the second interpretation: that generation only grounds the 
assignment of parental rights to particular persons.  As we shall see in Chapter 8, this is a 
position that Locke arguably holds.  But before we explore Locke’s position in greater depth, we 





CHAPTER 7:  CONSENT AND CONTRACT 
7.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we examined the idea, apparently held by Grotius, that the act of 
begetting a child is the source or basis of parental authority in the same sense that an agreement 
is the source or basis of a contractual right (6.1).  We noted that this doctrine seems incongruous 
with the rest of Grotius’s thought in two ways.  First, the alleged basis of parental authority in 
generation seems oddly unrelated to Grotius’s account of the content and duration of parental 
authority, which is for the most part based on the child’s needs prior to attaining moral and 
economic independence.  The second incongruity concerns the way that parental right contrasts 
with other forms of acquired rights relating to other persons and external things—e.g., property 
rights, rights of husbands over wives, rights of masters over servants and slaves.  In all of these 
other cases, rights are acquired by means of the consent, or by some other voluntary act, of those 
whose liberty is directly prejudiced by the existence of the right.  Even property rights, according 
to Grotius, originally came about by consent—not (in the first place) by first seizure or by 
mixing one’s labor with a thing.  Pufendorf, who followed Grotius in this respect, expresses this 
view quite well: “Upon supposition that all men had originally an equal power over things, we 
cannot apprehend how a bare corporeal act, such as seizure is, should be able to prejudice the 
right and power of others, unless their consent be added to confirm it” (LNN: II.iv.5).  But it 
would seem that a similar objection could be leveled against the idea that “the bare act of 





claim a like authority (Locke 2T: II.65,).  Hobbes, too, found this notion utterly mysterious:  
“Those who have attempted in the past to assert the Dominion of a father over his children have 
only come up with the argument of generation, as if it were self-evident that what I have 
generated is mine” (DC: IX.1).   
In the previous chapter, we considered the possibility that these incongruities might be 
dispelled if generation were likened to God’s creation or to the act of production in a Lockean 
theory of property acquisition.  In this chapter, we look at the attempt to assimilate parental 
rights to the presumably less problematic voluntarist paradigm of contractual rights.  This at least 
appears to have the advantage of treating children as persons rather than mere inanimate things.  
Moreover, it is of some philosophical interest because it represents an attempt to carry the 
historical “movement from status to contract” observed by Sir Henry Maine to its logical 
extremity.  There are roughly two ways that philosophers have attempted this assimilation.  The 
more brazen route, apparently defended by Hobbes, is to simply maintain that the source of 
parental authority comes from the child’s actual, albeit perhaps tacit, consent.  The obvious 
objection to that argument is that children seem incapable of giving consent.  The second route, 
then, one version of which can be attributed to Pufendorf, is to explain parental authority in 
terms of the child’s hypothetical or future consent.    
7.2  Hobbes on Parental Authority 
One way to respond to the apparent incongruities of Grotius’s account is to attempt to bring 
the account of parental right into conformity with other kinds of acquired right by basing it on 
voluntary consent.  Hobbes, who maintained that “all obligation derives from contract,” pursued 





generation, as if therefore the parent had dominion over his child because he begat him; but from 
the child’s consent” (Lev: XX.4).  This argument, which is adumbrated in chapter XX of 
Leviathan, and given at greater length in chapter IX of De Cive, goes like this.  In the state of 
nature, everyone has a right to use everything which in his judgment may be useful in preserving 
his life.  Unlike most other natural law thinkers, Hobbes understands this natural right to extend 
“even to one another’s body” (Lev: XIV.4).  And because adults are roughly equal in their 
capacity to kill one another, everyone has cause to fear everyone else.  Each person must 
therefore regard every other “whom he neither obeys nor commands” as an enemy (DC: I, IX.3; 
Lev: XIII).  Moreover, such obedience must be absolute; for if the subject retains any right to 
resist the authority’s command, then the two remain in a (perhaps latent) state of war, and thus, 
they remain enemies.  The chief objection to this absolute power is that the subject cannot be 
obliged to do what would be destructive of his life, since that would defeat the purpose of 
escaping from the state of war in the first place.  Hobbes believes it follows that whenever it 
happens that one person gets another in his power, we may presume that the stronger will compel 
the weaker, “as a man in health may one that is sick, or he that is of riper years a child,” to 
pledge absolute obedience in exchange for life:  
For since the right of protecting ourselves according to our own wills, proceeded from 
our danger, and our danger from our equality, it is more consonant to reason, and more 
certain for our conservation, using the present advantage to secure ourselves by taking 
caution, than when they shall be full grown and strong, and got out of our power, to 
endeavor to recover that power again by doubtful fight (DC: I.14).   
The case of children, then, is the same as that of anyone else in another’s power:  “the 
dominion over the infant first belongs to him who first hath him in his power.”  Since, in the 
state of nature, the mother may either nourish and bring up her child or abandon him and 





the mother’s power before any others.”  If she does in fact bring the child up, “she is supposed to 
bring him up on this condition; that being grown to full age he become not her enemy; which is, 
that he obey her.”  It is because the child is first in the power of the woman who bore him that 
generation seems to be the basis of parental authority; in that sense, parental authority “follows 
the belly” (DC: IX.2-4). 
By pledging to obey his mother, Hobbes thinks that the child must be understood to authorize 
her actions as his own and to give up all right to resist her will.  For this reason, all of her actions 
must be presumed to be his as well, and since no one can injure (i.e., do an injustice to) himself, 
a child cannot be injured by his mother in the state of nature (DC: IX.7; Lev: XVIII).1  In short, 
in the state of nature, Hobbes understands the child’s relationship to his mother to be precisely 
the same as that of the subject with respect to a sovereign power.  Indeed, the child’s mother is 
his sovereign, for Hobbes holds that there is no difference, except for its size, between a family 
in the state of nature and a sovereign kingdom.  “[I]n the state of nature, every woman that bears 
children, becomes both a mother and a lord” (DC: IX.3; cf. DC: VIII and Lev: XX).2   
If the mother does not bring up the child, then the child has no obligations to his mother; if 
she abandons him before he is full grown, then any obligations he had to her are annulled.  
Instead, anyone who brings up the child comes to partake in the same dominion over the child, 
and on the same terms, as the mother initially had (DC: IX.4).  Notably, Hobbes’s assimilation of 
parental authority in the state of nature to a kind of dominion is the basis for one of his 
                                                          
1 Of course, even if the child had not submitted and so authorized his mother, she could not injure him in the state of 
nature, since all injustice is only “the not performance of covenant” (Lev: XV.2).  The most important consequence 
of the child’s submission to his mother is that he loses his natural right to resist her will.   
2 Strictly speaking, once the child has submitted himself to his mother, they are no longer in the state of nature with 
respect to one another.  After all, a family is but a small kingdom.  But I shall follow Hobbes in speaking of this kind 





arguments against basing that authority on generation:3  Sovereign dominion must be indivisible, 
because no one can serve two masters.  But “two persons, male and female, must concur in the 
act of generation.”  Therefore, generation cannot be the source of paternal dominion (Lev: XX.4; 
DC: VIII.1).4 
The child’s obligation to obey his parent does not bind third parties in the state of nature.  
That is to say, in acquiring rights over her child, the mother does not thereby acquire rights in 
rem, rights against the interference of others, only a right in personam against her child.  If 
someone judged that it would be beneficial to his prospects for survival to take possession of 
someone else’s offspring, he is entitled to do so by the right of nature.  This point bears 
emphasis.  Someone who assimilates parental authority to property rights, even partially, is 
largely interested in the rights in rem that parents hold against third parties.5  Hobbes is not just 
providing alternative theoretical foundations to the same rights.  He is interested in explaining a 
different kind of right:  the right of parents to demand obedience from their children. 
Does Hobbes have any account of parental rights against third parties in the state of nature.  
In short, no, because there is no mine and thine in the state of nature.  But this may deserve a 
qualification, although admittedly I do not find Hobbes making this qualification explicitly.  The 
                                                          
3 The other argument being the one already mentioned: that it is not self-evident that “what is begotten by me is 
mine.” 
4 Locke reversed this line of reasoning in an ad hominem argument against Filmer:  Filmer holds that those who 
beget a child have absolute authority over that child.  But mother and father beget a child together.  Since absolute 
power cannot be divided between two persons, the authority that comes from generation cannot, therefore, be 
absolute (2T: II.53). 
5 Recall the passage from Aquinas quoted in the previous chapter: “So long as man has not the use of reason, he 
differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil 
law, can use them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a son, before coming to the 
use of reason, is under his father's care.  Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to 
the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents' custody, or anything done to it against its parents' wish” 





fundamental law of nature is “that peace is to be sought after, where it may be found; and where 
not, there to provide ourselves the helps of war” (DC: I.7-8; Lev: XIV.1).  Now one way to keep 
the peace is to permit the first possessor of a thing to enjoy its use; this is the fourteenth law of 
nature (DC: III.18; Lev: XV.28).  Because this is not the outcome of a covenant, respecting the 
right of first seizure is not strictly an obligation to another person in the state of nature; but it is a 
rule of right reason, binding in conscience, and perhaps a “moral duty” owed to God (DC: III.27-
33; Lev: XV.36-41).  Since mothers have first possession of their children, a third party in the 
state of nature may have good reasons to respect a parent’s possession of her offspring, so long 
as doing so does not endanger the life of that third party.    
For Grotius, recall, parental authority loosened naturally as the child acquired reason and 
economic self-sufficiency—although we have seen that Grotius never tried to explain how this 
was connected to the origins of parental rights in generation.  Hobbes, as you would expect, does 
offer a unified account, and it entails denying that parental authority ceases of itself.  That is, 
because the child pledges complete submission to his mother (or foster parent), release from 
parental authority can only come from the parent’s voluntary manumission of the child (DC: 
IX.7), and this explains why grown children continue to owe their parents duties of honor, for a 
rational person would only emancipate her children on the understanding that she is to continue 
to be honored and aided by her adult children (DC: IX.8; cf. Lev: XXX.11).   
To this bald statement, however, three provisos must be added.  First, the child has no 
obligation to a parent who is unable or unwilling to preserve his life.  It follows then that if the 
child falls into the hands of some other adult, then he must be understood to owe obedience to 
that person (cf. Lev: XXI. 21-22).  Second, although Hobbes does not announce this expressly, it 





that parents can sell (or give away) their children in the state of nature, in which case the child 
owes obedience to the buyer or recipient (cf. DC: VIII.6, 13).  Third, because a person who 
submits himself to another also submits to this person all he has, it follows that a mother or foster 
parent who submits to the authority of another (like a husband), also transfers parental authority 
to this new master.   
By the same token, when any person submits to the authority of a commonwealth, the 
dominion over her children is transferred to the new sovereign.  Thus, in civil society, parental 
rights are conferred and determined by the sovereign’s positive law.  These rights are typically of 
a more limited nature than they were in the state of nature, for the state reserves to itself the 
power of life and death (Lev: XXX: 11).  But because good laws follow the laws of nature, they 
will generally recognize the right of biological parents as the first possessors of their children, 
since not respecting this right will generally be productive of unnecessary strife.6  All the same, 
bad laws that depart from the particular guidance of the law of nature are no less valid and 
binding for that (Lev: XXX.20; DC: XIV.10).  Thus, parents have no natural right to their 
children in opposition to a law that says otherwise.  Hobbes adds that it is because 
commonwealths are typically the creations of men that ultimate parental power is usually placed 
in the hands of fathers, not mothers (DC: IX.5-6; Lev: XX.4).7 
We have already observed that Grotius based a great deal of natural right on acts of will, and 
particularly on consent.  From Hobbes’s perspective, then, Grotius was on the right track in this 
respect, but failed to carry this principle to its logical conclusion when it came to parental right.  
                                                          
6 I have not seen this observation made by previous commentators on Hobbes. 
7 Pateman (1988) appreciates this, from a feminist perspective, as a welcome bit of realism, in contrast to the 






In remedying this, Hobbes would have understood himself to have accomplished several further 
objects.  First, he explained why the patriarchal absolutists were correct to think that paternal 
power is originally the same as political power, but he was able to do this without relying on 
obscure brute facts about generation and without relying on a shaky interpretation of Biblical 
authority.  In addition, he was able to explain why the patriarchalists were right in holding that 
both political power, and paternal power in the state of nature, were absolute, while at the same 
time anticipating and answering the objection that we almost never find parental authority treated 
as absolute in any existing society.  Finally, if the interpretation offered here is correct, then the 
doctrine of first seizure could explain the respect in which parental rights against third parties 
resemble property rights as rights in rem over persons. 
7.3  Hobbes on Parental Duties 
Do parents have any duties regarding their children in the state of nature?  (There is no 
question that there are usually parental duties in civil society; the existence of positive laws to 
that effect settles the question.)  At first, it might seem as if there cannot be any parental duties, 
and that Hobbes treats children as if they were nothing but the servants or slaves of their parents.  
And this is partly true.  First, Hobbes does think that, in the state of nature, the rights of parents 
and the rights of masters over servants are the very same and that these are absolute (Lev: 
XX.14; DC: VIII-IX).  To this extent, Hobbes would have agreed with Filmer that “a son, a 
subject, and a servant or a slave, were one and the same thing at first” (Filmer 1949: 188).  It 





be punished for anything they do to their children (Lev: XVIII: 4).8  Further, Hobbes sometimes 
describes a servant in the state of nature as a kind of property, for the master “may say of his 
servant no less than of another thing, whether animate or inanimate, this is mine” (DC: VIII.5; cf. 
Lev: XX13).   
One might think that Hobbes would have to allow that parents can act unjustly toward their 
children, since they have entered into an agreement whereby they will preserve their children in 
return for obedience.  If their children have rendered their side of the bargain, then the parents 
are surely obliged to keep faith with their word.  But this is mistaken.  Parents, after all, are 
sovereigns in the state of nature, and Hobbes is very clear that sovereigns cannot injure their 
subjects.  This is because sovereigns do not make an agreement with their subjects at all.  They 
only declare their intention not to destroy their subjects on the condition that they submit to the 
sovereign’s authority.  Therefore, while subjects and children do have obligations, sovereigns 
and parents are free of them (cf. Lev: XX.12). 
However, that parents in the state of nature lack obligations to their children does not imply 
that they have no purely moral duties toward them.  After all, Hobbes holds that sovereign rulers 
do have moral duties with respect to their subjects by the law of nature.  These duties are the 
precepts of right reason.  They are rationally binding, bind in conscience, and are perhaps owed 
to God, but they are not owed to other men, unless they are the outcome of an enforceable 
covenant (Lev: XV.36, 41; DC: III.27-33).  The moral duties of rulers, we are told, are 
“contained in this one sentence, the safety of the people is the supreme law,” by which is meant, 
Hobbes explains, not the bare preservation of the people, but all that makes life happy (DC: XIII. 
                                                          





2-4; cf. Lev: XXX.1).  So, if parents are sovereign lords to their children in the state of nature, 
then it would seem that they must have the same moral duty regarding their children:  to secure 
their safety and flourishing. 
There are a couple of difficulties with that interpretation.  First, it not obvious that this could 
be a moral duty for procreators as such; it would only be a duty for those who take the trouble to 
preserve their child’s life in the first place, which is the basis upon which the child is presumed 
to consent to parental authority, and the act by which parents become small-scale sovereigns.  
True, procreators might have a moral duty not to wantonly kill an infant, assuming this would in 
no way help preserve the parent’s life; but it is hard to see why procreators in the state of nature 
have a moral duty to refrain from abandoning their offspring to certain death.9  And, indeed, 
Hobbes says that a mother “may rightly, at her own will, either breed [her child up] or adventure 
him to fortune” (DC: IX.2).   
Second, we should ask why the safety of the people is the supreme duty of rulers, in order to 
see if the same rationale applies to parents.  A law of nature, recall, is a “a precept, or general 
rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his 
life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it 
may be best preserved” (Lev: XIV.3).  So why does preserving the safety of the people tend to 
preserve the life of the sovereign?  As I read him, Hobbes’s answer is that there is an identity of 
interests between the people and the ruler.  Rulers benefit from the safety and flourishing of their 
subjects because, in peace, they are a source of wealth and power, and because without peace, 
                                                          
9 It seems significant in this connection that Hobbes always describes the epitome of the law of nature in negative 
terms as, “Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thyself,” (Lev: XV.35, DC: III.26), and not 
in the positive terms of the Gospel, “All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to 





they are a threat to the ruler’s personal security.  That is, of course, a very optimistic view, but 
set aside that objection.  The question we want to ask is whether a similar story could be told 
about the identity of interests of parents and children in the state of nature.  If we cannot, then we 
lack an account as to why parents would have even moral duties in the state of nature to preserve 
the lives of their children.  But children—at least young children—are neither sources of wealth 
nor immediate threats.  So why should right reason direct parents to look to their safety?  Perhaps 
it will be urged that we should look to the future benefits children provide parents, for when the 
children are older, they can work for, and later support their parents in old age.  This, so the 
argument would go, is a benefit that exceeds the costs of preserving the life of the infant, and so 
right reason commends preserving the lives of infants in order to reap these future benefits.  
Perhaps this argument could even explain why right reason directs procreators to preserve their 
children.  However, this argument could only justify preserving all of one’s children, if (as seems 
unlikely) the future benefits accruing to the parent of each additional child never dropped below 
the costs of raising an additional child.10   
Whether or not that is a convincing solution, it is worth observing that these interpretative 
difficulties are symptomatic of a deeper tension in Hobbes’s account.  For parental authority in 
the state of nature is assimilated both to the authority of masters over servants and to that of 
rulers over subjects.  But these two forms of authority seem quite different in their natures.11  
                                                          
10 Thus, I somewhat disagree with Blustein’s  interpretation, on which “parents in the natural state do have a duty to 
preserve their children, but it is a duty from which the right of self-preservation can exempt them” (1982: 107)—at 
least, I disagree if Blustein means to identify parents with procreators.  First, as I’ve said, it is important to 
emphasize that this is only a precept of right reason, not an obligation to the child.  Second, I would stress that 
procreators do not have a defeasible duty to raise their children unless this would compromise their ability to 
preserve their own lives; rather, they have, at most, a duty that is conditional on the probability that raising the child 
would positively benefit the parent.  Blustein places the burden of proof on the wrong side. 





Whereas the purpose of the servant is simply to serve the interests of the master, the purpose of 
rulers (as even Hobbes allows) is to serve the interests of his subjects.  As Hobbes puts it in De 
Cive, “the city [including the sovereign] was not instituted for its own, but for the subjects’ sake” 
(DC: XIII.3).  It would be absurd, though, to say that the household was instituted for the sake of 
the servants.  As we shall see in the next chapter, Locke was quite alive to these differences and 
they play an important part in his account of parental authority.  
7.4  Two Objections 
 It is probably an understatement to say that there are some serious objections to Hobbes’s 
account of parental authority.  I will mention only two.  The first is one that applies equally to his 
general political philosophy, which is that it relies on the dubious idea that contracts are binding 
no matter the circumstances in which they are made.  Locke makes a plausible argument against 
the validity of extorted promises.  If another had taken my horse from me by force, then I retain 
my right to the horse.  The horse ought to be given back to me, and I retain the right of retaking 
the horse.  But “by the same reason, he that forced a promise from me, ought presently to restore 
it, i.e. quit me of the obligation of it; or I may resume it myself, i.e. choose whether I will 
perform it” (2T: II.186).  Since the child’s “promise” to obey is extorted under threat of death, it 
cannot be binding either.   
Now Hobbes would agree with Locke that under civil law certain kinds of promises and 
agreements are considered invalid, but he would deny that this rule is already in effect in the 
state of nature as he understands it (which is to say, a state of war).  In a Hobbesian state of 
nature the horse-thief has no duty to give Locke back his horse, and so likewise, the extortionist 





that the plausibility of Hobbes’s account of parental rights depends in part on his conception of 
the state of nature as one where “there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; 
but only that to be every man’s, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it” (Lev: 
XIII.13).12   
The second objection comes from none other than Hobbes himself.  Given that Hobbes says 
that it is impossible “to make covenants with brute beasts,” who lack the reason to understand an 
agreement (Lev: XIV.22), it is odd that Hobbes could be so untroubled by the idea that covenants 
could be made with children, since they too seem to lack reason.  Hobbes even seems to admit all 
of this in one passage in Leviathan: 
Over natural fools, children, or madmen there is no law, no more than over brute beasts; 
nor are they capable of the title just, or unjust; because they had never power to make any 
covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and consequently never took upon 
them to authorize the actions of any sovereign, as they must do that make themselves a 
commonwealth (Lev: XVI.12). 
How can this admission fail to undermine his proffered justification of parental authority?  
Hobbes never squarely confronts this rather obvious objection.13  The problem is examined, 
however, by Pufendorf and his eighteenth-century commentator Jean Barbeyrac, so it is useful to 
turn to their discussions of the problem at this point.  
                                                          
12 Locke might reply that, even granting that the state of nature is a state of war, he has a right to retake the horse 
that was stolen from him.  So why shouldn’t he also be able to “retake” a promise extorted from him by reneging on 
it?  Hobbes could respond as follows.  First, we need to distinguish two ways that Locke might have had his horse 
taken from him: (A) The horse might have literally been taken from him, Locke having been overpowered or having 
remained wholly passive, or (B) Locke might have been extorted into giving the horse to the horse-thief.  In case 
(A), Locke may justly retake the horse, but his having been overpowered or remained passive is very different than 
having undertaken the speech act of making a covenant, the very possibility of which presupposes that the actor can 
“bind” himself.  In case (B), the two acts of extortion are on a par.  Either Locke cannot retake his horse or renege 
on his promise, or he can only do so because he lacks assurance that the other party will fulfill his side of the 
bargain. 
13 Perhaps Hobbes was not overly concerned about the details of his account of parental authority.  After all, unlike 
most of his contemporaries, he did not think of his account of natural parental rights had much practical import, 





7.5  Tacit and Presumed Consent 
A)  Pufendorf and Barbeyrac 
Pufendorf, after reviewing the positions of Grotius and Hobbes on paternal power, argues 
that there are, in fact, two grounds of parental authority.  One is the “Duty which Nature (in 
enjoining man to be a sociable creature) lays on [parents] to take care of their offspring” (LNN: 
VI.ii.4).  This is essentially Locke’s view as well, and we will examine such arguments more 
carefully in the next chapter.  Pufendorf’s second argument, which is our present concern, is that 
there is a kind of agreement between parents and children.  Unlike Hobbes, however, Pufendorf 
understands this agreement to be mutual.  The parent “by the very act of breeding up the infant, 
doth declare himself ready to fulfill the obligation of Nature, so far as in him lies, the well 
educating of his charge.”  And “though on account of imperfect force of reason, [the child] 
cannot expressly promise those reciprocal duties, which answer to the parent’s obligation,” we 
may yet infer his “presumed consent,” “by virtue of this care, employed by the parents about 
him.”  In this way, the child “contracts as firm an engagement toward [his parents], as if he gave 
his full and express consent,” and parents and children can be understood to be parties to a “tacit 
pact” (LNN: VI.ii.4).14  Hobbes might have had similar arguments in mind.  In De Cive, he 
claims that, if the mother is going to raise her child, “she is supposed to bring him up on this 
condition; that being grown to full age he become not her enemy; which is, that he obey her” 
(DC: VIII.3, emphasis added).  And in Leviathan, he says that paternal dominion is based on “the 
child’s consent, either express, or by other sufficient arguments declared” (Lev: XX.4, emphasis 
added).  For Pufendorf, however, this tacit pact confers not only rights in personam against the 
                                                          





child, but rights in rem against third parties.  This is because, unlike Hobbes, Pufendorf thinks 
that everyone has natural rights to his own person which are held against the world.  (That is, for 
Pufendorf, rights are not bare liberties; they protect a sphere of liberty.)  In making this tacit 
pact, children have entrusted the exercise and protection of these rights to their parents during the 
period of their minority. 
  Barbeyrac levels a couple of perceptive objections at Pufendorf on this point.  First, 
Barbeyrac justifiably accuses Pufendorf of failing to distinguish between tacit and presumed 
consent.  (Hobbes, I believe, is often guilty of the same confusion.)  Properly understood, tacit 
consent differs from express consent only in that it is not declared by express signs like saying “I 
agree to that,” the shaking of hands, or the signing of a contract, but is instead inferred from 
certain actions or inactions, given the nature of the situation or business at hand.  For example, at 
dinner a man says to his fellows, “Unless anyone objects, I think I’ll take the last roll.”  Silence 
in this circumstance is a kind of tacit consent to his proposal.  Tacit consent, therefore, is still a 
form of actual consent.  Barbeyrac rightly points out that there is a second notion, more properly 
called “presumed” or “supposed consent,” (often called “hypothetical consent” now) which is 
easily confused with tacit consent.  In cases of presumed consent, “though a person be absolutely 
ignorant of what passes, and consequently could neither indirectly nor directly agree to it, yet we 
suppose he acquiesces in it, because we believe, [i] That if he knew it, he would freely consent, 
or [ii] at least that he ought so to do by the maxims of Natural Equity” (LNN: III.vi.2 n.3).   
We can sharpen Barbeyrac’s point if we more explicitly distinguish between the two kinds of 
“presumed consent” alluded to here (which I have marked as [i] and [ii]).  Let “dispositional 





preferences and values, were he only situated to do so.  Pufendorf gives a very good example of 
this kind of presumed consent, although he confusedly calls it a “tacit pact”: 
A Man is abroad at a distance from his family and his concerns, in the meantime a 
neighbor without particular orders, transacts some business for him; here again we must 
suppose a tacit pact, by virtue of which the one having lent his free assistance, the other 
is bound to requite the pains, and to refund the charge.  In as much as it may be fairly 
presumed, that had the absent party known how affairs stood, he would readily have 
consented to the whole management (LNN: III.vi.2). 
Dispositional consent is not a form of actual consent.  But when we are forced to make a 
decision regarding someone’s interests, and that person is either absent or unable to presently 
give consent (e.g., because they are unconscious, intoxicated, or temporarily insane), then 
thinking about what a person would be disposed to consent to often has to serve as a “second 
best.”  When actual consent is impossible, relying on dispositional consent can be understood as 
imperfectly deferring to the same value of not acting contrary to the person’s will.  Let 
“hypothetical rational consent,” on the other hand, refer to what an ideally rational or reasonable 
person would consent to in the circumstances.15  Barbeyrac hints at one version this idea, when 
he speaks of what a person “ought to [consent to] by the maxims of Natural Equity.”  Different 
conceptions of hypothetical rational consent may vary in their particular idealization conditions.  
For instance, we might ask what a perfectly prudent agent would consent to, what a “reasonable” 
agent would consent to (i.e., someone “willing to meet others half-way”), or what the average 
“man on the street” would consent to.  Plainly, this is not a form of actual consent either.   
With these distinctions in hand, we can return to Barbeyrac’s objection.  If children are 
unable to give express consent, then they are equally incapable of giving tacit consent.  Indeed, 
                                                          





you might argue that the capacity to give tacit consent is more demanding than the capacity to 
give express consent, since tacit consent requires a deeper understanding of the situation and 
familiarity with subtle conventions.  So Pufendorf has to be understood to mean that infants give 
presumed consent to the authority of their parents.  And indeed Pufendorf explicitly compares 
the child’s “supposed” consent to that of the man abroad who is supposed to consent to his 
neighbor looking after his business for him in his absence.  Barbeyrac says that this argument is 
“ill grounded and superfluous,” but if we distinguish between dispositional and hypothetical 
rational consent, then we can reconstruct Barbeyrac’s objection as a dilemma on which 
Pufendorf’s argument is either ill-grounded or superfluous.  It is ill-grounded if the child’s 
presumed consent is interpreted as dispositional consent, because unlike the man abroad who 
would be able to give or withhold consent regarding his business affairs were he only present, 
the infant entirely lacks the capacities to give or withhold consent.  It is superfluous if the child’s 
presumed consent is interpreted as hypothetical rational consent because, if we argue that a 
person would have consented to something were he only reasonable, then we might as well 
appeal directly to the reasonableness of our action.  According to Barbeyrac, that children have 
“an absolute need to be helped and directed by others” makes parental authority reasonable by 
itself; appealing to that what the child would reasonably consent to adds nothing (LNN: III.vi.2 
n.3; VI.ii.4 n.2).16 
                                                          
16 One may plainly see Pufendorf sliding alternately between tacit, dispositional, and hypothetical rational consent in 
the following passage: “It [is] fairly presumed, that had [the child], at his coming into the world, been furnished with 
the use of reason, and made capable of understanding that his life could not be preserved, without the kind provision 
of his parents, joined with their command over him, he would gladly have yielded obedience on so commodious 
terms.  Which consent of his, being rationally supposed, hath the same validity as if it had been openly declared.  In 
the same manner as a person, who hath had any business performed for him by another, in his absence and without 






Do Barbeyrac’s objections hit their mark?  He is certainly correct in insisting that presumed 
consent cannot confer authorization in the same way as can express or tacit consent.  He is also 
correct to point out that the presumed consent of an infant is not really comparable to the 
presumed consent of the man abroad, since in the case of the latter, but not the former, we can 
appeal to known preferences and settled dispositions.  But hypothetical rational consent may not 
be superfluous if it is understood, not as an alternative to what is reasonable in itself, but as a 
way of identifying what actually is reasonable.  Pufendorf held the common view that the most 
usual cause of wrong-doing is “when a man, without any reason, or, without sufficient reason, 
prefers himself to others,” as if others were “unworthy of his consideration or regard” (LNN: 
III.ii.6).  This failure to recognize the moral equality of others, and the equal importance of their 
claims, is what Pufendorf calls “pride.”17  To overcome this bias for ourselves, reason tells us to 
put ourselves in the other’s place and try to see things from his point of view: “When a man 
doubts whether what he is going to do to another be agreeable to the Law of Nature, let him 
suppose himself in the other’s room.  For by this means, … self-love and the other passions, 
which weighed down one scale, are taken thence and put into the contrary scale” (LNN: 
II.iii.13).18  In our day, Rawls has made a similar point: “to respect another as a moral person is 
to try to understand his aims and interests from his standpoint” (TJ: 338/297).19  But we know 
that role-reversal arguments have to be handled with care.  Should a judge release a guilty 
criminal, if that is what he would want were he in the criminal’s place?  Should we let an 
                                                          
17 Cf. Hobbes, Lev: XV.21; DC: III.13.  This is essentially identical to what Kant would later call “self-conceit”: 
thinking one’s own claims are more worthy of respect than those of others (Critique of Practical Reason 5:73-75 
and MM:  6:462). 
18 Pufendorf is explicitly following Hobbes here.  Cf. Lev: XV.35.; DC: III.13.27. 
19 Other important representatives of this tradition in contemporary moral and political philosophy include Nagel 





intoxicated person embarrass himself, if we think we would act the same way were we just as 
intoxicated?  The idealizations of hypothetical consent and hypothetical contract theories are 
elaborated in order to make clearer which perspectives ought to be given moral weight in 
different kinds of circumstances, if we are to treat others as moral equals.  Thinking about what 
sort of parental control a child would consent to if he were reasonable is no different:  the child’s 
idealized perspective is the way we think about what treating the child as a moral equal actually 
consists in.  So, if we understand the child’s hypothetical consent as a way of identifying what is 
just, there is nothing objectionable about invoking it.  All the same, Barbeyrac is correct to 
criticize Pufendorf’s attempt to make the child’s needs and the child’s presumed consent two 
different arguments for parental authority.  The child’s hypothetical consent is simply our way of 
appropriately gauging the child’s needs and interests by thinking about things from his 
(idealized) point of view.   
What about interpreting Hobbes as invoking the child’s hypothetical consent?  This seems 
distinctly unpromising.  Hobbes wants the child’s consent to actually authorize his parent as 
sovereign, but hypothetical consent, as we have said, is not a form of actual consent at all.20  The 
idealizations of hypothetical consent, on the other hand, can only be justified on moral grounds.  
But if we idealize the child’s capacity to give consent, why shouldn’t we also make further 
idealizations?  In particular, it seems that we should idealize away the parent’s power advantage 
over the child.21  But this would undermine Hobbes’s whole argument, for it turns crucially on 
the parent’s ability to threaten her child with death.  Therefore, it seems that Hobbes cannot help 
himself to the child’s hypothetical or presumed consent.  On the other hand, I do think that the 
                                                          
20 Cf. R. Dworkin (1977): 151. 





prospects of appealing to tacit consent are more promising for Hobbes than they are for 
Pufendorf.  But before I explain why, let me briefly consider one further interpretation of consent 
that is sometimes invoked in this context. 
B)  Future consent 
Some have suggested that parental authority might be justified by the child’s future consent 
as an adult.  Jeffrey Blustein, for example, says that we might make sense of Hobbes in this way: 
“Though children, as children, do not actually consent, eventually they will come to see that 
obedience was a small price to pay for protection and that in obeying they only did what they 
would have wanted to do if they were fully rational.  This future-oriented consent obligates even 
very young children” (1982: 71).22  Similar ideas have occasionally been invoked in the 
contemporary philosophical literature on paternalism toward children.  Gerald Dworkin once 
argued that “Parental paternalism may be thought of as a wager by the parent on the child’s 
subsequent recognition of the wisdom of the restrictions.”  On this view, “there is an emphasis 
on what could be called future-oriented consent—on what the child will come to welcome, rather 
than on what he does welcome” (1972: 76-77).  Similarly, Samantha Brennan and Robert Noggle 
have claimed that “Most of us would give a sort of ‘retroactive consent’ to having had various 
sorts of restrictions placed on us when we were children—even if we did not agree with them at 
the time” (1997: 4).23   
                                                          
22 Blustein attributes this interpretation of Hobbes to Schochet (1975): 232, but I think Schochet’s view is closer to 
the one that I offer at the end of this section.  
23Other defenses of what is variously called “future-oriented,” “subsequent,” or “retroactive” consent can be found 
in Carter (1977) and Freeman (1997): 88.  Carter’s essay is the only sustained attempt to make sense of the notion 





Future-oriented consent can be understood in two ways.  On one interpretation, it is just a 
version of hypothetical consent.  We imagine that, as adults, we travel back in time to our 
infancy.  We then imagine ourselves being asked whether we consent to the authority that our 
parents intend to exercise over us as children.  If we judge that it is reasonable for such time-
travellers to give their consent, then parental authority is actually justified.  On this 
interpretation, the fiction of future consent is just a heuristic—not wholly unlike Rawls’s original 
position—for helping us think about how to treat children like moral equals.  On a second 
interpretation, however, future consent is understood to be a kind of actual consent, much like 
the more familiar prior consent (e.g., a living will), only instead of being prospective, it is 
retroactive.  For example, one contemporary philosopher gives the following example of 
retroactive consent: “Bill interferes with Jim’s freedom of action by preventing him from 
committing suicide.  Subsequently, Jim explicitly consents to the intervention by expressing his 
appreciation for Bill’s action.  He thus, after the event, alienates his right to non-interference for 
that particular act” (Carter 1977: 135).  This understanding of future consent has come in for a 
good deal of criticism.  Some complain that it is “surpassingly mysterious” how subsequent 
consent could retroactively authorize a prior act without dubiously invoking “backward 
causation in time” (Van De Veer 1979: 638).  Others object that it is unfair to make the moral 
status of parental control depend on some future event that they have no way of presently 
discerning (Feinberg 1986: 182).  If “ought implies can”—so this argument goes—then the 
justification of an action cannot depend on some event that is impossible for the agent to know at 
the time of action.  While these objections may not be absolutely watertight, they make daunting 
the prospect of defending future consent as a form of actual consent.  However, as an 





C) Hobbes and tacit consent 
Although Barbeyrac is correct in thinking that Pufendorf cannot appeal to the child’s tacit 
consent to justify parental authority, that notion may nonetheless be serviceable for Hobbes.  
This is because there is an important difference between what Pufendorf and Hobbes are trying 
to justify.  Pufendorf needs his argument for parental authority to justify the exercise of 
discipline—something which private individuals ordinarily lack the authority to inflict upon one 
another absent a special consensual relationship (like that between a husband and a wife or a 
master and a servant).  Therefore, it is important for Pufendorf that parental authority can be 
justified from birth.  But Hobbes does not need to justify the exercise of discipline; force is not 
prohibited in a Hobbesian state of nature.  All that Hobbes needs is an argument for filial 
obligation—an argument, that is, to explain why the child has a categorical reason to obey his 
parents and why he acts unjustly otherwise.  Strictly speaking, of course, parents cannot punish 
their children until the children are under a filial obligation, since Hobbes defines punishment as 
an evil inflicted by a superior authority (Lev: XXVII.1).  But parents can “inflict evils” as if they 
were punishments until their children confer them with authority.   
This suggests that Hobbes could tell the following story about the child’s tacit consent.  
Infants are indeed like brute beasts in that they lack the rationality to engage obligations, but 
parents can nonetheless discipline them in the same way that they might discipline a dog.  As 
with dogs, disciplining children will reliably condition sub-rational habits of obedience.  Until 
children have attained some modicum of rationality, children will obey their parents without 





necessary for engaging obligations,24 they typically continue to obey their parents out of 
ingrained habit.  But in doing so, they give their tacit consent to the existing arrangement, and 
parental strength is thereby transformed into parental authority, which the children now have an 
obligation to obey.  Moreover, it should come as no surprise if children could consent to parental 
authority before they can consent to political authority, since the first is so much more familiar to 
them and so much more easily understood.  That is why this story does not conflict with 
Hobbes’s claim that “over natural fools, children, or madmen there is no law.”  When children 
are born to a parent living in civil society, their authorization of their parent indirectly authorizes 
the state.           
I believe this story pretty effectively disposes of the objection to Hobbes’s account that 
children lack the rationality necessary to give consent.  Unlike Pufendorf, Hobbes doesn’t need 
the child to give his consent until the child is able to give it.  If that is correct, then the most 
serious objection to Hobbes will appeal to the unfair conditions under which children are said to 
give their consent and the moral implausibility of the Hobbesian state of nature lying in the 
background.   
7.6  Conclusion 
The idea that the parent-child relation might be understood as a sort of contract has seemed 
absurd to many—a kind of bourgeois individualism run amok.  But it is at least understandable 
as an attempt to explain how parental authority is compatible with the idea that we are born free 
                                                          
24 Therefore, when Hobbes says that the mother is supposed to have raised her child on the condition that “being 
grown to full age he becomes not her enemy; which is, that he obey her,” I interpret “full age” to mean, not 
adulthood, but the age where the child has the minimal understanding to make simple agreements and to respect his 





and equal, without appealing to the idea that, somehow, what I have begotten is mine.  
Ultimately, Hobbes’s view is not very attractive, but that is more due to its assumptions about the 
state of nature than due to any problem with his argument.  Pufendorf’s appeal to the child’s 
presumed, or hypothetical, consent is more appealing, but we must keep in mind that 
hypothetical consent is not really a kind of consent, but only a way of bringing to our minds in a 
clear and vivid way the perspective or interests of others.  Barbeyrac was correct to criticize 
Pufendorf for suggesting that the child’s needs and the child’s presumed consent were two 
different arguments.  We must have a substantive account of the child’s needs before we can 
know what it would be reasonable for the child to consent to in the first place.  This is the 
subject-matter of the next chapter.  





CHAPTER 8:  LOCKE AND THE FIDUCIARY MODEL 
8.1  Introduction  
In the previous two chapters, we considered two approaches to the moral basis of parental 
rights: that they might be grounded in the parents’ creation of the child, and that they might be 
grounded in the child’s consent to the parent’s authority.  A third approach—the one favored by 
Locke and the subject of this chapter—is to start with the child’s undeveloped capacities for 
reason and independence.  Locke’s rather elegant strategy is to argue that the child’s 
undeveloped potential for reason is at once the basis of the child’s moral equality with his 
parents and the basis for his temporary subjection to their authority.  As Locke puts it, “we are 
born free, as we are born rational; not that we have actually the exercise of either: age, that 
brings one, brings with it the other too. And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to 
parents may consist together, and are both founded on the same principle” (2T: II.61).  By 
founding parental authority in consideration of the basic moral equality of children and parents, 
Locke’s account has secured an enduring appeal, and many philosophers today see their own 
accounts of parental rights as essentially Lockean in spirit.1  However, I believe that Locke’s 
account of parental authority is much richer than most contemporary philosophers have realized.  
This is particularly so if we read Locke’s account of parental authority in the light of his views 
about the nature of government, property, and education, and then draw out some of the 
implications that Locke himself neglected.   
                                                          






I shall proceed in this chapter as follows.  After presenting the basics of Locke’s account in 
the next section (8.2), I use Locke’s distinction between government and property (8.3) to refine 
a Lockean theory of parental authority (8.4), as well as abuse of that authority (8.5).  I then 
consider two objections to a purely fiduciary model of parental rights, as well as replies to those 
objections which retain the child-centered focus of the fiduciary model (8.6).  
8.2  Equality and the Subjection of Children 
If we are “born free and equal,” then the subjection of children to parental authority seems to 
call out for some explanation.  Philosophers today typically ground human equality either in our 
basic rational and moral faculties, or in our qualitatively similar capacities for flourishing and 
suffering (cf. Williams 1976).  As we observed in Chapter 6, Locke’s own view is of the first 
sort, although it is ultimately rooted in his theology.  Because reason teaches us that we are all 
the workmanship of an infinitely wise and powerful Creator, we know that we must seek our 
proper ends in God’s intentions.  If God has deigned to create something, then we must presume 
that it is not to be destroyed, except insofar as he would so intend, which is to say, insofar as it is 
put to some nobler purpose (2T: II.6).  Since human beings need food, drink, and other things to 
subsist, we can infer that God must have intended human beings to use at least some parts of 
creation for their own benefit (I.86, II.25-26).  And yet, there is “nothing more evident, than that 
creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, 
and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without 
subordination or subjection” (II.4).  Therefore, while human beings are authorized by God to use 
inferior, non-rational creation for their own pleasure, they are not so authorized to use one 





“to preserve the rest of mankind” and forbids him to “take away, or impair the life, or what tends 
to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another” (II.7, 16).              
Like other natural law thinkers, Locke distinguishes between perfect duties of justice and 
imperfect duties of humanity and charity.2  Perfect duties are those which may be exacted by 
force (in the state of nature) or by legal proceeding (in civil society), and which, if not 
performed, do injury or damage to the party to whom the duty is owed.  Imperfect duties, on the 
other hand, are those which promote the good of others, and which we ought to do out of love for 
our fellow creatures if at all convenient, but which it would be wrong to exact by force or law, 
and which if not performed, do no injury or damage to the would-be beneficiary.3  Since each 
person is charged with preserving himself through his own industry, Locke thinks that, in what 
we might call “ideal circumstances,” we can generally fulfill our perfect duties to others by 
respecting their liberty and independence, and by performing whatever special obligations we 
have assumed by agreement (II.34, I.42).  But Locke allows that non-ideal circumstances may 
arise where a person lacks the means to preserve himself.  In such cases, the duty to preserve 
mankind gives rise to a perfect duty of charity.  As Locke puts it in the First Treatise, “Charity 
gives every man a title to so much out of another’s plenty, as will keep him from extreme want” 
(I.44).   
                                                          
2 Cf. Letter Concerning Toleration: “We must not content ourselves with the narrow measures of bare justice: 
charity, bounty, and liberality must be added to it” (Locke 1823, VI: 17)  A Third Letter Concerning Toleration: 
“that charity which our great Master so earnestly recommends and so strictly requires of all his disciples … obliges 
all men to seek and promote the good of others, as well as their own … by such means as their several places and 
relations enable them to use” (1823, VI: 149-150). 
3 Locke would have been familiar with the extensive discussion of this distinction in Pufendorf, LNN: I.vii.11, III.i, 





Locke’s precise language is significant here.  He is not saying that it would merely be 
commendable (an imperfect duty) for those with plenty to give away some of their surplus to the 
needy.  He says that those in extreme want have title – a natural right – to that surplus.  It is 
worth noting that Locke is not innovating here; the “right of necessity” was a traditional natural 
law doctrine, which we already find in writers like Grotius and Pufendorf.4  The most familiar 
right of necessity is the right to kill, or cause the death of, another person in self-defense.  But, in 
the present case, the right to necessity has other implications.  Jean Barbeyrac, the influential 
editor of Grotius and Pufendorf, sums up the doctrine well:  “In case of extreme necessity, the 
imperfect right that others have to … duties of charity from us, becomes a perfect right; so that 
men may by force be obliged to the performance of these duties at such a time, though on all 
other occasions the performance of them must be left to every man’s conscience and honor” 
(WDM: I.ii.14 n).5  Because extreme necessity confers a perfect right on the person in want to 
another’s surplus, the person with plenty cannot exact concessions out of the person in want in 
exchange for what will preserve his life—for example, by forcing “him to become [a] vassal,” by 
threatening to withhold relief otherwise.  According to Locke, that kind of coercive offer is no 
different than putting “a dagger at his throat” and offering him slavery or death.6  Ideally, the 
goal of charity is to enable the person in want to become independent again, thereby 
reestablishing what I’ve called ideal circumstances.   
                                                          
4 A doctrine, I might add, that deserves more attention by contemporary philosophers, who have tended to work with 
only the cruder distinction between doing harm and allowing harm.  See, for example, the puzzles raised in Nozick 
(1969).  
5 Cf. Pufendorf: “Those things which Nature enjoins one Man to pay another, without any antecedent Pact, as are 
the Offices of Charity and Humanity, we cannot challenge any otherwise, than by gentle and easy Methods; as by 
persuading, admonishing, desiring, or entreating.  But we must not apply Force to the most obstinate refuser; unless 
in the Case of extreme Necessity” (LNN: III.vi.6).  See also LNN I.vii.7, II.vi passim and Grotius, RWP: II.ii.6. 





Now the child, too, can be understood as a person in non-ideal circumstances on account of 
his lack of independence.7  Since infants are born without the strength and reason to preserve 
their own lives, they come into the world in a similar state of extreme want, except that giving 
them the bare means of subsistence is not enough.  If the lives of young children are to be 
preserved—which the fundamental law of nature demands—they must receive the active care of 
adults8 who will help them during the “weakness and imperfection of their nonage” until they 
“are able to shift and provide for themselves” (2T: II.66, 79).  But even should the child grow 
into a self-sufficient adult, he could still not be entrusted with his liberty, unless he could (and 
were disposed to) govern himself by reason and thereby know and respect the rights of others 
(II.56, 6).  So, the child must also be instructed in the law by which he is to govern himself 
(II.63).  Until he reaches this age of discretion, his actions must be governed by those who do 
have an understanding of right and wrong (II.61).  But when the child attains the age of 
discretion, he is (pace Hobbes) naturally free from the temporary rule of his parents:  “The bonds 
of [their] subjection are like the swaddling clothes they are wrapt up in, and supported by, in the 
weakness of their infancy: age and reason, as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they drop 
quite off, and leave a man at his own free disposal. (II.55, cf. II.59, 65).  Only those who are “by 
a natural defect” precluded from ever developing their powers of reason are subject to the 
perpetual government of their parents (II.60).  In this respect—in holding that the duration of 
parental authority is connected to the child’s attainment of reason—Locke is essentially 
following Grotius (see 6.1).   
                                                          
7 Schapiro (1999) makes this claim about childhood in Kant’s moral philosophy.  Her idea of ideal and non-ideal 
circumstances is due to Korsgaard (1996d), which is in turn indebted to Rawls  (TJ: esp. §39). 






Someone of a perverse bent might ask whether a parent may entirely neglect his child’s 
education, if he intends to always care for and govern the child just as if she were naturally 
disabled.9  After all, the parent would still be preserving the life of his child, and he would not be 
exercising control over anyone who is actually able to govern himself.  Locke does not anticipate 
this question—but, happily, Barbeyrac does and the answer he gives would be available to 
Locke.  Barbeyrac rejects the premise on which the question is founded, viz. that by neglecting 
the child’s education we are not actually doing harm, but only withholding a benefit.  Because 
the child is in a state of “absolute need to be helped and directed by others,” the right of necessity 
kicks in (LNN: VI.ii.4 n.2).  Thus, our duty to help the child becomes a perfect duty, and “a 
damage or hurt may be done to the soul by neglecting to inform the mind, or regulate the 
passions of such as we are obliged to instruct or reform” (LNN: III.i.2 n. 2).  Locke would almost 
certainly agree.  But the questioner might press the issue as follows.  Why think that the child 
needs to become a rational being?  Why not think that the child just has two possible destinies: 
either to become a rational creature, or to remain in an animal state?  Locke, I think, has an 
answer to that question.  That a child has the potential to become a rational being reveals that it is 
God’s will that these rational faculties actually be developed.  Therefore, to intentionally hinder a 
child’s development by neglecting the cultivation of her mind is a kind of waste and spoilage, 
which the natural law expressly forbids (II.6, 31).  But, on this reconstruction, Locke’s answer 
ultimately depends on his providential worldview.  And that raises the question how we would 
                                                          





respond to this problem.10  Having flagged that difficult question, let us table it and continue with 
our exegesis of Locke.    
Children, for Locke, while not born in a state of full equality, are born to it (II.55).11  That is, 
while they are not presently in a position to enjoy their natural freedom from the subjection to 
the will or authority of any other person, it is their birthright as a human being to attain this state.  
Special authority over children, then, is conferred on certain adults so that they can fulfill their 
charge to “preserve, nourish, and educate” children who are in a state of extreme want (II.56).  
Pufendorf put the same point more concisely: “that this care [of children] may be rightly 
managed, it is requisite that [parents] have a power of ordering the actions of their children for 
their good” (WDM: II.iii).12  Locke, then, is simply following Pufendorf when he says that “The 
power… that parents have over their children, arises from that duty which is incumbent on them, 
to take care of their offspring, during the imperfect state of childhood” (2T: II.67).  Parental 
rights, in other words, are instruments for fulfilling our duties to children.  For this reason, Locke 
describes parental authority as a kind of temporary, limited government: “Parental power is 
nothing but that, which parents have over their children, to govern them for the children’s good, 
                                                          
10 Ackerman’s own solution to this problem seems to me unsatisfying.  Ackerman believes that all “power relations” 
between rational beings have to be justified to one another dialogically on terms that all parties can reasonably 
accept.  (That is, his view is somewhat like that in Scanlon [1998] or Habermas [1990]).  When Ackerman considers 
whether a parent might raise a child so that the child never develops the necessary rational capacities to engage in 
dialogue, he explains that this would be impermissible because “all power relations that can possibly be mediated 
through dialogue are in fact legitimated” in this way (1980: 145).  But it is unclear why that follows from any of 
Ackerman’s initial premises.  Unfortunately, I don’t know how to press this point, except through a science-fiction 
example.  Suppose we were able to perform a surgical operation on parrots that made them to be capable of 
rationality and of engaging in justificatory dialogue with us.  Would that make the omission of the operation 
impermissible?  If we say ‘no,’ then that seems to be because we have some residual idea about the natural teleology 
of development, which differs from surgical interventions.  But how can we explain the normative significance of 
that difference without a providential or teleological worldview?  
11 Similarly, Pufendorf writes that children “become persons like ourselves, and our equals, as to all those rights 
which naturally accrue to men” (LNN: VI.ii.4). 





till they come to the use of reason.”13  In similar terms, Pufendorf had described parenthood as 
the “most sacred kind of government” (LNN: IV.ii.1).  
8.3.  Government and Property  
A)  The nature of government 
That parental authority is described as a form of government is important, since Locke draws 
a crucial distinction between the nature of government and of property-ownership in the First 
Treatise: 
Property, whose original is from the right a man has to use any of the inferior creatures, 
for the subsistence and comfort of his life, is for the benefit and sole advantage of the 
proprietor, so that he may even destroy the thing, that he has property in by his use of it, 
where need requires: but government being for the preservation of every man’s right and 
property, by preserving him from the violence or injury of others, is for the good of the 
governed….not for the sole advantage of the governors (but only for theirs with the rest, 
as they make a part of that politic body) (2T: I.92, 93). 
Locke is telling us here that, properly understood, property-ownership and government are 
diametrically opposed to one another in their natures.  Property-ownership is a kind of private 
right which gives the proprietor the prerogative to exploit his possessions for his own benefit and 
for more-or-less whatever ends he prefers.14  Government, on the contrary, is not a private right, 
but a fiduciary trust (II.149, 156):  It is a “right of office,” conferred on governors by the consent 
of the governed for certain limited ends.15  The chief end of government is to benefit the 
                                                          
13 2T: II.270, emphasis added; cf. also II.55-58.   
14 The main limitation is that one may not, of course, use one’s property in a way that violates the rights of others.  
Similarly, while the property-owner is entitled to use his property to whatever benefit he likes, he may not waste his 
possessions by letting them spoil or destroying them to no purpose (2T: II.6, 31). 
15 Locke speaks of someone having a right when that person is entitled to something:  either entitled to do 
something, usually without interference (like the right to exercise his liberty and dispose of his possessions [e.g., I.4-






governed by preserving “every man’s right and property,” that is, to protect every person’s 
private rights (or property in the wide sense, which includes not only ownership of things, but 
also the rights to life and liberty) (II.64).  The governor is to use his official powers to benefit 
himself only as one of the governed.  To attempt to exercise such official powers “not for the 
good of those, who are under it, but of his own private separate advantage” is tyranny.  Hence, 
the governor’s official powers are not a part of his property,16 and the people are not “to be 
looked on as an herd of inferior creatures, under the dominion of a master, who keeps them, and 
works them for his own pleasure or profit” (II.163).  In contrast to the more ambiguous picture 
presented by Hobbes, then, Locke very sharply distinguishes the natures of public and private 
dominion (see 7.3). 
B)  Slaves and servants 
Not only are public and private dominion distinguished, Locke denies that human beings may 
generally be held as property at all.  Although this point was already discussed in Chapter 6, it 
nonetheless deserves emphasis.  Hobbes had said that a lord “may say of his servant no less than 
of another thing, whether animate or inanimate, this is mine” (DC: VIII.5).  And this view found 
support in Roman law, where a human being was either in his own power or jurisdiction (sui 
juris) or in the power or jurisdiction of another (alieni juris).  Those who were sui juris were free 
men; everyone else was, legally, a slave—not a person with rights, but a thing belonging to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
127]); or to have some positive service rendered to him (like the child’s right to be nourished and maintained by his 
parents [e.g., II.78]).  Locke also speaks of both “rights of office,” which typically consist in the conferred 
authorization to act in some public capacity for the public good, and private or personal rights, like the rights to life, 
liberty, and estates, which pertain to the separate and distinct interest of the individual (cf. II.6, 31).  On “rights of 
office,” see II.164.  On what I am calling “private rights,” see II.123.  Locke denies that princes have a legitimate 
“distinct and separate Interest from the good of the community” at II.163. 





another person, which could be used, sold, or destroyed at the owner’s discretion (Cf. Gaius, 
Institutes I.ix).  Now the importance of the Roman law can hardly be exaggerated for the natural 
law tradition.  The most systematic exposition of Roman law, the Institutes of Gaius, provided 
the basic plan of organization for treatises on natural right by philosophers such as Grotius, 
Pufendorf, and Kant.  It is partly for this reason that virtually all natural law theorists up through 
Kant devote sections to the three basic forms of domestic status: marriage, children, and 
servants.17   
Locke follows Grotius and Pufendorf in rejecting the Roman concept of servitude.  For these 
moderns, no human being was ever entirely without rights—except perhaps one guilty of a 
capital crime who had thereby renounced his fellowship with the rest of humanity (cf. 2T: II.11).  
And this meant that no one ever has the right to kill another human being, except in self-defense 
or as just punishment (RWP: II.v.28; LNN: VI.ii.6).  According to Pufendorf, for example, “the 
Law of Humanity doth by no means allow us to extinguish all marks of primitive equality in a 
slave, who, whatever he may have formerly designed, is now in a condition of peace and 
kindness with us, so as to use him in the same manner as a beast or inanimate creatures, towards 
which we cannot stand under any engagement [i.e., hold duties toward]” (LNN: VI.iii.7).  With 
respect to Hobbes’s above remark, Pufendorf insists that to say “this is mine” of another human 
being means something entirely different than to say than “this is mine” of a thing:     
For by the former expression I mean no more, than that I, and none else, have the right of 
governing such a person; yet so as to be myself under some kind of obligation to him, and 
not empowered to exercise that right upon him, in an unlimited absolute manner.  But, on 
the other side, the property I claim over a thing, implies a right of using, spoiling, and 
                                                          
17 Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is particularly modern in having separated his discussion of “abstract right” from that 
of the family and economic relationships.  Furthermore, Hegel has no special discussion of servants at all:  slavery is 





consuming it, to procure my advantage, or to satisfy my pleasure; so that, what way 
soever I dispose of it, to say it was my own, shall be a sufficient excuse (ibid).   
Grotius and Pufendorf both allow that a person may consent to enter into servitude, either 
temporarily or permanently, in return for the necessaries of life.  But this does not confer on the 
master any right to abuse, much less kill, the servant or slave.18  Pufendorf further argues that 
masters may not sell or give away servants “as we do our … goods and commodities,” for “men 
usually [have] peculiar reasons why they choose to submit to this person rather than any besides” 
(ibid. and WDM: II.iv.5).  Locke’s view is largely the same.  Being the property of God, we do 
not have the right to destroy ourselves, and so we cannot give anyone else a power we lack 
ourselves.  We can sell ourselves as servants into “drudgery,” but not chattel slavery.  Locke, 
however, goes somewhat further than Pufendorf in allowing only temporary contracts of service 
in exchange for wages (2T: II.24, 85).  Locke does not explain why temporary servitude is 
permissible, but not permanent servitude.  Perhaps he would agree with Kant’s explanation:  that 
to alienate one’s liberty for life is to give the owner the right to “use up,” or consume, the 
servant, which is inconsistent with the servant’s humanity (MM: 6:283).  In any case, at this 
point, one can see that the status of the servant is close to collapsing into that of the free man, 
and one suspects that Locke ought to have entirely gotten rid of it and replaced it with a 
contractual relationship between equals (as Hegel would later do); for as long as this form of 
authority is retained, it remains ambiguous between a form of government over persons (which is 
for the good of the governed) and a form of property (which is for the sole advantage of the 
owner). 
                                                          





C)  Lawful government 
A corollary of the principle that government is instituted for the good governed is that “the 
ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates 
and undetermined resolutions” issued arbitrarily at the ruler’s pleasure.  First, one of the reasons 
for establishing government in the first place is to establish an impartial umpire, who can settle 
disputes rationally and disinterestedly.  For when people are judges in their own case, “passion 
and revenge are very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat” for justice to be done 
(2T: II.125, cf. II.8).  But it is hardly an improvement on the state of nature, if the governor 
himself is to rule by personal inclination and whim, rather than in accordance with impartial 
rules.  No less important, it is only under settled, promulgated law may “the people … know 
their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law, and the rulers too kept within their 
due bounds, and not to be tempted, by the power they have in their hands” to use it for purposes 
other than those for which it was entrusted to them (II.137, cf. II.124).  Because Locke 
distinguishes between lawful liberty and unlawful license—in contrast to Hobbes or Bentham, 
for example—Locke understands law, not as a constraint on true liberty, but as constitutive of 
it.19  Where there is no law, there can be no liberty.  I am at liberty only when I may dispose 
freely of what is my own, but I own nothing without law which sets limits to the rightful action of 
others—including the action of the government (II.138).  This does not mean that issuing laws is 
the only legitimate function of the government.  The executive must have the freedom to act 
according to its own discretion within the law for the good of the people.  And, in some cases, 
“where a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm,” the executive may even, at his 
                                                          





own prerogative, depart from the letter of the law where that is necessary to fulfill the 
government’s fundamental purpose of promoting the public good (II.159 and ch. XIV passim). 
Finally, a few comments are in order on the idea that government is for the good of the 
governed.  First of all, Locke does not imply of course that the governor loses his own private 
rights upon taking office.  As Locke puts it in the Letter Concerning Toleration, becoming a 
magistrate does not oblige a man to disavow his humanity (1823, VI: 11).  For example, 
although a governor may not use official powers to enforce a particular religion, he may, in 
common with all private persons, make use of argument and persuasion in order to convert 
others to his own faith.  And, since government is founded to protect property, it almost goes 
without saying that Locke never imagined that officials in government should be unable to hold 
and look after their own private property. 
It is also important that we avoid interpreting the “good of the governed” too narrowly.  First, 
Locke does not understand this in a welfarist or utilitarian sense; the “good of the governed” 
refers primarily to the preservation of the rights of the governed.20  There can be no question, 
therefore, of sacrificing the rights of a few to make many others happy.  Second, Locke does not 
believe that governors have either the duty or the right to sacrifice the rights of peoples in other 
nations for the benefit of his own people (cf. 2T: II, ch. xvi).  It is best, then, to understand Locke 
as holding a version of what Joseph Raz has called the “service conception” of authority.  This, 
according to Raz, is the idea that the role of authorities is to help the governed conform to the 
                                                          
20 Cf. Kant: “The well-being of a state must not be understood as the welfare of its citizens and their happiness….By 
the well-being of a state is understood, instead, that condition in which its constitution conforms most fully to 
principles of right” (MM: 6:318).  Locke’s view, however, is probably not quite so austere as Kant’s.  In the Letter 
Concerning Toleration, for example, Locke says that the power of civil government is to be directed to the 





reasons that already apply to them (1986: 55-56).  On Locke’s version of that idea, the people are 
bound by the law of nature to respect the rights of human beings, not only within the boundaries 
of their country, but in other countries as well; it is the role of governors to help the people 
conform to that law—with their consent, of course.21 
8.4  Parental Government 
A)  The inviolability of the child 
Because of his immediate polemical aims in undermining patriarchalism, Locke often 
stresses the differences between paternal and political power (II.1-3, 71, 86), but there is also 
much to learn from the similarities between these two forms of government.  On Locke’s view, 
parental rights are not a kind of proprietary right, acquired by generation, which parents can 
exercise for their own capricious ends, but are instead fiduciary rights, held in trust by parental 
“governors,” which are to be exercised for serving the interests of children.  In fact, Locke insists 
that, “to speak properly,” the rights of parents over minor children are “rather the privilege of 
children, and the duty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power” (II.67).  Unlike things 
held as property, children have rights against their parents.22  Like anyone else, children hold 
                                                          
21 Locke would not agree that the government helps people, in principle, to conform to all the reasons that already 
apply to them.  For that fails to distinguish between perfect and imperfect duties and fails to circumscribe the 
jurisdiction of government to civil interests. 
22 Brennan and Noggle (1997) seem to misinterpret Locke on this point when they write: “While we share with 
Locke the belief that the basis of parental rights is the parents’ responsibility for the welfare of children …, we also 
believe that children’s rights also impose limits on the rights of parents” (11).  In the note accompanying this 
sentence, they explain that “While [Locke] is clearly an important early spokesperson for the view that parents do 
not have absolute authority over their children, it is also the case that the limits on parental power he proposes are 
not generated by a belief in children’s rights” (24n.13).  The passage I quote above (2T: I.89) shows that this 
supposition is false (cf. also II.84, 190).  True, Locke claims that the ultimate ground of parental duties is respect for 
the workmanship of God (II.56; cf. I.52-53), but that is true of all moral duties for Locke (II.6).  Perhaps Brennan 
and Noggle only mean that Locke sees no role for the state to intervene in the family to protect children’s rights.  It 






general rights to life, limbs, and property against the world—and that of course includes their 
parents (II.65).  Therefore, parents may not kill or mutilate (e.g., castrate) their children, nor sell 
them as if they were mere things (I.56-57).  But instead of a right to their present liberty, the 
weakness of children gives them, until they reach maturity, “a right to be nourished and 
maintained by their parents,” as well as a right to education for the cultivation of their capacities, 
so that they will be suited as adults for the lawful liberty befitting rational beings (I.89, II.56; cf. 
II.78). 
In offering this basic picture of children as persons with rights, and not as the property of 
their parents, Locke is in general agreement with Grotius and Pufendorf.  Again, the essential 
point of reference is Roman law, in which the child was in the power of, and thus the slave of, 
his father (unless the father were still under his own father’s power, in which case the child was 
legally in the power of his grandfather).  Just as a man exercised the power of life and death over 
his slaves, and could sell them, so too could he sell his children and, in legal theory at least, kill 
them with impunity.23  This was the infamous paternal power, the patria potestas, of Rome.  It 
was relatively easy for natural law philosophers to dismiss any suggestion that this absolute 
paternal power was a part of the natural law.  First, even the Institutes recognized that “there is 
scarcely any other nation where fathers are invested with such power over their children as at 
Rome.”24  Second, most natural law thinkers rejected, as we have just seen, the idea that any 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
internal life of the family, but it is false to say that Locke recognizes no enforceable legal rights between family 
members.  Locke expressly recognizes that families are subordinate to the civil authority, and that the authority of 
parents “reaches not their life or property” (II.65).  But the rights to life and property are paradigmatic of legally 
enforceable rights. 
23 Gaius, Institutes I.lii, lv; Digest of Justinian I.v. 
24 Gaius, Institutes I.lv.  This is expressly pointed out by Grotius, RWP: II.v.7 and in Barbeyrac’s accompanying 





person could exercise absolute power over another.  Third, they held that a person could only 
become a servant only by his own consent or crime, and neither could be imputed to children.   
B)  The inalienability of children 
Obviously, then, parents can have no right to harm, much less to kill, their children.  Nor can 
they be treated as possessions that may be given away or sold to another for any reason at all.  
According to Grotius, where positive law does not forbid it, natural right does permit a parent to 
“pawn his child, and sell him too,” but only “if there be a necessity for it, and no other way of 
maintaining him.”  What he seems to have in mind is putting the child into servitude in exchange 
for his upkeep.  Grotius reasons that the child cannot be wronged in this way, if this is the only 
means available to meet his basic right to live (RWP II.v.5).  This, then, is just another 
application of the right of necessity, which can make actions permissible that are otherwise 
forbidden.  However, even in this case, the parent does not entirely alienate his parental rights 
and duties, for, as Grotius goes on to tell us, “Nature does not permit this; all he can do is trust 
his son to another, who undertakes to maintain him, and whom he substitutes in his own stead for 
that purpose” (RWP: II.v.26).  Pufendorf, on the other hand, does seem to permit children to be 
fully adopted by others while the original parents live, but only “when ‘tis likely to prove to the 
child’s advantage,” not at the mere convenience of the original parents.  Otherwise, he agrees 
with Grotius that selling a child into servitude is better than allowing him to perish from hunger, 
and permissible in that case alone.  But he suggests that it would be better if such transactions 
proceeded under the supervision of the magistrate, rather than carried out as purely private 
exchanges (LNN: VI.ii.9).   
Although Grotius and Pufendorf clearly maintain that a child is not simply held as property, 





selling a child and exposing it in one breath, and he never makes the exception that parents might 
sell their children into servitude in order to preserve the child’s life (2T: I.56).  Locke’s reasons 
for this position are not hard to understand.  First, lacking any rights themselves over the child’s 
liberty as an adult, the parents cannot transfer any such rights to another (II.189).  Second, by the 
right of necessity, anyone in absolute need is entitled to the resources held by others necessary to 
preserve his life, and no one may use a person’s extreme want to turn him into a vassal (I.42).  
Further, Locke seems to agree with Grotius in that parental rights and duties are not alienable at 
will. “The nourishment and education of their children, is a charge so incumbent on parents for 
their children’s good,” he explains, “that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it” 
(II.67).  He is even more adamant about this in a passage from the First Treatise:  “a father 
cannot alien the power he has over his child, [and though] he may perhaps to some degrees 
forfeit it, … he cannot transfer it” (I.100).   
What Locke does permit is for parents to temporarily delegate some of their power to others, 
particularly to schoolmasters, tutors, or masters of apprentices (II.69).25  But, like subordinate 
ministers of a government, these people remain accountable to the parents (cf. II.152).  
Explaining the same idea, Blackstone says that such a person acts “in loco parentis, and has such 
a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge … as may be necessary to answer 
the purposes for which he is employed” (CLE: I.xvi.2).  But in this, parents have not quitted their 
ultimate responsibility for the child’s well-being.  Thus, a parent who has negligently entrusted 
                                                          
25 Cf. also this passage from Locke’s Third Letter Concerning Toleration: “ ‘What is it that warrants and authorizes 
schoolmasters, tutors, and masters to use force upon their scholars or apprentices?’ I answer, a commission from the 
father or mother, or those who supply their places; for without that no indirect or at a distance usefulness, or 





his child to an unfit guardian is partly responsible, at least morally speaking, for any harm that 
comes to the child. 
Although a parent cannot entirely alienate his parental authority at will, he can forfeit it if he 
fails in his duties to nourish and educate his child.  (Similarly, for Locke, one cannot alienate 
one’s right to life by contract, although one can forfeit it through crime).  Since Grotius, 
philosophers had debated whether the true foundation of parental authority and honor is 
generation or upbringing.26  For the most part, Locke is in the latter camp, and this leads him to 
partly disagree with Grotius’s contention that “paternal authority be so personal and annexed to 
the relation of the father, that it can never be taken from him and transferred to another.”27  On 
the contrary, Locke argues: 
[T]his power so little belongs to the father by any particular right of nature, but only as he 
is guardian of his children, that when he quits his care of them, he loses his power over 
them, which goes along with their nourishment and education, to which it is inseparably 
annexed, and it belongs as much to the foster-father of an exposed child, as to the natural 
father of another; So little power does the bare act of begetting give a man over his issue; 
if all his care ends there, and this be all the title he hath to the name and authority of a 
father” (II.65). 
For Locke, then, parental rights are “annexed,” not to procreators as such, but to the role of 
governing and educating children, whether that role be performed by a the biological parent or a 
foster-parent.  In this limited respect at least, Locke’s view resembles that of Hobbes.  Moreover, 
if a parent were to try to sell her child, all that she would really do is abandon her child; whoever 
then took responsibility for the child’s care would, by that act, acquire parental authority—
whether that be the person with whom money was exchanged, or someone else (I.100).   
                                                          
26 Cf. Pufendorf on the duty to honor one’s parents: “Whether this perpetual duty and obligation of children, 
remaining after their father’s power is expired, arise from the act of generation, or from the faithful care and labor of 
breeding them up, is a controversy that hath divided learned men” (LNN: VI.ii.12). 





C) The good of the governed 
Locke, then, is extremely scrupulous in eliminating any vestige of the idea that parental 
power is a kind of property right.  Let us now consider in more detail the idea of parental 
government.  In this connection, much of what it means for a political magistrate to exercise his 
rule for “the good of the governed” can be imported to the case of parental governors.  First, a 
person on becoming a parent does not forfeit his humanity or his own private rights and interests.  
True, Locke does believe that the instinct of parents to care for their offspring is so strong that 
parents “sometimes neglect their own private good for it” (I.57).  But it is plain that he does not 
think that parents have a standing duty to always put their children’s good before their own, 
since he tells us that a parent “may dispose of his own possessions as he pleases, when his 
children are out of danger of perishing for want” (II.65).  Pufendorf makes a similar point, only 
more explicitly.  He says that parents have a duty to enable their children “to become honest and 
useful members of society,” but that the law of nature “doth not command parents to pinch and 
defraud their own inclinations, and to make themselves miserable for the sake of their issue” 
(LNN: IV.xi.5).28 
Second, as before, the good of the governed is not to be understood narrowly as exclusive of 
the good of others.  Parents are to instruct their children in their duties and in the limits of their 
rightful liberty.29  And Locke holds that learning how to govern oneself as a rational and moral 
                                                          
28 Cf. also Locke’s friend, James Tyrrell:  “[I]n his children [a parent] is chiefly to design their good and advantage, 
as far as lies in his power, without ruining himself” (PNM: I, 17, emphasis added).   
29 Arneson and Shapiro (1996) nicely sum up Locke’s view, to which they largely subscribe:  “On Locke’s view, 
biological parents have fiduciary obligations to care for their children.  Since children are incapable of controlling 
their own conduct by their reason in a steady way that adequately caters to their prudential long-term interests and 
the interests of others affected by their conduct, parental obligations include the duty to govern their children.  These 
obligations are oriented to the interests of children and of humanity at large, and the concomitant rights that devolve 
on parents so that they may fulfill their obligations are rights to act for the good of their children (subject to moral 





being is one part of the child’s true interests.  “Law, in its true notion,” he claims, “is not so 
much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest” (2T: 
II.57).  Therefore, “To turn [the child] loose to an unrestrained liberty, before he has reason to 
guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free; but to thrust him out 
amongst brutes, and to abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as 
theirs” (II.63).  As I have already noted in a previous chapter, this last quotation could be 
interpreted to mean that it is in the interests of people to be able to govern themselves in society 
so that they do not have to be suppressed by others like wild animals.  Or (not incompatibly) it 
could be understood to mean that a prerequisite for a distinctively human life is the capacity to 
live sociably in community and in relationships structured by law and reciprocity.30 
Philosophers today often ask whether, in fulfilling their duties to maintain and educate their 
children, parents have a duty to promote their child’s “best interests” or only their “basic 
interests.”31  Most who raise the question in this way take the latter view, since promoting the 
child’s best interests seems like too demanding a standard.  A casual reading might suggest that 
Locke endorses a “basic interests” account, since he speaks of parents as having the duty to 
preserve the lives of their children and to make them capable of looking after themselves as 
adults (cf. II.64, 79).  But in fact he takes a third view, less often recognized in the contemporary 
literature.  Children have a right, he explains, “not only to bare subsistence, but to the 
conveniences and comforts of life, as far as the conditions of their parents can afford it” (II.89, 
                                                          
30 The latter interpretation is, of course, the more classical picture, which natural law writers had inherited from 
Cicero in particular (see On Duties, Bk I.)  In this spirit, Locke writes that “God having made man such a creature, 
that, in his own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, 
convenience, and inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to 
continue and enjoy it” (II.77).  See also ELN: IV. 





emphasis added).  Pufendorf defends a similar position.32  The gloss I would put on this is that, 
beyond having their basic interests met, children have a further right to enjoy roughly the same 
standard of living as do their parents.  Of course, parents are not under a duty to spoil their 
children, and they may deprive them of anything that they think would be injurious to the 
formation of their characters.  But, that qualification in place, I believe that the Lockean view is 
that parents who deprive their children of the same level of comfort that they provide themselves 
are failing to treat their children like persons of equal moral concern.                 
D) The consent of the governed 
Although Locke treats the parent as a kind of governor, he does not of course believe that 
political and parental government have the same origin.  In contrast to Hobbes, Locke does not 
try to erect parental authority on the consent of the governed.  This, of course, is because 
children, lacking reason, are incapable of giving their consent.33  Now Pufendorf had held that a 
child could not give consent because he was not the “master of his reason” in the sense that he 
could not “understand the business at hand, … know whether it be convenient for him, and 
whether he have the strength and ability to perform” his side of the agreement (LNN: III.vi.3).  
Locke would surely agree with all of this this, but it is not the point he stresses.  For Locke, what 
is essential for a man to be the master of his reason is his ability to know “that law he is to 
govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will” (2T: 
                                                          
32 “As for the measure of what ought to be spent on education, in training up children for a civil life, it is to be stated 
according to the fortunes of the parents, and the genius and capacity of the children. Thus, much at least is required, 
"That they be enabled to become honest and useful members of human society.  But this is a general rule in the 
whole affair:  "That as nature doth not command parents to pinch and defraud their own Inclinations, and to make 
themselves miserable for the sake of their, Issue ; so a parent placed in a high and wealthy condition is, no doubt, in 
fault, if he do not take care that his children be brought up after the most exact and accomplished manner of 
institution” (LNN: IV.xi.5). 
33 Like Pufendorf, and unlike Hobbes, Locke needs to justify parental discipline of children—not just the obedience 





II.63).  For Locke, then, to be rational is not only to be capable of sound instrumental reasoning; 
it is to know the true worth and proper purposes of things.  The child must learn, for example, 
that human beings may not arbitrarily destroy themselves, and therefore cannot subject 
themselves as slaves to the absolute and arbitrary authority of another (II.23).  Indeed, in a 
central passage from Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke makes it clear that imparting 
this sort of understanding is the fundamental task of education: “to set the mind right,” he 
explains, means that “on all occasions it may be disposed to consent to nothing, but what may be 
suitable to the dignity and excellency of a rational creature” (STCE: 31).34   
So, Locke does not appeal to the child’s consent to justify parental authority, because it is the 
task of parents to make their children capable of giving rational, lawful consent.  Also, in 
contrast to Pufendorf, Locke avoids appealing to the child’s presumed or hypothetical consent.  
Like Barbeyrac, Locke thinks that the child’s “absolute need to be helped and directed by others” 
is a sufficient justification for the child’s subjection to parental authority.  That said, I see no 
reason why Locke’s argument could not be rephrased in terms of the child’s hypothetical 
consent—for instance, that, given every child’s absolute need, no rational person could 
reasonably reject the authority of adult guardians over her in childhood.  Indeed, this may be an 
attractive style of argument for philosophers who want to avoid Locke’s appeals to natural law or 
to the Creator’s intentions. 
                                                          
34 I take it that “consent” in this passage has a broader meaning than it does in political theory.  In this context, 
Locke means (like Kant) that a rational being does not “consent” to the invitation of his inclinations except when it 
is suitable for a rational creature to do so.  In this sense, all intentional action involves consent.  But since consent in 





8.5  Prerogative, Tyranny, and Exploitation 
A) Domestic lawfulness 
Because the parent is a species of governor, it is important that she always exercise her 
power in a lawful and rational way for the good of the child—never arbitrarily, nor in the heat of 
passion, nor in an exploitative way.  Of course, unlike well-ordered states, families usually do 
not have written laws or constitutions which precisely delimit the rights and duties of each 
family member.  And because so much of parental government requires judgment and decision 
of particular cases, parental authority is in large part prerogative.35  But, as we have seen, 
prerogative for Locke is not a license for caprice, but only the authorization to promote the good 
of the governed without a specific, determinate rule (II.166).  Therefore in a broader sense, 
prerogative is lawful in spirit.  And it is in a lawful spirit that parents ought to exercise their 
authority over their children. 
For example, parents must not allow themselves to punish children when they are angry, “lest 
passion mingle with it, and so … exceed the just proportion” (STCE: 83).  This is important, not 
only so that justice may be done, but so that children are raised as rational creatures, who learn to 
respect the proper bounds of their liberty, and not to act only out of fear of those who are 
stronger than they (SCTE: 50-51).  For this reason, Locke insists that parents always treat their 
children as “rational creatures.”  Of course, this does not mean treating children as if their reason 
were already fully developed, for then there would be no need of parental authority in the first 
                                                          
35 Cf.: “It is easy to conceive, that in the infancy of governments, when commonwealths differed little from families 
in number of people, they differed from them too but little in number of laws: and the governors, being as the fathers 
of them, watching over them for their good, the government was almost all prerogative.  A few established laws 





place.36  But Locke does believe that children can begin to appreciate the force of reasons, at 
least at an elementary level, almost as soon as they are capable of language.  In particular, he 
thinks that children can soon detect the difference between reasonable punishment, which evokes 
shame, and mere “peevishness and arbitrary imperiousness” in their parents, which evokes only 
fear and resentment (SCTE: 71, 78, 81).  Moreover, children must be made aware that—allowing 
for relevant differences due to age and station—their parents are subject to the same moral rules 
as they are themselves (SCTE: 71).  Only in this way can parents impress upon children that the 
household is one made up of moral equals. 
On analogy with political rulers, parents who regularly exercise their power over children in 
an arbitrary way, or who use that power for their own “private separate advantage,” instead of for 
the purpose of promoting their children’s good, can be justly called, on Lockean grounds, petty 
tyrants (cf. II.199).  Such parents treat their children like inferior creatures that they own, to be 
enjoyed or worked for the parents’ own pleasure and profit (II.163).  Locke never expressly uses 
the language of tyranny to describe unjust parents, but his friend and occasional collaborator 
James Tyrrell did.37  In Patriarcha non Monarcha, we find a passage that captures the Lockean 
view I am describing perfectly:   
                                                          
36 Rousseau raises this objection to Locke in Emile, Bk. II, p. 91.  As to the advisability of reasoning with children, I 
would speculate that, to the extent that Rousseau does not simply caricature Locke, Locke is closer to the truth than 
Rousseau.  
37 Locke refers to “the ingenious and learned author of Patriarcha non Monarcha” at 2T: I.24.  Tyrrell’s book, 
which like Locke’s First Treatise is a refutation of Filmer’s Patriarcha, was published in 1681; Locke’s Two 
Treatises was published in 1689.  According to Peter Laslett, Locke spent much of his time in the years from 1680-
1683 in Tyrrell’s house, and during that time they collaborated on a critical commentary of Stillingfleet’s 
Unreasonableness of Separation.  With respect to their separate projects, Laslett has this to say:  
“Locke and Tyrrell, then, were in close communication when, as I am prepared to believe, both were 
engaged in refuting Filmer, and their writing plans followed a remarkably similar pattern.  So close were 
they, indeed, that some sort of collaboration would seem possible, or even likely.  But the remarkable thing 
is that the evidence we have goes to show that Locke most certainly did not let Tyrrell see his manuscript, 






God hath not delivered one man into the power of another, merely to be tyrannized over 
at his pleasure; but that the person who hath this authority, may use it for the good of 
those he governs.  And herein lies the difference between the interest which a father hath 
in his children, and that property which he hath in his horses or slaves; since his right to 
the former extends only to those things that conduce to their good and benefit; but in the 
other he hath no other consideration, but the profit he may reap from their labor and 
service, being under no other obligation but that of Humanity, and of using them as 
becomes a good-natured and merciful man; yet still considering and intending his own 
advantage, as the principal end of his keeping of them (PNM: I, 17). 
But this picture of parental tyranny, reasonable as it is, also raises some difficult questions:  If 
children are not the property of their parents, then is it ever appropriate for parents to profit from 
their children?  And if so, at what point does it become exploitative? 
B)  The exploitation of children 
Pufendorf usefully suggests that we distinguish between, on the one hand, property that 
children have inherited or been given, and on the other hand, children’s rights to their labor and 
the fruits of their labor (LNN: VI.ii.8).  With respect to property that children receive “by 
another’s bounty,” Pufendorf and Locke agree (as does Grotius) that parents cannot appropriate 
this for themselves, although it is appropriate for them to manage it during the child’s minority 
(for instance, the property may be revenue-generating land).  The harder question has to do with 
the extent to which children can be forced to work for the family, or to hand over wages from 
employment to the parents.  It is plain that a parent can compel her children to work and toil for 
their own good—for example, so that, as Tyrrell puts it, “being bred up in a constant course of 
industry, [the children] may be the better able either to get their own living [as adults], or else to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of some interest, since so many of Tyrrell’s positions against Filmer were also those of Locke…” (1960: 
60). 
In his note to 2T: I.24, Laslett points out that, in a letter to Locke of 1690, Tyrrell observes that the author of Two 





spend their time as they ought to do, without falling into the vices of idleness or debauchery” 
(PNM: I, 18).  But can parents require children to labor for the parents’ own benefit?  On the one 
hand, it might seem as if children should have as much right to their labor and the fruits of their 
honest industry as anyone else, and that parents have no right to benefit from their children’s 
pains (cf. 2T: I.42, II.34).  On the other hand, it might seem as if it were only fair for children to 
contribute something to the support of their family. 
Pufendorf took the view that parents were entitled to “any advantage or profit that can be 
made by the labor of a [child],”38 in order to go some way in recompensing them for the costs of 
maintaining and educating the child (WDM: II.iii.5; LNN: VI.ii.8).39  For the same reason, 
Pufendorf argues that parents can keep the profits earned while managing their children’s 
property.  One might object that parents are owed no such compensation, since (as both 
Pufendorf and Locke hold) they are under a duty to support and maintain their children out of 
their own property.  Anticipating that objection, Pufendorf replies thus: 
Though he were obliged indeed, by the Law of Nature, to support and maintain his 
offspring, yet he was not in the least prohibited to make what fruit or advantages he could 
of his labor.  One might as well say that parents are forbidden to take any delight or 
comfort in their children; a satisfaction so very great, that most, who are so happy as to 
enjoy it, esteem it invaluable, and beyond all compensation or equivalent.  For the same 
reason, it would be a high degree of impudence, for a son, in his state of minority, to 
require a reward for the service he does his father  (LNN: VI.ii.8). 
This reasoning is unconvincing.  There is no reason an employer should not delight in his 
employees either, but that does not show that he owes them no reward for their work.  
                                                          
38 Pufendorf has “son” instead of “child,” but I take it that the same point would apply to daughters as well. 
39 Tyrrell follows Pufendorf almost verbatim here:  “the Father hath a power to set his children to work, as well to 
enable them to get their own Living, as to recompense himself for the pains and care he hath taken, and the charge 
he may have been at in their education. For though he were obliged by the Law of Nature to breed up his children, 





Furthermore, you might think that the fact that parents take such delight in their children’s 
company—esteeming it beyond all compensation—only goes to show that they are not entitled 
to any further compensation for their pains. 
Locke seems to be more wary than Pufendorf of children being exploited by their parents.  
He never suggests that parents are owed any recompense except gratitude, and he certainly never 
says that parents are entitled to “any advantage or profit” that they can get from their labor of 
their children.  The duty of gratitude, it is true, does lay on adult children a duty to care for, and 
when necessary, to support their parents, but this is an imperfect duty, which parents have no 
power to exact from them, as though it were an ordinary debt.  Moreover, just as parents have no 
right to a bequest conferred on the child, they have no right to any income that children earn 
from their own labor.  Of course, parents may apprentice their children so that they learn a trade, 
but children can only be forced to work for the express purpose of providing for their own 
subsistence, where this is absolutely necessary—apparently another application of the right of 
necessity (II.64-69).  Although Locke does not speak to the issue, I can imagine a Lockean 
denying that parents have a right to all of the profits earned from their children’s property; 
perhaps it would be more appropriate if they paid themselves a manager’s wage or commission.  
What about services like household tasks?  One might imagine a Lockean—at least of a modern 
stripe—arguing that children should always be given a certain wage or allowance for any labor 
they do, so that they may profit from their honest industry.  In his educational treatise, however, 
Locke hints that children might be required to perform certain “little tasks” without any material 
reward.  Indeed, he even suggests that rewarding children for what they ought to do anyway is 
harmful, insofar as it excites their appetites, instead of encouraging virtue.  It is much better, he 





(STCE: 52-58, esp. 52).  This suggests that children do have duties to contribute certain services 
to the family, but it does not shed much light on the proper measure of these. 
In his discussion of marriage, Locke says that this should not be understood only a “right to 
one another’s bodies,” but also as a relationship of mutual support, assistance, and communion 
of interest (II.78).  If those latter characteristics can be extended to the whole family, then this 
might serve as an attractive basis for the parents’ right to the services of their children.  We find 
a position of this sort in Hegel.  I discuss Hegel’s conception of the family at greater length in 
Chapter 10, but it is fitting to consider the Hegelian view on the labor of children here.  Hegel 
agrees that parents have a duty to maintain and educate their children, and he is eager to 
distinguish the status of children from that of chattel slaves (PR: 143R, 174A).  But he argues 
that “the right of the parents to their children’s services, as services, is based on and limited to 
the common concern of caring for the family in general” (174).  When Hegel speaks of the 
parents’ right to their children’s services, as services, he means to set aside the sorts of cases 
where the purpose of the child’s work is purely educational or otherwise exclusively in the 
child’s interests; he is explaining here when services can be required of children for other than 
paternalistic reasons.  What is important about Hegel’s account is that he eschews any story 
about an individual claim for compensation for expenses outlaid.  The parents, as individuals, are 
not entitled to the child’s services.  Although parents’ labors may deserve the child’s gratitude, 
they are not entitled to compensation from the child, as if the child had injured or wronged them.  
If anyone is responsible for the existence of the child’s needs, it is the parents themselves, not the 
child.  Since the child does not owe his parents compensation, giving the parents, as individuals, 





slavery.40  On Hegel’s view, then, it is the family as a whole that is entitled to the child’s 
services.  It is in only their capacity as family members that parents are entitled to the services of 
their children.  But what precisely does this mean?     
Here is my interpretation:  The family promotes each individual’s well-being when the 
members renounce their strictly separate individuality, and instead, cooperate as parts of a whole.  
This is in two respects.  First, from a spiritual or ethical perspective, each member attains a sense 
of his or her self-worth from the love, trust, and appreciation of the other family members (PR: 
158+A).  Second, each member is economically supported by the household’s common property 
(PR: 170-171).  “Economically” here should be understood in the broad sense, as suggested by 
its etymology:41 economic support includes not only monetary income, but also the value of a 
well-kept and comfortable home.  Both the earning of income and household management are 
essential material preconditions for the internal, spiritual life of the family to develop, because 
the family needs a secure and stable place to come together (PR: 170).  Only then do family 
members have a reasonable opportunity to experience what Hegel calls the “peaceful intuition of 
[the family’s] unity” (PR: 166).   
The services that parents can demand of children are essentially those which help maintain 
the material basis of the family.  In modern conditions, this often takes the form of having 
children help with household chores.  But it may also take the form of children helping with the 
parents’ primary productive activities, especially on farms or in small businesses.  In performing 
these services, children do not contribute only to the parents’ good; they contribute to the well-
                                                          
40 In the addition to §174, the text says that, in requiring their children’s services, parents must not claim to be 
justified “in their own right, for the most unethical of all relationships is that in which children are slaves.”  





being of the whole family, of which they partake.  Moreover, while these services do not have 
the child’s benefit as their primary justification, they are not harmful to the child either.  For by 
performing tasks for the sake of the family as a whole, the child wins appreciation for his 
contributions from the other family members, and this is an important part of his growing sense 
of self-worth.  In this way, it is only by contributing to the family as a whole that can the child 
fully benefit from what the family has to offer. 
The services that can be required of children, as endorsed in the above Hegelian picture, 
should not of course be confused with modern “child labor.”  As Marx recognized, modern 
industry entirely transformed the nature of the child’s place in the division of labor, from one 
governed by customary limits and supervised by ordinarily benevolent parents, to one of ruthless 
exploitation by employers (Capital, I.X.3).  Marx was correct, therefore, to ridicule the idea of 
defending child labor by invoking the natural authority of parents, when in fact the practice was 
rending the family apart, by turning children into commodities and keeping them employed for 
long hours outside the home.42  Even if a child’s work need not always be purely educational, it 
should not be allowed to positively hinder his education, and obviously it should not endanger 
his health or safety.  Of course, if a family cannot subsist in any other way, then one can hardly 
blame the parents for sending their children out for work.  In this sense, the right of necessity 
seems to apply.  But, for the same reason, we can say that no social system ought to exist which 
permits such extreme necessity, and that if such a society does exist, then individuals who can 
afford to hire children ought to be supporting them out of charity, instead of exploiting their 
want.   
                                                          





I do not want to attribute this Hegelian view to Locke.  That would be to underappreciate 
Hegel’s originality.  If it could be imputed to any natural law thinker, it would be Grotius (and 
perhaps his scholastic predecessors), for he had a sufficiently Aristotelian conception of the 
family to say, in connection with the duties of older children, that “it is but just, that what makes 
a part of the whole, should conform itself to the interest of the whole” (RWP: II.v.3).  My 
primary point, however, is to suggest that this Hegelian account may be available to someone 
otherwise endorsing a Lockean picture of parental rights, and that it is more attractive than 
Pufendorf’s story about compensating parents for their pains.   
8.6  Two Objections to the Fiduciary Model 
A) The assignment of parental duties 
Although there is much that is attractive in a picture of parental authority that depicts it as a 
kind of small-scale government, or fiduciary trust, instituted for the good of the child, there are 
two respects in which one might think that the fiduciary model cannot be the whole story.  First, 
it is not clear how the needs of children alone can establish that particular adults—like the 
biological parents—have special duties to particular children (and, therefore, also special rights).  
Clearly Locke does assume that the biological parents have these special duties, but how can that 
be accounted for?  Why do not children’s needs merely establish that adults in general have 
duties and rights with respect to children in general—just as the extreme want of the very poor 
creates duties of charity for everyone with surplus.43  Whatever their weaknesses, at least 
                                                          
43 Cf. O’Neill (1979): “an attempt to ground obligations [to children] only in needs or interests will not, by itself, tell 
us who has an obligation to meet those needs and interests.  By considering children’s needs and interests, we might 






accounts of parental authority that appeal to generation or to the child’s consent have a way of 
forging the special normative connection between parent and child.  Barbeyrac saw this problem 
very clearly.  Although he dismissed the idea that generation was the sole basis of parental 
authority, he also realized that generation at least explained the assignment of parental duties: 
It is certain that … education is the immediate foundation of paternal power, and the 
mutual duties of father and child.  But we must not exclude generation, which, to speak 
the truth, is the first foundation of all engagements to a father, and consequently of his 
power.  Indeed, how comes it to pass, that a father and mother are obliged above all 
others to bring up the child that is born to them? (LNN: IV.ii.4, n.1). 
B) Fundamental parental rights 
The second objection is that the fiduciary account fails to do justice to the notion that parents 
have fundamental individual rights—rights in their own name, not just rights of office—to raise 
their children.   Before I elaborate on this objection, let me say something about the nature of 
rights.   
Theories of Rights: Contemporary philosophers disagree about what we mean—or ought to 
mean—when we say that someone has a right.  On one prominent view, the function of rights is 
to carve up domains of freedom and control, so that, when there is a conflict of wills, it is known 
whose will has “right of way” (cf. Hart 1955, 1984; Wellman 1985: esp. chs. 4, 7).  This is 
known as the Choice or Will Theory.  The Will Theory works well for capturing the sense of the 
old legal nostrum ubi jus ibi remedium –where there is a right, there must be a remedy.  Kelsen 
gives this illustration: “One contracting party has a legal right against the other party because the 
legal order makes the execution of the sanction dependent … upon the [first] party’s expressing a 
will that the sanction be executed against the delinquent.”  It is only when “the law is at the 
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disposal of an individual” in this way that it can be considered “ ‘his’ law,” and thus, his right 
(Kelsen 1949: 82).  But the Will Theory appears to be at variance with common usage in some 
ways.  For example, it seems to imply that there can be no inalienable rights, since such rights 
cannot be exercised or waived at the individual’s discretion.  That suggests that, where education 
is compulsory, children do not (strictly speaking) have a right to be educated.  More 
fundamentally, young children appear not to have any rights at all on this account, since they are 
incapable of exercising their rights (cf. MacCormick 1977, 1982).  Parents may have duties 
regarding their children, but children cannot have rights unless they can exercise control over 
those duties.44   
Amongst moral and political philosophers, the more influential view is to say that the 
function of rights is to protect important interests.  The Interest Theory has been most 
influentially articulated in recent years by Joseph Raz.  He claims that “ ‘X has a right’ if and 
only if … some aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some 
other person(s) to be under a duty” (1986: 166).  On this view, one need not necessarily have the 
power to exercise one’s rights (e.g., by having the power to demand or waive the performance of 
another’s duty) in order to have a right.  As Neil MacCormick puts it, “powers of waiver and 
enforcement are essentially ancillary to, not constitutive of, rights” (1982: 164).  One virtue of 
the Interest Theory, especially from our point of view, is that it has no difficulty in accounting 
                                                          
44 Cf. Hart (1955): “These considerations incline us not to extend to animals and babies whom it is wrong to ill-treat 
the notion of a right to proper treatment, for the moral situation can simply and adequately be described here by 
saying that it is wrong or that we ought not to ill-treat them or, in the philosopher’s generalized sense of ‘duty’, that 
we have a duty not to ill-treat them.  If common usage sanctions talk of the rights of animals or babies it makes an 
idle use of the expression ‘a right’, which will confuse the situation with other different moral situations where the 





for the rights of children.  Because children have a strong interest in receiving care and 
education, they have right against their parents and the state to have this provided for them.     
One question we will have about the Interest Theory is the extent to which it is committed to 
a welfarist theory of morality.  Some philosophers—notably the utilitarians—hold that all moral 
rights and duties ultimately appeal to well-being for their justification, while others, like Kant, 
hold that there is a fundamental right to be one’s own master, which is irreducible to its 
contribution to the person’s well-being (MM: 6:236-237 and 2.1 above).  Could such a right to 
freedom be recognized by Raz’s Interest Theory?45  Admittedly, Raz’s definition seems 
prejudiced in favor of welfarist theories of morality, and Raz’s own moral philosophy inclines in 
that direction,46 but I do not think his theory of rights needs to take a stand on this issue.  All that 
we need to say is that, if X has a right, then someone else’s duty is grounded in something that is 
“good” for X in the broadest sense; in other words, the duty exists for the sake of X.  This 
extremely thin sense of a person’s “good” can encompass both well-being as well as freedom or 
autonomy.  Indeed, it is the same sense of “good” that is implied when we say that government 
exists for the good of the governed.  That phrase, as I have argued, can be understood to include 
the protection of the rights of the governed, not just the promotion of the general welfare.  The 
reason why we have to be able to say that the duty exists for the sake of the right-holder is 
brought out well by Matthew Kramer:   
                                                          
45 Cf. Wenar (2005): “Will theorists and interest theorists have erred in adopting analyses framed to favor their 
commitments in normative theory.  This has turned the debate between them into a proxy for the debate between 
Kantianism and welfarism.  Yet that normative dispute cannot be resolved through a conceptual analysis of rights” 
(224). 
46 See Raz (1986): ch. 12; (1994a); and (1994b).  The position is slightly hedged in his (2004), but not in a way that 





Suppose first that, as a result of a statute or a judicial ruling or some other mandate, X has 
a duty to provide his parents with a certain level of financial support after they reach the 
age of sixty-five.  Suppose next that, as a result of some mandate, X has a duty to inform 
on his parents whenever they utter seditious sentiments.  Now, in each of these situations, 
X bears a duty with a content that pertains to his parents… Why do we ascribe to the 
parents a right-to-be-furnished-with-financial-support in the first setting, and deny that 
they have a right-to-be-informed-upon in the second setting?  (1998: 91).  
The explanation is simply that the first duty exists for the good of, or for sake of, the parents, 
while the second does not.      
 Understood in this broad way, I believe that the Interest Theory is a good theory of moral 
rights.  It also works fine when we think about legally protected moral rights.  However, the 
Interest Theory runs into trouble when we come to rights of office, fiduciary rights, and other 
morally derivative rights. The President, for example, has certain special rights and powers that 
attach to the office of the presidency, but the justification of these rights do not appeal to the 
good of the President.  They do not exist for his sake.  Rather, we say that the holder of that 
office needs a certain domain of freedom and authority in order to promote the good of the 
people.  With respect to these morally derivative rights of office, the Will Theory seems like a 
more natural fit.  What it means to say that the President has a right to keep certain information 
confidential is that, if the President and some other party disagree about whether to disclose the 
said information, the President’s will has “right of way.”   
 Raz’s attempt to handle rights of office within the Interest Theory seems to me quite 
unsatisfying.  He says that rights of office do protect the interests of the right-holders, but that 
these interests need not be intrinsically valuable.  Instead, those interests are only worthy of 
consideration insofar as they are instrumental in protecting the interests of others (1986: 178-





way of protecting his interests; it is just that the only reason to protect his interests is that, on the 
whole, it is instrumental to protecting the morally important interests of the people.  This is an 
unnecessary epicycle.  The Will Theory provides a much more straightforward explanation: the 
rights attaching to the office of the President define the President’s domain of freedom and 
authority.  We can know what those rights are, in an operational sense, without knowing their 
justification at all.  For instance, we may agree about the powers of the monarch, but disagree as 
to whether they are rights of office, or personal rights, akin to property rights.                     
I see no reason why we ought to think that our ordinary talk about “rights” should always 
conform to one theory of rights or another.  The reason why both the Will and Interest theories 
have had such long lives in the philosophical literature is because they both have a foothold in 
ordinary thinking.  It would be a misunderstanding of the nature of concepts to think that they 
must either be univocal in their content or else hopelessly confused.  Political philosophers tend 
to be partial toward the Interest Theory for the good reason that it is more useful for talking 
about what they are interested in, namely, the justification of duties.  But many legal 
philosophers are more inclined toward the Will Theory, because it is more useful for thinking 
about whose will should prevail in law where parties are in conflict.  Henceforth, I shall refer to 
“operational rights” when referring protected spheres of freedom and control, and “fundamental 
rights” when referring to protected interests.  Operational rights, therefore, may or may not be 
fundamental rights.   
Are parental rights fundamental rights?:  Parental guardians clearly have operational 
rights.  But do parents have a fundamental right to exercise those operational rights?  If parental 
rights are just rights of office, then it would seem that the answer is ‘no.’  Consider a standard 





Presidency.  But Obama does not have a fundamental right to be President.  He is not personally 
wronged or injured if the electorate does not select him for that office—even if he would have 
been the better candidate for the position.  Or take another example:  Some people think that the 
Supreme Court erred when it settled the disputed election in Bush v. Gore in favor of George W. 
Bush; they think that Al Gore really won the election.  Suppose that is true.  While the electorate 
would have been wronged in that case, I do not think we would say that Gore had been 
personally wronged.  After all, no one thinks that Gore should have been personally compensated 
for his misfortune.   
Some philosophers who endorse a Lockean account of parental rights accept the implication 
that parents have no fundamental right to rear their children.  James Dwyer argues that, properly 
understood, parents would have only legal privileges to rear their children and direct their 
upbringing.  On this view, adults would not have “any legal claims of their own against state 
efforts to restrict their child-rearing practices or choices that would not, on the whole, improve 
the children’s well-being,” and no personal “entitlement to direct a child’s life.”  The role of 
parent would be understood “as a benefit enjoyed contingent upon fulfillment of attendant 
responsibilities, like other fiduciary positions such as a trustee or attorney” (1997: 64).   
Dwyer does not offer a theory as to how these privileges are initially assigned; he is mainly 
interested in arguing that parents have no fundamental right to direct their children’s education.  
Peter Vallentyne (2003), however, argues that the operational rights of parental guardians ought 
to be assigned to whomever it is in the child’s best interests to possess those rights.  This is not 
only a rule for the initial distribution of parental rights; if, after the child has grown older, it 
becomes apparent that he would be better off in the care of some other adult, then custodial 





as a rule (Vallentyne claims) it can be presumed that biological parents will be the best 
caretakers for their children, and that transferring custody would not be in the child’s best 
interests.  David Archard seems to agree: “it may be reasonable to presume that biological 
parents should act as the child’s caretakers, especially if the feasible alternatives can be shown to 
be unacceptably poorer…. What the state should not do is presume that natural parents have a 
right to rear which derives simply from biological parenthood” (2004: 152).  Just how strong the 
presumption in favor of biological parents should be depends on how important blood ties are to 
children.  J. David Velleman, for example, has argued that children have a strong interest in 
being raised by their biological parents, on the premise that knowing our parents is an important 
part of getting to know ourselves (2005, 2008b).     
 But most people think that parents (not just their children) are personally wronged if they are 
deprived of their authority to raise their children as they think best—at least so long as they 
would be adequate parents.47  For example, in some Australian states from the 1930s to the 
1970s single mothers had their newborns taken away from them in order to give the children a 
“better life” with an adoptive married couple (Richards 2010: 11).  Whether or not this wronged 
the child, we probably feel that it certainly wronged the mother.  William Galston urges us to 
recognize this point when he insists that “As a parent, I am more than the child’s caretaker or 
teacher, and I am not simply the representative of the state delegated to prepare the child for 
citizenship” (2002: 103).  Instead, he insists that raising one’s children, and raising them in a 
particular way, is a part of most parents’ conception of the good life.  But conceiving of parental 
rights on a purely fiduciary relationship fails to capture that aspect of parenthood. 
                                                          
47 Cf. Page (1984), who insists on accommodating “the powerful intuitive idea that parents, rather than children, are 






C) Locke’s position 
Interestingly enough, Locke has relatively good answers to both of these objections, but they 
depend on his larger theological picture.  In the Essays on the Law of Nature, Locke argues that, 
just as we know that there is a wise Creator from the fact that “this visible world is constructed 
with wonderful art and regularity,” so too can we “infer the principle and definite rule of our 
duty from man’s own constitution and the faculties with which he is equipped.”  “For since man 
is neither made without design nor endowed to no purposes with these faculties which both can 
and must be employed, his function appears to be that which nature has prepared him to 
perform” (ELN IV, 103-105). 
And as Locke sees it, there is abundant empirical evidence that God intended a child’s 
biological parents to be his natural caretakers.  First, there is the utter helplessness of children.  If 
they are to survive, someone has to take care of them.  Second, there is the fact that mothers 
naturally produce the milk that infants need for nourishment upon giving birth.  Third, there is 
the strong natural affection that mothers tend to have for their infants.  Fourth, we find that 
mothers naturally nurture and raise their young in many other animal species, particularly the 
mammals and birds.  Fifth, we find that, in those animal species where caring for the young 
makes the female less able to provide for herself, the bond between mating pairs last longer, so 
that the male can help provide for, and help raise, the female and the young.  Sixth, in human 
beings, we find strong bonds of love between mating males and females, which lasts for many 
years, if not for a lifetime.  Finally, we find that human fathers, as well as mothers, tend to 
develop a natural attachment for their offspring (2T: II.78-81).   
Therefore, just as the eye seems to have been fashioned by a wise Creator as an instrument 





maintaining and raising their children for the purpose of continuing the human race.  The natural 
need of children and the natural faculties and affections of parents appear to fit together like hand 
and glove.  Because God has so wisely ordered nature so that there is an instrument available to 
provide for child’s need, we must infer that it is indeed God’s intention and will that parents raise 
their young.  Furthermore, by appealing to parents’ natural inclination to preserve their own 
children, Locke puts parental duty on a footing comparable to the basic duty to preserve one’s 
own life: 
[God] has in all the parts of the Creation taken a peculiar care to propagate and continue 
the Several Species of Creatures, and makes the Individuals act so strongly to this end, 
that they sometimes neglect their own private good for it, and seem to forget that general 
Rule which Nature teaches all things of self-preservation, and the Preservation of their 
Young, as the strongest Principle in them over rules the Constitution of their particular 
Natures (I.56). 
 So, although Locke denies that the content or duration of the authority that parents have over 
their offspring derives from the “bare act of begetting,” he does think that the assignment of 
parental rights and responsibilities to particular men and women rests on the relationship of 
generation.  To that extent, Locke could agree with Grotius that it is “by generation that parents 
acquire rights over children.”  Even then, however, Locke would insist that it is not the bare act 
of begetting that confers those rights, but rather God’s evident intent in having made the 
biological parents his instruments in continuing the race.  In one sense, therefore, Locke’s 
account of the special duties of parents is essentially forward-looking.  All human beings have a 
duty to preserve mankind where it is possible to do so, but because parents are especially fitted 
by nature to preserve the lives of their offspring, they are singled out with the special 





by itself to create a genuine obligation with the “force of morality,” for which a law issued and 
enforced by a superior is wanting.48 
Given Locke’s belief in a providential Creator, I believe his argument for the special duty of 
parents toward their own offspring is at least as good as his arguments for the other parts of the 
natural law.  In fact, I would venture that it is considerably stronger.  If we suppose that human 
nature has been created by God for particular purposes, it seems more straightforward to argue 
that God intended parents to raise their own young than that, say, he intended labor to be a title 
to property or for all men be free and equal.  Does this argument also enable Locke to argue that 
parents’ have fundamental rights to rear their children?  For all human purposes, it does.  Of 
course, Locke does not think that this right, or any other, holds against God.  But the relevant 
point from Locke’s perspective is that parental rights have the same basis as rights to one’s own 
person:  not mere human convention, but God’s will, which is reason (II.6).   
Contemporary philosophers, who wish to detach Locke’s theory of parental authority from 
his theological picture, have not sufficiently taken notice of the fact that they are thereby 
deprived of Locke’s own answers to these objections.  Can such answers nonetheless be supplied 
from within a secular fiduciary account?  I believe that a reasonable answer is available for the 
first objection, but not for the second.     
                                                          
48 Cf. ECHU: II.xxviii.5-8.  But the point is made even more clearly in a draft manuscript for the Essay: “show no 
law of a superior that prescribes temperance, to the observation of breach of which law there are rewards and 






D) Parental liability 
 The most plausible argument for establishing the special duties of biological parents appeals 
to the parent’s responsibility for the child’s present state of neediness.  Were the parent not to 
care for the child, so the argument goes, the parent would be harming the child.  The argument 
has occurred to many writers, but we find a particularly clear articulation of it in Blackstone’s 
Commentaries: 
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a principle of 
natural law; an obligation … laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own 
proper act, in bringing them into the world: for they would be in the highest manner 
injurious to their issue, if they only gave their children life that they might afterwards see 
them perish. By begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation 
to endeavour, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be 
supported and preserved. And thus the children will have the perfect right of receiving 
maintenance from their parents (CLE: I.xvi.1).49 
Many contemporary philosophers have made the same argument.  Velleman puts it 
straightforwardly enough:  
Consider the hackneyed example of a child who is drowning at the deep end of a 
swimming pool.  People lounging around the pool obviously have an obligation to rescue 
the child.  But the obligation doesn’t fall on the bystanders equally if one of them pushed 
the child in.  The one responsible for the child’s predicament is not just a bystander like 
the others, and he bears the principal obligation (Velleman 2008b: 251). 
If there is anything right about the concept of liability, then this argument is hard to quarrel 
with in the abstract.  However, it does raise some difficult questions, which I will simply flag 
without trying to resolve.  First, it is not clear just what the parents are liable for.  The traditional 
view is that the parents are liable for the entire cost of maintaining and educating the child until 
the child reaches adulthood, and that view still finds support amongst some philosophers.  But in 
                                                          





all modern societies, much of the cost of raising children is now socialized (e.g., through public 
schools, public health-care, or in some countries, public day-care).  Are these cases of some 
people being unjustly forced to subsidize the choices of others?  Interestingly, Velleman (2008b) 
suggests that parents are mainly responsible just for personally rearing their own children; he 
does not explicitly draw any economic consequences from the liability argument at all. 
The second hard question concerns the circumstances under which one becomes responsible 
for a child’s existence?  The most obvious way of incurring such responsibility is to intentionally 
procreate.  Similarly, it would seem that one is responsible for a child’s existence when one 
intentionally induces someone else to procreate for you.50  And surely we will want to say that 
parents can incur liability for children that they did not intend to create as well.  The traditional 
view is that by voluntarily having sexual intercourse, individuals assume responsibility for any 
offspring that may result.  The existence of birth control and abortion have somewhat 
complicated this.  If my partner assures me that she is using birth control, but has deceived me, 
then am I still responsible for supporting the child that results?  What if the man wishes his 
partner to have an abortion, but she refuses.  Is he still liable to support the child.  In other words, 
if women have the right to choose whether or not to be mothers, ought men have the same right 
(cf. Brake 2005)? 
But let’s set aside these questions.  I shall assume that they concern the periphery of the 
liability account, not its core.  So let us agree that there is a good secular explanation as to why 
                                                          
50 Suppose that Mr. A and Ms. B want a child, but they discover that Mr. A is infertile.  In consequence, Mr. A and 
Ms. B contract with a sperm donor, Mr. C, so that Ms. B can get pregnant.  This results in the birth of D.  Even 
though Mr. A has not made a genetic contribution to the creation of D, it seems that Mr. A is just as morally 
responsible for D’s existence as an ordinary biological father would be (or at least very nearly so).  Does Mr. C have 






some adults have greater responsibility for meeting children’s needs than other adults.  Can this 
argument, like Locke’s, also be used to show that parents have a fundamental right to raise their 
own children?  The suggestion would be that insofar as my life goes better for me when I live up 
to my obligations, I have a strong personal interest in having the freedom to do so.  There is 
something to be said for this argument, insofar as no one else will fulfill my obligation for me.  
To return to Velleman’s example, suppose, as a joke, I push a child into the swimming pool, not 
realizing that he does not know how to swim.  As it turns out, I am the only person on site strong 
enough to pull the child up from the bottom of the pool.  In that case, it makes some sense to say 
that someone who prevented me from saving the child would wrong both the child and (to a 
lesser extent) me.  But suppose now that I am not the only one capable of rescuing the child.  
Someone else jumps into the pool first and saves the child.  Even though this person had less of 
an obligation than me to save the life of the child, it does not seem as if he has wronged me by 
performing my obligation for me.  These points seem to carry over the case of biological parents.  
It is reasonable to think that parents have a right to fulfill their obligations to their children, if no 
one else would do so for them.  But it does not seem as if parents have a right to be the persons 
who meet their children’s needs, if someone else might do as well or even better than they could.  
If that argument is sound, then we shall either have to accept that biological parents do not after 
all have a fundamental right to rear their own children, or that the modern fiduciary account of 





CHAPTER 9:  THE VALUE OF INTIMACY 
9.1  Introduction 
 Over the last three chapters, we have explored three paradigms for parental rights:  property, 
contract, and government.  The property paradigm, while no longer very popular, has appealed to 
some philosophers for three respectable reasons.  First, enforceable parental rights are, at least in 
large part, rights held against third parties with respect to the management of children, and 
property rights are paradigmatic of such rights in rem over external things.  Perhaps for this 
reason Aquinas compared a young child to an ox or a horse in the way each belongs exclusively 
to some and not others (ST: II-II, Q. 10, a.12).  Second, if parental rights were akin to property 
rights, then that would explain why undue interference personally wrongs the parent.  In other 
words, that would explain the sense in which parental rights are fundamental rights—not just 
rights of office.  Third, if we think that we generally have property over what we create, or over 
what we are the first to seize, then perhaps children belong, at least in the first place, to their 
procreators, or to those into whose hands they first fall. 
 But although there may be some commonalities between property rights and parental rights, 
the fundamental difference is, of course, far more striking.  For us, the organizing idea of 
property is that which I can dispose of for my own advantage, while the organizing idea of a 
person is that of a being who has rights and cannot be used merely as a means.  Therefore, it 
seems like a moral category error to say that persons can be held as property.  This led us to our 





through contract.  Perhaps parental rights can be likened to contract rights.  We considered two 
versions of this idea.  First, that children actually make a pact with their parents which 
recognizes the parent’s authority in return for parent’s care, and second, that parental rights can 
be justified in terms of the child’s hypothetical consent.  The first view either founders on the 
fact that children are incapable of consent, or else it requires us to accept a Hobbesian conception 
of the state of nature.  The idea that parental rights might be justified by the child’s hypothetical 
consent is not wholly implausible, but as Ronald Dworkin has rightly said, “a hypothetical 
contract is not simply a pale form of an actual contract; it is no contract at all” (1977: 151).  
Rather, it is a heuristic for thinking about people’s interests, aims, or rights from an impartial 
point of view that accords everyone equal consideration.   
 This led us to our third idea.  Perhaps parental authority is best conceived, not as a form of 
private dominion, but as a form of government, which exists in order to protect the interests of 
the governed.  On this view, the child’s undeveloped potential for reason is at once the basis of 
the child’s moral equality with his parents and the basis for his temporary subjection to their 
authority.  While children are not presently in a position to exercise their natural freedom, it is 
their birthright as human beings to attain this state.  Special authority over children, then, is 
conferred on certain adults so that they can preserve, nourish, and educate children during their 
minority.  Thus, as Locke puts it, “Parental power is nothing but that, which parents have over 
their children, to govern them for the children’s good, till they come to the use of reason” (2T: 
II.270).  This has been an extremely attractive view for contemporary philosophers, because it 
makes the rights of children primary in the order of justification.  I believe that the fiduciary 
model will at least be an element of any satisfactory account of parental rights.  But there is an 





right to assume any particular fiduciary role, even if they are the well-qualified for it.  Therefore, 
by itself, the fiduciary account suggests that no one has a fundamental right to assume the office 
of guardian over their own biological children—and that seems counterintuitive. 
 A natural thought at this point is that the fiduciary account of parents as governors is missing 
something important, namely, a recognition of the personal stake that parents possess in having 
an intimate relationship with their children.  The nature of that relationship, it will be argued, is 
very different from the sort of relationship a public office-holder has with the public, and it 
constitutes so fundamental an interest that it does make sense to say that parents have an 
individual right to rear their children.  The special interest of parents in having an intimate 
relationship with their children is one idea that was left relatively unexplored by the seventeenth-
century natural law theorists.  Hegel was perhaps the first major philosopher to think about the 
parental role in this way.  But Hegel (in stark contrast to Locke) has been almost entirely 
neglected in the contemporary literature on the topic.  In this chapter, I shall look at two 
contemporary intimacy-based accounts of parental rights.  Then, in the next chapter, we shall 
look at Hegel’s view in more detail and see what contributions he can make to the contemporary 
conversation.   
9.2  The Value of Intimate Relationships 
A)  The value of intimate relationships 
As I have just recounted, contemporary appeals to the value of intimacy in the literature on 
parental rights are typically motivated by a sense that fiduciary accounts, which focus on the 
rights and interests of children, are too one-sided and have wrongly left the interests of parents 





guardianship should be vested in biological parents who may not be the most competent to 
exercise them (cf. Fried 1978: 153)?  Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift put the question this 
way: 
If all that matters is ensuring that children’s interests are met as well as possible, then, 
children should be distributed to those people judged most likely to raise them best.  If 
parents’ interests play no justificatory role, what would there be to impugn a well-
intentioned and efficient government agency that distributed children, who under a 
laissez-faire system would be reasonably well-raised, to adults who would be better 
parents, thus leaving some adequately good parents childless?   (2006b: 86) 
Some philosophers accept that view:  parental rights over a given child, they maintain, ought to 
belong to those for whom possession is in the child’s best interests (Vallentyne 2003).  They just 
argue that, typically, biological parents can be presumed to be the best caretakers for their own 
children, and that moreover various pragmatic considerations rule out “redistributing” children in 
all but the most egregious cases of parental incompetence.  Thus, David Archard cautiously 
remarks, “it may be reasonable to presume that biological parents should act as the child’s 
caretakers, especially if the feasible alternatives can be shown to be unacceptably poorer…. 
What the state should not do is presume that natural parents have a right to rear which derives 
simply from biological parenthood” (2004: 152).  But many philosophers think that that kind of 
view is inadequate; instead, they “want a conception that will do justice to the hopes that parents 
have and the sacrifices they make in rearing their children” (Callan 1997: 245).   
Ferdinand Schoeman offers an account of this kind.  He argues that parents have a strong 
interest in having and maintaining an intimate relationship with their children, and that this 
interest is sufficiently important to ground the fundamental right of “biological parents … to 
keep their children under their care in the setting of privacy, autonomy, and responsibility which 





That means that even if children might be better off being raised differently or by someone else, 
third parties (including the government) may not intervene in any way, except to protect the child 
from serious and irreparable harm.  This argument essentially has two parts.  First, Schoeman 
offers a characterization of intimate relationships and of the social conditions they need to thrive.  
Second, he applies this account to the relationship between parents and children, and draws 
conclusions about parental rights.     
 Schoeman describes an intimate relationships as one in which the parties share their selves 
with one another to such a degree that the ordinary boundaries that “give shape to the self” 
become “transparent.”  As a consequence, each individual comes to think of her personal well-
being as inextricably entangled with that of the other (1980: 8).  Such relationships, he maintains, 
are typically foundational to a meaningful and complete human life.  For most people, “human 
existence would have little or no meaning if cut off from all possibility of maintaining and 
reestablishing such relationships”; “they constitute one’s roots in life or attachments to living” 
(14).   
 Because intimate relationships are so fundamental to our well-being, Schoeman argues that 
we ought to recognize that people have a general right to form and maintain these relationships 
without interference.  This leads him to an account of the conditions under which intimate 
relationships thrive.  Intimate sharing, he argues “presupposes limited sovereignty on the part of 
those reaching out to and sharing with others to determine the conditions of the relationship” 
(14).  This limited sovereignty has two aspects.  First the parties to the relationship need to have 
the autonomy to order and conduct their relationship as they see fit.  Without this autonomy, the 
relationship does not permit the individuals to interact with one another in an immediate and 





from the outside.  A second aspect to sovereignty is privacy.  When we feel that we’re being 
watched, it is often difficult to act with sincerity, and without self-conscious artifice, since we 
tend to conform our actions to the standards we attribute to those watching us.  Moreover, certain 
kinds of sharing—sex and frank conversation being two examples—are intimate precisely 
because we don’t mean to share them with anyone and everyone.   
 It we have a general right to form and maintain intimate relationships, and privacy and 
autonomy are essential conditions for those relationships to flourish, then it appears to follow 
that we also have a right that our intimate relationships be accorded significant privacy and 
autonomy.  Schoeman is particularly concerned that the state refrain from interfering in such 
relationships, since he thinks that the intervention of the state, or even the threat thereof, tends to 
change the character of the relationship from one of shared commitment and spontaneity to one 
in which individual rights and duties are clearly marked out.  The consequence of this 
transformation is that people cease “see[ing] their interests fused with those of another” (14). 
“The very act of precisely sorting things out in conformity with the legalistic paradigm tends to 
wring out aspects of inner commitment” (15).  
 Now the parent-child relationship is one particularly common and important intimate 
relationship.  Many adults, at least in our culture, choose to have children for the very purpose of 
establishing such intimate relationships with their children (8).  From this, Schoeman draws two 
conclusions.  First, even if it were possible to improve the prospects and well-being of children 
by taking them from their biological parents and transferring custody to other guardians, we 
would, in doing so, be interfering with the intimate relationship of the parent with her child – a 
relationship which she has a fundamental interest in maintaining and, consequently, a right to 





disrupt the intimate character of the relationship, parents must also be accorded broad rights of 
privacy and autonomy in raising their children as they think fit (10).  Of course, this does not 
mean that children do not have protected interests as well; parental rights are not absolute.  And 
yet, if every moral duty that parents had to their children were legally enforceable, then parents 
would lack the autonomy and privacy that is necessary for intimacy in the first place.  As 
Schoeman sees it, the reasonable middle ground is to say that the state may only intervene where 
the failure of parents to fulfill their duties places children in clear and present danger of grave 
harm.    
∴ 
 There are at least two important criticisms to make of Schoeman’s argument.  First, even if 
he has established that parents have a fundamental interest in the intimate character of the parent-
child relationship, it is not clear how extensive this right to rear is.  It is a shortcoming of 
Schoeman’s argument that it is couched in such general terms.  We can allow that parents have 
an important interest in having an intimate relationship with their children and yet still not know 
how much authority parents have over the content of their children’s education (cf. Brighouse 
2000: 17 and Brighouse and Swift 2006b).  While I believe that consideration of far-fetched 
policy ideas—like the redistribution of children en masse—can be useful for reflecting on our 
moral beliefs, the usefulness will ultimately turn on the implications our beliefs have for more 
realistic problems and policies.  For instance, does Schoeman’s argument tell us whether parents 
can shelter their children from learning about Darwinian evolution or forms of safe-sex, if they 
believe those ideas are inconsistent with their religion?     
 The second objection is that, as Brighouse and Swift (2006b) point out, there is a gap in 





unjust for the state to disrupt our already existing intimate relationships or prevent us from 
establishing them.  It is less clear that Schoeman has made the case for thinking that adults have 
a right to establish an intimate relationship with children in the first place.  As Schoeman himself 
observes, “adults can establish intimate relationships with other consenting adults” (1980: 16). 
From the fact that my life cannot go well without some intimate relationships, it does not 
logically follow that I have a right to establish any intimate relationship whatsoever.  Therefore, 
Shoeman’s argument establishes that adults have a right to have some intimate relationships 
protected from interference, but not that they have a right to intimate relationships with children. 
    Schoeman tries to parry this objection by claiming that, in order for intimacy to take root, it 
is important that the parties be free to set the terms of their relationship.  But Brighouse and 
Swift are right to answer that, when it comes to the relationship between adults and young 
children, it is artificial to speak of the parties setting the terms; rather it is chiefly the adults that 
set the terms, and the children who must live with them.  With regard to relationships between 
adults, it is reasonable to give parties wide latitude to set the terms of their own relationships, 
since we assume that someone unhappy with the terms of that relationship can either renegotiate 
them or exit the relationship.  But since children lack power to affect the structure and character 
of their relationships themselves, it is reasonable for the state to be more solicitous of children’s 
interests than those of adults.  Therefore, it is arguable that the state is perfectly justified in 
making sure that both the pairings between particular adults and children, and the general 
structure of the parent-child relationship, are such that the not-yet-autonomous child could 





9.3  The Distinctive Intimacy of the Parent-Child Relationship 
 Brighouse and Swift want to remedy Schoeman’s argument so that it avoids the two 
criticisms we have just considered.  The approach they take is to argue that while the parent-
child relationship is indeed just one form of intimate relationship, it has several unique features 
that make it non-interchangeable with other intimate relationships.  This move is supposed to 
block the objection that adults do not have a powerful interest in establishing an intimate 
relationship with children at all, since they can just as well have intimate relationships with other 
adults.  Because parent-child relationships are so different in kind from intimate relationships 
between adults, Brighouse and Swift think that they can establish that adults do have protected 
interests in having intimate relationships with both adults and children.  But they also argue that, 
although this grounds a fundamental parental right to rear children, it does not necessarily 
ground extensive parental rights of control.  “Insofar as the purpose of parental rights is to protect 
the parental interests in having and maintaining a relationship of that kind, parental rights are 
justified only insofar as they are required for protecting that relationship” (2006b: 102).   
 Brighouse and Swift pick out four features of the parent-child relationship that make it 
distinctive from other intimate relationships.  First, children, particularly young children, are far 
more vulnerable to their parents, physically and psychologically, than their parents are to the 
child.  In intimate relationships between adults, the parties are typically in more symmetrical 
positions with regard to their vulnerability to one another.  Second, a child generally does not 
have either the de facto or de jure power to exit from a relationship with her parent, whereas the 
parent typically has both powers.  In adult intimate relationships, both parties ordinarily possess 
the de jure power to exit, and even if their de facto power is unequal, that power is usually 





exists between parent and child is also very different than that which exists between two adults: 
“The love one receives from one’s children, again especially in the early years, is spontaneous 
and unconditional and, in particular, outside the rational control of the child.”  In this way, 
children are capable of giving something to parents that no adult can give.  Finally, the role of 
parent comes with a responsibility for fostering the healthy development and well-being of the 
child.  Unlike many intimate relationships, then, the role of parent is, at least in large part, a 
fiduciary role (2006b: 92-95).    
 When we concentrate on the fiduciary role of the parent, we usually end up focusing on the 
child’s interests, since that is what the parent is charged with looking after.  This can make it 
appear as if the rights of parents are wholly derived from the duty to look after the child’s 
interests.  Brighouse and Swift want us to recognize, however, that parents have “a nonfiduciary 
interest in playing this fiduciary role.”  True, to play the role of parent is, first and foremost, to 
care for a child’s interests, but the reasons for the adult to play that role are not entirely reducible 
to the child’s interests.  Rather, it is a valuable thing for one’s own life to “meet this distinctive 
moral burden.”  This is not only because the love and trust of a child is qualitatively different 
from that of which adults are capable; it is also because being a parent requires the development 
and exercise of capacities that are not called for by any other pursuit and which open up 
possibilities of self-discovery that are unavailable in any other relationship.  Brighouse and Swift 
argue that this analysis of the parent-child relationship shows that the intimacy involved is quite 
different from that possible between adults and contributes to the well-being of adults in a 
different and non-interchangeable way.  They conclude, therefore, that the “challenge of 
parenting is something adults have an interest in facing, and it is that interest that grounds 





Moreover, the fundamental interest that parents have in intimacy with their children helps us 
think about the content and extent of parental rights.  Now many of the operational rights and 
powers that parents have over their children and against third parties are ultimately grounded in 
the interests of their children.  For example, the right of parents to shield their children from 
strangers exists in order to protect children from people who might harm them.  These 
operational rights of control are not grounded in the parent’s own fundamental rights.  The 
operational rights that are grounded in fundamental rights of parents are primarily what 
Brighouse and Swift call “associational rights.”  These are rights that parents need in order to 
protect their ability to share a life with their children.  For instance, not only do parents have a 
right to live with their children and spend substantial time with them, but they also have “the 
right to share their enthusiasms with their children, including, for example, their enthusiasms 
regarding their own particular cultural heritage” (2006b: 102).  Thus, “parents should be free to 
have their children accompany them to religious ceremonies and to enroll them in associations in 
which they will participate in the communities of value of which the parents approve (Hebrew 
School, the Ukranian Youth League, cricket clubs, and so on)” (2009: 57).  This is important 
since shared interests and values facilitate intimate relationships. 
This right to expose children to our values and enthusiasms is limited, however, by the 
parent’s duty to meet children’s basic interests.  The present argument would be compatible with 
various ways of filling in the content of those basic interests.  Brighouse and Swift hold that one 
of the most important of them for liberal theory is that of acquiring the basic capabilities for 
exercising autonomy as an adult.  They do not expand much on what this entails, other than that 
it prohibits parents from “indoctrinating” their children, forcing them into a particular career, or 





104-105).  Elsewhere, Brighouse has explained his conception of autonomy as follows.  
Negatively, to be autonomous is to be free from manipulation, adaptive preferences, and 
illegitimate coercion.  Positively, it is to have the capabilities for reflecting critically on one’s 
beliefs and values, subjecting moral principles to scrutiny, and disciplining one’s own behavior 
in light of those values and principles (2002: 42; 2000: ch. 4; 1998).  Why is this prospective 
autonomy a basic interest?  Living well, he argues, has two aspects:  the way of life must be 
good and the person living that life must endorse it “from the inside.”1  But because people have 
different characters, personalities, and constitutions, some generally good ways of life may not 
be suitable to some people.  Thus, some people will find that the culture in which they were 
raised, while perhaps valuable for others, cannot make them happy (2000: 61-73).  “For some of 
us it is vital for our long-term well-being that we be able to throw off some parts of the unchosen 
parts of our identities.”  This, he argues, is especially true for women or homosexuals who grow 
up in cultures that are sexist or intolerant of homosexuality (2002: 50).  Therefore, if people are 
going to be assured a fair opportunity of living well, they need to “possess epistemically reliable 
ways of evaluating different ways of life” (Brighouse 2000: 63-71).      
Brighouse and Swift maintain that as long as parents ensure that the child’s interests are 
sufficiently served, “parents are not under an obligation to be considering the child’s best 
interests as they exercise these [associational] rights” (Brighouse and Swift 2006b: 102).  This 
appears to mean that, for example, when deciding whether it would be best to enroll my son in 
the Boy Scouts, I may appeal to my interest in sharing my enthusiasm for the outdoors with him, 
                                                          
1 This is the picture of well-being that I examined at length in 3.2-3.3.  Although I criticized the idea that this 
conception of well-being provided a strong argument against paternalism, I did made no objections to it as an 
account of well-being.  The main question seems to be how objective one wants to make one’s claims about ways of 





even if I think he might be better served by doing something else with his time.  The reverse side 
of this argument, however, is that parents cannot object to sharing authority over their children 
with some other agency—like public schools—if that is in the child’s best interests, “as long as 
this division does not infringe the fundamental rights of parents to intimate relations with their 
children” (103). 
∴ 
In at least three ways, the Brighouse-Swift argument is a significant improvement upon 
Schoeman’s.  First, it tries to explain what is distinctively valuable about the parent-child 
relationship as compared with other intimate relationships.  Second, it gives us some guidance in 
thinking about the content of parental rights.  And third, in arguing that parents have a 
nonfiduciary interest in fulfilling the fiduciary responsibilities of parenthood, it incorporates the 
attractive parts of the fiduciary account within a larger and more complete theory of the family.    
I have four critical comments.  The first is a relatively minor point.  It seems to me that it 
would be possible to give a better and fuller account of the interest that people have in becoming 
parents.  It seems right that a person has distinctive interests in being the recipient of a child’s 
spontaneous affections and in taking on the responsibility for a child’s education and daily needs.  
And while the child’s vulnerability and inability to exit from the family do seem to condition the 
kinds of responsibility parents undertake, I would hesitate to say that we have a comparably 
weighty interest in forming relationships with people who are especially vulnerable to us and 
who cannot leave us.  Indeed, parents who value their children’s dependence too much may 





consider ways of improving this account later on (esp. 10.4); it suffices at present to have flagged 
the need to do so. 
The second objection is this:  the argument says that parents only have a fundamental right to 
those interactions with their children that are necessary for maintaining an intimate relationship.  
This is an important part of the account, because it “immediately supports only the right [of 
parents] to live with, and associate intimately with the children, not the right to control their 
education” (Brighouse 2000: 17).  But if we restrict ourselves to what is necessary for 
maintaining an intimate relationship with one’s children, then adults can actually claim 
surprisingly little parental autonomy in their own name (as opposed to arguing that more parental 
autonomy is in their child’s best interests).  To see this, consider a divorced couple that lives in 
the same city and which shares joint custody over the children.  The children spend half of the 
their time with their mother, and half with their father.  It seems that each of the parents under 
this arrangement has an opportunity to maintain an intimate relationship with the children, even 
though they must share divided authority with the other parent.  But that suggests that, for an 
intact family, a similar kind of divided authority might be arranged with the state, without 
infringing the parents’ fundamental rights to maintain an intimate relationship with their 
children.  That is, the child might live with their parents half the time, and with a state-appointed 
mentor the other half of the time. 
Third, the way that Brighouse and Swift characterize the associational rights of parents does 
not seem quite right.  Suppose I am an extremely assiduous social worker looking in on a parent-
child relationship.  The father has enrolled his child in the Boy Scouts, even though I think it 
would be better for the child to focus on learning how to play a musical instrument.  Perhaps I 





decision ought to be respected, since it will provide opportunities for the parent to realize his 
interest in bonding with his child.  But this seems like an odd way for the father himself to 
reason.  We are supposed to imagine him granting that, although participating in the Boy Scouts 
is certainly not in his son’s best interests, he is justified in enrolling his son in that activity 
anyway, since it is important to him and doesn’t significantly harm his son?  That doesn’t sound 
right.  I don’t mean to suggest that parents always have a duty to pursue their children’s interests 
at the expense of their own.  (And I certainly don’t mean that parents must always defer to their 
children’s judgments about their own best interests.)  But it seems strange to say that parents 
might legitimately seek bonding activities with their children for themselves—even when that is 
not what is best for their children.2         
I have reserved my most serious criticism for last.  Recall that one thing that Schoeman 
wanted to explain was whether the state would wrong parents if it redistributed at birth their 
children to other guardians who were more capable of promoting their best interests.  We have 
reviewed the difficulty that Schoeman has in actually demonstrating that such a redistribution 
would wrong parents, since he does not explain why adults need to establish intimate 
relationships with children.  Brighouse and Swift think that their account bridges the gap in 
Schoeman’s argument and shows why the redistribution scheme would wrong parents, namely, 
because parents have a strong nonfiduciary interest to play the fiduciary role of parent, and this 
interest is grounded in the fact that the kind of intimate relationship involved in this role is an 
important part of a fully flourishing life for many, if not most, adults.  This interest is important 
enough, they argue, that it warrants protection with rights.  But there is at least one important 
                                                          





part of the conclusion that Schoeman wanted to reach that Brighouse and Swift acknowledge 
their argument does not establish:   
We have shown why no one who will do an adequately good job of raising a child should 
be prevented from being a parent.  But we have not shown that the child they should be 
allowed to raise should be their own biological child.  This is not because we believe that 
there is no weighty interest in raising one’s own biological child but because we do not 
have an argument establishing that there is such an interest.  In this we are not alone.  
Such an interest is frequently asserted, but we are not aware of any convincing arguments 
for it.3 
 It is not altogether clear to me what Brighouse and Swift are claiming that their argument 
does and does not establish.  The most natural interpretation is that while parents have no 
positive claim to raise their own biological children, they do have a claim against having children 
redistributed away from them at birth, so long as they are adequately good parents.  Technically, 
this would still permit the state (as far as parent-centered arguments go) to send new parents 
home from the hospital with children that are not biologically their own, but it is hard to imagine 
what the rationale behind this exercise would be, unless perhaps there were some way to predict 
which parents would be best at raising which “kinds” of children.  If this is the only scenario 
under which parents would be deprived of their biological children, then the lack of an argument 
to establish the positive right of parents to raise their biological children is not very alarming.  I 
get the sense that this is the interpretation that Brighouse and Swift have in mind, for they say, a 
little later:  
[A]bsent an argument that the interest in having a biological connection to the child one 
raises is very powerful indeed, we do not claim that the interest in being a parent impugns 
                                                          
3 Ibid., p. 97-98.  And later on, they state, “We have an argument against the forcible redistribution of children from 






redistribution at birth.  What we do claim is that it impugns redistribution away from 
people who would be adequately good parents (though not as good as others) (98). 
But this last sentence is not a conclusion that their argument entitles them to.   
 Since the interest in parenting is just as strong for unwillingly childless people as it is for 
procreators, the former have the same rights as the latter to be parents.  Consequently, the 
conclusion that Brighouse and Swift’s argument really establishes is that whenever parents have 
their second child, then that child should always be redistributed away from the biological 
parents to unwillingly childless (but adequate) would-be parents, until all adequate would-be 
parents have at least one child.4  In fact, the conclusion that Brighouse and Swift actually 
establish is even stronger and stranger:  So long as the unwillingly childless people would make 
adequate parents, we should always redistribute children to them and away from their biological 
parents, even when it is known with certainty that the biological parents would be substantially 
better at promoting the child’s interests than the initially childless would-be parents.  Only then 
would we be respecting the rights of all parties.  The only kind of reason that could possibly 
defeat the presumption of redistributing children to unwillingly childless persons is the same 
kind of reason that could justify denying custody to biological parents of their first child, namely, 
that they cannot meet children’s basic needs.  Now if that is the conclusion that Brighouse and 
Swift intended to convey, they certainly don’t drive the point home.  The only way that I can 
imagine avoiding this truly weird conclusion, given their argument, is to insist that the right to 
parent establishes only a negative duty on the part of the state to refrain from redistributing 
children away from adequate parents but no positive duty to redistribute children to adequate 
                                                          
4 After every willing and adequate parent has at least one child, Brighouse and Swift’s argument gives us no further 
guidance as to the distribution of children.  This is because their argument establishes a right to parent, not a right to 





parents.  But I don’t know what argument Brighouse and Swift could possibly avail themselves 
of to establish this asymmetry.   
 It may help to see my point here to observe that the argument that Brighouse and Swift offer 
has precisely the same structure as an argument which grounds the right to private property in the 
contribution that individual property-ownership makes to the property-holder’s well-being or 
freedom.5  In contrast to Lockean arguments which ground property rights to particular things in 
some special transaction or relationship of the right-holder, an argument that appeals to a general 
interest in having property—for example, because it fosters the development of personal 
responsibility and independence—naturally leads to the conclusion that “everyone ought to have 
property” (cf. Hegel PR: 49A).  But that conclusion, far from establishing that all redistribution 
of private property is illegitimate (as a Lockean argument might), really establishes that, if 
anyone is without property, then some redistribution from the haves to the have-nots is 
mandatory.6  The Brighouse-Swift argument, as it stands, is no different.  If it is true that the 
“challenge of parenting is something that adults have an interest in facing,” then it would appear 
to follow that we ought to redistribute children at birth from the haves to the have-nots, until 
everyone able and desiring to take on this role has the opportunity.7 
9.4  Intimacy and Natural Affection 
Conspicuous in its absence in these contemporary discussions is any invocation of the natural 
affection that parents, and especially mothers, are often thought to have for their offspring.  After 
                                                          
5 For example, the argument in Hegel, PR: 41 + A, 45 + R, 46,  49A.  See the interpretation in Waldron (1988): ch. 
10. 
6 Thus, Hegel, PR: 229A, 230, 238 + A, 239 + A.  Again, see Waldron (1988): ch. 10. 





all, you might have thought that this was the most obvious respect in which a parent has a 
personal interest in raising her own child.  It seems particularly odd that there is no mention of 
the possibility that a mother might develop a strong attachment to her child in the womb.  But, in 
fact, Brighouse and Swift scrupulously avoid any such argument.  Schoeman, for his part, 
maintains that the significance of the biological tie is only conventional, but that it does deserve 
respect since people in our culture do happen to value it (1980: 18).  Arneson and Shapiro also 
seek to minimize the biological in their Lockean account of parental rights: 
Locke may perhaps make too much of biological parenthood, but the rest of the story he 
tells remains credible.  Society assigns major responsibility to particular persons to be 
primary guardians of particular children; in our society, biological parenthood is one way, 
perhaps a generally acceptable way, to assign these bundles of rights and responsibilities 
that are conventionally identified with parenthood (1996: 381). 
Neil Levy and Mianna Lotz (2005) go further still.  They agree that the significance of blood ties 
is only conventional, but that it is a convention that we ought to try to change, since it tends to 
marginalize blended and adoptive families.  All of this differs sharply, of course, from the view 
that has predominated in Western thought.  To select but one representative, we find 
Montaigne—who lost all but one of his children in infancy—reflecting that:       
If there is truly a Law of Nature – that is to say, an instinct which can be seen to be 
universally and permanently stamped on the beasts and on ourselves (which is not 
beyond dispute) – I would say that, in my opinion, following hard on the concern for self-
preservation and the avoidance of whatever is harmful, there would come second, the 
love which the begetter feels for the begotten (Essays, II.8, p. 434). 
How are we to account for this sea-change?  Part of the explanation, as I have already 
intimated, arises from a desire to hold an inclusive conception of the family that encompasses not 
just the traditional “biological” family, but also families where children are not genetically 
related to one or both of their social parents.  We have also become more sophisticated about 





used to make power relations seem inevitable.  In part, this is due to anthropological researches.  
In part, it is due to feminist challenges to masculine idealizations of maternity.  Simone de 
Beauvoir assures us that closer attention to women’s voices will reveal that “no maternal 
‘instinct’ exists: the word hardly applies, in any case, to the human species.  The mother’s 
attitude depends on her total situation and her reaction to it [and] this is highly variable” (1952: 
511).  But even if there were natural feelings that parents felt for their biological children, we 
have become skeptical that they would have any normative significance.  As we observed in a 
previous chapter, natural law thinkers held, as Aquinas puts it, that “those things to which man 
has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good” (ST: I-II, Q.94, 
a.2).  But most modern philosophers are more likely to endorse Mill’s view that there are bad 
instincts, as well as good, and that “Conformity to nature has no connection whatever with right 
and wrong,” and the conviction that it does has led to “false taste, false philosophy, false 
morality, and even bad law” (“Nature,” CW, X: 400, 373). 
 In the next chapter, I turn to Hegel’s account of the family, which, as we shall see, has much 
in common with the intimacy-based approaches we have just considered.  But it also has much to 
contribute, not least in shedding light on the connection between biological and moral 





Chapter 10:  The Affective Family in Modern Society 
10.1 Introduction:  The Relevance of Hegel 
In this chapter, I discuss Hegel’s conception of the family, its role in shaping future members 
of modern society, and the ways that the parental role can be a fulfilling part of a complete life.  
The chapter’s premise is that a Hegelian account of the family is well suited to capture and 
integrate the more attractive ideas about the moral basis of parenthood that we have come across 
in the last four chapters.  Before I delve into the details of this interpretation, let me offer an 
overview as to the general shape Hegel’s integration of these ideas will take.   
Like Locke, Hegel resists any temptation to assimilate parental rights to property (see 
Chapters 6 and 8).  But whereas Locke (especially in the Second Treatise) tends to speak of the 
goal of moral education as the task of instructing the child in the law by which he is to govern his 
actions, Hegel provides a much more nuanced account of different aspects of rightful action: of 
abstract legal right, of inward morality, and of our associated lives in modern institutions.  It is 
not that Locke had no notion of these subtleties, as his educational treatise makes evident.  But it 
is Hegel’s contribution to have provided a useful framework for organizing these ideas.  Hegel 
also has a more modern view of the relationship between parents and other agencies, like 
schools, in raising children.  For Locke, educators are merely the hired agents of parents, and 
understandably he foresaw no role for the government in this sphere.  But Hegel insists that the 





in some cases.  In this way, the state takes on some of the characteristics of a “universal family” 
(PR: 239). 
Although Hegel does not think of parental rights on a contractual model as, for instance, 
Hobbes did (see Chapter 7), Hegel does help us better understand why modern philosophers have 
sometimes been attracted to that position; namely, because we are resistant to the idea that we 
should be governed by some power alien to our will.  The animating principle of the modern 
world, as Hegel sees it, is that we ought to be governed by law and yet obey only our own will 
(cf. Rousseau, SC: I.6).  While contract is one way to obey a law that is not alien to our will, it is 
not the only way.  We may also identify with the law to which we are subject.  Thus, the love and 
trust that the child has for his parents play an essential role in making it possible for the child to 
internalize their rules and expectations and eventually make them his own.  Moreover, if these 
rules are rational, then as an adult, the individual will be able to look back at his childhood and 
endorse his parents’ rules—at least on the whole—as consistent with his will as an adult.  
Therefore, there is something to the intuitions of the contract model; it is just that it fails to see 
that the origins of personal freedom lie in the intimate, solidary relationship of the family—not in 
a contractual relationship between independent individuals. 
Hegel is indeed our contemporary insofar as he both makes affective relationships central to 
his account of the family and emphasizes not just the duties of parents, but the contributions that 
parental roles can make to the lives of adults.  This contrasts sharply with the tenor of 
seventeenth-century philosophers—even in the case of Locke, who was in many ways ahead of 
his time in his thinking about the family.  But Hegel’s account also has virtues that are missing 
from recent intimacy-based theories, which we explored in Chapter 9.  First, his account of 





raising children.  Second, the richer account of the formative tasks of the family reveals some of 
the different aspects in which parenthood can be a rewarding role for people.  Third, because 
Hegel approaches the parent-child relation through the romantic love of the parents, he helps us 
understand the relationship between the different kinds of intimate relationship in the family.  
Fourth, Hegel suggests why the blood relation may contribute to the intimacy of the family as 
well as provide a model on which non-biological parent-child relations may be patterned.  Rather 
than either taking biological facts as inherently normative, or treating them as mere brute facts, 
Hegel, I shall claim, seeks to “spiritualize,” or humanize, our biological nature and raise it to 
ethical significance.  In this way, Hegel seeks to reconcile our natures as natural and moral 
beings.  If Hegel is right, then, there is a sense in which Grotius was on to something when he 
sought to found the moral authority of parents on generation (see Chapter 6)  
The primary respect in which Hegel’s account of the family will be unsatisfactory to us today 
concerns the rigid gender roles he assigns mothers and fathers.  Even, here, however, Hegel’s 
theory is of interest, in that it at least helps us single out different ways in which the family can 
contribute to a rewarding life.  We may want to think that both men and women can participate 
in “motherhood” and “fatherhood,” as Hegel understood those roles.  And yet, at the same time, 
Hegel does force us to ask ourselves whether we can really pull off that amalgamation of roles 
without endangering the interdependent solidarity of the family unit. 
Ultimately, this chapter is more in the spirit of a rational reconstruction of a compelling 
Hegelian account than that of pure historical exegesis.  Like many sympathetic interpreters of 
Hegel’s social thought, my reading deemphasizes Hegel’s systematic metaphysical ambitions, 
and tries to find various ways of democratizing and naturalizing his views.  And throughout, I 





than seeking the more dispassionate reading of the serious historian.  Nevertheless, I have 
endeavored to be mindful of the difference between Hegel and a compelling Hegelian account, 
and to this end I have sought to make it apparent in those places where I am going beyond, or 
contrary to, Hegel’s texts. 
∴ 
Because Hegel approaches the parent-child relation through the romantic and conjugal love 
that parents have for one another, I begin with a discussion of Hegel’s views on the nature of 
modern marriage (10.2).  This may seem like an unnecessary digression from our main subject, 
but I shall be arguing (especially in 10.3.B) that Hegel correctly recognizes a close connection 
between the “inwardness” of companionate marriage based on romantic love and the ethical 
character of the modern parent-child bond.  In order to bring the originality of Hegel’s picture of 
marriage and the family into relief, I shall draw liberally on other writers, especially Locke, 
Montaigne, Kant, Aristotle, and Simone de Beauvoir.  After an initial discussion of the relation 
between parents and children, as well as that between husbands and wives (10.3), I turn to a 
discussion of the formative tasks of the family in the upbringing of children (10.4).  This, as I’ve 
already intimated, serves two purposes.  In part, it enriches the Lockean account by providing a 
more nuanced view of the educational goals of the family.  But it also brings into focus some of 
the different ways that parenting can be a fulfilling role for adults.  Finally, in the last section, I 





10.2  Nature, Contract, and Love  
A) The marriage contract 
To appreciate Hegel’s conception of marriage, and how it influences his conception of the 
parent-child relation, it is useful to contrast Hegel’s view with that of the older natural law 
tradition.  For a philosopher like Locke, marriage was understood primarily in natural, 
instrumental, and contractual terms.  First, man and woman come together out of natural sexual 
impulse.  The typical result is procreation, but this is not ordinarily the intention of the mother 
and father.  The propagation of the race is the design of Nature, or God, and we human beings 
participate in it simply by pursuing our own appetites.   As Locke puts it:    
What father of a thousand, when he begets a child, thinks farther than the satisfying his 
present appetite?  God in his infinite wisdom has put strong desires of copulation into the 
constitution of men, thereby to continue the race of mankind, which he doth most 
commonly without the intention, and often against the consent and will of the begetter 
(2T: I.54). 
Now all mammals come into the world needing the care of their mothers, who are naturally 
attached to their young.  In grazing species, mothers can typically provide this care without any 
special contributions of the male, because she can find food for herself while nursing.  But in 
animals that must hunt and gather their food, like many species of birds and carnivores, the 
mother often needs the help of her mate.  Nature provides for this as well by implanting in these 
animals a certain attachment between mating pairs which lasts as long as necessary in order to 
raise the young (2T: II.79).  Since human beings come into the world extremely helpless and 
have a very long childhood, man and woman must stay together even longer than mating pairs in 





passion, but a tendency to form a more enduring affectionate attachment to our mates.1  So 
Locke recognizes the existence of conjugal love, but it is instrumentally subordinated to the 
purpose of rearing children.   
 In the lower animals, natural impulses and attachments ordinarily suffice to keep male and 
female for as long as is necessary (II.80).  But because human beings have freedom of the will, 
and do not act from instinct alone, we must be guided by law (II.57).  Therefore, man and 
woman do not rely on affection alone, but make conjugal agreements in order care for their 
mutual offspring.  The whole position is summed up most concisely in the following passage:        
Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman: and though it 
consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one another’s bodies, as is necessary to 
its chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual support, and assistance, and a 
communion of interest too, as necessary not only to unite their care, and affection, but 
also necessary to their common offspring, who have a right to be nourished and 
maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves (2T: II.78). 
Because the chief end of marriage is procreation and education of the young, there is no reason 
why matrimonial contracts “may not be made determinable,2 either by consent, or at a certain 
time, or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts,” so long as the 
interests of any children are secured. 
∴ 
                                                          
1 There is a long and mostly unconvincing criticism of this part of Locke in note 12 of Rousseau’s Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality.  Rousseau wants to argue that, in the state of nature, man and woman would not have formed 
any lasting attachments and would have separated immediately after copulation.  While Rousseau rightly insists on 
the distinction between moral love and physical desire, he fails to appreciate (at least in this instance) that there is 
also a difference between loving attachment and romantic love.  Part of the problem (as Rousseau half recognizes) is 
that the very idea of human beings in a historical state of nature is incoherent, since it is natural for human beings to 
live in groups mediated by convention.   





Characteristically, Hegel thinks this picture is not so much wrong as one-sided—particularly 
for his own time.  Of course, there are natural, instrumental, and contractual aspects to the 
formation of families, but these for Hegel must be understood in their connection to the spiritual, 
non-instrumental, and institutional aspects.   
Hegel would agree with Locke that biological drives and the developmental needs of children 
form the natural foundation of the family.  Basic to Hegel’s picture is a natural drive for the 
feeling of unity with another, which underlies the human sentiment of love (EN: 369; PR: 158A).  
In its most basic, biological form, this desire for unity underlies the sex drive, which exists in all 
animals (EN: 368).  In mammals and birds, mothers (and in some species, fathers) also have this 
feeling of unity with their young offspring (EN: 370A, pp. 425-426).3  Now, from our 
perspective, most of Hegel’s philosophy of nature is admittedly overly metaphysical and 
rationalistic: He wants to account for why nature necessarily had to be the way that it in fact is, 
and he is unwilling to accept anything as a brute fact.4  For this reason, Hegel’s attempt to 
explain why the sex drive and maternal affection exist is unlikely to be of much interest to us 
except from a historical perspective.5  But that notwithstanding, there is, I think, little 
objectionable in his basic understanding of the drives to which we are subject as animals. 
                                                          
3 Although I do not find Hegel expressly saying so, he at least ought to agree with Locke that the tie between fathers 
and their offspring, where such exists, is at least originally mediated through the father’s enduring attachment to the 
female, since otherwise the father would not be around for the birth of his offspring.  (Indeed, this helps account for 
why, even amongst human beings, there is considerably more cultural variation in fatherhood than in motherhood.) 
4 Thus: “thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing the necessity of its facts” (EL: 1). 
5 In order to explain the sex drive, he writes, “the individual as a singular does not accord with the genus immanent 
in it, and yet at the same time is the identical self-relation of the genus in one unity; it thus has the feeling of this 
defect.  The genus is therefore present in the individual as a straining against the inadequacy of its single actuality, 
as the urge to obtain its self-feeling in the other of its genus, to integrate itself through union with it and through this 





Hegel would also agree with Locke that, as rational creatures, mature human beings do not 
act upon instinct or impulse alone.  Because we are able to represent our impulses to ourselves, 
we are able to stand back from them and resolve ourselves against acting as we are immediately 
inclined (EM: 473-478; PR: 4 ff.).  And because we are capable of communicating our 
representations to one another through language (EM: 459), we are capable of making practical 
intelligence external and collective, in that we can coordinate our activity with one another by 
means of laws and agreements (EM: 485-486).      
But Hegel would say that Locke jumps too quickly from the idea that the human family is 
always structured by rules and agreements to the historically contingent idea of marriage based 
on a free contract between the parties.  This is indeed typical of the spirit of the modern age, but 
Hegel recognizes that in other times and places, kinship laws have been arranged differently and 
yoked to various other ends.  In some societies, for instance, parents might arrange their 
children’s marriages for their own social, economic, or political ends, without consulting the 
individuals concerned (PR: 162A).  Or a man’s wife and children may be regarded as his 
property, which may even be purchased or sold to others (PH: 286-287; PR: 43R, 175R).  But in 
the modern world, we recognize “the right of the subject’s particularity to find satisfaction” or 
“the right of subjective freedom” (PR: 124; cf. 261A).  This means that there is a general demand 
that the institutions under which we live as men and women be, in some sense, expressions of 
our individual wills—not alien impositions.  Social contract theory is one manifestation of this 
modern spirit: that we be subject only to a government to which we consent (PR: 258).  Marriage 
as a voluntary contract between the parties is another.   
Hegel breaks from Locke in a more significant way when he insists that marriage, at least in 





I might enter into a bargain for any number of motives, and I am typically more interested in 
simply finding someone who will hold up his side of the bargain than in my partner’s particular 
personality.  And there have been times and places where marriage has been like that as well.  
Marriages might be made for all kinds of reasons:  for political connections, for social 
advancement, to engage in sex without sin, to avoid becoming an old maid, to acquire a helpmate 
in running the farm, to acquire children or heirs, and so on (PR: 162A).  And all of these motives 
would be free of any social disapproval, so long as one followed through on one’s duties as a 
husband or wife.  For Montaigne, writing in late sixteenth-century France, this is one reason why 
friendship of the highest sort is almost impossible in marriage: although marriage is freely 
contracted, “it is a bargain struck for other purposes; within it you soon have to unsnarl hundreds 
of extraneous tangled ends, which are enough to break the thread of a living passion and to 
trouble its course, whereas in friendship there is no traffic or commerce but with itself” (Essays, 
I.28, p. 209).  This is not to say that, in such periods, husbands and wives did not feel tenderness 
and affection for one another.  It is only that romantic love was not understood to be either 
essential to marriage or a moral precondition for entering into it.  
Hegel thinks that we moderns take a much more puritanical attitude toward marriage.  At 
first, this is surprising.  You might have thought that the spirit of subjective freedom would have 
led us to believe that everyone should feel free to marry for whatever reasons they like.  But, 
instead, we insist that marriage has to be entered into with the right motive—that of true love.  
As Hegel puts it, “In modern times … the subjective origin of marriage, the state of being in 
love, is regarded as the only important factor.  Here, it is imagined that each must wait until his 
hour has struck, and that one can give one’s love only to a specific individual” (PR: 162A).  This 





consists “chiefly in a … right in one another’s bodies, as is necessary to its chief end, 
procreation.”6  To us, this seems crude.  We are more likely to agree with Hegel’s view that sex 
is, at its best, but an external expression of the love that spouses have for one another.  From a 
truly human, or spiritual, perspective, marriage in the modern world is supposed to have no end 
beyond the love that two individuals have for one another.  Children may be the culmination of a 
marriage, but marriage is not for procreation (164 + R).7   
This is an important part of the explanation as to why Hegel does not follow Kant in treating 
of marriage and family alongside property and contract.  Kant was innovative in sharply 
separating his discussions of law and rights from that of morality in the Metaphysics of Morals.  
As he saw it, although one can act within one’s rights regardless of motive, one’s action has 
genuine moral worth only if it is performed from the motive to do one’s duty for its own sake.  
Hegel follows Kant in distinguishing between external or “Abstract Right” and the realm of 
conscience or “Morality.”  But Hegel thinks that, unlike property and contract, which are 
concepts of abstract or external right, the family cannot be understood without bringing to bear 
some of the “internal” concepts of morality, like intention and happiness.  For Hegel, then, 
marriage and family are partially akin to Kantian morality, in that these are relationships that 
                                                          
6 This sounds like Kant’s view—viz., that “sexual union in accordance with law is marriage …, that is, the union of 
two persons of different sexes for lifelong possessing of each other’s sexual attributes” (MM: 6:277)—but in fact it 
is very different.  For Locke, marriage exists for the sake of children.  Kant, on the other hand, is closer to holding 
St. Paul’s view:  “that it is better to marry than to burn.” (1 Cor. 7:10).  For Kant, marriage exists in order to make 
sex, which is morally problematic, permissible.  Procreation may be “an end of nature,” Kant says, but it is not 
essential to marriage.  Ultimately, then, Hegel’s view is more akin to Kant’s than Locke’s, in that it is concerned 
with the ethics of sex.  However, instead of dwelling on the idea that sex is immoral outside of marriage, Hegel 
argues that the ethical significance of sex can only be fully realized in marriage.  For Kant, sex within marriage is 
not wrong; for Hegel, it is good.  
7 Thus, Hegel’s conception of marriage is well-suited to the expansion of the institution to include same-sex couples.  
This is in contrast to modern natural law theorists who continue to stress the centrality of procreation—cf. Finnis 





must be undertaken with the right motives, and for no end beyond themselves.8  By attempting to 
handle marriage as a part of external right, which may be performed for any motive, Hegel thinks 
that, like Locke, Kant “debased” the institution and reduced it to a mere “contract entitling the 
parties concerned to use one another” (PR: 161A).  This does not mean marriage and family are 
merely moral categories for Hegel.  As we shall see later on, they have a social, external 
character that cannot be fully captured by the individualistic categories of morality either.  
B) Love and recognition 
But why does Hegel think that romantic love has become central to the modern family?  And 
how has that affected the relationship between parents and children?  To understand this, we 
need to say more about Hegel’s understanding of the nature of love.  We have already seen that, 
in its more primitive forms, animals too experience a drive for unity.  But Hegel thinks that, in 
human or spiritual terms, this drive for unity has a different and deeper significance—namely, 
that it satisfies our need for recognition.   
Hegel’s central discussion of recognition is, of course, the “struggle for recognition” dialectic 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit (166-196).  But it would be out of place here to enter into an 
extended discussion of that complex passage and its implications for our subject matter—indeed, 
this is a task made particularly difficult given that Hegel denies that the struggle for recognition 
exists in its pure form outside the state of nature (EM: 432A).  Instead, I want to simply describe, 
in a somewhat breezy manner, the nature of the desire for recognition in ordinary life. 
                                                          
8 Fichte makes the same point even more clearly: “Philosophers have felt obliged to explain what the end of 
marriage is and have answered the question in very different ways.  But marriage has no end other than itself; it is its 





Unlike most animals, human beings have a highly developed capacity to imagine how things 
look to others, and how something would look to ourselves, differently situated.  This ability to 
distance ourselves from our own immediate perspectives is what allows us to make the 
distinction between reality and appearance.  Within practical cognition, this perspective-taking 
permits us to make the distinction between what is desired and what is desirable, which is to say, 
between what merely seems good and what is really good.  Hegel believes that once a subject has 
made that distinction, he cannot but want what is really good, what there is reason to want.  I 
may want my own arbitrary will to be an authoritative reason for me, but that is not the same as 
not caring about what there is reason to do.  This is the basis of our capacity to value things as 
opposed to merely desiring them.   
Now the perspective of other subjects is potentially disturbing, because their ideas about 
what is true and good may conflict with my own, and in this way, challenge the objective 
authority of my perspective.  Moreover, to know that I and my perspective objectively matter at 
all, I am bound to think about how I appear in the viewpoint of others.  This is why I seek the 
recognition of my reality and worth in the eyes of others.  The need for recognition can be 
glimpsed in its most primitive form in children, who immediately seek the recognition of their 
parents for any small achievement.  Without that recognition, the child cannot take satisfaction in 
his accomplishment, as it isn’t yet real for him.  Although the recognition we need as adults is 
typically not so direct or immediate, the basic need does not go away.  As Hegel sees it, we are 
only real and valuable to ourselves insofar as we exist for another (PS: 178).  Alone we feel 





But this need for the recognition of others appears to come at a great cost, for it seems to 
imply that we cannot truly be free, or self-determining.9  Instead, we appear to be condemned to 
exist for ourselves only by existing for others.  As Rousseau puts it in the Discourse on the 
Origins of Inequality, in such a state, the individual is “always outside himself and knows how to 
live only in the opinion of others”; it is “from their judgment alone that he draws the sentiment of 
his own existence” (1997: 187).  But this need for the recognition of the other puts us in the 
power of another, for now I depend on his approval.  And this suggests that, in a very deep way, 
the modern demand for individual freedom in society is impossible to satisfy.  As Rousseau 
seemed to suggest pessimistically in the Discourse on Inequality, freedom appears possible only 
in the personal independence and isolation of the state of nature.  The solution to this problem, 
according to Hegel, is to identify with the other who recognizes me.  To identify with another, in 
this sense, is to conceive of the other as a part of myself.  And love is the most immediate and 
intense form of such identification—although, as we shall see, it is not the only form.  In Hegel’s 
words, “The first moment in love is that I do not wish to be an independent person in my own 
right” (158A).   
Now the idea of identifying with another through love or affection is familiar enough.  
Aristotle, for instance, says that a person relates to his true friend as he relates to himself; a 
friend is another self.  And so, my desire that my friend fares well is not like my goodwill toward 
perfect strangers, but more like my desire for my own well-being.10  There is a particularly 
moving portrait of such identification in Montaigne’s essay “On Friendship”:   
                                                          
9 Freedom, in its broadest sense, is “the absence of dependence on an Other,” or—to say the same thing—to be 
limited and determined by nothing external to oneself, to be self-determined (EM: 382+A; PR: 7, 23). 





What we normally call friends and friendships are no more than acquaintances and 
familiar relationships bound by some chance or some suitability, by means of which our 
souls support one each other.  In the friendship which I am talking about, souls are 
mingled and confounded in so universal a blending that they efface the seam which joins 
them together so that it cannot be found.  If you press me to say why I loved [my friend], 
I feel that it cannot be expressed except by replying: ‘Because it was him: because it was 
me’ (Essays I.28, pp. 211-212).  
Or, again, Freud observes that “At the height of being in love the boundary between ego and 
object threatens to melt away.  Against all the evidence of his senses, a man who is in love 
declares that ‘I’ and ‘you’ are one, and is prepared to behave as if it were a fact” (1961: 13).   
The gloss that Hegel would put on this last idea—that of being prepared to behave as if I and 
my beloved were one—is twofold.  First, as Aristotle suggests, the well-being of the beloved 
becomes a part of my well-being (PR: 125).  Second, another part of my well-being now 
becomes the well-being of my relationship with the beloved.  That is, it becomes important to 
me, not only that I and my beloved fare well, but that we fare well together.  In this way, the 
relationship is not just a casual relation, like that of the parties in a mutually advantageous 
business contract; the relationship has its own life and substance, of which I experience myself as 
a part (PR: 159).  Being in the grip of this love, I do not want to become the person who could be 
happy without my relationship with the beloved.  Someone might say, “But we are assuming you 
would be just as happy separated as you are now.  What, then, could be bad about that?”  The 
lover replies, “If I were happy separate from my beloved, then that would not be me.”11 
                                                          
11 There is some difficulty in understanding the proper sense in which I would no longer be me if I ceased to care 
about what I now care about.  Does the lover really believe that in such a case there would be no continuity of his 
personal identity?  That seems like an exaggeration.  A better way of understanding this language is as talk about my 
practical identity.  If I ceased to care about what I now care about, then my life would be organized according to 
different principles, and I would be a different person in the way that Paul was a different man than Saul had been.  





Now, as Hegel sees it, by seeking recognition in someone with whom I identify in this way, I 
put myself in the power of another who is not alien to myself.  “Just as Adam says to Eve: ‘You 
are flesh of my flesh and bone of my bone, so does spirit say: ‘This is spirit of my spirit, and its 
alien character has disappeared’” (PR: 4A).12  Therefore, I get to have it both ways.  My worth as 
an individual is affirmed through the recognition of another, and yet, in virtue of my 
identification with the other, I remain wholly “with myself.” Therefore, being dependent on 
nothing that is alien to myself, I become self-determining—or free.  This being with oneself in 
another is the “concrete concept of freedom” which we feel immediately “in friendship and 
love” (PR: 7A).   
However, to really have it both ways, it is necessary that my individual identity is not wholly 
lost in the union; my individuality is preserved and transformed in the union.  As Hegel put it in 
an early writing, “the separate still remains” in love, but now “as something united.”13  In love, 
my individuality is preserved in that the other loves me as a particular, concrete person, who in 
turn needs me, and needs my love and recognition (PR: 162A).  Thus, “The second moment of 
love is that I find myself in another person, that I gain recognition in this person, who in turn 
gains recognition in me” (PR: 158A).  Because my individuality is not wholly effaced in love, 
Hegel might be a little wary of some of Montaigne’s talk of a total blending of souls.  After all, if 
identification led to a perfect unity, then we would no longer be a “we” at all—but only an I.  
Then presumably we would be back to where we started and in need of external recognition and 
                                                          
12 Although this quotation captures the present idea perfectly, I have taken it slightly out of context.  Hegel is 
actually describing the way in which mind’s rational comprehension of something (e.g., a part of nature or society) 
removes its alien character: “it is only when I think that I am with myself, and it is only by comprehending it that I 
can penetrate an object; it then no longer stands opposed to me.” 





validation all over again.  In a genuine “we,” there is a unified plurality—not a perfect unity.  
This is essentially an Aristotelian idea.  In the Politics, Aristotle disapproves of the notion he 
attributes to Aristophanes, according to which “lovers, because of their excessive friendship, 
want to grow together and become one instead of two.”  The result of that, Aristotle maintains, 
would be that “one or both [of the lovers] has necessarily perished” (Politics II.4, 1262b10-15).  
This is as if, recognizing that a harmony or rhythm were a kind of unity, one were to then 
conclude that the most beautiful harmony is a single note, or the most engaging rhythm a single 
beat (Politics II.5, 1263b33—35). 
C)  Amitié and amour 
But the kind of “love” implicated in the desire for recognition does not, at first blush, seem to 
have much to do with romantic or sexual love—Montaigne’s amour.  For Aristotle and 
Montaigne, the highest kind of affection is “friendship-love,”—amitié in Montaigne’s 
vocabulary.  Such friendships may exist in marriage, these philosophers allow, but they are 
usually not friendships of the most perfect kind.  The highest friendship, because it is a form of 
identification, is between equals, but man and woman are naturally unequal (NE: VIII.5, 7, 12; 
Essays I.28, p. 210).  For Montaigne, amour is not even a kind of amitié:   
You cannot compare with friendship the passion men feel for women, … nor can you put 
them in the same category.  I must admit that the flames of passion … are more active, 
sharp and keen.  But that fire is a rash one, fickle, fluctuating and variable; it is a feverish 
fire, subject to attacks and relapses, which only gets hold of a corner of us.  The love of 
friends is a general universal warmth, temperate moreover and smooth, a warmth which 
is constant and at rest, all gentleness and evenness, having nothing sharp or keen.  What 
is more, sexual love is but a mad craving for something which escapes us…. As soon as it 
enters the territory of friendship (where wills work together that is) it languishes and 





And yet Hegel takes romantic and conjugal love to be the paradigmatic form of “recognitive” 
love (cf. PS: 456).  Why?  There are, I believe, two parts of the explanation. 
One reason why amour is the highest form of love for Hegel can best be brought out by 
further contrast with Montaigne.  Montaigne, as we have seen, doubts that there can be true 
friendship between husband and wife.  In part, this is because, in Montaigne’s world, marriage is 
seldom entered into for the sake of the other person; it is “bargain struck for other purposes.”  “In 
marriage, alliances and money rightly weigh at least as much as attractiveness and beauty.  No 
matter what people say, a man does not get married for his own sake: he does so at least as much 
(or more) for his descendants, for his family.  The customary benefits of marriage … concern our 
lineage” (Essays III.5, p. 959).  Montaigne is also skeptical that women are capable of the same 
depth of friendship as men.14  And yet, because the “perfect friendship” is one in which 
“everything is common,” one in which each friend “grieves that he does not have several souls, 
several wills, so that he could give them all to the one he loves,” it seems to Montaigne like a 
blunder of creation that the union of souls should always be separated from the union of the 
flesh:        
If it were possible to fashion such a relationship, willing and free, in which not only the 
souls had this full enjoyment but in which the bodies too shared in the union – where the 
whole human being was involved – it is certain that the loving friendship would be more 
full and more abundant  (Essays I.28, p. 210, emphasis added). 
Hegel starts from a similar premise: “love is indignant if part of the individual is severed and 
held back as a private property.”15  But for Hegel, romantic love makes possible this complete 
                                                          
14 “Women are, in truth, not normally capable of responding to such familiarity and mutual confidence as sustain 
that holy bond of friendship, nor do their souls seem firm enough to withstand the clasp of a knot so lasting and so 
tightly drawn” (Essays I.28, p. 210). 





union of body and soul—a companionship in which nothing is held back.  This is a form of 
friendship that was unavailable to Montaigne. 
For this reason, Hegel would also disagree with Kant’s contention that sexual “ardor has 
nothing in common with moral love properly speaking, though it can enter into close union with 
it under the limiting conditions of practical reason” (MM: 6:426).  Where Kant sees animal, 
sexual passion and spiritual, moral love as two distinct affections, which may be combined, and 
whereby moral love governs and limits sexual passion, Hegel understands moral love to be the 
“truth” of sexual passion, the implicit end after which sexual passion strives, and in which 
sexuality is completed (PR: 163-164; EM: 397).  That is, in pleasure, I make myself aware of 
myself and as existing for myself; I feel myself to be alive (cf. PS: 360 ff.).  In sex, I seek this 
pleasure through physical contact with another sensual being that feels me.  This is already a sort 
of incipient recognition.  I feel myself to be alive as I am felt to be alive by another.  But this is 
only a “recognition” (if it can be called such) of me as a living thing, and yet I also desire to be 
recognized as a person or subject.  And this is precisely what love is, the emotional mutual 
recognition of two subjects.16  This, I believe, is an important aspect of Hegel’s thought to which 
we will return in the parent-child relation.  Hegel neither wants to treat conjugal union as a 
purely natural relationship, nor as a purely spiritual one.  He wants to show how the spiritual 
relationship is founded on and transforms the natural relationship (PR: 161+A).  In this way, 
Hegel rejects Kant’s pronounced dualism between our animality and humanity (cf. MM: 6:387); 
                                                          
16 Kant, perhaps, came closest to holding a similar view when he described, in another context, the physical beauty 
of nature as a visible symbol of morality.  See Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 351 ff.  Montaigne comes 
closest to Hegel’s view when he quotes Cicero on love: “Love is the striving to establish friendship on the external 





instead, Hegel seeks to reconcile our animal and spiritual natures, by showing how spirit 
transforms and yet preserves our animality.  
The second reason why amour is the highest form of love for Hegel is due to its intense 
exclusivity.  Ordinarily we are tolerant of our friends having friends other than ourselves.  True, 
we can feel jealousy for a friend’s attention, especially when we feel that our affection for him is 
greater than that we receive in turn.  But too much of that kind of jealousy we regard as 
pathological.17  And it is not unusual for close friendships to exist between three or four people 
who usually associate with one another as a group.  But jealousy seems much more inherent in 
romantic love.  Amour, as opposed to lust, seems prone to fix on the particularity of a single 
person, and then to elevate the worth of that person, perhaps unrealistically, in comparison to all 
others.  And, as Rousseau observes, “one wants to obtain the preference that one grants”: we 
want our own virtues to be compared with and valued above those of all others in the eyes of the 
beloved (Emile, Bk. IV, p. 224).18  Surprisingly (given the nature of her relationship with Sartre), 
Beauvoir makes a similar argument: “No doubt fidelity is necessary for sexual love, because the 
desire felt by two people in love concerns them as individuals; they are unwilling for this to be 
contradicted by experiences with outsiders; they want each one to be irreplaceable for the other” 
(1952: 445-446, emphasis added).  We might think of romantic love, then, as the cult in which 
the individual is worshipped—indeed, where the individual seeks his own worship.  But 
paradoxically the lover does so by seeking to renounce his individuality in union with the 
                                                          
17 This is why, I think, Montaigne’s description of his friendship with Etienne de La Boëtie strikes us as bordering 
on the erotic: “The perfect friendship which I am talking about is indivisible: each gives himself so entirely to his 
friend that he has nothing left to share with another” (Essays I.28, p. 215). 





beloved (158A).19  The argument, therefore, is that amour becomes the highest form of love for 
moderns like Hegel, because it is the kind of affection that most fully recognizes “the right of the 
subject’s particularity to find satisfaction” (PR: 124), the right of the individual to be first and to 
be exalted above others—or, to put it in Rousseau’s vocabulary, the right of comparative self-
esteem, of amour propre.20 
10.3  The Affective Family 
A) Companionate marriage 
And yet, how can it be reasonable to found a family on amour, if amour, as so many 
philosophers attest, cannot last long between two people.  “I know of no marriages which fail 
and come to grief more quickly,” Montaigne asserts, “than those which are set forth on foot by 
beauty and amorous desire.  Marriage requires foundations which are solid and durable… The 
boiling rapture is no good at all.”  And later he adds: “it is against the nature of amour not to be 
impetuous, and it is against the nature of what is impetuous to remain constant” (Essays III.5, pp. 
959, 1001).  I believe that part of Hegel’s position has to be a reconceptualization of what amour 
is.  Hegel, admittedly, does not have that much to say on this head, so it would be a little 
                                                          
19 Narcissism appears to be a pathological deviation from romantic love, in which, roughly, the subject seeks to 
recognize herself through the eyes of the lover, but is little interested in recognizing the other as a subject in his own 
right.  If this is correct, then we would expect narcissism to become more prominent in cultures more devoted to the 
cult of romantic love. 
20 I find Lawrence Stone (1977) to offer an excellent description of modern individualism in the sense that is integral 
to amour:  
Individualism is a very slippery concept to handle.  Here what is meant is two rather distinct things: firstly, 
a growing introspection and interest in individual personality; and secondly, a demand for personal 
autonomy and a corresponding respect for the individual’s right to privacy, to self-expression, and to the 
free exercise of his will within limits set by the need for social cohesion… Because these are now such 
familiar tenets of Western society, they should not be taken for granted.  They are culturally determined 
values, which most societies in the world have despised or deplored, and which most still do.  Normally, 
individualism is equated with narcissism and egocentricity, a selfish desire to put one’s personal 





presumptuous to say that I am merely articulating Hegel’s view.  Rather, I shall describe the sort 
of reconceptualization that I think is necessary if one is to hold, with Hegel, that the modern 
family should be based on romantic love.    
For Montaigne, amour is essentially sexual infatuation: it is a “feverish fire”: “rash, fickle, 
fluctuating, and variable” (Essays I.28, p. 209).  It is not, however, merely lust or sexual arousal.  
Mere sexual arousal (especially for men, it seems) is not that particular in its object; it can be 
quite casual.  A man may be sexually aroused by one woman, and satisfy his desire with another.  
Sexual infatuation, on the other hand, like friendship, is focused on a particular person and is not 
so easily transferred at will.21  It seems difficult to deny that sexual infatuation is, indeed, like a 
short-lived fever.  Therefore, there is something to Montaigne’s view that a marriage based on 
sexual infatuation is bound to be in trouble, unless it is soon replaced with the much cooler 
relationship of friendship—albeit, a friendship that is unlikely to be of the highest kind.22  
Hegel—and I think we—carve up our emotional lives in a different way.  We think of sexual 
infatuation as, at its best, the opening act of romantic love.  The less feverish, but possibly much 
deeper, loving-companionship that comes later comprises its later acts. 
                                                          
21 Thus:  
“As for me, I no more know Venus without Cupid than motherhood without children: they are such things 
whose essences are interdependent and necessary to each other.  So such cheating splashes back on the man 
who does it.  The affaire costs him hardly anything, but he gets nothing worthwhile out of it either….I 
rarely lent myself to venal commerce with prostitutes…because I despised it.  I wanted to sharpen the 
pleasure by difficulties, by yearning and by a kind of glory.”  And elsewhere: “A good marriage (if there be 
such a thing) rejects the company and conditions of Cupid: it strives to reproduce those of loving-
friendship.” (Montaigne, Essays III.3, pp. 930-931; III.5, p. 961). 
22 Cf. Mary Wollstonecraft:  
“Friendship is a serious affection; the most sublime of all affections, because it is founded on principle, and 
cemented by time.  The very reverse may be said of love.  In a great degree, love and friendship cannot 
subsist in the same bosom; even when inspired by different objects they weaken or destroy each other, and 
for the same object can only be felt in succession.  The vain fears and fond jealousies, the winds which fan 
the flame of love, when judicially or artfully tempered, are both incompatible with the tender confidence 





But now, you will wonder whether we and Montaigne are simply talking past one another.  If 
that is indeed what we are doing, then Montaigne would seem to have the better view, since it 
seems to have a stronger claim to having carved nature at its joints.  What, other than a will to 
self-deception, could justify calling these apparently different feelings by the same name?  As 
Montaigne puts the accusation:   
Those who think to honor marriage by associating passion with it are like those (it seems 
to me) who to promote virtue hold rank to be none other than a virtue: there is some 
cousinship between rank and virtue but great differences as well; there is no gain in 
confusing their names and title-deeds: we wrong them both by confounding them in that 
way” (Essays III.5, p. 959). 
To parry this charge, Hegel will have to maintain that the loving companionship of enduring 
romantic love does not simply replace the more intense and transitory feeling of sexual love, but 
that the two are somehow of a piece.  It must be argued that true romantic companionship cannot 
develop except from the germ of sexual ardor, and perhaps as well, that something of sexual love 
is preserved in the later acts of the romantic relationship.  Such an argument might go something 
as follows. 
First, romantic infatuation forms in the lover’s mind the idea that he cannot be happy without 
this particular individual, the beloved.  Further, this infatuation leads the lover to seek out the 
particular virtues of the beloved and to compare them favorably to others.  In this way, romantic 
infatuation fixes in our minds the special particularity of this one individual, and, when all goes 
well, this forms the basis of the attitude of cherishing the person of the beloved—an attitude that 
is more durable than the first fever of infatuation.  This attitude in turn inspires in us ethical 





realizing or sustaining.23  A romantic infatuation that understands itself to be merely provisional 
seems incomplete or half-hearted.  But the insufficiency of infatuation is not merely because it is 
fleeting; it also has a tendency to be superficial.  Sidgwick, for instance, has a useful distinction 
between the more unreflective forms of love and rational benevolence:  
Love is not merely a desire to do good to the object beloved, although it always involves 
such a desire.  It is primarily a pleasurable emotion, which seems to depend upon a 
certain sense of union with another person, and includes, besides the benevolent impulse, 
a desire of the society of the beloved: and this element may predominate over the former, 
and even conflict with it, so that the true interests of the beloved may be sacrificed (1907: 
244). 
Because infatuation inspires in us ideals of benevolence, respect, and so forth, it leads us on to a 
deeper, if less passionate, relationship that is adequate to the task. Therefore, just as the natural 
sex impulse draws us upward to the spiritual feeling of romantic love, so too does the feeling of 
romantic love draw us upward to a committed relationship that binds us with ties that are 
stronger than transitory feelings.  And, therefore, as sex is incorporated in but subordinated to 
romantic infatuation, romantic infatuation is incorporated in but subordinated to the committed 
ethical relationship of matrimonial companionship (PR: 163+A).   
Of course, marriage is not merely romantic love—whether infatuation or loving-
companionship.  Love is a feeling, whereas marriage is a commitment, the general contours of 
which are shaped by prevailing custom and law.  The claim, then, must be that the loving-
companionship of the later acts of romantic love cannot exist without commitment.  The ethical 
ideals of loyalty, trust, and respect require commitment to flourish.  If we did not commit 
ourselves to those we love, then we would be holding something back from them; indeed, we 
                                                          
23 As Rousseau puts it, “A heart full of an overflowing sentiment likes to open itself.  From the need of a mistress is 





would be holding back our humanity, our capacity to resolve our will and rise above mere 
inclination.  But we do not create the terms of this commitment from nothing: to a greater or 
lesser extent, we use existing social forms as models (cf. Raz 1986: 308-33, 391-395).24  This 
accounts for the institutional character of marriage.25  One effect of this institutionalization is to 
supply external social incentives and sanctions for remaining true to our commitments—
although, sometimes to a degree that is undesirable (cf. Neuhouser 2008: 170-171).   
Because marriage is fundamentally a loving commitment, Hegel says that it “should be 
regarded as indissoluble in itself” (163A).  This does not mean that the commitment of modern 
marriage must endure a genuine change of heart.  If we were unconflicted creatures, whose 
feelings and desires always led in one direction or another, then commitments of any sort might 
be unnecessary.  But that, of course, is not our nature.  If we are to satisfy some of our wants, 
then we have to resolve ourselves not to act on wants that are incompatible with them.  Marital 
commitments are resolutions of this sort: an identification with some of our wants and feelings, 
and a decision to cut others off from us as outlaws (cf. Frankfurt 1988a).  This also involves a 
certain amount of character planning: a resolution to attend to and foster those feelings and 
                                                          
24 This is why social conservatives are not completely irrational in thinking they have something at stake in the 
public recognition of same-sex marriage.  As Gallagher (2004) observes, since “social meanings are encoded in [the] 
law… [e]ither the legal incidents of marriage will be designed around opposite-sex sexual reality, or they will be 
designed around the allegedly more generic ‘gender neutral’ same-sex sexual reality.  In either the case, one of the 
two groups is going to find the ‘fit’ between legal form and the relationship being regulated is not as good” (58).  
Gallagher’s remark is only inaccurate in drawing the line between same-sex and opposite-sex couples; the real 
division is between couples committed to strongly gendered conceptions of marriage, and those committed to a more 
gender-neutral social form. 
25 Many philosophers and legal theorists have held that marriage and family are “creations” or “products” of legal 
enactment.  Cf. Russell (1929): 204; Olson (1983); Okin (1989): 130-131; Nussbaum (2000): 252-264.  While there 
is some truth to that view, it is ultimately one–sided and misleading.  Mill is closer to the truth when he remarks that 
“Laws and systems of polity always begin by recognizing the relations they find already existing between 
individuals” (SW: I, ¶ 5 / CW, XXI: 264).  Laws do have a certain conservative force in giving official public 
recognition to certain existing social forms, but the law rarely creates those social forms whole-cloth.  Although I do 
not agree with the substance of her argument, Gallagher (2004) is correct when she says that “Marriage law helps 
sustain the core pubic (as opposed to private or sectarian) understandings of what marriage is and what purposes it 





desires that we identify with, and to avoid situations that would inflame the outlaw desires.  But, 
whatever it once meant, there is no reason to think that modern marriage must be a commitment 
to remain together where the spouses are permanently estranged from one another in their 
affections (PR: 176).  This is similar to our modern attitude toward religious commitment.  We 
think it reasonable for a believer to make a commitment to attend church every week, whether he 
feels like going or not, but generally unreasonable to make a commitment to attend even if he 
should one day cease to believe.  Unlike medieval theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, we do 
not think that apostates should be compelled to return to the church for “backsliding” on their 
commitment to God (ST: II-II, Q. 10, a.8).   
B) Love of children 
In contrast to most previous philosophers, Hegel explicitly approaches the relationship of 
parent and child through the romantic relationship of the man and the woman.  Whereas Locke 
sees the love between man and woman as instrumental for the purposes of the care and 
upbringing of children, Hegel sees children as an expression or culmination of the love that the 
man and woman have for one another; in his words, as “the objective and concrete form of their 
union” (PR: 175A).   
This should be understood as a part of a larger trope of “externalization” in Hegel’s 
philosophy, whereby “inner” aspects of personality are only first or fully recognized by the 
subject in external “objects” that somehow bear the stamp of that personality.  For example, in 
the famous dialectic of Lord and Bondsman from the Phenomenology of Spirit, the bondsman 
becomes conscious of what he truly is—the master of his own desires, and thus, a being with a 
mind and will of his own—through his disciplined work on an external object.  Thus, the 





stamp of his own activity (PS: 194-196).  For similar reasons, in his discussion of property in 
The Philosophy of Right, Hegel argues that persons need private property, an external sphere of 
freedom, in order to take the first steps toward becoming reasonable, responsible beings (PR: 
41+A).  Just as individuals seek a sense of themselves in their work, the couple seeks a sense of 
their union in external things.  Hegel notices that this phenomenon is already at work in the 
couple’s attitude toward common property, especially in the couple’s home.26  But in the child, 
the couple sees their union in a “spiritual form,” in another human being, who they “love as their 
love” and who can return that love.  “In the child, the mother loves her husband and he his wife; 
in it, they see their love before them” (PR: 173+A).  The child, then, is at least one way that the 
man and woman preserve something of their sexual intimacy with one another in the 
companionship of marriage.  
At first, this might seem like the wrong attitude for parents to take up toward their child.  
Beauvoir, for example, criticizes parents who narcissistically look upon their children as if they 
were their doubles or alter egos, and try to project their personalities wholly upon them, when in 
fact each child is an independent subject, not a tool for the fulfillment of parental needs (1952: 
512, 522).  It would seem the case stands no differently when a couple projects the image of their 
union upon the child.  But there is a more charitable way of looking at this.  What the parents 
are, in effect, doing is extending the individualistic affection of romantic love to the child.  Just 
as modern marriage is based on the love that two “infinitely unique” individuals have for one 
another’s particularity, so the modern family extends that recognition of individuality to the child 
by including the child in the couple’s love story.  This is not just some child; this is the child that 
                                                          
26 Beauvoir observes that “The ideal of happiness has always taken material form in the house, whether cottage or 
castle; it stands for permanence and separation from the world.  Within its walls the family is established as  a 





you and I have brought into the world together.27  Cultures which base matrimony on different 
concerns tend to also take different attitudes toward the child.  Where marriage was primarily a 
pragmatic partnership for running a household or farm, children were often regarded as an 
additional source of labor.  Where lineage was of the highest importance, the child (especially 
the son) was an heir and a continuation of the family name.  Where marriage was understood to 
exist to control the sinful passion of sex, the fruit of that union is likely understood to be born in 
original sin, whose will must be broken by stern and unrelenting discipline.28  The cult of the 
individual nourished by romantic love, on the other hand, now embraced the child as possessing 
his or her own particular character that is infinitely unique and worthy of being cherished and 
developed for its own sake.29 
There is another, albeit closely related, connection to draw between romantic love and the 
intimacy of the parent-child bond.  I characterized Hegel’s view of romantic love as a form of 
                                                          
27 Stone (1977) illustrates one aspect of the modern recognition of the child’s individuality in changes in certain 
naming practices in modern England.  Prior to the later eighteenth-century, a child might be given the name of a 
deceased sibling, or a younger son might be given the same name as the eldest living son, in case he should die.  For 
example, “Edward Gibbon records that after his birth in 1737, ‘so feeble was my constitution, so precarious my life, 
that in the baptism of my brothers, my father’s prudence successively repeated my Christian name of Edward, that, 
in case of the departure of the eldest son, this patronymic appellation might still be perpetuated in the family.’”  But 
this practice died out during the same period as the ascendency of romantic love, “indicating a recognition that 
names were highly personal and could not be readily transferred from child to child” (409).  
28 Cf. Stone (1977): “Because of this [sixteenth-and-seventeenth-century] conviction of the innate sinfulness of the 
child, the only solution seemed to be to crush his will.  For the child was both the hope of the future – the 
embodiment of parental ambitions to create a generation of virtue and godliness that would presage the Second 
Coming – and, at the same time, the negation of all such aspirations, the incarnation of Original Sin, the victim from 
birth of the manifold and endless temptations of the Devil.  Puritans in particular, therefore, were profoundly 
concerned about their children, loved them, cherished them, prayed over them and subjected them to endless moral 
pressure.  At the same time they feared and even hated them as agents of sin within the household, and therefore 
beat them mercilessly” (175). 
29 Perhaps in reaction to the permissiveness of Rousseau’s Emile, Hegel himself often stresses the importance of 
discipline and obedience.  For example: “One of the chief moments in a child’s upbringing is discipline, the purpose 
of which is to break the child’s self-will in order to eradicate the merely sensuous and natural” (PR: 174+A; cf. EM: 
396A).  But this must be read alongside the passages in which Hegel stresses the importance of the family circle 
embodying love, care, and trust.  In any case, it would not be surprising if the new spirit of the sentimental family 





friendship in which the whole human being—body and soul—is involved in the union.  This has 
a dual significance.  On the one hand, the ethical relationship of marriage is a spiritualization of 
the sex drive and a culmination of the aspirations it inspires in us. On the other hand, sexual 
union is a kind of visible symbol or manifestation of the loving friendship.  Something similar is 
at work in the parent-child bond.  As mammals, we have a natural tendency for affection toward 
our biological offspring.  This natural affection has been spiritualized—raised to a higher ethical 
level—in the modern attitude of cherishing the individuality of this particular child.  And yet, the 
physical relation between parent and child—the ability to see oneself, as well as one’s partner, in 
the features and traits of the child—is retained as a symbol and external manifestation of the 
ethical unity of the family.  (Although Hegel thinks that, in the ideal case, the blood tie binds the 
mother, father, and child, there is no reason to think that a similar tie cannot exist between just 
one parent and the child—at least, once the culture has come to recognize the great value of the 
parent-child relation.)    
This picture has important implications for thinking about the fundamental interest of parents 
to raise their biological children.30  Throughout the chapters of Part II, we have been wrestling 
with the question as to what ethical significance, if any, generation might have.  Grotius, recall, 
held that parents acquire their rights over children by generation, while Hobbes scoffed that it 
was far from obvious what I have begotten is mine.  Various philosophers have wondered 
whether parental rights might be akin to the rights of producers, or even analogous to the rights 
of God over his Creation (see Chapter 6).  But many contemporary philosophers have 
downplayed the importance of biological relations compared with social and moral ones.  For 
                                                          
30 It is a fundamental right in that it is a right the parent holds in her own name (see 8.6.B).  It is a prima facie right 





example, as we observed in Chapter 9, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift (2006b) argue that 
adults have an interest in assuming the role of parent, because it is a fulfilling form of 
relationship which is quite unlike intimate relationships with adults.  But they say they know of 
no good argument for thinking that adults have an interest in raising their own biological 
children; apparently raising any child would do just as well.31   
My argument is that when we look at the modern parent-child relation as the spiritualization 
of the natural affection that mammals have for their offspring, this stark separation between 
biological and social parenthood loses much of its appeal.  One sign of this is that there are 
individuals who have little interest in being a parent in the abstract (the child may be an 
“accident”) but, given that they actually have a biological child, have a strong desire to raise and 
have a relationship with that child.  Given that there is already someone out there who is 
physically a part of himself, the biological parent has a strong desire to form a human 
relationship with this child.  Otherwise, he will feel as if he has lost a part of himself. 
Some philosophers deny that there can be any special ethical significance in raising one’s 
biological children, since all of the ethical values of biological parent-child relationships can also 
exist in the adoptive variety (Levy and Lotz 2005).  One reply to this is that this is because 
adoptive relationships are consciously modeled on natural families (Page 1984).  It is hard to 
imagine what families would be like if we did not rely on natural affection as the basis for the 
larger social institution.  For instance, Levy and Lotz argue that “there is no reason why an 
adopted child cannot be considered the physical expression of a couple’s love for one another, in 
a sense that is just as real as [a biological child]” (2005: 245-246).  That may be so, but it is hard 
                                                          
31 They do not expressly deny that biological parents have an interest in raising their offspring; only that they can 





to believe that this idea would be available for adoptive parents to appropriate were there no 
families based on natural ties.  Moreover, if there were nothing valuable about raising one’s own 
child, then one would be indifferent as to whether one left the hospital with one’s own newborn 
or that belonging to another couple.  This seems to express an indifferent attitude toward the 
child’s individuality, which is wholly antithetical to the spirit of the modern family.32 
The fundamental claim, then, is that if adults have interest in having an intimate relationship 
with children, then they surely also have an interest in having an intimate relationship with their 
own biological children.  Not only is the modern parent-child relationship a spiritualization of 
the natural affection of parents for their offspring, but it is a valuable basis for and expression of 
that intimacy.  But let me be clear: there is no reason to think that valuing the special form of 
intimacy that is possible between biological parents and children denigrates the value of adoptive 
relationships.  After all, to say that there is a valuable form of sharing and mutual giving in 
modern marriage that was absent in the friendship between Montaigne and La Boëtie is not to 
denigrate that relationship either.   
C) Mothers and fathers 
To this point, I have for the most part been speaking generically of “parents.”  But for Hegel 
there are important differences in the way that motherhood and fatherhood fit into a complete 
life.  We want to understand why Hegel thinks parenthood is gendered and how integral that is to 
                                                          
32 It is sometimes pointed out that there have been other cultures, like the Romans, who placed relatively little 
importance on the blood tie.  But, at least in the case of the Romans, this was symptomatic of the fact that what was 
important was not the individual child, but carrying on the family name.   Cf. Veyne (1987): “The ‘voice of blood’ 
spoke very little in Rome.  What mattered more was the family name.  Bastards [were] forgotten by their fathers…. 
Adoption could prevent a family line from dying out….Children who were moved about like pawns on the 






his larger view.  The place to begin, I think, is with the relation between the family and the larger 
social order.  In modern society, the family exists alongside the economic sphere (i.e., civil 
society), and the state.  Therefore, an important part of Hegel’s task is to show two things: (i) 
that all three major institutions can respect the individual’s right to subjective freedom—that is, 
the individual’s right to be subject only to institutions that are expressions of his will; and (ii) 
that these institutions can exist in harmony with one another, without irreconcilable conflict.   
The general nature of institutional conflict is perhaps best exemplified in Hegel’s reading of 
Antigone.  After the death of Oedipus, one of his sons, Eteocles, assumes the throne of Thebes, 
but his brother Polyneices believes that the throne should be his instead.  Polyneices attacks the 
city and both brothers are killed in the combat.  Their uncle, Creon assumes power and orders 
that Eteocles is to be given a proper burial, while the traitor Polyneices is to be denied burial 
rites.  But Antigone, the sister of Eteocles and Polyneices, feels bound by familial piety to 
oppose Creon and to ensure that both brothers receive a proper burial.  When she is caught, 
Creon sentences Antigone to death.  For Hegel, the tragic character of this story consists in the 
fact that both Antigone and Creon are acting in accordance with the duties they most identify 
with.  Antigone identifies with the divine law that holds the family unit together through the 
reverence of the dead, while Creon identifies with the human law that holds the larger 
community together (PS: 444-476).  Hegel understands this, as Terry Pinkard puts it, to be a 
“discord within Greek culture itself, between the two ethical powers that the Greek form of life 
recognizes as essential to itself: the divine law and the human law, embodied in the different 





Hegel that the Greek culture was not rational on its own terms.33  The question is whether 
modern society is any more rational, or whether it also contains deep internal contradictions.  
Indeed, the potential for contradiction seems particularly great, given the increased complexity of 
modern society; for now civil society has emerged as a distinct sphere of activity separate from 
the family and the state.  In particular, many have worried that the individualistic character of the 
market economy is corrosive to the solidary relations constitutive of both the family and political 
community.    
The heart of Hegel’s attempt to reconcile these three spheres of human activity is to show 
that participation in all three spheres of life is essential to the full development of modern 
personality (cf. Neuhouser 2000: 140).  By participating in productive activity in the economy, I 
develop skills that are useful to and appreciated by others.  I thereby simultaneously manage to 
earn an income to satisfy my personal desires and to “become somebody” in the eyes of the 
world.  And by earning esteem and recognition for my contributions and achievements, I become 
somebody in my own eyes as well (PR: 207, A).  I also earn recognition for being a loyal and 
dutiful citizen.  The general form of these duties is that of sacrificing my particular well-being 
for the good of the country.  In the extremity, this means risking, or giving, my life for my 
country in war (PR: 325-327).  But in more everyday circumstances, it might involve the 
willingness to pay taxes and the willingness to meet other reasonable citizens halfway when our 
particular interests conflict for the good of the community (PR: 324, 309).  By identifying with 
the country, I can perform these duties with the same kind of unalienated satisfaction that I take 
in take in doing my duties in my family and in my work (149, 261,R). 
                                                          
33 I have benefited much from Pinkard’s whole discussion of this passage from the Phenomenology.  See especially 





The three primary sources of recognition in the modern world—love as a family member, 
esteem as a contributing member of society, and respect as an equal member of the larger 
community—are complementary and not interchangeable with one another.  Someone without 
intimate relationships is likely to lack a sense of his intrinsic worth as an individual.  For that 
reason, he may lack the motivation to seek esteem, or alternatively, pursue that esteem to 
unhealthy excess.  Someone who does not make himself useful to others through work is likely 
to lack a sense of having made anything out of himself, of having accomplished something of 
value to others.  And someone without any attachment in his larger political community lacks a 
stake in something larger and more enduring than himself and his narrow circle of concerns.  
Hegel’s claim is that the modern social order is rational insofar as these forms of recognition are 
complementary parts of an integrated modern selfhood.34 
Given this picture of the modern self, it is somewhat surprising that Hegel denies that women 
have a direct role to play in civil society or the state.  The woman has her sole vocation in the 
family; instead of seeking to prove herself as an individual through struggle with the external 
world, her ethical disposition consists in a feeling of unity with her family.  Her work consists 
largely in ensuring that this feeling of intimate unity is available to the other family members as 
well (PR: 164A, 166).  One may ask how, on Hegel’s premises, women were supposed to find 
satisfaction for her own particularity in such a world.  Of course, this was essentially the social 
world that existed in Hegel’s time.  Philosophically, then, he was faced with a choice.  He could 
argue that the gendered family was inconsistent with the modern spirit of subjective freedom and 
must eventually give way—that, as Mill will later put it, “the social subordination of women … 
                                                          





stands out as an isolated fact in modern social institutions; a solitary breach of what has become 
their fundamental law; a single relic of an old world of thought and practice exploded in 
everything else” (SW: I, 16; CW, XXI: 275).  Or he could argue that, despite superficial 
appearances, the gendered family was indeed rational.  Hegel opted for the second course.   
As for the exclusion of women from civil society (and public office), Hegel undoubtedly 
understood this as a part of the division of labor.  As production is carried out on a larger scale, 
the primary site of production moves outside of the household.  Household work and childcare, 
on the one hand, and primary production, on the other, are both time-consuming occupations, so 
it is rational for a man and woman to divide these tasks amongst one another (cf. PR: 198).  
Setting aside woman’s alleged natural unsuitability for work outside the home, it does seem 
almost inevitable that, under such conditions, women should take on the domestic role, since it is 
women who undergo pregnancy, give birth, nurse, and are perhaps more naturally suited to care 
for young children.35  Even more egalitarian thinkers, like Wollstonecraft and Mill, who thought 
that women ought to be allowed to pursue professions or public office, nonetheless understood 
that this would usually be an alternative to marriage and motherhood—a choice men were not 
forced to make.36  Hegel may have even understood the separate spheres of man and woman to 
be a sign of their fundamental equality.  Where man and woman share the same sphere, as was 
the case when the home was still the primary site of production, then (so the reasoning goes) one 
spouse must inevitably be subject to the other.  Only by giving woman her own sphere can she 
                                                          
35 At least as Hegel undoubtedly assumed.  See PR: 175A.  
36 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, ch. IX, ¶¶ 21-30 / 1995: 237-240; Mill, SW: IV, ¶ 21 / 





acquire a sphere of autonomy.  Tocqueville, Hegel’s contemporary, attributed this outlook to 
Jacksonian America:  
America is the one country where the most consistent care has been taken to trace clearly 
distinct spheres of action for the two sexes and where both are required to walk at an 
equal pace but along paths that are never the same…. Thus Americans do not believe that 
man and woman have the duty or the right to perform the same things but they show the 
same regard for the role played by both and they consider them as equal in worth 
although their lot in life is different (DA: II.2.xii, pp. 697, 699). 
Why, on Hegel’s view, women should be excluded from ordinary political participation (as 
opposed to pursuing a political vocation) is harder to understand—that is, until it is recalled that 
Hegel imagines that political representation is mediated by one’s membership in one of the 
estates of civil society.  Additionally, Hegel probably assumed, like James Mill, that wives have 
the same political interests as their husbands, and that they were already virtually represented.37  
Hegel would presumably say that women do gain a kind of recognition in civil society and in the 
state as the wives of men who directly participate in those spheres.  Finally, even if Hegel hadn’t 
thought that women were naturally unsuited to the affairs of state, he might have thought that 
activity in civil society was a necessary formative experience to be prepared for political activity.  
Because the domestic vocation of women encouraged them to rely on their emotion and 
intuition, they might be unsuited to thinking rationally and critically about political issues (PR: 
166A; PS: 475)38  
Allen Wood suggests that Hegel might have understood the separate spheres of man and 
woman to have a still deeper significance.  The problem is that if women took on the same 
                                                          
37 James Mill, “On Government,” ch. 8, p. 27. 
38 J.S. Mill makes an argument for woman’s suffrage that, as we shall see shortly, should be congenial to Hegel, and 
which grants the present premise: that is, even if the ethical disposition of women is prejudiced in some ways, that 
one-sidedness may help balance out the equal and opposite one-sidedness of the ordinary ethical disposition of men 





individualistic ethical disposition as men, then the solidarity of the family would suffer (1990: 
244-246).  At the end of his monumental The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England 1500-1800, 
Lawrence Stone permits himself some remarks on the twentieth-century family that illustrate this 
sentiment well:  
Group life, as in a nuclear family, … involves a trade-off between the demands of 
collective affect [and] intimacy…, and those of personal privacy and autonomy for its 
individual members…. Since [today] self-fulfillment is the chief goal to which all else 
has to be sacrificed, couples with marital problems now divorce without giving much 
thought to the consequences on the psychological stability not only of themselves and 
their spouses but also of their young children.  Similarly, mothers of very young children 
put their jobs before their duties as wives and mothers, sometimes with equally damaging 
consequences to their marriage and their children (1977: 685).     
As an interpretation of Hegel, this reading gains credibility given that Hegel also supposes that in 
a rational social order, the different estates of civil society will have specialized ethical 
dispositions.  That is, while the ethical disposition of the agricultural estate is based on the 
interdependence of family life, the civil service identifies with the universal interest of the state, 
and the estate of trade and industry identifies most with the individualistic and self-reliant spirit 
of civil society (PR: 203-205).  Presumably the idea here too is that the stability of the social 
order requires that each of the three spheres of society needs its partisans—particularly in the 
Estates General (cf. PR: 301-302).  On this analysis, the same is true of the family.  Out of 
necessity, the family must be integrated into the larger economy, but if it is to retain it substantial 
character against the centrifugal forces of civil society, then that solidarity needs one of the 
spouses to be its special champion. 
∴ 
Of course, Hegel’s vision of the relation between husband and wife is one that is no longer 





least, it seems inevitable that women would seek the same opportunities for self-realization and 
recognition as modern society afforded to men.  The Hegelian case against Hegel’s conception of 
woman’s social role was put most forcefully by Beauvoir in The Second Sex, from which it is 
worth quoting at some length: 
[W]oman’s work within the home gives her no autonomy; it is not directly useful to 
society, it does not open out on the future, it produces nothing.  It takes on meaning and 
dignity only as it is linked with existent beings who reach out beyond themselves, 
transcend themselves, toward society in production and action.  That is, far from freeing 
the matron, her occupation makes her dependent on husband and children; she is justified 
through them; but in their lives she is only an inessential intermediary.… Woman is not 
allowed to do something positive in her work and in consequence win recognition as a 
complete person.  However respected she may be, she is subordinate, secondary, 
parasitic.  The heavy curse that weighs upon her consists in this: the very meaning of her 
life is not in her hands.  That is why the successes and the failures of her conjugal life are 
much more gravely important for her than for her husband; he is first a citizen, a 
producer, secondly a husband; she is before all, and often exclusively, a wife (1952: 
456).39  
From a more practical point of view, insofar as the woman is economically dependent on her 
husband, she finds it difficult to exit a bad or abusive marriage, and her power within the family 
reflects this dependence (Okin 1989: ch. 7; Mill, SW: II, ¶ 9 / CW, XXI: 291-292).  This 
considerably vitiates the ideal of the separate but equal spheres of man and woman.   
Even more damning, Beauvoir argues that, insofar as women are denied the opportunities for 
transcendence and recognition available to men, they are not particularly good at their assigned 
roles of mother and wife.  “The great danger which threatens the infant in our culture, lies in the 
fact that the mother to whom it is confided in all its helplessness is almost always a discontented 
                                                          
39 Cf. Mill: “All women are brought up from the very earliest years in the belief that their ideal of character is the 
very opposite of men; not self-will, and government by self-control, but submission, and yielding the control of 
others.  All the moralities tell them that it is the duty of women, and all current sentimentalities that it is their nature, 
to live for others; to make complete abnegation of themselves, and to have no life but in their affections” (SW: I, ¶ 





woman.”  She feels herself socially inferior and “has no independent grasp on the world or on the 
future.”  As a consequence, “She will seek to compensate for all these frustrations through her 
child” (1952: 513).  This can lead to a variety of pathologies, but the one that is particularly 
damaging to Hegel’s view is the maternal refusal to let her child grow up.  Having felt needed, 
respected, justified, and authoritative only as a mother, the woman encourages the child’s 
dependency and obstructs the child’s attempt to depart from the family as a self-sufficient 
individual (519).  Having been taught to value nothing but the substantial unity of the family, it 
is unsurprising if she cannot appreciate the importance of children striking out on their own.  
Likewise, because woman does not experience herself as a subject in her own right, because she 
is asymmetrically dependent on her husband, she cannot provide that reciprocal recognition that 
Hegel attributes to conjugal love (247).  The drive for recognition may lead a man to marry and 
raise a family, but it is largely the approval of other men he is seeking (426).  As Beauvoir sees 
it, only when woman concretely affirms her status as subject through own activities and projects 
can she become the companion for man that Hegel wanted her to be:  
Genuine love ought to be founded on the mutual recognition of two liberties; the lovers 
would then experience themselves both as self and as other: neither would give up 
transcendence, neither would be mutilated; together they would manifest values and aims 
in the world.  For the one and the other, love would be revelation of self by the gift of self 
and enrichment of the world (667). 
Mill had made a similar argument:  “Intimate society between people radically dissimilar to one 
another, is an idle dream.  Unlikeness may attract, but it is likeness which retains; and in 
proportion to the likeness is the suitability of the individuals to give each other a happy life” 
(SW: IV, ¶ 15 / CW, XXI: 333). 
Finally, and most ironically, it is not even clear that Hegel’s conception of the family 





society, a society only encourages woman’s identification with the family and alienation from 
the state and its larger goals.  In the Phenomenology, Hegel describes womankind as “the 
everlasting irony [in the life] of the community,” who “changes by intrigue the universal end of 
the government into a private end, transforms its universal activity into a work of some particular 
individual, and perverts the universal property of the state into a possession and ornament for the 
Family” (PS: 475).  Setting aside questions about the historical accuracy of that claim, one may 
ask how political loyalties can but seem unreal compared to those of the family for a person 
confined to the domestic sphere.  The reflective woman in such a condition may well deny any 
allegiance to a state built by men and for men; she may conclude, with Virginia Woolf, that “as a 
woman, I have no country.  As a woman I want no county” (1938: 109, cf. 78). 
Beauvoir’s indictment of the historical station of women can, at times, come across as 
unreceptive to what was good in the world we have lost.  Or it may seem unbalanced, 
deprecating all that has traditionally been feminine while glorifying the masculine world in spite 
of “its possessiveness, its jealousy, its pugnacity, its greed” (Woolf 1938: 74).40  Indeed, one 
occupational hazard of social criticism is the failure to appreciate the ways that meaningful lives 
can be lived within worlds that seem to the critic oppressive, unenlightened, or unjust.  In doing 
so, the critic appears to assert that any happiness in that world was but false consciousness, and 
to invalidate the lives of those who learned to feel at home and to thrive in the social 
environment that it was their lot to inhabit.  We should beware of this pitfall, as it bespeaks a 
                                                          
40 This led Virginia Woolf to a deep ambivalence about the situation of women: “We … are between the devil and 
the deep sea.  Behind us lies the patriarchal system; the private house, with its nullity, its immorality, its hypocrisy, 
its servility.  Before us lies the public world, the professional system, with its possessiveness, its immorality, its 
pugnacity, its greed.  The one shuts us up like slaves in a harem; the other forces us to circle, like caterpillars head to 
tail, round and round the mulberry tree, the sacred tree, of property.  It is a choice of evils.  Each is bad.  Had we not 
better plunge off the bridge into the river; give up the game; declare that the whole of human life is a mistake, and so 





certain shallowness of insight into the human condition.  Almost all societies have their charms 
as well as their pathologies.  What is called for, then, is a certain balance of perspective—but we 
must not forget that social criticism is an essential part of that balance.      
∴ 
Of course, more than social criticism was necessary to effect the emancipation of women.  
Birth control and legalized abortion has made it possible a woman to make pregnancy voluntary, 
to reduce the size of her family, and to make motherhood a “rationally integral part of her life” 
(Beauvoir 1952: 121).  Public education has socialized the rearing of children to a large degree.  
Household machines, cheap clothing, ready-made meals, and the microwave oven have greatly 
reduced the time required to feed, clothe, and clean up after the family.  These material and 
technological advances have made it increasingly possible for husbands and wives to share the 
tasks of family and civil society, in a way that was nearly impossible in the nineteenth century.   
And this has had the consequence not only of transforming the role of women in the public 
sphere, but of narrowing the differences between motherhood and fatherhood in the private.  The 
ideal father can no longer confine himself to the role of bread-winner.  He must increasingly take 
over a significant (if not yet equal) portion of the duties of child-care.  And, indeed, we find 
philosophers today arguing that fathers who fail to develop familiar and intimate relationships 
with their children have not only “failed to deliver on their obligations” as parents, but have also 
missed out on “fully flourishing lives” (Brighouse and Swift 2006b).41  Moreover, it seems 
reasonable to think that if women are to develop an ethical disposition that is partly directed 
                                                          
41 Brighouse and Swift take a rather absolutist line here:  they do not confine their verdict to contemporary society, 





toward individual self-fulfillment, then the solidarity of the family depends on husbands and 
fathers also developing an ethical disposition that incorporates the emotional feeling of familial 
unity that Hegel had attributed to women alone.  If part of the good life for women today is to 
include historically male activities and attitudes, then part of the good life men is going to have 
to include activities and attitudes that were historically female.  (Further, if men and women can 
both take on aspects of traditional motherhood and fatherhood, then there would seem to be no 
barrier to same-sex couples raising children—as of course many already do).     
Just how far this transformation of gender roles will go in the future is difficult to know.  On 
the one hand, Susan Moller Okin looks forward to a possible moral regeneration of society:  
Only when men participate equally in what has been principally women’s realms of 
meeting the daily material and psychological needs of those close to them, and when 
women’s participation equally in what have been principally men’s realms of larger scale 
production, government, and intellectual and artistic life, will members of both sexes be 
able to develop a more complete human personality than has hitherto been possible (Okin 
1989: 107).  
On the other hand, giving Hegel a sympathetic hearing, Wood observes that:  
[I]t is easy to agree with the platitudes that men should be more sensitive, women more 
self-confident.  But we have never really seen what human personalities would be like if 
they were not socialized through the traditional system of gender stereotypes.  We do not 
know what role gender differences might play in personalities balancing the substantial 
principle with the reflective (1990: 246). 
It would be unduly pessimistic, and anthropologically naïve, to think that the dichotomous 
gender stereotypes of nineteenth-century Western culture are immutable.  Many of us have 
witnessed in our own families how the character of father-child interactions have changed from 
one generation to the next.  Whether this will lead, as Okin hopes, to a future “without gender,” 
where “one’s sex would have no more relevance [in social practices] than one’s eye color or the 





“parent,” is more doubtful (Okin 1989: 171).  At least, that is my suspicion, if sexuality and 
reproduction are as fundamental parts of human psychology as they are in other mammal 
species.  But perhaps we are already entering a society in which gendered personality types are 
more loosely defined, permit greater individual interpretation, and tolerate more nonconformity.  
In that case, we would not be looking forward to a society in which each person might become a 
“complete exemplar of community,” but instead, a world where individuals are less one-sided 
than they once were and have more choices about the particular virtues they will contribute to 
their families and communities (cf. Rawls, TJ: §79; Hegel, PR: 207 + A). 
10.4  The Formative Tasks of the Modern Family 
A)  Origins and departures 
We now turn to Hegel’s account of the formative tasks of the family with respect to 
preparing children for modern life.  Hegel’s perspective in this respect is not wholly inconsistent 
with Locke’s, but he does have two contributions to make.  First, he has the resources for a more 
nuanced account of moral and social development, which is better attuned to the modern world.  
Second, whereas parenting for Locke is primarily conceived of as a duty, for Hegel, as a part of 
“ethical life” (or Sittlichkeit), parenting is at once a duty (that is, for those who have children) 
and an activity in which individuals find personal fulfillment (PR: 147-149).  This is a much 
more modern perspective, especially now with the advent of effective birth control.  Once 
becoming a parent was a natural and expected part of marriage.  Now it has become (at least 
potentially) a choice for couples to make.  In this way, Hegel’s perspective has much in common 





Hegel’s complex account of the cultivation of modern personality, of Bildung, also provides 
Hegel with the resources for a richer account of the intrinsically rewarding aspects of parenting.         
Much like Locke, Hegel insists that “children are free in themselves,” though, on account of 
their immaturity, they are not yet prepared to actually exercise that freedom for themselves.  
Because they are “born free” (as Locke would put it), children cannot be regarded as things that 
owned and used by their parents (PR: 175+R, 43R).  And for the same reason, the child does not 
remain under the authority of her parents after coming of age:  the family to which the child is 
born is merely her “original basis and point of departure” (PR: 177).42  This means that parents 
have a duty to prepare the child to leave the family as a free personality and enabled to become 
full member of society (PR: 175, 239).  In the Second Treatise, Locke explains this as the 
process of children coming to know the natural and customary law by which a person is to 
govern his actions (2T: II.6).  Hegel offers us, as I’ve said, a much more nuanced framework.  
On the Hegelian view, parents have a duty to see that their children are enabled to act as free 
agents with respect to each of the different moments in the “concept of right.”  That is, children 
are to be instructed to act in accordance with their external rights as persons (Abstract Right); 
their reflective capacities for conscience and value are to be fostered (Morality); and they are to 
be enabled to participate in the major institutions of the modern social order: as members of 
valuable intimate relationships, as productive and self-respecting contributors to the economy, 
and as dutiful citizens of a good state (Ethical Life).  These parental duties have a positive and 
negative aspect.  Positively, the parents have the task of making the child feel secure, loved, and 
valued.  Negatively, the parents have the task of raising the child out of her “natural immediacy” 
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by helping her to recognize her ability to stand above and judge amongst her inclinations and to 
be receptive to reasons (PR: 175).  Let us examine these in more detail.43     
B) ‘A circle of love and trust’ 
 The first and fundamental responsibility of parents is to raise the child from infancy within “a 
circle of love and trust” (PR: 175A).44  First, this is essential for a person to develop a basic 
sense of security in the world, since otherwise a person may be subject to chronic feelings of 
anxiety and fear as adults (cf. EM: 396A, p. 57).  Second, this permits the child to develop a 
sense of unity with others.  Without this, we will have great difficulty as adults experiencing 
intimacy with friends, lovers, or our own children.  Moreover, by forming affective bonds with 
other family members, we develop the capacity to empathize with others, which is essential to 
morality, and even to consider their welfare as a part of our own (cf. PR: 125).  The basic form 
of trust we develop in the family is also the basis for more impersonal forms of trust and 
reciprocity, such as that which underlies a sense of belonging to the political community (cf. PR: 
268).45  Burke was perceptive when he said that we begin by loving and trusting the “little 
platoon we belong to in society,” and that “this is the first link in the series by which we 
                                                          
43 Throughout sections A) and B), I have benefited from the discussion of Hegel’s view on the formative tasks of the 
family in Neuhouser (2000): 148-157. 
44 Can there be a duty to love someone?  Kant held that insofar as love is a feeling (as opposed to the practical 
attitude of benevolence), one cannot love at will.  And because “ought implies can,” there can be no duty to love 
(MM: 6:401; G: 4:439).  But even if we cannot instantaneously produce in ourselves a feeling of love for someone, 
it seems that we usually can take measures to foster that feeling over time.  Parents who do everything in their power 
to foster the feeling of love for their children, but find that they cannot, do not act wrongly.  In this sense, we can 
agree with Kant.  But all the same, they do not fulfill one of the fundamental role-obligations of parenthood.  
Because such individuals are not capable of fulfilling the parental role for their children, they are obliged to ensure 
that someone else can.  On duties to love, see Liao (2006) and Richards (2010): ch. 9.  Richards also has a 
discussion of the consequences of people who lack the capabilities to parent their children in Chapter 2. 
45 Although she never refers to Hegel, Morse (1999) has some insightful, albeit probably uncontroversial, things to 
say about the importance of familial love and attachment in early childhood for fostering the trust necessary for a 





proceed” to more public affections and loyalties, such as those for country and mankind 
(Reflections ¶ 75, 1987: 41).  The military allusion is appropriate:  armies have long recognized 
that the best way to make soldiers loyal to the army is to first make them loyal to a small “band 
of brothers.”    
    The unconditional love we receive from our parents is also crucial to developing a basic 
sense of self-respect or self-worth.  The child learns that he is valued for who he is by his 
family—for his “immediate individuality”—and that there is no danger of forfeiting that love 
(EM: 396A, p. 61).  This sense of self-worth is what enables us to appreciate that certain actions 
are unworthy of us and that we owe it to ourselves to make something of ourselves.  It also 
motivates us to seek the esteem of others in a healthy and measured way.  That is, when we enter 
school, and later begin work, we find that we are not loved merely for who we are, as we were in 
the family, but are now valued according to our achievements and contributions.  If I have a 
healthy conception of self-worth, Hegel suggests that I will feel as if the world does not yet 
recognize my true value, and I will be motivated to prove myself (EM: 396A pp. 61-62).  Of 
course, as the child begins school and takes his first steps into civil society, the family continues 
to provide support: for instance, by providing him a refuge of love and acceptance, when he 
comes home from school, and by encouraging the child to achieve in accordance with his 
abilities.  In these ways, the immediate love and trust we experience as children is the basis of 
participation in all of the major institutions of ethical life: of the family, civil society, and of the 
state (PR: 125). 
What Hegel leaves out of his description of the familial circle is as important as what he 
includes.  A certain measure of parental love and attachment for children is surely a cultural 





the feelings of intimacy, love, and trust.  Other periods and cultures have attributed more 
importance to the fear and reverence that a child should have for his parents.  For example, in 
contrast to the intimate, even saccharine, terms of endearment between parents and children 
(especially fathers and daughters) with which we are familiar from Victorian novels,46 Stone 
offers us the following excerpts from an early eighteenth-century book of etiquette, which 
admonishes children on the proper ways to show deference to their parents: 
3.     Never sit in the presence of thy parents without bidding, tho’ no stranger be present. 
… 
6.     Never speak to thy parents without some title of respect, viz.: Sir, Madam, etc. 
7.     Approach near thy parents at no time without a bow. 
 
Another of the most effective methods of socialization of the period, Stone continues, was to 
teach children “at a very early age, to be afraid of death and eternal damnation.”  “It was 
standard advice in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,” he explains, “to tell [children] to 
think much about death.”  For example, in 1694, a certain John Norris instructed children as 
follows: 
Be … much … in the contemplation of the four last things, Heaven, Hell, Death, and 
Judgment.  Place yourselves frequently upon your deathbeds, in your coffins, and in your 
graves.  Act over frequently in your minds the solemnity of your own funerals; and 
entertain your imaginations with all the lively scenes of mortality.  Meditate much upon 
the places, and upon the days of darkness, and upon the fewness of those that shall be 
saved; and be always with your hourglass in your hands, measuring out your own little 
span and comparing it with the endless circle of eternity (Stone 1977: 172-173). 
Continuous with this preoccupation with eternal punishment, whipping and flogging were the 
routine forms of discipline in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English homes (ibid, 176).  
Against this background, Locke is a very profoundly progressive educationalist, discouraging 
                                                          





frequent beatings as well as any attempt to frighten children with superstition or religion (STCE: 
47ff, 138).  But even he hardly ever mentions familial love without insisting that it be balanced 
and even preceded by filial awe:   
I imagine everyone will judge it reasonable, that their children, when little, should look 
upon their parents as their lords, their absolute governors; and, as such, stand in awe of 
them: and that, when they come to riper years, they should look on them as their best, as 
their only sure friends: and, as such, love and reverence them…. Fear and awe ought to 
give you the first power over their minds, and love and friendship in riper years to hold it  
(STCE: 41, 42; cf. 40-44 passim, 78-80, 95, 99, 107, 167 and 2T: II.67).  
The point is not that Hegel—nor we for that matter—think respect for parental authority 
unimportant.  Cultural patterns do not differ from one another in being completely unlike nearly 
so much as in which values and attitudes are given pride of place.  
Providing this circle of love and trust to children is, of course, not merely a duty; in 
performing this role, parents too realize a great good.  In much of life, for most of us, we know 
the world could very well get along without us.  Were we to disappear from the face of the earth, 
our positions would quickly be refilled, and our fellow citizens would never miss us.  But in 
caring for a child, the parent feels necessary.  Perhaps many parents never feel their existence so 
justified as when their child ceases to cry when put into their arms.  The sentiment may have a 
special quality in the case of one’s biological children—and for at least two reasons.  First, by 
valuing the child, I am able to value my own existence, since the child could not have come into 
the world without me.  Second, as the child’s biological parent, I am irreplaceable in a unique 
way.  Were I to vanish, the child might be fortunate enough to acquire a step-mother or step-
father, but she will never have another natural mother or father.  Perhaps this experience is best 
exemplified in the mother’s nursing of the child, for here the child literally draws its life and 





relation to the infant, we may also observe that, as the child grows older, the parent enjoys the 
privilege of the child’s spontaneous and unconditional love and trust for her.  This is a kind of 
love and trust that is seldom possible between adults, even in committed relationships like those 
spouses and partners.47  Indeed, part of what is wonderful about the child’s love is that it is so 
strong that commitment on his part is not only impossible, but quite unnecessary. 
Much of this intimacy, especially with young children, has traditionally been associated with 
the role of mothers.48  There are also rewarding aspects of attachment to the child that have been 
more traditionally been associated with fatherhood.  Men have often found greater meaning in 
their work, insofar as they know they are supporting their children.49  They have also often been 
inspired to take a more altruistic and selfless view regarding the future of their country—a 
phenomenon that is visible today in political discourse about both the environment and the 
national debt.  In these ways, attachment to one’s children actually deepens a person’s 
commitment to his other roles as worker and citizen.  As we have already observed, in our time 
the various forms of personal fulfillment traditionally associated with motherhood and 
fatherhood are increasingly available to both men and women.     
                                                          
47 This last theme is well captured by Brighouse and Swift (2006b): 93. 
48 Cf. Hegel: “In the period of infancy, the mother’s role in the child’s upbringing is of primary importance…” (PR: 
175A). 
And Montaigne: “I am incapable of finding a place for that emotion which leads people to cuddle new-born infants 
while they are still without movements of soul or recognizable features of body to make themselves lovable.  And I 
have never willingly allowed them to be nursed in my presence.  A true and well-regulated affection should be born, 
and then increase, as children enable us to get to know them; if they show they deserve it, we should cherish them 
with a truly fatherly love, since our natural propensity is then progressing side by side with reason; if they turn out 
differently, the same applies, mutatis mutandis: we should, despite the force of Nature, always yield to reason” 
(Essays II.8, p. 435). 
49 To choose an example almost at random, one may think of the dock-worker in On the Waterfront, who has found 






C) Bringing the rational to self-consciousness 
Free will and conscience:  The negative task of parents is to raise children out of their 
natural immediacy to consciousness of their wills and rational natures (PR: 174-175).  That is, 
the child must be enabled to stand back from his immediate inclinations, recognize his power to 
determine his will one way or another, to do so on the basis of reasons, and eventually on the 
basis of reasons that he himself reflectively endorses.50  In this way, the child’s will becomes 
more genuinely his own, and thus, freer and more distinctly human (PR: 10A).51  Parents pursue 
this task, at least initially, primarily through discipline and example.  The first effect of discipline 
is to give the child the sense of resisting his own inclinations in order to avoid punishment or 
disapproval.  By giving the child conflicting motives—e.g., “I want to write on the wall; I don’t 
want to get in trouble”—the parent helps the child gradually distinguish between his immediate 
wants and his capacity for choice.  The second effect is that consistently applied discipline leads 
the child to develop habits of good conduct.  In this way, the child comes to feel at home in what 
originally seemed like alien constraints, and his unruly desires lose some of their originally sharp 
and precipitate character (EM: 409-410).  Third, if the child loves and trusts his parents, then he 
recognizes their power and will as authoritative for him.  (In this way, establishing the bond of 
love and trust between parent and child—rather instilling awe and fear in the child—is, once 
more, fundamental).52   In recognizing the authority of his parents, the child comes to share his 
                                                          
50 See the discussion of the will in the Introduction of the Philosophy of Right, as well as §129ff. 
51 Schapiro (1999) develops a similar account within a Kantian framework.  See my 4.5.A for more discussion of 
this topic.     
52 Presumably, in a home where love and trust is lacking, a child might develop a sense of the power of his will over 
his immediate inclinations, without recognizing the authority of his parents and thereby without developing a sense 
of moral principles.  That, anyway, is one lesson one might draw from the dialectic of Lord and Bondsman in the 





parents’ attitude toward his own conduct, and eventually identifies with their norms as rational.53  
Similarly, insofar as the loving care of his parents inspires the child is to look up to them as 
superior beings, the child will emulate them, and thereby come to knowledge of rational ideals 
and virtues in the concrete character of their persons.54  In these ways, the child learns not only to 
resist his immediate natural self, but moral principles are implanted in his nature, such that “the 
rational [appears to the child] as his own most personal subjectivity” (PR: 175A). 
In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant says that there are four forms of moral “receptivity” which 
are preconditions for moral subjectivity: respect for oneself, love of other human beings, 
conscience (i.e., practical reason), and moral feeling (i.e., the susceptibility to feel pleasure or 
displeasure from being aware of the consistency, or inconsistency, of our actions with our duty) 
(MM: 6:399-403).  It is impossible to be under a duty to acquire these forms of receptivity, as 
they are necessary for moral agency in the first place.  Kant speaks of these forms of receptivity 
as if they were innate and need not be acquired.55  This is difficult to accept.  No doubt we are 
sufficiently “good-natured” as to be disposed to acquire these forms of moral receptivity, but it 
                                                          
53 Cf. Rawls: “[The child] may see no reason why he should comply with [parental norms]; they are in themselves 
arbitrary prohibitions and he has no original tendency to do the things he is told to do.  Yet if he does love and trust 
his parents, then, once he has given in to temptation, he is disposed to share their attitude toward his misdemeanors” 
(TJ: 465/407).  Velleman (2006b) makes the interesting suggestion that children accept their parents’ power as 
authoritative insofar as the child implicitly recognizes that his parents treat him as end in himself. 
54 “Since the boy is still at the age of immediacy, the higher to which he is to raise himself appears to him, not in the 
form of universality or of the matter in hand, but in the shape of something given, of an individual, an authority.  It 
is this or that man who forms the ideal which the boy strives to know and to imitate; only in this concrete manner 
does the child at this stage perceive his own essential nature” (EM: 396A, p. 54). 
55 “There can be no duty to have moral feeling or to acquire it; instead every human being (as a moral being) has it 
in him originally”; “So too conscience is not something that can be acquired, and we have no duty to provide 
ourselves with one; rather, every human being, as a moral being, has a conscience within him originally”; “it is not 
correct to say that a human being has a duty of self-esteem; it must rather be said that the law within him 
unavoidably forces from him respect for his own being.”  If any of the forms of receptivity can be acquired, it would 
seem to be love of human beings—at least, it can be acquired toward particular persons:  “Beneficence is a duty.  If 
someone practices it often and succeeds in realizing his beneficent intention, he eventually comes actually to love 





seems misguided to think that they are, in a developed form, innate in the infant.  One way to 
understand Hegel’s project as we have canvassed it thus far, then, is as providing a genetic 
account of how children acquire these four forms of moral receptivity.    
Justice:  Although Hegel does not much remark on it, the family must also play a crucial role 
in opening the child’s eyes to the basic principles of property and justice (i.e., Abstract Right).  
This might seem surprising, since Hegel says that “no member of the family has particular 
property” (PR: 171).  One might instead suppose that the family would be a school for 
communism, insofar as both are based on the principle “from each according to his ability, to 
each according to his needs.”56  But the family fosters a conception of mine and thine in at least 
two ways.   
First, although much is held in common within the family, the child soon recognizes that 
other families have their own communal possessions, which are not held in common with his 
family.  Thus, we find distrust of the family in Plato’s Republic because it encourages people to 
think in terms of what belongs to me and mine and sets citizens against one another (Republic, 
Book V, 464ff).  Hegel essentially agrees with Plato about the connection of the family with 
“subjective particularity,” only he thinks that communal solidarity can be made to coexist with 
that more subjective ethical disposition (PR: 185R).   
Second, it would probably be a mistake to take too literally Hegel’s claim that all property in 
the family is held in common (PR: 171).  True, it is important for the child’s sense of security 
that he does not feel like a lodger in his parents’ house; that instead, he feels it is his home as 
well.  However, if the child is to develop a sense of his own freedom and responsibility, as well 
                                                          





as the rightful limits of that freedom, then it is important that certain things belong to him, while 
other things belong to other family members (cf. PR: 41).  Rousseau can help fill out our picture 
here.  To develop his pupil’s sense of justice, Rousseau has Emile plant his own garden: “I make 
him feel that he has put his time, his labor, his effort, finally his person there; that there is in this 
earth something of himself that he can claim against anyone whomsoever, just as he could 
withdraw his arm from the hand of another man who wanted to hold on to it in spite of him” 
(Emile, Bk. II, p. 98).  Later, when Emile and the gardener get into a disagreement over who has 
a right to plant in the garden, Emile receives an object lesson in negotiating competing claims of 
mine and thine. 
Justice and the gendered family:  A number of philosophers have worried that the 
patriarchal or traditional gendered family is not, in fact, a good school for justice and the moral 
sentiments, but is rather a school for despotism, on the one hand, and servility on the other.  Mill 
puts the point forcefully in the Subjection of Women:   
Think what it is to be a boy, to grow to manhood in the belief that without any merit or 
any exertion of his own, though he may be the most frivolous and empty or the most 
ignorant and stolid of mankind, by the mere fact of being born a male he is by right the 
superior of all and every one of an entire half of the human race…. Is it to be imagined 
that all this does not pervert the whole manner of existence of the man, both as an 
individual and as a social being? (SW: IV, ¶ 4 / CW, XXI: 324-325) 
The moral training of mankind will never be adapted to the conditions of the life for 
which all other human progress is a preparation, until they practice in the family the same 
moral rule which is adapted to the normal constitution of society (SW: II, ¶ 12 / CW, 
XXI: 293-294). 
More recently, Okin has developed a similar line of argument.  Taking Rawls’s picture of moral 
development in the family as her point of departure, she argued that a society of just citizens 





If gendered families are not just, but are, rather, a relic of caste or feudal societies in 
which roles, responsibilities, and resources are distributed not in accordance with the two 
principles of justice but in accordance with innate differences that are imbued with 
enormous social significance, then Rawls’s whole structure of moral development would 
seem to be built on shaky ground.  Unless the households in which children are first 
nurtured, and see their first examples of human interaction, are based on inequality and 
reciprocity rather than on dependence and domination … how can whatever love their 
receive from their parents make up the injustice they see before them in the relationship 
between these same parents? (1989: 99-100). 
This is an important issue, and it goes to the heart of the question about the theoretical stability 
of Hegel’s gendered conception of the family.  Unfortunately, most discussions of this question 
in contemporary political philosophy have remained relatively superficial.   
 A sense of fairness or justice is not primarily a set of doctrines that the child learns when 
young.  It consists most fundamentally in the capacity to empathize with others and look at 
things from their points of view.  When developed, this capacity can lead the subject to criticize 
the unfairness or injustice of some of the institutions and practices which she might have taken 
for granted in childhood.  For example:  Emile, after having reflected on the sense of possession 
we feel toward the products of our labor, and after having learned to look at things from the 
perspective of others (like the gardener), may one day begin to wonder why his father should 
own the products of the gardener’s labor.  Of course, having an effective sense of justice does 
not guarantee that one will not make mistakes in moral judgment.  Nor is this meant to deny that 
growing up under just or egalitarian institutions is conducive to the development of the sense of 
justice.  The more just the ethical institutions which comprise the initially unquestioned 
background of our lives, the more individual injustices will stand out as incongruous.  This, after 
all, was an important part of Mill’s indictment of the subordination of women: it “stands out as 
an isolated fact in modern social institutions… a single relic of an old world of thought and 





But if there was anything right in the mid-century psychological research on the authoritarian 
personality undertaken by Theodor Adorno and his collaborators, then it seems that what is most 
important for the development of a (democratic) sense of justice and fairness is an “internalized 
and individualized approach to the child” on the part of the parents.  This is what fosters empathy 
and perspective-reversal.  What is most likely to lead to an intolerant or authoritarian personality 
is a parenting style that is distant, stern, or arbitrary (Adorno et al. 1950: 384-389).  This 
suggests that it is not traditional gender roles per se that most inhibits the sense of justice, but 
authoritarian families based on relations of overt domination and submission which deprive the 
child of a “a circle of love and trust.” 
A conception of happiness and value:  Philosophers now often follow Rawls in speaking of 
two “moral powers”:  a sense of justice (or conscience and moral feeling more generally), and a 
capacity for a conception of the good, or happiness, or the good life (TJ: §§63, 77).  A 
conception of the good may be understood in the most general sense as those ends, relationships, 
and activities that we endorse as valuable components of our lives.  It seems that adult human 
beings cannot lead happy or fulfilling lives without having something like a conception of the 
good.57  As Kant once suggested, human “happiness is not something [merely] sensed but 
something thought.”58  We do not find out whether we are happy merely by attending to our 
feelings.  We consider whether our lives are living up to our ideas about what is worthwhile in 
life.  Therefore, Rawls seems to get it about right when he says that “we can think of a person as 
being happy when he is in the way of a successful execution (more or less) of a rational plan of 
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ends that are self-denying. 
58 Kant, Lose Blätter aus Kants Nachlass, Rudolph Reicke (Königsberg: Ferd. Beyer, 1889): 1:11-12.  Quoted from 





life drawn up under (more or less) favorable conditions, and he is reasonably confident that his 
plan can be carried through (TJ: 359).59   
Because human happiness or fulfillment is something thought, not merely sensed, it is 
something we must learn how to pursue.  This aspect of education is not a theme that Hegel 
devotes a lot of attention to, but he has the resources for a rich account.  One part of an education 
for happiness consists in learning to recognize that our various desires may conflict and change 
over time (PR: 17; see also my 4.5.B).  As a consequence, we must learn to “purify” our desires, 
by organizing them in such a manner as they can be consistently pursued without undermining 
one another (PR: 19).  But in order to do this, a person must learn to stand back from and 
evaluate his own desires.  Hegel believes that there is no single yardstick—like quantity of 
pleasure—by which we can measure some desires as more worthwhile of fulfillment than others 
(PR: 17 + A).  Instead, we simply have to reflect on our desires and determine which ones mean 
more to us than others.  We typically do so by reflecting on the conception of the good that best 
expresses the kind of person we want to be.  This is why most of us do not decide to cultivate a 
single easily satisfied desire as the whole of our conception of happiness: that would, as Hegel 
says, be “a destructive limitation,” a cramped conception of what a good human life consists in 
(PR: 17A).60  Therefore, not only do parents have a role in helping the child stand back from his 
immediate desires (as we have seen), but they also serve as the child’s first role-models of what 
an integrated human life can look like.  Whereas the child, at first, simply wants to do whatever 
                                                          
59 This more measured formulation in the revised edition is an improvement on the original version: “Someone is 
happy when his plans are going well, his more important aspirations being fulfilled, and he feels sure that his good 
fortune will endure” (TJ 1971: 409).       
60 I have benefited much from the discussion of Hegel’s view on happiness in Wood (1990): esp. 69-71.  Wood puts 
Hegel’s view most concisely as follows: “We form the idea of happiness not so much in order to get the satisfactions 





he feels like at the moment, he observes how his father balances work with time devoted to the 
family and how he takes delight in the outdoors, baseball, and American history. 
Children also need to be introduced to rewarding activities.  Because the capacities of 
children are expanding, they are constantly outgrowing the activities that they used to delight in.  
Young children may delight in very simple activities, like spinning tops, but this entertains few 
adults, or even older children.  Therefore, another formative task that falls to parents is to 
introduce their children to the sorts of activities which are rewarding for adults.  Locke provides 
an example of this when he advises parents and tutors to instruct even young gentlemen in trades 
and crafts, not as a career, but as rewarding diversion (STCE: 201-205).61  Now one way to do 
this is to simply introduce children to many different activities—horseback-riding, piano, 
baseball, chess, etc.—and find out which ones the child most prefers.  But the more common and 
natural approach is to initiate the child into the activities that the parents themselves find 
rewarding.  This has the additional advantage of providing the parent and child the opportunity to 
do something together and therefore strengthen their friendship: as Aristotle says, friends cannot 
easily spend time together unless they enjoy doing some of the same things (NE: VIII.6, 
1157b24).  In these cases, parents do not, properly, pursue their own interests in bonding with 
their children instead of their children’s own best interests; they pursue both at once.62  
                                                          
61 In this instance, Rousseau is much more utilitarian than Locke.  When Rousseau comes to the same subject, he 
follows Locke in recommending carpentry to his pupil, but Rousseau wants Emile to learn such a trade, not so much 
for its own sake, but so that he will be independent (Emile, Bk. III, pp. 195ff). 
62 According to Brighouse and Swift (2006b), parents are not obliged to pursue their children’s best interests when 
enrolling their children in activities that the parent can share with the child, so long as the child’s interests are “well-
enough served” (102).  (See 9.3.)  I agree that parents have a legal right to act this way, but this does not sound to 
me like healthy advice for the parent-child relationship.  I would think that the parent would want to pursue bonding 
activities with children that were a part of the child’s good, as well as their own.  Perhaps the problem is an implicit 
assumption that, given any two activities, one is always better for a person than another.  But it is more plausible to 
think that most valuable activities are incommensurate in the contributions they make to a person’s life (cf. Raz 





Moreover, the purpose of this education for living in not mainly to give final form to the child’s 
mature conception of the good.  As Frederick Neuhouser puts it, the task is to give the child “the 
raw material … that makes up the indispensable (and inescapable) basis of the particular being” 
that he or she ultimately becomes.  We expect that, as our children mature, they will refashion 
this material to a greater or lesser extent to suit their own particular bent (2000: 153). 
Although a conception of the good life should not be a cramped or “destructive limitation” of 
human potential (PR: 17A), limitation is nonetheless necessary.  “Initially – i.e. especially in 
youth – the individual balks at the notion of committing  himself” to any particular path in life, 
as Hegel explains.  The youth regards this “as a limitation imposed on his universal 
determination and as a purely external necessity” (PR: 207R).  But to become anything actual, 
we must learn to limit ourselves (PR: 13A).  This is particularly true with respect to finding an 
occupation and niche in life.  The wide range of opportunities regarding career-choice in modern 
life can be a stumbling block to young people, if they lack the will to apply themselves in any 
one direction.  This particular challenge of modernity is a common theme in Victorian literature: 
characters like Richard Carstone from Dickens’s Bleak House just cannot manage to settle on 
any one career, but instead flit from one vocation to another, causing parents or guardians great 
anxiety that they will never make anything out of themselves at all.  Thus, another responsibility 
of parents is to help their children find a viable role which is well-suited to their temperament 
and abilities and to help summon the young person’s resolution to follow through on their 
decisions.   
Religion and the absolute:  Societies that tolerate religious pluralism have typically 
accepted the propriety of parents bringing their children up in their own religious or 





domains of the family, especially in the lower classes, Bertrand Russell wryly noted that “One of 
the few rights remaining to parents in the wage-earning class is that of having their children 
taught any brand of superstition that may be shared by large number of parents in the same 
neighborhood.”  “And even this right,” he continued, “has been taken away from parents in some 
countries” (1929: 206).   
In fact, the role of the family in religious education can be made to look peculiar from two 
directions.  In most historical societies, political rulers have sought ideological support from 
religion or some other comprehensive worldview (like historical materialism).  In such societies, 
permitting parents to teach their children heterodox opinions may seem politically destabilizing.  
On the other hand, there is the liberal view according to which “the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life.”63  On this picture, the state must not use its coercive powers to indoctrinate individuals.  
But then, if we think of the parent as a kind of governor, why shouldn’t the child have analogous 
rights against his parents?  Or to put the point a little differently, it may seem almost as wrong to 
indoctrinate children in one particular religious faith or comprehensive worldview as it would be 
to select for young children their future occupation or spouse.64  Instead, so the argument goes, 
parents ought to raise their children so that all of these matters are as open as possible when the 
child reaches an age in which she can exercise her own autonomy.  
To understand Hegel’s view on this question, we have to understand his conception of 
religion.  Hegel thinks of religion as one way of relating to what we take to be “absolute truth,” 
and that, as such, “it contains the requirement that everything else should be seen in relation to 
                                                          
63 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1991). 





this and should receive confirmation, justification, and the assurance of certainty from this 
source.”  But religion is not the only way of relating to the absolute: “religion is the relation to 
the absolute in the form of feeling, representational thought, and faith.”  Philosophy and science 
are also ways of relating to the absolute: they however take the form, not of inward feeling, but 
of cognition disciplined by the study of what actually or necessarily exists.  Because 
philosophical/scientific cognition and religion may both make claims about the absolute, they 
can come into conflict.  On the other hand, most religions accept the authority of scientific 
cognition to a greater or lesser extent, but preserve for themselves an authority regarding “higher 
things” that are not accessible by science, and which are “the unlimited foundation and cause on 
which everything depends” (PR: 270R).   
Hegel agrees with the liberal that the modern individual has an interest in being free to relate 
to the absolute on his own terms.  This is a necessary part of the right of subjective freedom.  I 
must be free to interpret how things ultimately hang together in a way that seems valid to me.  To 
use a phrase with much currency in contemporary philosophy, the modern individual demands 
the right to endorse his comprehensive worldview from the inside.  Thus, the state has reason not 
to meddle with religion.  As Hegel puts it, the “sphere of inwardness is not, as such, the province 
of the state.”  But, all the same, the state cannot be indifferent to religion, for it has its own 
ethical doctrines, which may come into conflict with certain religious beliefs.  For example, the 
just state cannot be indifferent between religions that accept the civic equality of the sexes and 
those that deny it.  Hegel’s solution to this problem is not altogether different from that of Rawls.  
The modern state should strive to stand above differences between (what we might call) 
“reasonable” religious doctrines—that is, those that embrace the authority of the state and the 





should also tolerate religious groups that are less reasonable in this sense, but which do not 
directly endanger others or the stability of the state (PR: 270R).   
Should parents follow a similar policy of toleration?  I think Hegel would say that education 
is impossible without giving children some sense of “absolute truth,” of the ultimate grounds of 
validity for facts and norms.65  This is especially the case if we expect children to have any way 
of judging matters by their own lights.  And, in good conscience, parents cannot perform this 
duty except in accordance with their own understanding of the absolute.  Matthew Clayton has 
recently argued that parents ought to instruct their children only in those beliefs and norms which 
everyone could reasonably accept, such as empirically verifiable facts and principles of mutual 
respect.  They should not “enroll” their children in any particular religious or comprehensive 
doctrine—though of course they may introduce their children to their own personal faith or 
philosophy.  In short, children should not be brought up as Catholics, Muslims, or Marxists, but 
should only voluntarily join such groups upon reaching the age of maturity (Clayton 2006: 119-
123).     
I believe that Clayton makes the mistake of thinking that what makes something a 
“comprehensive doctrine” is the fact that it has propositional content that is controversial 
amongst reasonable people.  Thus, on this view, the resurrection of Christ is a part of a 
comprehensive doctrine, because many people who accept the duties of mutual respect do not 
believe in it.  But the more important question has to do, not with the content of the doctrine as 
such, but with the source of validity for that content.  A religious believer may subscribe to the 
same norms of mutual respect as the secular philosopher, and yet whereas the philosopher 
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regards these norms as valid in themselves, the religious believer may think that they ultimately 
derive their validity from God’s will.  If we think about “comprehensive doctrines” in terms of 
the ultimate source of validity, then it hardly seems possible to raise a child without a 
comprehensive doctrine.  The philosopher may raise his child to respect the rights of other 
persons, and yet keep an open mind about the existence of God.  But in doing so, he is raising the 
child to regard the source of validity for morality as independent of the truth of any traditional 
religious worldview; for this child, respect for persons is a part of absolute truth.   
To the extent that it would be possible to raise a child without any relation to absolute truth, 
the child would grow up without any real convictions at all.  This is why Hegel thinks that it is in 
the interest of the state that every citizen should belong to some religious community (PR: 
270R).  We may reinterpret this to mean that the state has an interest in all children being 
brought up with some reasonable conception of absolute truth—which may include certain 
philosophical outlooks not ordinarily regarded as religions. 
Still, someone might ask, why parents ought to have the task of initiating children into a 
particular relation to absolute truth.  Why shouldn’t government schools take on this task, as they 
have in some societies?  The schools might then instruct children in the “absolute truth” of basic 
liberal moral principles and of scientific inquiry (though not of particular scientific theories, 
which are revisable).  Questions about religion and personal ethics, in turn, would be taught as 
matters about which reasonable people disagree, and on which everyone must eventually come to 
his own conclusions.  The objections to this proposal are probably legion, but I will confine 
myself to two of the more interesting.   
First, such a society would endanger the very intellectual autonomy it seeks to protect.  In 





reflection on that essential core would be regarded as either unnecessary or even dangerous.  
Religion and personal ethics, on the other hand—matters on which people were free to differ—
may increasingly be regarded as inessential accretions to the core of orthodox absolute truth.66  
In that case, the individual would  regard himself as responsible for his relation to absolute truth 
only at the inessential peripheries.  By assigning the ultimate responsibility for religious and 
philosophical education to individual families, we sustain the ideological pluralism that makes 
intellectual autonomy meaningful. 
The second point is perhaps more important for present purposes.  For the young child, the 
absolute first resides in the persons of his parents (EM: 396A, pp. 59-60).  It is in them that the 
child puts his trust, and it is they who are the ultimate arbiters of good and bad, true and false.  
This is the truth implicit in the now-antiquated saying that a father is like a god to his children.  
One task of parents, therefore, is to help their children transfer this absolute trust from 
themselves to independent standards of the good and the true.  If this is accurate, then no one is 
in nearly so good a position as the parents to carry out such an education.     
∴ 
As before, the educational responsibilities of parents are not only duties for Hegel; they are 
also opportunities for personal self-fulfillment.  Of course, I cannot hope to canvas all of the 
different ways that people find child-rearing personally rewarding.  But we may mention a few 
of those that are especially interesting from a philosophical point of view—most of which Hegel 
does not specifically mention.  First and most fundamentally, there is simply the fact of doing 
                                                          





something momentous.67  Loren Lomasky captures part of this quite well when he observes that, 
though “few people can expect to produce a literary or artistic monument, redirect the life of a 
nation, garner honor and glory that lives after them[,]… it is open to almost everyone to stake a 
claim to long-term significance through having and raising a child” (1987: 167).   
Second, there is the opportunity to be respected as a role model and authority.  At its best, 
this not only feeds the parent’s amour propre, or self-esteem, but inspires her to deserve that 
respect—and this too a person can take satisfaction in.  Earlier I mentioned that having a child 
can add meaning to our other social roles.  A similar phenomenon is at work here in the way that 
parenting can enhance a person’s interest in being a good person.  That is, since being a good 
person is a part of the role of being a parent, those who identify with the role of parent as a part 
of their practical identity may develop a stronger identification with the associated moral 
principles and ideals.   
Then there are myriad ways it is rewarding to introduce others to those activities and 
traditions that we ourselves value or delight in.  In part, this may be because we think these 
activities or traditions deserve to be passed on, and we take satisfaction in doing justice to the art, 
or sport, or faith.  Moreover, insofar as we identify with what we teach and share, we may also 
feel that a certain part of ourselves is passed on to be preserved in another.  Perhaps we also find 
that, in the act of introducing someone to something we value, we experience that thing again 
afresh.   
Finally, we should return to Hegel’s point that the parents attain their unity in their children 
(173+A).  This should not be understood to mean merely that parents see in the child an 
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amalgam of their biological traits.  The child’s upbringing is also the spouse’s mutual project that 
typically becomes the focus of their own friendship.  As Bertrand Russell observes, “cooperation 
in the serious business of rearing children, and companionship through the long years involved, 
bring about a relation more important and more enriching to both parties” than typically arises 
from “mere sex relations” (1929: 199).    
10.5  The Family, Civil Society, and the State 
A) Initiation into civil and political society 
Of course, parents need not, by themselves, confer all of the education that their children will 
need for life in the modern world.  Indeed, generally speaking, parents are not equipped to do so; 
instead they typically cooperate with other agencies, especially the schools, in the task of 
socializing children (PR: 239).  There are four respects in particular where the family is not 
especially well-suited to carry out the education of children.  The first and most obvious is in 
providing children a formal education, especially at higher levels.  Modern schools take 
advantage of the benefits of specialization and the division of labor in teaching children diverse 
subjects like mathematics, the natural sciences, social studies, literature, and arts and crafts.  
Parents, in contrast, seldom have the time or training to provide their children with a comparable 
preparation for future careers or higher education.  A second important function of schools is to 
introduce children to the larger and more impersonal social world.  In the school, the child is no 
longer doted upon as he might be in the home; he learns to look upon himself as just one 
individual amongst others (EM: 396A, p. 61).   
Third, at least where schools have some cultural and economic diversity, children learn to get 





for citizenship in a pluralistic society—especially democratic citizenship (see Chapters 11 and 
14).  Hegel does not emphasize this theme, as he tends to think of political will-formation taking 
place first and foremost in the legislature (PR: 301+R, 316-319).  But insofar as we think 
ordinary citizens have an important role in deliberating on the content of the general will, it is 
important that we learn how to see things from the perspectives of people who have backgrounds 
different than our own (see 14.3-14.5 below).   
Fourth, encounters with other children, with teachers, and with ideas foreign to the culture of 
the child’s family all help foster higher forms of reflection on morality, ethics, and worldview.68  
Only in such encounters does the young person typically begin to appreciate that he might have 
been brought up differently than he was.  By confronting the contingency of his own beliefs and 
values, the youth is forced to find reasons for believing and valuing some things rather than 
others.  Again, this is not a theme much emphasized by Hegel, but we do find it in both Locke 
and Rousseau.  They don’t think of schools having this function; indeed, they are both suspicious 
of the bad influence that schools have may have on children.  But they do see this broadening of 
intellectual horizons as the great value to be gained from travel.  Locke, for instance, says that 
we improve in wisdom and prudence “by seeing men, and conversing with people of tempers, 
customs, and ways of living, different from one another, and especially from those of his parish 
and neighborhood” (SCTE: 212).  Similarly, Rousseau declares that “whoever has seen only one 
people does not know men; he knows only the people with whom he has lived” (Emile, Bk. V, p. 
451).   
                                                          





B) The state as parens patriae 
In all modern societies, the state has assumed a large role in the provision of formal 
education.  We shall explore the responsibility of the state in education in Part III.  Here we ask a 
different question: What authority does the state have over the education of children?  Does the 
state, for example, have the right to require parents to send their children to public, or publicly 
accredited, schools?  From a Hegelian perspective, we are initially drawn in two directions.  On 
the one hand, the feeling of familial love leads family members to identify with one another and 
to think of themselves as members of a single whole (PR: 158-159, 173).  Besides governing the 
internal life of the family, this unity is also the basis of the family’s relation to the rest of society, 
in that the family is typically considered to be one legal person (PR: 171).  This accounts for 
what Kant identified as the “property-like” character of parental rights (see 6.5.D).  For Hegel, 
the legal rights of the parent over her children resemble the legal rights of the individual, not 
over her external property, but over herself (PR: 57, 70).69  This might lead us to think that the 
state will have relatively little authority over the child’s education, that education is a part of the 
personal prerogative of parents.  On the other hand, “children are free in themselves”: they may 
not be used by parents for their own ends, but rather must be brought up to depart from their 
original family unit, to assume a life of independence and freedom of personality  (PR: 175).  
This might lead you to think that the state has an important role in ensuring that parents follow 
through on this responsibility.  And if there are aspects of the child’s education that the family is 
not well-suited to provide, then presumably the state may require children to attend school—or 
even its own schools. 
                                                          
69 Hegel’s own way of thinking about this is, of course, for the husband to represent the family to the external world.  
Our view today allows both spouses equal representation.  Irresolvable disagreements between the parents may have 





For Hegel, as you would expect, there is some truth in both of these perspectives.  The key is 
to integrate them in the right way.  Because the ethical unity of the family is of great importance 
to both children and parents, the state will generally have reason to respect the autonomy and 
privacy of the family.  The interests of the individual in opposition to other family members 
become salient for the state chiefly in connection to the dissolution of the family (PR: 159).  This 
should be understood to have two aspects in the case of children, which correspond to the 
positive and negative educational tasks of parents (see 10.4).  First, the child’s interests attain 
legal relevance insofar as the bonds of love and trust which make the family into an ethical unity 
in the first place are threatened or broken by acts of abuse, exploitation, or neglect.70  In such 
cases, the state may intervene: first, in an attempt to reestablish the proper relationship; and if 
that fails, then to remove the child, if possible, to another family where she may live in an 
atmosphere of love and trust.   
The second way the child’s interests have legal salience is with respect to the ethical 
dissolution of the family which (as far as the child is concerned) occurs as a matter of course 
when the child reaches maturity (PR: 177).  That is, parents have a duty, as we have said, to 
prepare their children to leave the family as free agents with respect to each of the different 
moments in the “concept of right”: (i) as legal persons, (ii) as subjects capable of morality and a 
conception of happiness, and (ii) as participants in the primary institutions of modern ethical life 
(i.e., as members of a family or intimate association; as participants in the economic sphere; and 
as citizens of the state).  Insofar as parents are failing in any of these responsibilities, the state 
                                                          
70 Hegel says that the unity of the family cannot assert itself against feeling (PR: 159A).  What Hegel has in mind, I 
take it, is that one spouse may not compel another to remain in the family if they are emotionally estranged from one 
another (cf. 163A, 176A).  But we may expand the point to cover the parent-child relation.  Parents who do not love 






has a right in its role as parens patriae to intervene.71  As Hegel puts it, the state,72 in its 
character as a “universal family … has the duty and right, in the face of arbitrariness and 
contingency on the part of the parents, to supervise and influence the education of children in so 
far as this has a bearing on their capacity to become members of society” (PR: 239).   
Hegel’s expansion on this topic (from the appended lecture notes) is somewhat ambiguous, 
but worth quoting at length: 
It is difficult to draw a boundary here between the rights of parents and those of [the 
state].73  As far as education is concerned, parents usually consider that they have 
complete freedom and can do whatever they please.  With all public education, the main 
opposition usually comes from the parents, and it is they who protest and speak out about 
teachers and institutions because their own preference goes against them.  Nevertheless, 
society has a right to follow its own tested views on such matters, and to compel parents 
to send their children to school, to have them vaccinated, etc.  The controversies which 
have arisen in France between the demands for freedom of instruction (i.e., for parental 
choice) and for state supervision are relevant in this context (PR: 239A).     
Perhaps there is no bright line to draw between the authority of parents and that of the state, but I 
think we can sharpen the Hegelian position in several ways.   
First, not only is it clear that parents have no right to act however they please toward their 
children, Hegel would not accept that they have an absolute right to follow their own conscience 
in education.  Of course, he does recognize the interest that individuals have in acting in 
accordance with their own views and their own conscience; this is a part of the right of 
subjective freedom.  But Hegel also thinks it is absurd to give absolute deference to people’s 
                                                          
71 The classical statement of parens patriae principle in American law comes from the Supreme Court decision, 
Prince v. Massachusetts 341 U.S. 158, 166 (1943): “Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the 
state as parens patriae may restrict the parents control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the 
child’s labor, and in many other ways.” 
72 Hegel says “civil society,” rather than state, but that is because he thinks of the state’s police powers as a part of 
civil society, inasmuch as they protect the interests of individuals.   





inner feeling of conviction, no matter how uneducated or perverse (PR: 124R, 261A, 270R).  So 
the state need not defer to a parent’s benighted views about beating children with a rod, just 
because the parent can sincerely claim that he finds this instruction in his religion (namely, at 
Proverbs 13:24).  If the state has good reason to believe that this kind of discipline is harmful to 
children, then this is a case where the state is within its rights to rely on its own tested views.  
Second, it is clear that Hegel believes that the state has a right to set up public schools, which 
teach students the moral and constitutional principles on which the state is based (PR: 270R).  In 
this way, Hegel is closer to contemporary liberals who stress the importance of civic education in 
public education than he is to classical liberals like Mill who fear that government schools will 
inevitably lead to state indoctrination (cf. Callan 1997 and Macedo 2000; Mill, OL: V, ¶¶ 13-14 / 
CW, XVIII: 302-303).  In this connection, there has been a debate in contemporary philosophy 
as to the extent to which schools ought to inculcate liberal sentiments by “rhetorical” rather than 
“rational” teaching.  For instance, according to William Galston,  
[F]ew individuals will come to embrace the core commitments of liberal society through 
a process of rational inquiry.  If children are to be brought to accept these commitments 
as valid and binding, the method must be a pedagogy far more rhetorical than 
rational….Civic education … requires a noble, moralizing history: a pantheon of heroes 
who confer legitimacy on central institutions and are worthy of emulation (1991: 243-
244).       
I think Hegel would look upon this as obscurantism, not wholly unlike attempting to use religion 
or superstition to prop up the legitimacy of the state.  For Hegel, the state must instead 
“champion the rights of reason and self-consciousness” (PR: 270R). 
The harder question has to do with whether Hegel would agree with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which holds that “Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of 





parents have such a right where its exercise would endanger the state (PR: 270R).  For instance, 
in countries like France under the Third Republic, republican institutions were often thought to 
be threatened by reactionary Catholic schools.  Or again, as a young state, Turkey sought to close 
down schools run by European colonial powers.  In such cases, Hegel would undoubtedly defend 
the broad authority of the state over the content of education.  He is aware that this sort of 
justification is prone to abuse, but he doesn’t seem to think philosophy can do much about that 
(234A).  On the other hand, when the state is strong, then presumably parents should be 
permitted to enjoy much broader freedom of educational choice.  And though this is not Hegel’s 
view, I would add that when the state is strong, its ability to interfere in educational choice for 
political purposes ought to be institutionally restrained.      
However, there remains the state’s paternalistic concern for the interests of children to 
consider.  I do not see how such considerations could justify requiring children to attend 
government-run schools, although it certainly would justify requiring parents to send their 
children to publicly accredited schools.  Does that mean that parents ought not be permitted to 
home-school their children?  Hegel’s text appears to incline in that direction.  It seems to me that 
the liberal Hegelian might appropriately discourage home-schooling as suboptimal for 
socialization, especially for older children, and yet permit it, so long as there were sufficient 
oversight to ensure that parents were indeed providing their children with an adequate education 
(on adequacy in education, see Chapters 14 and 15).   
Finally, to consider a question of much interest to contemporary philosophers, to what extent 
does the state have an interest in encouraging children or adolescents to engage in “critical 
reflection” on received beliefs and values?  Like many contemporary liberals, Hegel believes that 





superstition” (PR: 270R).  Does this mean that the state should require that children receive an 
education that encourages such reflection?  This is a large topic, and I shall not be able to do it 
full justice here.  But I do want to draw one contrast.   
My sense is that Hegel’s concern is somewhat different than that of most contemporary 
liberals.  Contemporary liberals do not seem nearly so concerned with whether a person’s faith or 
worldview is true or rational, as with whether or not a person has embraced it in an authentic 
way, for reasons of her own.  Hegel’s view, on the other hand, is more objective.  He wants 
people to act in accordance with institutions that are rational, and if possible, to comprehend 
their rationality.  He is less concerned with subjective authenticity.  This approach may have its 
virtues, in being less psychologically intrusive and less likely to cause antagonism with parents.  
In its role as overseer of children’s education, the state might best focus on ensuring that children 
have access to reliable information about their world, and let reflection takes its own course in 
the young without much conscious direction by educational authorities.   
10.6  Conclusion 
The premise of this chapter has been that a Hegelian account of the family—especially when 
naturalized, democratized, and extended beyond some of Hegel’s own immediate concerns—is 
well suited to capture and integrate many of the more attractive ideas about the moral bases of 
parental authority and responsibility that we have explored throughout Part II.  A brief summary 
of our main conclusions may be useful.   
I argued in Chapter 8 that any satisfying account of parental rights will at least have to 
include as one important element the Lockean idea of the parental role as a fiduciary trust 





he also goes beyond Locke in several respects.  First of all, given his nuanced picture of the 
various stages or aspects of the concept of right (i.e., Abstract Right, Morality, and Ethical Life), 
Hegel provides us with a richer framework for thinking about the cultivation of a free rational 
and moral personality.  Relatedly, Hegel’s attention to the importance of subjective freedom in 
modern life leads him to emphasize the ways in which parenthood is not just a duty imposed by 
Nature or God, but a rational part of a fulfilling life, something worth pursuing for its own sake.  
Then, insofar as we democratize Hegel and reject his strong assumptions about gender roles, we 
can also explain some of the ways that men and women in contemporary society are free to enjoy 
various valuable aspects of parenting traditionally associated exclusively with either motherhood 
or fatherhood.  Finally, Hegel’s more modern understanding of the state, especially with respect 
to its role in education, offers us resources for thinking about conflicts between parents and the 
state.   
Hegel also shares much with contemporary authors who stress the importance of love and 
intimacy in family life.  But Hegel can make contributions here as well.  First, Hegel’s theory of 
recognition can deepen our understanding of how and why love and intimacy are as important to 
us as they are—as well as how they are related to modern individualism.  Second, the complex 
account of ethical cultivation, or Bildung, suggests manifold ways in which the parental role can 
be fulfilling.  Third, I have interpreted  Hegel as providing an account for how “blood relations” 
may contribute to the intimacy of the family insofar as we spiritualize, or humanize, these natural 
relations and raise them to a higher ethical significance.  In this way, I argued, Hegel seeks to 
reconcile our animal and spiritual natures, instead of seeing them as either antagonistic or 





have been unable to do—how generation can be ethically significant without attributing any 









PART III:  EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND 
EDUCATION 
 
Introduction and Overview 
In 1953 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously that schools legally segregated by race 
violate a state’s responsibility to treat its citizens equally.  “In these days,” wrote Justice Warren 
in the Court’s opinion, “it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in 
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity, where the state has 
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”1  While 
almost no one would disagree with that pronouncement today, there remains the crucial question 
as to how we ought to understand the idea of making educational opportunity accessible to all 
“on equal terms.”  Does it require that the state spend roughly the same amount on educating 
every child?  Or does it require that the state attempt to compensate children who have fewer 
educational advantages in the home?  Is it unfair if different local governments devote different 
amounts of resources to education?  Should we be trying to achieve a rough equality of 
educational outcomes—or at least to eliminate any achievement gap between different sectors of 
society?  Or should equality be understood in a more modest way:  an equal opportunity, not for 
success in life, but for a decent or adequate education.  But, then, adequate for what—decent in 
what respect? 
                                                          





I explore these questions over the next five chapters.  Chapter 11 sketches the institutional 
history of public-school finance in the United States, which has done so much to frame the 
debate in this country about educational opportunity.  The first part of that chapter examines the 
ideological origins of the common schools and their public support (11.2).  The second part 
examines the legal history of challenges to school-finance systems from the 1970s to the present 
(11.3).  Chapter 12 sorts out conceptual issues for talking about distributive justice in education.  
The problem, here, is that there are at least two literatures relevant to thinking about conceptions 
of distributive justice in education:  the field of school finance in law and public economics, and 
the field of distributive justice in political philosophy.  Both literatures provide useful conceptual 
tools for thinking about fairness in the distribution of education, but unfortunately they remain 
largely uninformed by one another.  Therefore, the aim of Chapter 12 is to provide a conceptual 
framework that integrates some of the conceptual apparatus of each of these two disciplines, 
particularly with a view to facilitating discussion amongst political philosophers about justice in 
the domain of education.  I then draw on this framework in the three following chapters. 
The more substantive philosophical discussions of Part III are to be found in Chapters 13 
through 15.  Chapter 13 examines conceptions of equal treatment and equal chances in 
education.  Most of the chapter is devoted to a critical discussion of Rawlsian “Fair Equality of 
Opportunity.”  Many people are attracted to the notion that, ideally, people from different sectors 
of society ought to have equal prospects of success in life.  However, it turns out that it is very 
hard to find a good argument for that position.  In Chapter 14, I turn to the adequacy approach to 
thinking about justice in education.  On this view, justice has been done when every child 
receives a “good enough” education—not necessarily an equal education.  But how can we 





The prevailing approach is, as Debra Satz puts it, to try to “derive … the nature and content of 
educational adequacy from the requirements for full membership and inclusion in a democratic 
society of equal citizens” (2007: 636).  Chapter 14 therefore considers several different views as 
to what that might consist in, most notably in the company of Amy Gutmann and Elizabeth 
Anderson.  In Chapter 15, I defend an account of justice in education that incorporates both 
elements from the adequacy approach and the norm of equal treatment.  Chapter 15 is the most 
constructive chapter of Part III, but it is best read along with, at least, 13.4.E (on equal treatment 






CHAPTER 11:  ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND TRENDS IN THE PUBLIC 
SUPPORT OF COMMON SCHOOLS 
11.1 Introduction 
Although we shall pursue questions about equal opportunity in education as philosophical—
not legal—questions, they are ultimately questions that have arisen from the problems and 
tensions in real institutions.  If we take the time to acquaint ourselves with some of the history of 
these institutions, I think we may achieve deeper insight into the nature and import of our 
philosophical questions.  In this chapter, then, I sketch the institutional history of public support 
for schools in the United States.   
This historical sketch unfolds in two main parts.  The first part concerns the emergence of 
common schools in the first half of the nineteenth century.  Studying this period sheds light on 
the historical arguments in favor of public schooling, how states and local communities came to 
share the costs of supporting schools, and how this system led to significant inequalities between 
localities in the twentieth century.  The second half of our historical outline focuses on the court 
cases from the late 1960s to the present which have challenged the inequalities and inadequacies 
of state school systems.  It is largely from this legal history that contemporary political battle-





11.2  The Origins of Common Schools and Public Support 
A) The rise of the common schools 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the American “school system” was a diverse 
patchwork composed of private schools, charity schools, town-sponsored schools, church-run 
schools, and informal frontier schools, and it varied considerably by region.  Most Americans did 
not conceive education to be primarily a public function.  Education is nowhere mentioned in the 
U.S. Constitution, and although this made education a power reserved for the states under the 
Tenth Amendment, only seven of the sixteen states had asserted this power in their constitutions 
by 1800.  Often schools were associated with churches, and most believed it to be the right and 
responsibility of parents to make decisions about their own children’s schooling, just as it was 
appropriate for them to guide their children’s religious instruction.  In the religiously diverse 
Mid-Atlantic states, many parents sent their children to schools run by their own denomination 
or religion.  As in England, the well-to-do would often send their children to more expensive 
private schools, where they were prepared for a classical education at the universities.  Rounding 
out the system, philanthropists in the larger cities founded and supported free charity schools for 
the children of the poor.  Some of these—“Sunday schools”—met only once a week, so that 
working children could attend; others—the monitorial schools—employed only a very few 
teachers and relied on older students to teach the younger ones.  The most common role for state 
governments in education during this period was to give private schools financial assistance from 
a permanent educational endowment—a practice somewhat resembling modern voucher 
schemes.1  These endowments were funded in various ways, including Federal land grants and 
                                                          





various fines, fees, or excise taxes.  But typically they were not funded by direct taxes.  In the 
South, the rural and aristocratic character of plantation society made schools difficult to maintain 
and unattractive to the wealthy.  Therefore, while the children of the upper-class would be 
educated by private tutors, most children, white and Black, received no formal education at all 
(Cremin 1970). 
It was only in New England that there was a long tradition reaching back to colonial times of 
treating education as a public function.  Land holdings in most of New England were much 
smaller than in the South and towns were more common.  As a result, there were fewer practical 
barriers to schools than existed in the South.  And unlike the Mid-Atlantic colonies, where 
religious pluralism encouraged the separation between church and state, there was initially no 
sharp distinction between civil and religious functions in the Puritan colonies of New England.  
For example, it was typical for all inhabitants of a seventeenth-century Massachusetts town to be 
required to support the town’s church and minister, whether they were personally church-
members or not.  The church was understood to be the whole town’s church.  Hence, it is not 
surprising that the school should likewise be understood to be the town’s common school.  As 
early as 1647, the colony of Massachusetts passed a law requiring all towns of over fifty 
households to maintain a teacher, and all towns of over one-hundred households to maintain a 
grammar school.  The impetus for founding schools at that time was primarily religious.  Their 
purpose, as the 1647 law made clear, was to foil the “Chief project of ye old deluder, Satan” of 
keeping men illiterate and ignorant of the Scriptures.  The law provided that teachers and schools 
were to be supported “either by the parents or masters of such children, or by the inhabitants in 





Federal Constitution, it enacted the first general state school law, essentially reauthorizing the 
1647 law (Cremin 1951: 86-87; 1970: 181-182). 
Enthusiasm for schools grew markedly in the country under the influence of republican 
thinking during the revolutionary and early national periods.  Steeped in Enlightenment ideas 
about the perfectibility of man and society through knowledge, republicans held, in the words of 
one writer, “that the mode of government in any nation will always be moulded by the state of 
education,” that “the throne of tyranny is founded on ignorance,” and that “literature and liberty 
go hand in hand.”2  This republican faith in knowledge led a number of prominent statesmen and 
intellectuals to devote considerable energy to drafting plans for public school systems.  Thomas 
Jefferson, who was familiar with similar proposals from his stay in Revolutionary France, 
worked out the most detailed program of the period in his “Bill for the General Diffusion of 
Knowledge” for the state of Virginia.  The bill reflected Jefferson’s conviction that, though “the 
people are the only safe depositories of their own liberty,” even the people “are not safe unless 
enlightened to a certain degree.”  This idea, that a self-governing people must be enlightened, 
was the basis for Jefferson’s belief in the necessity of universal public education, which would 
impart to every member of society sufficient learning, as he put it, “as will enable him to read & 
to vote understandingly on what is passing.”3  But Jefferson also recognized that every society 
must have its leaders, and these men would need more education than the average citizen.  
Jefferson thought that these leaders should be drawn from the country’s “natural aristocracy” of 
talent of virtue—not just from the “artificial aristocracy” of wealth and birth.4  Therefore, he 
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proposed that there be a selection system at each stage of schooling that would send the “best 
geniuses” of modest means to further education at public expense.  Jefferson’s concern was not 
with  “equal opportunity” as we would think of it.  Typical of republicanism, his aim was 
oriented toward the public good:  “we hope to avail the state of those talents which nature has 
sown as liberally among the poor as the rich, but which perish without use, if not sought for and 
cultivated.”5      
Republican educational ideals found fertile ground in New England.  As one historian 
observes, “It is not difficult the perceive the close relationship between the desirability of all 
children being able to read and interpret the Bible for themselves, the essence of the older 
Protestant tradition, and the desirability of all children being able to read in order to participate in 
the affairs of government” (Cremin 1951: 93).  In 1800 Massachusetts took the important step of 
being the first state to permit local school districts to levy property taxes in support of their 
common schools, thereby setting in place what would become the central feature of the 
American school-finance system, even as it exists in our day.  Tax support for the schools did not 
immediately lead to free schools, however.  Many schools employed the rate-bill system, on 
which pupils would be charged a tuition based on ability to pay.  This, unfortunately, had the 
effect of discouraging some poor families from sending their children to school at all, since they 
regarded the receipt of charity to be stigmatizing.  In 1827 the Massachusetts common schools 
became the first in the country to do away with all private tuition and to be entirely supported by 
public taxes.  Writing in 1843 as the first secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education, 
Horace Mann could boast that: 
                                                          





Our schools are perfectly free.  A child would be as much astonished at being asked to 
pay any sum, however small, for attending our Common Schools, as he would be if 
payment were demanded of him for walking the public streets, for breathing the common 
air, or enjoying the warmth of the unappropriable sun (quoted in Cremin 1951: 91-94). 
But outside of New England, the individualistic and philanthropic traditions of education had 
a firmer grip on the minds of Americans.  Many considered taxation for general public education 
an unjust burden and an intrusion of government into the proper domain of the family.  When 
Henry Barnard called for a state-wide tax to support common schools in Rhode Island, citizens 
allegedly complained that “he might as well take a man’s ox to plough his neighbor’s fields as to 
take a man’s money to educate his neighbor’s children.”6  Although many Americans accepted 
the ideal of universal education, they also understood it to be satisfied so long as there were 
adequate charity schools available for those whose family could not afford to pay for it.  When 
the Free School Society of New York City—the forerunner of the public school system—wanted 
to expand beyond its traditional role as a charitable institution and attract the children of middle-
class citizens in the 1820s, they found that many parents were too proud to send their children to 
free schools.  The Society only succeeded in its aim of attracting these students by implementing 
a rate-bill system and asking families to pay for what the Society was prepared to offer for free 
(Ravitch 1974: 22).  In 1822, Daniel Webster could still praise New England for its peculiar 
insight into what he took to be the proper role of government in education: 
[New England] early adopted and has constantly maintained the principle, that it is the 
undoubted right, and the bounden duty of government, to provide for the instruction of all 
youth.  That which is elsewhere left to chance, or to charity, we secure by law.  For the 
purpose of public instruction, we hold every man subject to taxation in proportion to his 
property, and we look not to the question, whether he himself have, or have not, children 
to be benefited by the education for which he pays (Cremin 1951: 92).  
                                                          






During the period from 1820 to 1850, at least two further arguments for tax-supported 
common schools assumed prominence and helped convince many Americans that education was 
a legitimate public function after all.  Both of these arguments emphasized the importance of 
children from diverse backgrounds being educated together.  First, in the era of Jacksonian 
democracy, those concerned to establish and preserve social equality saw the common schools as 
the great social leveling device (Cremin 1951: 33-44).  Arguing for tax-supported common 
schools in the Pennsylvania legislature in 1835, the New England native Thaddeus Stevens 
invoked what he took to be the good example of ancient republics:  “There all were instructed at 
the same school; all were laced on perfect equality, the rich and the poor man’s sons, for all were 
deemed children of the same common parent—of their commonwealth.”  Meeting the 
individualist objection that the tax law would force responsible parents to support the children of 
the profligate, Stevens countered:         
It ought to be remembered, that the benefit is bestowed, not upon the erring parents, but 
the innocent children.  Carry out this objection and you punish children for the crimes 
and grades founded on no merit of the particular generation, but on the demerits of their 
ancestors; An aristocracy of the most odious and insolent kind—the aristocracy of wealth 
and pride.7 
For Stevens, public education was not only a means of sifting out the diamonds in the rough for 
public benefit.  It was also a means for attacking the causes of poverty:  
I know how large a portion of the community can scarcely feel any sympathy with, or 
understand the necessities of the poor; or appreciate the exquisite feelings which they 
enjoy when they see their children receiving the boon of education, and rising in 
intellectual superiority, above the clogs which hereditary poverty had cast upon them.  It 
is not wonderful that he whose fat acres have descended to him from father to son in 
                                                          





unbroken succession, should never have become familiar with misery, and therefore 
should never have sought for the surest means of alleviating it.8 
The other argument typical of the period was nationalistic.  With new influxes of 
immigration from the 1820s onward, most notably that of the Irish Catholics, many Americans 
began to worry that differences in language, religion, and culture would undermine the 
cohesiveness of American identity and the commitment to free self-government.  If all children 
were educated together in common schools, then perhaps they “would form similar associations, 
cultivate kindred political and social feelings, and in their manners and customs become 
peculiarly American.”9  For instance, in an 1849 speech by Benjamin Labaree, President of 
Middlebury College, we find these newer nationalistic themes overlaid onto the older republican 
motif of education for civic virtue: 
The multitude of emigrants from the old world, interfused among our population, is 
rapidly changing the identity of American character.  These strangers come among us, 
ignorant of our institutions, and unacquainted with the modes of thought and habits of life 
peculiar to a free people.  Accustomed to be restrained by the strong arm of power, and to 
look upon themselves as belonging to an inferior class of the human race, they suddenly 
emerge from the darkness of oppression into the light and liberty of freemen…. Shall 
these adopted citizens become a part of the body politic, and firm supporters of liberal 
institutions, or will they prove to our republic what the Goths and Huns were to the 
Roman Empire?  The answer to this question depends in a great degree upon the wisdom 
and fidelity of our teachers…”10 
In the same period, W.S. Dutton, a Congregationalist minister, urged Americans to set aside 
religious differences in schooling for the sake of national harmony: 
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The children of this country, of whatever parentage, should, not wholly, but to a certain 
extent, be educated together,—be educated, not as Baptists, or Methodists, or 
Episcopalians, or Presbyterians; not as Roman Catholics or Protestants, still less as 
foreigners in language or spirit, but as Americans, as made of one blood and citizens of 
the same free country—educated to be one harmonious people.  This, the common school 
system, if wisely and liberally conducted, is well fitted, in part at least, to accomplish.11 
Although it was a slow and gradual process, the institution of the free common school spread 
from New England to the rest of the Northern states by about 1850 and then through the South 
after the Civil War.  Later in the nineteenth century, the high school would be added to the 
common school system.  In this way, the common schools largely replaced the older patchwork 
of private, religious, and philanthropic schools and academies.  A notable exception, of course, 
was the Catholic parochial school system, and this too had important implications for the future 
contours of the American school system.  
It was not that most Protestants had wanted to exclude Catholics from the common schools.  
Quite the contrary, the leaders of the common school movement earnestly wanted the schools to 
be American, not sectarian.  Part of the problem was that their understanding of what America 
was—their notion of where the country stood in the march of history—was difficult to 
disentangle from their essentially Protestant outlook.  American republicanism was understood to 
be the political culmination of the revolt against despotism that Luther had begun.  It is really not 
surprising, then, that Catholics often felt that instruction in the common schools defamed their 
religion.  There was also the problem of conducting moral education.  For most Americans in the 
mid-nineteenth century, the foundation of morality was religion, and they took for granted that 
schools would not only improve the minds of students, but shape their moral characters.  
                                                          





Protestants of different denominations found that they had enough in common that moral 
education in the schools could be conducted along nonsectarian lines, at least as far as they were 
concerned.  As they understood it, one part of this nonsectarian moral education was the reading 
of the Bible without commentary or interpretation by the teachers.  But Catholic leaders objected 
that lay reading of the Bible was a Protestant practice and was forbidden for Catholics.  On the 
other hand, doing away with all reference to religion in the schools, even if that would have been 
satisfactory to Protestants, was not acceptable to Catholics either; this would be an education fit 
only for “infidels.”   
Not only did the Catholics want to maintain their own school system, they also wanted it to 
receive state funding.  This led to a particularly heated battle in New York City in the 1840s.  
From the Catholic perspective, just as the state of New York gave financial support to both 
Catholic and Protestant orphanages, it ought also to support both the Catholic and Protestant 
schools (which the Protestants called “common schools”).  This evenhandedness would have 
been quite the opposite of establishing a state religion, as the Catholics saw it.  And many 
European and Commonwealth countries did eventually adopt this strategy.  But by this time, 
there was already a strong tradition in New York and other states of not funding sectarian 
schools, and there was insufficient political will to reverse this policy.  The political settlement 
that finally emerged from this controversy laid the basic pattern that continues to characterize the 
American educational system: publicly supported “common schools” and a separate, privately 
supported—but tax-exempt—system of religious schools.12   
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That dual system was further entrenched in American law in 1925.  The state of Oregon had 
passed a law compelling all children to attend public schools, on the republican argument that 
“the State has an interest in making it certain ... that the citizen is fitted, both in mind and body, 
to perform [his duties to the State].”13  This law would have effectively abolished private schools 
throughout the state.  In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, since the 
freedom of parents to raise their own children was a fundamental liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment,14 the state could only abridge that liberty where there was some 
“reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State.”  And the Court denied 
that the state had “any general power … to standardize its children by forcing them to accept 
instruction from public teachers only.”15  In this manner, the Court recognized in parents a 
constitutionally protected right to send their children to private schools. 
The basic system of financing public schools that emerged in the second half of the 
nineteenth century had local and state-wide components.16  First, there were state laws 
authorizing local school districts to levy property taxes and issue municipal bonds for capital 
projects.17  Second, these local funds were supplemented by the state permanent education 
endowment and possibly by state-wide taxes.  (In some states, however, the revenues of state-
wide taxes were apportioned to local districts on the basis of taxes paid; hence, there was no 
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redistribution across districts.)  A number of states also discovered by trial and error the principle 
of matching-funds.  When state monies were provided to local communities unconditionally, the 
local communities often used this revenue in place of taxing themselves.  To avoid this, state 
revenues were made conditional on local communities taxing themselves at a certain rate.  In this 
way, state funds could be used to encourage local initiative (Cremin 1951: 126-128).   
With the exception of the land grants which helped fund the state education endowments, 
very little funding for primary and secondary education came directly from the Federal 
Government.  As late as 1920, the federal government was responsible for only 0.3% of all 
revenues for primary and secondary education (Odden and Picus 2008: 6).  As a part of the 
Johnson administration’s “War on Poverty,” the federal government significantly increased its 
part in financing schools with the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) 
(known as “No Child Left Behind” since its reauthorization and amendment in 2001).  Title I of 
ESEA instructed the federal government to provide grants to local school districts on the basis of 
the number of students living in poverty.  In the following two years, provisions were added to 
fund special education programs for disabled and bilingual children.  As a consequence of these 
special and compensatory education programs, the part of the federal government in financing 
education increased from 4.4% of total public educational expenditures in 1960 to 8% in 1970, 
which is roughly the percentage that the federal government provides today.18  Although ESEA 
was groundbreaking in defining a new role for the federal government in education, it may also 
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be seen as a continuation of the tradition of viewing education as an anti-poverty measure—a 
tradition which we have seen goes back to the early advocates of common schools and even to 
the older philanthropic tradition of charity schools.  In any case, while ESEA improved special 
and compensatory education programs, and had the effect of giving the federal government more 
leverage over educational policy, it did not alter the basic nature of the school-finance system in 
the United States, which continues to confer primary responsibility on state and local 
governments. 
B) Modernization and inequality 
As we have seen, when the state school systems coalesced into their basic modern forms in 
the mid-1800s, they assumed a decentralized and predominantly local organization under state 
auspices.  In part, this was simply due to the piecemeal history of their development.  In part, it 
was due to the dispersed agricultural character of American society.  But the desire of local 
communities to retain as much control as possible over their children’s education, as well as over 
their taxes, was also an important factor.  When the industrialization of the later nineteenth 
century began to increasingly concentrate wealth regionally, this decentralized system of 
financing schools led to significant inequalities between districts.  This inequality was 
exasperated because, at the same time, the provision of education was growing more expensive.  
Teaching was being professionalized, the number of years of schooling extended, and states 
sought to improve educational standards by imposing higher academic requirements on local 
schools.  One author from the period suggests that the costs of education doubled during the 
period from 1870 to 1900 (Cubberly 1905: 34).  As a consequence of these trends, some 





In fact, poorer districts often taxed themselves at many times the rate of wealthier districts and 
yet still received considerably less revenue per pupil.   
Initial attempts at the state level in the early twentieth century to ensure that all schools had 
the minimal funds for providing a basic education took the form of an improved and enhanced 
system of flat grants.  Flat grants are simply lump sum payments apportioned according to some 
criterion.  For example, in 1900 many states apportioned money according to the number of 
school-age children residing in a district.  E.P. Cubberley, who one of the first scholars to devote 
intense study to school finance, argued that states ought instead to apportion funds to schools on 
a per-teacher basis, as that would roughly track the number of children actually in school, while 
also giving local districts an incentive to improve their schools by hiring more faculty.  Although 
larger and more rationally apportioned flat grants did increase the funds available to the poorest 
schools, they did little to alter the fundamental inequality between rich and poor districts, since 
the funds were apportioned alike to all schools (Coons et al. 1970: 39-61; Odden and Picus 2008: 
276-282).   
In the 1920s states began to replace or supplement flat grants with foundation programs, first 
devised by George D. Strayer and Robert M. Haig.  In a typical foundation scheme, the state 
government guarantees every local school district a certain amount of revenue per pupil, the 
“foundation level,” on the condition that the district tax itself at least up to some minimal 
participation rate.  If the district does not raise the foundation level at the participation rate, then 
the state makes up the difference from general state revenues.  Central to the idea of a foundation 
program is that local districts are permitted to tax themselves in excess of the participation rate; 
these revenues remain in the district and do not count toward the foundation level.  In this way, it 





excess of the foundation level.  For example, suppose that the state foundation level is $500 per 
pupil and the participation property-tax rate is 2%.  Now suppose that the district of Flatfield 
would raise $400 at the participation rate, but since it chooses to tax itself at 3%, it actually raises 
$600 per pupil.  Under the foundation program, Flatfield would thus receive state revenues of 
$100 per pupil (the foundation level of $500 minus the amount Flatfield raised at the 
participation rate, $400).  Adding that $100 to the $600 that Flatfield raised through local taxes 
yields $700 per pupil. 
In theory, if a district raised more than the foundation level at the participation rate, then the 
state might recapture that “excess revenue” to help fund subsidies to poorer districts.  As before, 
revenues raised at tax rates higher than the participation rate in wealthy districts would remain in 
the local district.  Again, suppose that the foundation level is $500 per pupil and the participation 
tax rate is 2%.  Now the wealthy district Riverwood raises $1,000 per pupil at the participation 
rate, but goes ahead and taxes itself at the higher rate of 3% and raises in all $1500 per pupil.  If 
the foundation program recaptured excess revenues, then $500 ($1000-$500) would be 
redistributed to poorer districts like Flatfield; Riverwood would then keep total revenues of 
$1000 per pupil ($1500-$500).  But in practice recapturing is typically unpopular politically and 
is rarely implemented.19   
Unlike flat grants, foundation plans do have the potential to equalize revenues between 
districts to some extent.  Just how equalizing a foundation plan is depends on the details of the 
plan’s design.  If the foundation is set at a high level, such that few districts can reach that level 
at the participation tax-rate, then the plan tends to level out differences between districts.  It is 
                                                          






even more equalizing if, in addition, there is a high participation rate, such that few districts 
choose to tax themselves any further.  On the other hand, low foundation levels, or low 
participation rates, will be much less equalizing (Coons et al. 1970: ch. 3-5).  As a matter of 
historical record, foundation levels were not very high in most states until the wave of court 
challenges beginning in the late 1960s.  Moreover, they were often set in a relatively arbitrary 
way, more sensitive to available state revenues and the balance of political power than to any 
particular educational purpose (Minorini and Sugarman 1999b).   
11.3  Three Waves of Court Challenges to School-Finance Systems 
A)  The First Wave:  Education and Equal Protection 
By the 1960s many advocates of school-finance reform despaired of attaining their ends 
through legislative means, since those who were most disadvantaged by the status quo, the poor, 
were also those with the least clout in state legislatures.  As John Coons and his coauthors put it 
in 1970, “the testimony of seventy years of frustration of legislative reform strongly confirms the 
futility of political commotion at the state level.” They depicted the status quo as a political 
“logjam” of vested interests which only the courts could break.  In doing so, the judiciary would 
liberate democratic processes to consider reasonable alternatives (Coons et al. 1970: 293-294). 
The legal strategy was to argue that state school-finance systems which produced large inter-
district inequalities by relying substantially on local property-tax revenues violated the right of 
children in poorer districts to equal protection under the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Lying in the background, of course, was the precedent of Brown v. Board of 
Education, where the Supreme Court had ruled that legally segregated schools violated the Equal 





understood to have been a case primarily about racial segregation.  On that reading, it was at 
most tangentially related to the school-finance question—although some reformers did see 
school-finance reform as a continuation of the civil rights struggle, given that Blacks and other 
minorities disproportionately lived in poorer districts.  But one could also understand Brown to 
have been a case about equal educational opportunity.  In a famous central passage, Brown 
seemed to define the nature of state and local governments’ responsibilities in education: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.  
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both 
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.  It 
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities even in the armed 
forces.  It is the very foundation of good citizenship.  Today it is a principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him to adjust normally to his 
environment.  In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity to an education.  Such an opportunity, 
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to 
all on equal terms.20 
Perhaps it could be argued that decentralized school-finance systems failed to make educational 
opportunity available to all on equal terms and in that way violated the Equal Protection clause.   
When does a law violate the Equal Protection clause?  The original impetus behind the Equal 
Protection clause was, of course, to forbid state governments from invidiously denying Blacks 
the same legal rights accorded to whites; thus, the clause embodies the basic liberal right to 
equality under the law.  But courts quickly discovered that in a complex and heterogeneous 
society, the law is bound to treat and impact individuals in different ways depending on their 
circumstances.  Therefore, Equal Protection jurisprudence has faced the difficult task of 
navigating a path between, on the one hand, undue interference with the discretion of 
                                                          





democratically elected legislatures, and on the other hand, eviscerating the substantive 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The approach American jurisprudence has adopted is 
to apply two different standards, depending on the characteristics of the case.21  In most cases, 
particularly those involving economic regulation, the Court is deferential to the legislature and 
only requires that the law employ reasonable means toward accomplishing a rational state policy.  
Under this “rational basis” test, the state does not have to prove that the law employs the most 
reasonable means, nor that the purpose of the law is particularly wise or enlightened.  But the 
Supreme Court has also found it appropriate to carve out an inner circle of cases to be given 
special “strict scrutiny.”  These are cases in which a law either abridges a constitutionally 
protected fundamental right, or where it invokes a classification, like race or religion, that is 
“suspect” because of historical patterns of prejudice.  Under the strict scrutiny test, the state must 
show that the law is in pursuit of an extremely important or “compelling state interest” and that 
there is no less discriminatory or restrictive means of pursuing that interest.  Where the rational 
basis test is employed, laws are seldom declared unconstitutional, whereas they are often 
overturned under the strict scrutiny test.   
The first high-profile case to attack the local financing of schools on equal protection 
grounds was McInnis v. Shapiro in 1968.  The plaintiffs argued that, because education was so 
fundamental an interest, as the Brown decision had recognized, the school-finance laws of 
Illinois should be held to the standard of strict scrutiny.  Held to that standard, the plaintiffs 
argued that the school-finance system must be declared unconstitutional, because the 
“classifications upon which students … receive the benefits of a certain level of per pupil 
                                                          






educational expenditures are not related to the educational needs of the students and are therefore 
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.”  The federal district court, however, rejected this 
argument.  The court declined to apply the strict scrutiny test, apparently on the ground that “the 
allocation of public revenues is a basic policy question more appropriately handled by a 
legislature than a court.”  Then the court ruled that the inequalities in the Illinois school finance 
system were an inevitable part of giving local communities control over education and taxes, and 
that local control of schools is a rational state policy.  Such inequalities were not the result of 
intentional, invidious discrimination.  As the Court observed:   
[D]elegation of authority to school districts appears designed to allow individual 
localities to determine their own tax burden according to the importance which they place 
upon public schools.  Moreover, local citizens must select which municipal services they 
value most highly.  While some communities might place heavy emphasis on schools, 
others may cherish police protection or improved roads.  The state legislature’s decision 
to allow local choice and experimentation is reasonable, especially since the common 
school fund assures a minimum of $40 per student.22 
Additionally, the court held that the plaintiff’s proposed standard of apportioning funds on the 
basis of educational needs was too vague for courts to determine whether or not the standard had 
been met.  In legal jargon, the need-standard was held to be “nonjusticiable.”   
At about the same time as the McInnis case was unfolding, the legal scholars John Coons, 
William Clune, and Stephen Sugarman (1970) were developing a slightly different Equal 
Protection argument.  Like the plaintiffs in McInnis, they argued that school-finance cases should 
be held to the standard of strict scrutiny, in part because education was so fundamental an 
interest.  But the Coons team wanted to be able to accommodate the plausible argument that 
states had a rational interest in giving local communities significant control over the funding of 
                                                          





their schools.  It was important, therefore, to avoid arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment 
required some narrowly defined school-finance formula, like equal expenditures per pupil or 
apportionment on the basis of educational need, which would be incompatible with local control.  
Moreover, in light of the McInnis decision’s rejection of the educational needs standard, it was 
necessary to find a standard that was manageable for a court to apply.  The Coons team argued 
that a state-finance system (including the state laws governing local taxation) may not apportion 
funds on the basis of any suspect classification and that district wealth should be recognized as a 
suspect classification.  Hence Equal Protection requires that the quality of public education in a 
district not be a function of that district’s wealth.  If some schools are better funded than others 
because of the tax preferences of local voters, that would be acceptable.  What is unacceptable is 
a school-finance system that legally empowered rich districts to raise more revenue per pupil 
than poor districts at the same level of tax effort.  In short, what the Fourteenth Amendment 
required of state school-finance systems is fiscal neutrality. 
Fiscal neutrality could be made compatible with local control through what Coons and 
coauthors called a “power-equalization” scheme.  Under such a scheme, the state would use its 
general revenues to guarantee that every local district can operate as if it had the same tax base 
per pupil as some key district—ideally, but not necessarily, the wealthiest district.  For example, 
suppose that the per-pupil property assessment of the state’s wealthiest district, Riverwood, is 
$10,000, and that the per-pupil assessment of Flatfield is $8000.  The residents of Flatfield 
decide to tax themselves at a rate of 1%, so they locally raise $800 per pupil.  But since the state 





Flatfield an additional $200 from statewide revenues.23  It is important to note that the principle 
of fiscal neutrality does not require that a state implement power equalization.  Fiscal neutrality 
would also be satisfied by a centralized state financing system which apportioned revenues on an 
equal per pupil basis, on the basis of need, etc.  Power equalization is only required by the 
principle of fiscal neutrality where there is significant financing through local taxes.  The 
concept of power equalization is important to the Equal Protection argument, however, for it 
shows that there is a way of giving local districts significant control over school finance, which 
does not discriminate on the basis of district wealth.  Indeed, the Coons team argued that if states 
really cared about local control, then power equalization was the only way to give poorer 
districts real power to improve their schools.    
The most innovative part of the Equal Protection case for fiscal neutrality is the claim that 
district wealth constitutes a suspect classification.  The Coons team pointed out that there were 
two other areas in which the Supreme Court had held that the Constitution protected citizens 
against differential treatment on the basis of wealth.  First, the Supreme Court had held that 
states could not make the basic rights of criminal defendants conditional on their ability to pay 
for services.  In particular, states could not require indigent defendants to pay for a court 
transcript, since that effectively denied them the right to appeal the verdict of the case; 
additionally, states were required to appoint counsel for defendants who could not afford to pay 
legal fees.24  Second, states could not make voting conditional on the ability of citizens to pay a 
poll tax.25  The Coons team argued that the child’s interest in education was of comparable 
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importance to the rights of criminal defendants and voters.  Whereas most citizens will never be 
criminal defendants, every citizen is legally compelled to go to school for the greater part of 
childhood.  And like voting, education is fundamental to democratic society.  Echoing the 
republican arguments articulated by early advocates of public education like Thomas Jefferson, 
Coons and his co-authors maintained that 
All political behavior inevitably must reflect the presence or absence of education.  A 
man’s understanding of public issues is a function of those communications which are 
intelligible to him…. If society’s stake in the preservation of the ‘voting interest’ really is 
broader than protecting the mechanical act of pulling a lever … education must be 
viewed as a crucial interest.  The model of the voting citizen, we trust, is not one of 
passive absorption and Pavlovian reaction; it is the model of response and participation, 
a role for which education is the fundamental preparation (1970: 372).   
Hence, just as it was discriminatory to make the right to vote conditional on wealth, the Coons 
team argued that it was discriminatory to make the quality of our preparation for democratic 
citizenship conditional on wealth. 
The fiscal neutrality argument was accepted by the California Supreme Court in 1971.  In 
Serrano v. Priest, plaintiffs—who claimed “to represent a class consisting of all public school 
pupils in California, ‘except children in that school district, the identity of which is presently 
unknown, which school district affords the greatest educational opportunity of all school districts 
within California’”—argued that the state’s reliance on local property taxes was in violation of 
their Equal Protection rights.26  The court observed that the tax bases did vary widely across the 
state: “in 1969-1970, for example, the assessed valuation per unit of average daily attendance of 
elementary school children ranged from a low of $103 to a peak of $952,156—a ratio of nearly 1 
                                                          





to 10,000.”27  Moreover, these inequalities in tax bases led poorer districts to tax themselves at 
high rates for comparatively low revenue yields.  “For example, Baldwin Park citizens, who paid 
a school tax of $5.48 per $100 of assessed valuation in 1968-1969, were able to spend less than 
half as much on education as Beverly Hills residents, who were taxed only $2.38 per $100.”28  
Accepting that education is a fundamental right and that district wealth constituted a suspect 
class, the court in Serrano held that the California school-finance laws should be held to the 
standard of strict scrutiny.  It roundly rejected the argument, accepted in McInnis, that the 
inequalities were a necessary consequence of a policy favoring local control.  It held that the 
pretense of local control is a “cruel illusion”: “Far from being necessary to promote local fiscal 
choice, the present financing system actually deprives the less wealthy districts of that option.”29  
Hence, employing the language of the Coons team, the court in Serrano ruled:   
We have determined that [the California public school financing system] invidiously 
discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a child’s education a 
function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors.  Recognizing as we must that the 
right to an education in our public schools is a fundamental interest which cannot be 
conditioned on wealth, we can discern no compelling purpose necessitating the present 
method of financing.”30   
B) The First Wave Collapses:  San Antonio v. Rodriguez 
The legal victory for advocates of school-finance reform marked by Serrano was short-lived.  
Only eighteen months after Serrano was decided, a similar case from Texas reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court as San Antonio v. Rodriguez.  Like Illinois and California, Texas financed its 
schools through local property taxes and a state-wide foundation program.  In a 5-4 decision, the 
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majority denied that the inequalities that arose from the system of local financing violated the 
Equal Protection clause.  The Court held that it was not appropriate to hold the school-finance 
laws of Texas to strict judicial scrutiny, and that, when held to the appropriate rational basis 
standard, the Texas financing system was reasonably related to the legitimate state interest in 
promoting local control over schools.   
The argument that the strict scrutiny standard was inappropriate had three parts.  First, the 
Court rejected the idea that district wealth counted as a suspect class.  Where the Supreme Court 
had previously recognized the presence of wealth discrimination, these had been cases where 
indigent individuals were absolutely deprived of some essential benefit like the right to a court 
transcript, the right to defense counsel, or the right to vote.  But the members of the class 
allegedly being discriminated against in Rodriguez had not been shown to be indigent; indeed, 
they had not even been shown to be individually poor at all.  The attempt to define a suspect 
class on the basis of characteristics of a district, rather than characteristics of individuals, marked 
a significant departure from previous wealth-discrimination cases.  Moreover, the majority was 
disturbed by how large and amorphous the suspect class was.  In the Court’s opinion, Justice 
Powell observed with some trepidation that the plaintiffs in Serrano claimed to represent every 
child in the state of California, except those in the unidentified district that had the highest per 
pupil property assessment.  To recognize a group that incorporated the vast majority of the 
population of schoolchildren potentially marked a dramatic transformation of previous 
discrimination jurisprudence.  The plaintiffs in Rodriguez had claimed to act on behalf of a more 
modestly delimited group—those “schoolchildren throughout the State who are members of 
minority groups or who are poor and reside in school districts having a low property base.”  But 





and it denied that all members of minority groups lived in poor districts.  Just as important, the 
plaintiffs had not shown that anyone had been absolutely deprived of an education.  At most they 
received an education of lower quality than children in wealthier districts.  The Court argued that 
“where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or 
precisely equal advantages.”31  Indeed, this seems particularly apt of the law regarding state-
appointed defense counsel. 
The second argument against invoking strict scrutiny was that the case did not involve a 
fundamental right.  The Court argued that the “fundamental importance” of a child’s interest in 
education was not the proper test as to whether it should count as a fundamental right for the 
purposes of Equal Protection; the sole question was whether it was explicitly or implicitly 
protected by the U.S. Constitution.  Since education is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution, 
the majority ruled that it was not a fundamental right.  The plaintiffs had argued that education 
was a fundamental right, because it is so essential to exercising explicitly mentioned 
constitutional rights, like the freedom of speech, the ability to benefit from a free press, as well 
as the right to vote.  This argument features prominently in Justice Marshall’s long dissent in 
Rodriguez.  He agreed that not all important or fundamental interests are constitutionally 
protected, and that the fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment “should be 
firmly rooted in the text of the Constitution.”  But Marshall argued that 
The task in every case should be to determine the extent to which constitutionally 
guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned in the Constitution.  As the 
nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest 
draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of 
                                                          





judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be 
adjusted accordingly.32 
While the majority appears to have been skeptical of this argument, they granted the premise that 
some “identifiable quantum of education” may be necessary in order to meaningfully exercise 
these constitutional rights.  But the majority denied that the U.S. Constitution could be 
interpreted to guarantee “the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice,” and, 
once again, they pointed out that the plaintiffs had not established that the basic education that 
Texas did guarantee to all “fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic 
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the 
political process.” 33     
The third argument against applying strict scrutiny to Texas’s school-finance laws was that 
the case involved, not some straightforward abridgement of individual rights, but complicated 
policy questions about how a state will raise and disburse tax revenues.  Echoing McInnis, the 
Court held that such matters of public policy are better handled, however imperfectly, by 
legislatures than by the judiciary.  Moreover, the Court feared that interfering with the way a 
state devolved powers on local governments would constitute a serious violation of the principle 
of federalism, which respects the state’s broad authority to run its own affairs as delimited in the 
Federal Constitution. 
Having disposed, to its satisfaction, of the argument for applying strict scrutiny, the Court 
asked whether the Texas school-finance system at least had a rational basis in legitimate state 
interests.  In this respect, too, the Court essentially followed McInnis in deeming the state’s 
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system a reasonable response to the interest in giving local communities power over education.  
The Court observed that “direct control over decisions vitally affecting the education of one’s 
children is a need that is strongly felt in our society.”34  And part of local control, Justice Powell 
urged, means “the freedom to devote more money to the education of one’s children.”  But 
vesting control over education in local communities also offers citizens more freedom to 
participate in decision-making as to how tax dollars will be spent:  “Each locality is free to tailor 
local programs to local needs.  Pluralism also affords some opportunity for experimentation, 
innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.”  In this respect, Justice Powell 
found an analogy to the U.S. Federal system, in which each state may “serve as a laboratory and 
try novel social and economic experiments.”35 
Finally, the Court rebutted the charge that the inequalities in the Texas school-finance system 
were arbitrary in a discriminatory or invidious way.  Of course, there was a sense in which the 
inequalities that emerged from decentralized decision-making were arbitrary.  “But any scheme 
of local taxation—indeed the very existence of identifiable local governmental units—requires 
the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary.”  This kind of 
arbitrariness, however, could hardly be said to constitute discrimination against any class.  
Moreover, the Court worried that a decision for the plaintiffs might endanger the constitutional 
legitimacy of all local government:  “[I]f local taxation for local expenditures were an 
unconstitutional method of providing for education, then it might be an equally impermissible 
means of providing other necessary services customarily financed largely from local property 
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taxes, including local police and fire protection, public health and hospitals, and public utility 
facilities of various kinds.”36  Notably, Justice White dissented from this line of argument.  He 
allowed that local control was a legitimate state aim, but (similar to the court in Serrano) he 
denied that the Texas school-finance system was a means rationally related means to 
accomplishing that aim, since the ability of local communities to improve their schools was an 
option only realistically available to the richer districts.  Justice Marshall also questioned 
whether Texas could invoke the interest in local control in good faith, given that “statewide laws 
regulate … the most minute details of local public education,” including required courses, 
approved textbooks, teacher qualifications, and the length of the school day.”37 
C) The Second Wave of Court Challenges:  Equity and State Constitutions 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez put to rest the legal argument that inequalities in 
state school-finance laws were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and ended the attempt 
to force school-finance reform throughout the country in a single action.  It did not, however, end 
court challenges to school-finance systems altogether.  Now plaintiffs argued that funding 
inequalities between districts were in violation of state constitutions.  They did so on two 
grounds.  First, most state constitutions have their own Equal Protection Clauses, and it was 
recognized that states might interpret equal protection differently than had the Federal 
Government.  Moreover, unlike the Federal Constitution, education is mentioned in every state 
constitution, so there should be no difficulty in establishing that education is a fundamental right 
in the state context.  It was on this basis that the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its initial 
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Serrano v. Priest decision in Serrano II.38  Second, the education clauses of some state 
constitutions might be interpreted independently of the Equal Protection clauses as guaranteeing 
“some degree of equity in educational funding or opportunity”  (Minorini and Sugarman 1999a: 
43).  Many state constitutions guarantee that the state will provide a “thorough and efficient” or 
“general and uniform” system of schools.  The Constitution of Montana goes so far as to say that 
“It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education which will develop the full 
educational potential of each person. Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each 
person of the state."39  It was on the sole basis of the education clause that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court found the state’s school-finance system unconstitutional in Robinson v. Cahill.  
These victories marked the beginning of the second wave of court challenges to school-finance 
systems, which now appealed to state constitutions instead of the Federal Constitution.  In all, 
plaintiffs were successful about half the time.  While some states followed California and New 
Jersey in finding school-finance systems to be unconstitutional, several others endorsed 
arguments similar to those invoked by the majority in Rodriguez and upheld the school-finance 
laws.   
The fate of the California school-system after Serrano II is worthy of note at this juncture, 
since it is often invoked in debates about the politics of educational equity.  At first, the state 
legislature enacted a power-equalization scheme similar to that proposed by the Coons team.  
But soon afterwards, California voters passed by referendum the tax-relief measure Proposition 
13.  This law limited property tax rates to 1 percent of the assessed value; permitted the assessed 
value of real property to respond to rates of inflation not in excess of 2 percent annually; 
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permitted property to be reassessed only upon sale or improvement; forbade the state legislature 
from levying a state-wide property tax; and required all further tax increases to pass by a two-
thirds super-majority in the legislature.  These constraints made it fiscally impossible for the 
state to implement the power-equalization scheme, so the legislature instead enacted a new plan 
that replaced most local financing with state-financing.  The new system succeeded in 
substantially equalizing the expenditures between districts, but Proposition 13 has substantially 
slowed growth in educational spending.  As a consequence, California went from being one of 
the highest spending states on education to becoming one of the lowest.  Although the lessons to 
be drawn from  experience of California are hotly debated, it is often cited as an example of how 
voters will typically respond to attempts to equalize educational spending—namely, by leveling 
down.40 
D) The Third Wave of Court Challenges:  Adequacy 
Equity-based challenges to school-finance system continued through the 1970s and 1980s.  
At least five factors, however, encouraged plaintiffs at the end of the 1980s to start casting 
around for a new legal new strategy which focused not on fiscal equity but on the adequacy of 
the state educational system.  First, the rate of victories for plaintiffs in equity cases slowed.  
From 1980 through 1988, only two states invalidated their school-finance systems, while eight 
upheld them as constitutional (Minorini and Sugarman 1999a: 55).  Many courts interpreted the 
state education clause as guaranteeing, not equal funding, but only an adequate or sound basic 
education for every district.  Second, in 1983 the National Commission on Excellence in 
Education published an influential report, A Nation at Risk, arguing that American 
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schoolchildren were falling behind their peers in other countries.  This led many education 
experts to emphasize the importance of improving achievement, raising standards, and increasing 
accountability.  Third, in light of the experience of California, many argued that equality in 
school financing is consistent with equally lousy schools.  This suggested that, if the goal was 
improving education, and not just equalizing the dollars spent per pupil, then a more outcome-
oriented principle was needed.  Fourth, a related point, some were disenchanted with the openly 
redistributive emphasis of equity-based arguments.  Perhaps it would be better to focus instead 
on improving the education of all, which would be more in keeping with the political mood since 
A Nation at Risk anyway.  Fifth and finally, some believed that power-equalization failed to 
address the fact that urban districts, even if they received funds comparable to suburban districts, 
faced higher educational costs due to students with special needs, and had to provide many other 
services from their property taxes which competed with education.   
The new legal strategy, the “adequacy” approach, first crystallized in 1989 when the 
Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated the state’s school-finance system in Rose v. Council for 
Better Education.  The court held that the Kentucky Constitution, which held that the state shall 
“provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the state,” required the state to 
provide equal opportunity to every child for an adequate education, and that the evidence 
revealed that schools of Kentucky were inadequate as measured by national standards.  Providing 
a uniformly efficient education to all children of the state is consistent, the Court ruled, with 
local communities supplementing the state system through local taxes, but the final responsibility 
for guaranteeing that all children receive at least an adequate education must rest with the state.  





legislature to adopt any specific measures, it did try to provide general standards by which an 
adequate educational system could be measured:  
An efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each and every child 
with at least the seven following capacities:  (i) sufficient oral and written communication 
skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) 
sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to 
make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to 
enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and 
nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical 
wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or 
her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced 
training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and 
pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills 
to enable public school students to compete favorably in surrounding states, in academics 
or in the job market.41 
To its advocates, the adequacy approach has several advantages over the equity approach.  
With its focus on educational outcomes, rather than fiscal equity, the adequacy approach would 
seem to prevent a state from, in effect, washing its hands of failing schools, so long as those 
schools received the same funds that more successful schools received.  It also promised to 
foreclose another California scenario, by which a state remedied fiscal inequality essentially by 
leveling down.  On the adequacy approach, equalizing the funding between districts would have 
be pointless unless it actually improved the educational outcomes of some children.   
To some extent, the adequacy approach resembles the needs-based approach deployed by the 
plaintiffs in McInnis.  For example, it would take into account the varying needs of different 
students and the different circumstances of different districts.  The most significant difference 
between the adequacy and the needs-based approaches is that adequacy does not condemn all 
                                                          





inequalities between districts which are not based on educational needs; it only insists that basic 
educational needs be met.  In practice, this might be accomplished either by redistributing funds 
from richer districts to poorer ones, or by increasing overall educational funding—the advantage 
of the latter option being that no one’s education suffers and is, besides, more politically viable.   
Also noteworthy is the claim by its advocates that the adequacy approach may also be more 
suitable than the fiscal-equity approach for taking into account so-called intangibles, like the 
benefits of having higher-achieving classmates.42  This matter of educational intangibles 
hearkens back to a central issue Brown.  As you would expect, segregated schools were dismally 
provisioned for most of their history.  But this changed just before Brown.  In the 1940s, the 
Supreme Court had already declared segregated professional schools in state universities to be 
unconstitutional, on the grounds that they were not really equal to the facilities provided for 
whites.  Southern states saw the writing on the wall, and in a final effort to prove their good faith 
in the “separate but equal” standard laid down in Plessy v. Ferguson, they began to pump money 
into schools for Blacks in the early 1950s.  Some states even spent more on schools for Blacks 
than on those for whites.  Therefore, by the time that Brown reached the Supreme Court, 
“substantial equality” between Black and white schools had been achieved.  As the Court 
observed in its opinion:     
Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools 
involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, 
qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other ‘tangible’ factors.  Our decision, 
therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and 
white schools involved in each of the cases.43   
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Therefore, the decision instead turned on the intangible factors inherent in segregation:  
To separate [schoolchildren] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because 
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may 
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone…. ‘Segregation with 
the sanction of law… has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development 
of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a 
racial[ly] integrated school system.’44 
One appeal of the adequacy approach, therefore, is that, by focusing on educational objectives, it 
can potentially take intangible factors into account as Brown did—factors which would be 
invisible on the fiscal equity approach (cf. Satz 2007).  Some advocates even hope that focusing 
on intangible factors within an adequacy framework could provide a viable legal strategy for 
attacking de facto racial segregation at the state level, which has proved resistant to the 
traditional federal Equal Protection challenges modeled on Brown.45 
Since the decision in Rose, court challenges to school-finance systems have significantly 
shifted from the equity to the adequacy approach, and several state high courts have followed 
Kentucky in invalidating their school-finance systems on adequacy grounds.  In other states, 
however, school finance systems have withstood adequacy challenges.  Interestingly,  some 
states have held that the adequacy standard is too vague to be justiciable, thus echoing the 
decision in McInnis.   
11.4  Conclusion 
The rise of public schools and of compulsory universal education, as well as the end of 
segregation, may properly be understood as moments in what Talcott Parsons has called the 
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educational revolution: “the first attempt in history to give large populations as a whole a 
substantial level of formal education.”  Thus, the educational revolution may be set aside the 
related industrial and democratic revolutions as one of the central social transformations of 
modernity (Parsons 1967: 409).  And like the social disturbances of those other revolutions, the 
disturbances created by the educational revolution have brought in their train difficult questions 
of social philosophy.  Perhaps the most fundamental is:  Who has responsibility and authority for 
the education of children?  The great early modern philosophers of education, Locke and 
Rousseau, never really questioned the premise that responsibility and authority over education 
vested in parents and their delegates.  One of the general tendencies of the educational revolution 
has been a shift of responsibility and authority from parents, and secondarily from religious 
associations, to various levels of government.  That some such shift is appropriate is subject to 
broad, though not universal, consensus.  But how to articulate the principles lying behind the 
new balance of power is immensely controversial.   
This question about authority and responsibility is closely bound up as well with questions 
about the proper goals of education.  When authority over education was held almost entirely by 
the parents, there was relatively little friction over what children ought to be taught or how much 
ought to be spent on education.  But as authority is dispersed across various agencies, 
disagreements about the content and extent of education become endemic.  The public schools 
are the frontlines in the culture wars, and not uncommonly a theater for battles over economic 
inequality. 
Let me close by briefly expanding on the problem of inequality, since it is the focus of the 
following chapters.  When education was primarily a function of parental authority, there was 





provided for its children would differ from that of another.  The primary question was what 
minimal education every child ought to receive—if not from his parents, then from the 
philanthropic members of the community.  The answers given were various, but they typically 
pointed to moral and religious education, as well as training for an occupation or station in life.  
As literacy and numeracy assumed greater economic and political importance, governments 
began to take measures to ensure that children from all families had access to at least some 
formal schooling.  Given the conditions and traditions of nineteenth-century America, these 
measures, as we have seen, were typically decentralized and local in character.  One 
consequence of state intervention was to increase expectations that children would receive equal 
educations, seeing as they were equal citizens.  Not only do government inputs to education 
become politicized, but educational outcomes do as well.  Whereas before, differences in 
educational outcomes had seemed like a natural phenomenon, the state increasingly seems 
implicated in their creation.46  And at the same time, the decentralized structure of the school 
system inevitably produces new inequalities, just as individual families have always done. 
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CHAPTER 12:  THE PHILOSOPHER’S GUIDE TO DISTRIBUTIVE 
CONCEPTS IN EDUCATION 
12.1  Introduction 
There are at least two literatures relevant to thinking about conceptions of distributive justice 
in education:  the field of school finance in law and public economics, and the field of 
distributive justice in political philosophy.  Both literatures provide useful conceptual tools for 
thinking about fairness in the distribution of education, but unfortunately they remain largely 
uninformed by one another.  The aim of this chapter is to provide a conceptual framework that 
integrates some of the conceptual apparatus of each of these two disciplines, particularly with a 
view to facilitating discussion amongst political philosophers about justice in the domain of 
education.   
12.2  Three Dimensions of Principles:  Metrics, Rules, and Scope 
Political philosophers have devoted much attention to the task of distinguishing and 
articulating various principles of justice, which might be mistaken for one another, or whose 
deep structural similarities might be overlooked.  Three dimensions of a principle can be 
distinguished.  First, there is the question of the metric, “currency,” or “distribuendum” of 
distributive justice.  This issue has, as it happens, been most thoroughly explored in debates 





resources, Rawlsian primary goods, capabilities, etc.?1  These are examples of the various 
metrics that a distributive principle might employ.  The metric measures individuals’ distributive 
shares.  Of course, some “shares” (like resources or primary goods) are more literally distributed 
or redistributed than others, which are really desirable consequences of distributions (like 
welfare or capabilities).  Nonetheless, I will adopt the common, looser way of talking and speak 
of all shares as being distributed.   
The second dimension of a principle is what I will call the rule.  For any given metric, we 
might maintain that we ought to maximize aggregate shares, equalize shares, maximize the 
shares of the smallest holder (what is often called “maximin” or “priority for the worst off”), 
equalize initial shares, and so on.2  By themselves, both metrics and rules are incomplete; when 
they are combined in a particular way, I will speak of principles.  Although they are logically 
independent of one another, some rules and metrics tend to go together in the most common 
principles.  For example, classical utilitarians hold that we ought to maximize welfare; Rawls 
holds that we ought to maximize the primary goods of the worst-off group; and Dworkin holds 
that we ought to equalize initial holdings of resources.  Although it is useful to distinguish 
between metrics and rules, more complex principles might be decomposed in different ways.  
For example, we might describe the principle of “equal opportunity for welfare” as composed of 
the somewhat recondite metric “opportunity for welfare” and the simple rule “equality,” or 
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alternatively, as composed of the simple metric “welfare” and the more sophisticated rule “equal 
opportunity.”3  Nothing of substance turns on such notational variants.   
The third dimension of a principle is its scope.  Many traditional discussions of social justice 
assumed that principles of justice apply only within the nation-state.4  But over the last thirty 
years, several writers have argued that the proper scope of distributive justice is global,5 while 
some feminists have argued that principles of justice ought to be applied on a smaller scale to 
individual families as well (notably Okin 1989).  These are debates about a principle’s proper 
scope.       
12.3  Metrics in the Distribution of Education 
When we turn to the distribution of education, we can likewise characterize various 
distributive principles across the dimensions of metric, rule, and scope.  I discuss metrics in this 
section and rules in the next.  The dimension of scope does not receive its own section, but is 
discussed at various points along the way. 
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of metric, or distribuendum, in education:  inputs and 
outcomes.  The labels, I trust, are relatively transparent.  Inputs are roughly factors that go into a 
person’s education, while outcomes are results or (as economists sometimes say) “products” of 
the educational process.  Let us now examine these two metrics in more detail.      
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A)  Inputs 
The most straightforward input-metric, and the one that features most prominently in the 
history of school finance, is dollar-expenditure-per-pupil.  For instance, court challenges to the 
equity of school-finance systems (like Serrano v. Priest and San Antonio v. Rodriguez) have 
often turned on the large inequalities in per-pupil expenditure between districts (see 11.3.A,B).  
But one might measure inputs in other ways as well.  For instance, since resources (e.g., 
transportation and building costs or teacher salaries) have different costs in different regions and 
neighborhoods, one might measure inputs, not in monetary terms, but in terms of what money 
can buy.  For instance, in one influential work, “educational resources” are defined as “those 
services and goods, such as teachers, guidance counselors, textbooks, and libraries, which are 
used in schools” (Wise 1968: 143 n. 1).  Sometimes school-finance writers take into account the 
different prices of various educational resources by speaking of “price-adjusted costs.”6  
Although it is rare in the school-finance literature, philosophers sometimes take rather 
broader views of inputs.  For example, the other children in the school might be considered an 
intangible resource made available to individual students.  Thus, Brian Barry argues that “One of 
the things that makes a school ‘good’ is having middle-class children in it, because of the 
personal resources they bring to it: middle-class articulacy, middle-class ambitions, and so on” 
(2005: 64).  On this view, then, even if schools were equal in all other tangible factors, different 
compositions of the student body may deprive some children of crucial educational inputs.  Since 
intangibles are by their very nature difficult to measure as inputs, school-finance economists who 
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want to take them into account tend to shift to more outcome-oriented metrics.  Here is a second 
example of a broad conception of inputs:  In order to take into account the special needs of 
students with disabilities, Harry Brighouse suggests we think of inputs as “effective educational 
resources,” where resources are effective for a particular student only if she can actually benefit 
from them.  Thus, a deaf child is not given effective educational resources if she is put in a 
classroom without a teacher or aid who is trained to communicate with the hearing impaired 
(2000: 139).  The notion of effective educational resources reveals the tight conceptual 
connection between inputs and outcomes.  Inputs produce outcomes.  If a resource did not tend 
to improve educational outcomes in some way, then it generally wouldn’t qualify as an 
educational input.7  In that sense, outcomes seem to be conceptually prior to inputs.       
Another conception of resource-inputs that might occur to some philosophers is to treat a 
person’s native capacities or endowments as “internal resources,” in the way suggested by 
Ronald Dworkin (1980b; 2000: ch. 2).  On this view, true resource equality is inconsistent with 
devoting the equal bundles of external resources to people with unequal internal resources; 
instead, those with fewer internal resources ought to be compensated with more external 
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resources.8  Applied to the domain of education, this approach seems to stretch the notion of 
resource-inputs near, if not beyond, the breaking point, but it is not an incoherent view. 
The dimension of scope is particularly important for thinking about input-metrics, since 
inputs come from different sources.  Consider, for example, a system in which states aid local 
districts by making unconditional flat grants on a per-pupil basis.  If one looked at the state 
grants in isolation, one might say that they are fair, since the state is treating every district 
equally.  But if one instead focused on the total local and state expenditure per pupil, one might 
be led to say that the system is unfair because the system as a whole is disadvantageous to poorer 
districts.9  Since the states have primary legal responsibility for education in the United States, 
school-finance experts usually restrict their scope to the distribution of total state and local 
expenditures between districts within particular states.  However, one might well take a wider 
perspective by looking at disparities between states, or (conceivably) even between different 
countries.  On the other hand, one could also examine equity in more fine-grained terms.  
School-finance theorists typically focus on equity between districts, because districts are the 
basic administrative entities and thus their fiscal information is the most readily available.  But 
one might also look at disparities between schools within a district.  This is especially important 
if some neighborhoods attract teachers with more seniority or if magnet schools with selective 
admissions policies are better resourced than other schools in the district.  Finally, one could 
examine the inputs devoted to each student.  Schools receive more funding for disabled, 
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bilingual, or economically disadvantaged children, on the premise that their education is more 
costly.  It is also common for schools and districts to devote more resources to gifted students or 
to college-prep programs—especially in the form of smaller class sizes. 
Since school finance is often treated as a sub-discipline of public economics, inputs are 
usually understood to be restricted in scope to public inputs.  In this context, input equity means 
equity in the public funds devoted to public schools.  Political philosophers, however, are likely 
to be interested in private educational inputs as well.  After all, one central argument for the 
institution of public schools is to counter-balance the privilege of private education that is 
inaccessible to less wealthy families.  I shall refer to narrow-scope principles as those that 
encompass only public inputs and wide-scope principles as those that encompass public and 
private inputs.  For convenience, private inputs may be divided into three categories: (i) private 
inputs to public schools, (ii) private inputs to private schools, and (iii) private inputs to informal 
education.  Let’s examine these briefly in turn.   
(i)  First, public funds often do not exhaust the revenues received by public schools.  Public 
schools may receive supplementary resources from private charities, private companies, or from 
voluntary parental donations.  Many parents also donate their time in volunteering as assistants 
in the classroom.  All of these supplementary inputs can raise questions of fairness.  For instance, 
although Parent Teacher Association groups have traditionally raised extra revenues for schools 
through events like bake sales, private “boosterism” occasionally takes on much larger 
proportions.  In Greenwich Village, parents wanted to use voluntary contributions to hire an 
additional teacher in order to reduce class sizes in their school.  As it turned out, they were 
prevented from doing so by the New York City school board (Kozol 2005: 46-49).  One could 





unfair, or because one thought it might set a bad precedent and compromise the public character 
of the school system, with wealthy parents eventually voting for lower taxes and contributing 
private money directly to their children’s schools. 
(ii) Next there are private inputs to private schools in the form of tuitions, donations, or 
funding from religious organizations.  Much of the school-finance literature simply ignores 
private schools.  Egalitarian political philosophers, on the other hand, are likely to be very 
concerned about significant disparities between public and private schools.  R.H. Tawney, for 
example, held that the English private schools (the so-called “public schools”) were one of the 
two central pillars of social inequality in England (the other being the inheritance of wealth).  Of 
course, the distinction between public and private schools is complicated by the fact that, under 
some systems, privately administered schools can receive public funds.  For example, in many 
countries, religious schools are publicly funded.  In the United States, charter schools are 
privately administered and partially funded by the state.  Additionally, some advocates of school-
choice argue that parents ought to be given vouchers which they could spend at the accredited 
school of their choice (cf. Friedman 1961: ch. VI).  This suggests one strategy for equalizing 
inputs between private and public schools: one might use vouchers to publicly fund privately 
administered schools, but block all private supplements to them (cf. Brighouse 2000: 160).        
(iii) Finally, there are private inputs to informal education that take place primarily through 
the family.  Private inputs might take the form of the day-to-day vocabulary of parents, the 
amount of time spent reading with children or helping them with homework, educational extra-
curricular activities, parenting-style, and so on.  Obviously, these factors are difficult to quantify 
and compare to public inputs, so economists and legal scholars usually do not treat them as 





this a natural way of thinking.  Brighouse, for example, defends the following input principle: 
“Children of different classes but the same level of natural talent should receive roughly equal 
educational resources.”  Crucially, however, he argues that we must take into account resource-
inputs both in the school and in the home.  Thus, “If we assume that children from wealthy 
families will generally receive greater educational resources outside the school, this supports 
compensating by expending more in school on similarly talented children from less wealthy 
backgrounds” (Brighouse 2000: 138).10 
B)  Outcomes 
We have been exploring some of the complexities of input-metrics.  Outcome-metrics can 
be discussed more briefly.  The most influential conceptual framework in the school-finance 
literature—developed by Robert Berne and Leanna Stiefel—distinguishes between outputs and 
outcomes.  By “outputs,” they mean educational attainment as measured by standards such as 
test-scores, subject mastery, high school graduation or college-entrance rates, and so on.  By 
“outcomes,” they mean life-time consequences, such as “income, occupational status, personal 
satisfaction, ability to compete in the labor market, or status in life” (1984: 12).  For the sake of 
transparency in terminology, I will simply refer to these respectively as “academic, or 
educational, outcomes” and “lifetime outcomes.”  Berne and Stiefel also note that, since 
measuring and collecting information about lifetime outcomes is very difficult, most economists 
focus either on inputs or academic outcomes.  But philosophers are likely to be interested in 
academic outcomes only insofar as they have some connection with lifetime outcomes, since it is 
lifetime outcomes that seem to matter from a moral point of view.  We should also observe that 
                                                          
10 I might note that Brian Barry (2005) misrepresents Brighouse by quoting the first sentence without putting it in 





some outcomes are not really individual outcomes at all.  For example, in the last chapter, we 
saw that many republican thinkers emphasized the positive social consequences of universal 
education, including the formation of virtuous and responsible citizens and leaders.  I shall refer 
to these simply as “social outcomes.”  Finally, whereas the dimension of scope is complicated on 
input-metrics, it is conceptually straightforward on outcome-metrics.  That is, one might 
compare outcomes within various populations: for instance, within an individual school, within a 
district, within a state, within the country as a whole, or even internationally. 
Metrics can always be specified at coarser or finer grains, but this is particularly important 
for thinking about academic outcomes.  Michael Walzer claims that “The goal of the reading 
teacher is not to provide equal chances but to achieve equal results” (1983: 203), and Brian Barry 
argues that “we should regard the demands of social justice as being met to the extent that there 
are equal educational attainments at the age of 18” (2005: 47).  At first blush, any sort of equality 
in educational attainment sounds like an extremely ambitious—perhaps impossible—goal.  But 
much depends on the grain of measurement.  Rates of high-school graduation or functional 
literacy are relatively modest, coarse-grained metrics; grade-point averages or scores on 
standardized tests, on the other hand, are much more demanding, fine-grained metrics.  Walzer, 
it turns out, has the modest outcome of basic literacy in mind, while Barry means, much more 
ambitiously, “similar (university entry level) scores” or “graduation from equally well-regarded 
high schools with equally impressive records.”   
Many philosophers—Rawls being only the most notable example—hold that one central goal 
of an educational system is to provide children from different backgrounds with equal chances of 
success in life, or equal life prospects (TJ: 74/64).  These are plainly lifetime outcome metrics, 





three.  First, one might understand them in welfarist terms.  On this view, “success” in life would 
be cashed out either in terms of lifetime happiness or desire-satisfaction.  A person’s life 
prospects, or chances of success, then would be understood in terms of his lifetime expected 
welfare (cf. Arneson 1989).  Of course, it is hard to predict future utility, but we can make 
reasonable estimates that, for instance, people living in poverty and economic insecurity are less 
likely to be happy or satisfied than those living in secure affluence.  Rawls, however, rejects 
subjective well-being as the appropriate measure of person’s just expectations for several 
reasons.  First, there are the well-known difficulties inherent in making interpersonal welfare 
comparisons.  Second, because preferences are shaped by the existing social system, Rawls 
thinks that they do not provide an independent basis for judging the merits of different social 
systems.  And third, like Kant, Rawls maintains that happiness or satisfaction only has moral 
weight when it is consistent with justice; in this respect, the right sets limits on what is truly 
good.  Therefore, Rawls proposes that we measure a person’s relative “success” in life more 
objectively in terms of her level of social advantage.  By this, he means a person’s lifetime share 
of “primary social goods”—things which a rational person is presumed to want more of rather 
than less, whatever her more particular values and desires.  Assuming that everyone enjoys equal 
liberty under the law, Rawls claims that the appropriate metric for measuring relative “success” 
is shares of the variable primary goods, like income and authority.  Since Rawls is interested in 
the basic structure of society, as opposed to the idiosyncratic circumstances of individuals, he 
supposes that we should go about this by dividing society up into several representative social 
classes, characterized by their greater and smaller shares of income and power (TJ: §§15-16).  A 





in the class hierarchy.11  Similarly, a person’s life prospects, can be defined as the initial chances 
that a person with given characteristics will end up in any given class.  Finally, some may feel 
that the welfarist account of success is too subjective and that the Rawlsian account is too 
materialistic.  In this vein, Amy Gutmann suggests that the liberal conception of life chances 
should not be identified simply with “income, social status, or political power,” but instead with 
“all opportunities to develop and exercise our human capacities” (1987: 129 fn.3). 
However we think about life prospects, it is important to specify the point in life at which 
prospects are to be measured and compared.  After all, two people may have equal prospects at 
ages 1, 12, or 18, and yet have very different prospects at ages 25 or 40.  Rawls, for instance, 
tells us that individuals born into different income classes are to have equal life chances, but he 
does not tell us at what age those prospects are to be equal.  This led James Fishkin to point out 
that, in theory, we could equalize the life chances of people born to families from different social 
classes simply by randomly assigning newborns to different families just after birth (1983: 57-
64).  But, as Fishkin recognizes, this would trivialize the principle of equal life chances.  Why 
not just treat birth as a fair “natural lottery”?   
What a principle of life-chances needs, then, is a point in life that can be treated as a morally 
relevant “starting gate.”  Prior to the starting gate, the goal is to equalize the advantages that bear 
on people’s future prospects; past the starting gate, individuals’ prospects are permitted to 
diverge from one another, at least when this is due to their own choices.  An important question 
                                                          
11 For example, in a Rawlsian spirit, the sociologist John Goldthorpe has developed an influential seven-fold 
hierarchy of occupational classes measured in terms of basic social advantages like income, job security, opportunity 
for advancement, and degrees of authority and autonomy.  In descending order of advantage, these classes are: I. 
Large proprietors and higher-grade professionals, administrators, and managers; II.  Higher-grade technicians and 
lower-grade professionals, administrators, and managers; III Routine non-manual employees; IV. Small proprietors, 
small farmers, self-employed artisans; VI. Lower-grade technicians and supervisors of manual employees; VI. 





for educational policy is whether the purpose of schools is to get individuals up to an equal 
starting line, or whether school is to be conceived as the first part of the competition for 
advantage.  Some may say that this marks a distinction between primary and secondary (i.e. high 
school) education.  Or perhaps schools can somehow simultaneously perform both roles.  In any 
case, these are questions that have to be faced by principles that prescribe equal life chances. 
12.4  Rules in the Distribution of Education 
Having discussed the metrics of distribution, we now turn to a classification of distributive 
rules.  I place these in five categories: horizontal equity, vertical equity, maximization, neutrality, 
and adequacy. 
A) Horizontal equity 
The simplest rule is horizontal equity.  Often, horizontal equity in the distribution of 
education is understood to mean simply equal public expenditure per pupil.  Following Berne 
and Stiefel, however, I will use the term in a more expansive way to mean equal distributive 
shares for all, where the shares can be filled in in different ways (1984: 13).  Thus, horizontal 
input equity says that every student ought to receive equal educational inputs, while horizontal 
outcome equity says that inputs ought to be distributed unequally (if necessary) so as to realize 
equal academic or lifetime outcomes.   
Sometimes horizontal equity is described as the principle of “equal treatment for equals.”12  
This is the standard definition in public finance, but I dislike the description for two reasons.  
                                                          





First, talk of “equal treatment” connotes an input metric,13 whereas on my understanding the rule 
may be applied to either input- or outcome-metrics.  Second and more importantly, it needlessly 
opens simple horizontal equity up to internal critique.  For instance, Berne and Stiefel claim that 
“The problem with the horizontal-equity criterion in school finance is that in most instances the 
assumption that children are substantially equal is easily refuted.”14  But this is question-begging: 
a principle of horizontal equity need not claim that children are alike in all interesting respects; 
only that it is appropriate for some reason to distribute shares to all children in the same way.  A 
principle of horizontal equity may be objected to, from an external standpoint, for failing to take 
into proper account morally salient differences, but it need not be guilty of making an easily 
refuted assumption. 
B) Vertical equity 
Instead of distributing shares equally to all, we might distribute shares differently to students 
with different profiles of relevant attributes.  This is the rule of vertical equity.  Vertical equity 
can be either continuous or step-wise.  Consider a progressive income tax.  It incorporates both 
continuous and step-like elements.  Insofar as one is taxed some percentage of one’s earnings, 
the tax incorporates continuous vertical equity.  At a rate of 10 percent, someone earning 
$40,000 pays $4000 while someone earning $41,234 pays $4123.40.  But the tax brackets which 
determine the tax rate one pays incorporate step-wise vertical equity.  Step-wise vertical equity 
can be conceived as “layered” horizontal equity: that is, horizontal equity for similarly situated 
subgroups, but not between subgroups.   
                                                          
13 Cf. Hayek (1960): “From the fact that people are very different it follows that, if we treat them equally, the result 
must be inequality in their actual position, and that the only way to place them in an equal position would be to treat 
them differently” (87). 





As before, I understand vertical equity as a rule that can be applied to either input- or 
outcome-metrics.  An example of a vertical input principle is the weighted-pupil system, on 
which a school receives funds in proportion to its student population, except that students with 
special needs are given extra weighting.  For instance, each disabled student may be weighted as 
2.3 pupils and each economically disadvantaged student as 1.2 pupils.  An example of a vertical 
outcome principle is Rawls’s principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity:  that persons of the same 
native talent and level of motivation ought to have the same life prospects.  To be complete, 
principles of vertical equity need to explain not only the attributes that define who is to receive 
the same or different distributive shares, but also the range of difference in distributive shares 
between those who are to be treated differently (Berne and Stiefel 1984: 35).  For example, a 
weighted pupil system tells us both the characteristics of children who are to be given additional 
resources and the amount of extra resources they are to receive.  On the other hand, while 
Rawls’s principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity tells us who is to have similar life prospects, 
the principle does not, on its own, tell us how much the life prospects between subgroups may 
differ (as observed in Brighouse 2000: 128).     
In the previous examples, vertical equity is applied at the level of the pupil, but vertical 
equity can also be applied at the school or district level.  A trivial example, I suppose, is 
apportioning more funds to schools with more students.  (But usually this is couched in terms of 
horizontal equity toward students.)  More interesting are systems which take into account special 
circumstances of some districts like economies or diseconomies of scale or the high-cost of 
transportation for rural schools (Berne and Stiefel 1984: 15; Odden and Picus 2008: 72-73).  
If we define horizontal and vertical equity such that they can apply to either input or outcome 





principle in more than one way.  For example, we might adopt in practice a principle of vertical 
input equity in order to achieve, or at least approach, the valued goal of horizontal outcome 
equity.  In this case, horizontal outcome equity is the morally fundamental notion, as it guides us 
in determining the details of the principle of vertical input equity.  A similar phenomenon can be 
observed when we play with a principle’s scope.  Brighouse, as we have seen, defends a 
principle of horizontal input equity with a wide scope: that is, it encompasses all educational 
inputs, public and private.  But because some children receive more educational inputs in the 
private sphere than others do, this means that in the schools, we should distribute educational 
resources according to a principle of vertical equity, whereby children with fewer resources in 
the home receive more in the school.  Here, then, we have a wide-scope principle of horizontal 
input equity which determines the contours of our narrow-scope principle of vertical input 
equity in the schools.15  A final example:  Having described Rawls’s Fair Equality of 
Opportunity as a kind of vertical lifetime-outcome equity, and Brighouse’s principle of 
educational resource equality as a kind of wide horizontal input equity, it may be surprising to 
discover how similar in substance they are to one another.  If we assume that, within a class of 
people similarly talented and motivated, the only statistically important factor affecting people’s 
life prospects is total educational inputs, then Rawls’s Fair Equality of Opportunity would imply 
something like Brighouse’s educational resource equality. 
                                                          
15 Just how we would actually make these determinations is another question.  If children reach school having 
received different educational inputs in the home, then how do we compensate the disadvantaged?  We can’t just 
give them, in kindergarten, the resources they should have had as toddlers.  Presumably they will need much larger 
inputs now than they would have needed at an earlier developmental stage, if they are to have any hope of catching 
up with their peers.  But how can we calculate the size of compensation without implicitly relying on a principle of 
outcome equity?  Perhaps the idea is that we ask, counter-factually, what level of educational achievement the child 
is likely to have reached by now had he previously enjoyed the appropriate educational inputs, and allocate whatever 






An alternative to equalizing shares is to maximize them in some respect.  There are two main 
alternatives here:  one can maximize aggregate distributive shares or selectively maximize the 
shares of those students with a particular profile.16  The most important versions of selective 
maximization array students across some range of attributes (e.g., innate ability, past academic 
performance) and then maximize the shares of those either at the top end (“maximax”) or bottom 
end (“maximin”) of that range.   
The notion of maximizing educational inputs, while logically coherent, is never reasonable.  
First, it would be pointless to increase inputs beyond the point that they improved outcomes.17  
Second, past some point of diminishing returns, the resources used for education will be more 
valuable elsewhere.  Third, when we are dealing with a fixed pool of resources, maximin is 
equivalent to equality, while maximax amounts to devoting all resources to those at the top end. 
Maximization is only sensible, then, when we are dealing with the metrics of academic or 
lifetime outcomes.  The most common philosophical views focus on lifetime outcomes.  For 
instance, the utilitarian approach is to distribute educational resources so that they maximize 
aggregate lifetime welfare.  Just what this entails in the distribution of educational resources is of 
course an empirical question.  It may justify spending somewhat more on the education of the 
most promising students, if they have the most potential to promote total social welfare in their 
professional lives.  Alternatively, one might want to distribute educational resources so as to 
                                                          
16 When population sizes can vary, there is an important difference between average and aggregate maximization.  
Cf. Parfit (1984): chs. 17, 19.  However, because the distinction is at best tangential to the question of educational 
policy, I ignore it here.  






maximize the lifetime outcomes of those with the worst lifetime prospects.  Rawls recommends 
this principle at one point:  “[T]he difference principle would allocate resources in education, 
say, so as to improve the long-term expectation of the least favored.  If this end is attained by 
giving more attention to the better endowed, it is permissible; otherwise not” (TJ: 101/86-87).   
Maximization is also the rule implicit in various forms of perfectionism.  For instance, one 
might want to distribute education, as Rawls puts it, in order to “maximize the achievement of 
human excellence in art, science, and culture” (TJ: 325/285-286).  Call this “elitist 
perfectionism.”  Although Rawls rejects elitist perfectionism, Thomas Nagel expresses limited 
sympathy with it:     
Equality of opportunity is fine, but if a school system also tries to iron out distinctions, 
the waste from failure to exploit talent to the fullest extent is inexcusable…. The position 
I favor is maximalist.  A society should try to foster the creation and preservation of what 
is best, or as good as it possibly can be, and this is just as important as the widespread 
dissemination of what is merely good enough.  Such an aim can only be pursued by 
recognizing and exploiting the natural inequalities between persons, encouraging 
specialization and distinction of levels in education, and accepting the variation in 
accomplishment which results” (1991: 135; cf. Nagel 1997: ch. 12).  
Nagel, reasonably, does not think of elitist perfectionism as a principle of fairness or justice.  It is 
simply another value with distributive implications that sits alongside justice, embodying 
“respect for what is valuable in itself” (1991: 131).  For Nagel, we must either balance these two 
values against one another in an intuitive way, or else find a conception of justice that is limited 
enough so as to leave room for promoting perfectionist goals.18 
Another version of perfectionism, one rooted in the idealist tradition, focuses on the full 
development of each individual’s potential, rather than emphasizing rare achievements.  Unlike 
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elitist perfectionism, this “democratic perfectionism” often is invoked as a principle of justice in 
education.  R.H. Tawney, for one, made such an argument:  
What a wise parent would desire for his own children, that a nation, insofar as it is wise, 
must desire for all children.  Educational equality consists in securing it for them.  It is to 
be achieved in school, as it is achieved in the home, by recognizing that there are 
diversities of gifts, which require for their development diversities of treatment.  Its aim 
will be to do justice to all, by providing facilities which are at once various in type and 
equal in quality (1931, 1964: 146; cf. 104). 
More recently, William Galston has recommended a conception of equality of opportunity on 
which “[T]he full development of each individual—however great or limited his or her natural 
capacities—is equal in moral weight to that of every other” (1986; 1991: 202-203). In much the 
same spirit,  John Gardner claims that “Our kind of society demands the maximum development 
of individual potentialities at every level of ability.  The goal of the American educational system 
is to enable every youngster to fulfill his potentialities, regardless of his race, creed, social 
standing or economic position.”19  The idea has even found its way into a few state constitutions, 
like that of Illinois:  “A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational 
development of all persons to the limits of their capacities.”20  
Critics object that this sort of maximizing principle unreasonably demands that we give up 
everything else we value for the sake devoting all of our resources to education.  As Arthur Wise 
put it, “Educational resources are limited.  Therefore, it is impossible to expend resources on 
every individual until he can no longer profit from them” (1968: 148-149; cf. Gutmann 1987: 
129-130).  And, indeed, it might be suspected that democratic perfectionism rests on an 
unrealistic idealist assumption that every individual has some definite inner potential that can be 
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fully realized.  On the other hand, it would be quite contrary to the whole tenor idealist tradition 
to suppose that individuals could fully realize their potential at the end of formal education in 
adolescence.  Humboldt, for example, says that “the highest and most harmonious development 
of [a person’s] powers to a complete and consistent whole” is “the end of man”—not the end of 
childhood.  Moreover, Humboldt says this is the end “towards which every human being must 
ceaselessly direct his efforts” (Humboldt 1854: 11, 13).21  Therefore, perhaps a more charitable 
interpretation of democratic perfectionism would understand it as enabling the individual to 
continue the project of self-realization himself.  John Dewey, for instance, who had one foot in 
the idealist tradition, suggests that “The criterion of the value of school education is the extent in 
which it creates a desire for continued growth and supplies means for making the desire effective 
in fact” (Dewey 1916: 53).  Still, whatever its virtues as an educational philosophy, one may 
doubt whether this idea will provide much guidance in distributive questions, unless it is 
employed as a threshold concept for defining an adequate education, in which case it is no longer 
a maximization concept.   
D)  Neutrality 
Unlike equality and maximization, some rules do not tell us just how shares ought to be 
distributed, but only rule out certain distributions.  I will refer to these rules as “neutral,” in that 
they insist that distributions not be based upon or biased toward certain factors.22  Perhaps the 
most familiar neutral rules are non-discrimination input principles.  These do not require us to 
devote the same inputs to every child, but forbid unequal distributions on the basis of certain 
                                                          
21 The passage is quoted at the beginning of chapter III (¶2) of Mill’s On Liberty / CW, XVIII: 261-262. 
22 Berne and Stiefel (1984) call this “equality of opportunity,” but this seems too narrow a meaning to associate with 





“suspect categories” like race, sex, or religion.  Notice that, when dealing with neutral input 
rules, it is necessary to distinguish between ex ante and ex post perspectives (cf. Berne and 
Stiefel 1999).  Suppose that extra educational resources (e.g., smaller class sizes) are distributed 
to students on the basis of a race-neutral standard, like performance on a special test, but that 
whites are statistically overrepresented, and Blacks underrepresented, in passing that test.  
Although the distribution of extra resources would be racially neutral from an ex ante 
perspective, the distribution would not be race-neutral from an ex post perspective, as whites 
turned out to be much more likely to benefit from the system than Blacks.   
One of the most important principles in school finance is that of district-wealth neutrality, 
also referred to as “fiscal neutrality.”  As we observed in the previous chapter, in a state school 
system where districts are financed largely through local property taxes, districts with high 
property-wealth per pupil are able to raise more revenue per pupil than districts with low 
property-wealth per pupil with the same, or even smaller, tax effort.  A school-finance system 
that embraced the principle of ex ante district-wealth neutrality might permit local districts to 
decide how much to tax themselves, but would guarantee that all districts received the same per-
pupil revenues for a given tax effort.  This is called a “guaranteed tax base” (GTB) program.  
Since local control would be retained under a GTB program, inequalities between districts would 
be likely to continue to exist, but the inequality of tax power between rich and poor districts 
would be neutralized.  Once again, it is important to keep the ex ante/ex post distinction in mind 
here.  In some states where GTB programs have been implemented, poor districts have 
responded to their increased tax power by voting for tax relief, while rich districts have voted for 
higher taxes in order to maintain their educational advantage.  From an ex post perspective, per 





of the system are ex ante neutral toward district-wealth (Odden and Picus 2008: 19-24, 56-57).  
Such cases force us to decide whether it is the mechanics of the distribution that is morally 
significant or the actual patterns of distribution.  The ex ante/ex post distinction should not be 
confused with the input/outcome distinction.  Whether we are looking at district-wealth 
neutrality from an ex ante or ex post perspective, we are still concerned with the distribution of 
inputs.  But neutrality principles can of course be concerned with outcomes.  One example is a 
principle that says that differences in academic or lifetime outcomes should not be significantly 
correlated with the socioeconomic class into which one is born.   
E)  Adequacy 
The last distributive rule to discuss is adequacy.  In the school-finance literature, the 
distinction between adequacy and equity concepts is typically drawn by explaining that adequacy 
is concerned with sufficient and absolute minimum levels of education, while equity is 
concerned with relational or comparative levels.23  Educational adequacy is thus a particular 
instance of what Harry Frankfurt called the doctrine of sufficiency:  the view that “what is 
important from the point of view of morality is not that everyone should have the same but that 
each should have enough.  If everyone had enough, it would be of no moral importance whether 
some had more than others” (1988c: 134-135).  Hence, as long as children receive the minimally 
adequate education—and it may be a “high minimum”—adequacy concepts do not condemn 
educational inequalities above the minimal threshold.  But it would be a mistake to say that 
adequacy is simply a weaker principle than equity, since an equitable system might not meet the 
                                                          





standard of adequacy.  As we observed in the last chapter, equality is consistent with equally 
lousy (Minorini and Sugarman 1999b: 186).   
Although adequacy is often contrasted with equity concepts, it is also commonly presented as 
an interpretation of equal opportunity.  For instance, in the landmark adequacy case, Rose v. 
Council, the Kentucky Supreme Court couched the constitutional mandate that the state provide 
an adequate education for all in the language of equality of opportunity: 
Each child, every child, in this Commonwealth must be provided with an equal 
opportunity to have an adequate education.  Equality is the key word here.  The children 
of the poor and the children of the rich, the children who live in the poor districts and the 
children who live in the rich districts must be given the same opportunity and access to an 
adequate education.24 
Some critics, on the other hand, argue that this is just misleading, and that even the weakest 
plausible conceptions of equal opportunity require more than adequacy.  On this view, “Equal 
educational opportunity demands equality, not adequacy” (Koski and Reich 2006: 608-611).  
Unlike equity, maximization, and neutrality, to speak of “adequacy” naturally invites the 
question, “Adequate for what?”  It is hard to imagine how that question could be answered 
without invoking either educational or lifetime outcomes at some level; inputs cannot be 
adequate in themselves.  As a result, adequacy principles always make some reference to 
educational or lifetime outcomes.  In fact, one way to think about adequacy is as a very coarse-
grained type of outcome equality.  Political philosophers who endorse adequacy conceptions 
typically focus on lifetime outcomes.  The dominant strategy is to try to “derive …  the nature 
and content of educational adequacy from the requirements for full membership and inclusion in 
a democratic society of equal citizens” (Satz 2007: 636; cf. Gutmann 1987).  Adequate 
                                                          





educational outcomes are then derived (at least in outline) by working backward from that 
conception of citizenship.  For instance, Debra Satz argues that “citizenship requires a threshold 
level of knowledge and competence for exercising its associated rights and freedoms—liberty of 
speech and expression, liberty of conscience, and the right to serve on a jury, vote, and 
participate in politics and the economy” (2007: 636).  In the previous chapter, we observed a 
similar approach in Rose v. Council.  In that case, the Kentucky Supreme Court found the state’s 
entire educational system unconstitutional because it failed to ensure the children of Kentucky an 
“efficient education,” which was interpreted to mean an education sufficient for developing the 
skills and competencies essential to modern life and citizenship.  The court held that such an 
education would have to include:  
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a 
complex and rapidly changing civilization;  
(ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the 
student to make informed choices;  
(iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to 
understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation;  
(iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical 
wellness;  
(v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her 
cultural and historical heritage;  
(vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or 
vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work 
intelligently; and  
(vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students 
to compete favorably in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.25 
Since it will presumably cost more to educate students with special needs up to adequate 
levels, adequacy incorporates a kind of vertical equity.  However, this must be qualified in that 
                                                          





adequacy says nothing about how to distribute shares after the threshold of adequacy is met.  
Moreover, as Paul Minorini and Stephen Sugarman explain, the relation between inputs and 
outcomes on adequacy conceptions (at least in the legal and economic literature) is complex:   
[A]lthough educational adequacy is more about outputs than inputs, nevertheless, in the 
minds of many of its supporters, the achievement of adequacy does not appear to be 
ultimately judged by actual educational outcomes.  It is still an opportunity concept, and 
as such, compliance with the adequacy requirement is ultimately still a matter of inputs, 
albeit now more broadly conceived.  In other words, at the level of the moral claim, 
educational adequacy seems to be about what fairly ought to be provided, leaving it in the 
end to the student to take advantage of that offering (1999b: 189). 
It would seem that “adequacy” is actually entering the equation at two different places.  First, 
certain educational outcomes deemed adequate are identified.  Then a level of spending is 
identified as adequate to realize those educational outcomes.  Both steps involve difficulties.   
Adequate outcomes: Academic outcomes can be specified in norm-referenced or criterion-
referenced terms.  “All 9-year-olds should read at a 4th-grade level” is an example of a norm-
referenced specification.  “All 9-year olds should be able to read and comprehend books 
comparable in difficulty to The Secret Garden” is an example of a criterion-referenced 
specification.  As James Guthrie and Richard Rothstein point out, because there is “relatively 
little consensus … regarding criterion-referenced adequacy, even in the basic skills of reading 
and math,” it is much easier to specify adequacy in norm-referenced terms.  For example, in 
spelling out her conception of an education adequate for standing as an equal in society, 
Elizabeth Anderson suggests that in developed countries, this would probably require 
“attainment of a high school diploma or its equivalent, representing real twelfth-grade-level 





But, as Guthrie and Rothstein point out, norm-referenced conceptions of adequacy are 
logically problematic.  A “4th grade reading level” is typically understood as the mean for 
today’s 4th graders.  But there is invariably a distribution around this mean.  Therefore resources 
are by definition already adequate for the average 4th grader to read at the 4th grade level,26 and 
at this resource-level, some 4th graders will naturally read at a 2nd grade level, while others will 
read at a 6th grade level.  Suppose we want virtually all 4th graders to read at what we now call 
the 4th grade level, and we can accomplish this by increasing educational funding and thereby 
reducing class sizes and increasing the pool of good teachers.  Assuming we really do succeed, 
then the average 4th grader will likely read at what we now call a 6th grade level.  But then 
that—what we now call the 6th grade reading level—is what we will then call the 4th grade 
reading level.  And, once again, the left tail of the distribution of 4th graders will read at what we 
will then call the 2nd-grade reading level (Guthrie and Rothstein 1999: 252-254).  Norm-
referenced specifications of adequacy, therefore, must either be understood to involve a program 
for somehow compressing the range of distribution, or (more likely) to be an elliptical way of 
referring to non-relative criteria (e.g., those educational attainments now typical of 4th graders).   
Adequate spending levels:  Suppose we find a way to identify a level of adequate outcomes.  
How do we move from a conception of adequate outcomes to a conception of adequate 
resources?  Three methods have emerged in the school finance literature.  Their details are not all 
that important for our purposes, but a brief review will help us appreciate roughly how the 
adequacy approach is understood by economists and students of public policy.   
                                                          





On the professional judgment approach, a group of professional educators identifies the 
resources and programs needed to produce adequate outcomes.  These inputs are then priced out 
and a per-pupil dollar expenditure is worked out.  This defines an adequate level of resources.  
Students with special needs can be taken into account by using an index for weighted pupils.  
Price differences can be taken into account by multiplying the basic per-pupil expenditure level 
by a regional cost index (Odden and Picus 2008: 77-81; Guthrie and Rothstein 1999).   
On the successful schools approach, a desired level of academic performance is first defined.  
For instance, in one model, this involved 18 different performance thresholds, which included a 
drop-out rate of 3 percent or less, an attendance rate of at least 93 percent, passage rates of 75 
percent on the 4th-grade proficiency tests in reading, mathematics, writing, and citizenship, and 
60 percent passage rates on comparable 12th-grade tests.  After the desired performance level is 
specified, districts that meet that level are identified.  Discarding the statistical outliers of high- 
and low-spending districts, an average per-pupil expenditure is worked out, which sets the level 
of resource adequacy.  As before, this amount can be adjusted by weighted pupils and regional 
cost indices.  “The underlying assumption,” according to one advocate of this approach, “is that 
any district should be able to accomplish what some districts do accomplish.”27   
The third method is the cost-function approach.  Once again, a level of adequate performance 
is first identified.  Then regression analysis is used to determine which factors outside the control 
of the school affect the cost of providing an adequate education—factors like the socioeconomic 
status of the student body or the local cost-of-living.  The results of this regression analysis are 
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then used to construct a cost index, which allegedly calculates how much more money is needed 
by more burdened districts to achieve adequate outcomes (Guthrie and Rothstein 1999; 
Duncombe and Yinger 1999). 
Our purposes do not requires us to delve into the various advantages and disadvantages of 
these three approaches to estimating a level of adequate inputs.   The point of this brief review is 
simply to illustrate the sense in which (at least for many of its advocates), as Minorini and 
Sugarman suggest, “educational adequacy seems to be about what fairly ought to be provided, 
leaving it in the end to the end to the student to take advantage of that offering” (1999b: 189). 
12.5   Conclusion 
We have now completed our framework for organizing ideas regarding the distribution of 
education.   We characterized distributive principles across three dimensions:  metric, rule, and 
scope.  In the field of education, we distinguished two families of distributive metrics: inputs and 
outcomes.  Amongst outcomes, we mentioned academic, lifetime, and social outcomes.  We 
distinguished between five families of distributive rule:  horizontal equity, vertical equity, 
maximization, neutrality, and adequacy.  The dimension of scope was invoked at several points, 
but it is most important for distinguishing wide input principles, which take into account public 
and private inputs, and narrow input principles, which focus only on public inputs.     
It remains only to underline the fact that these distributive principles may be endorsed in 
different contexts.  For example, the legal literature is naturally concerned with distributive 
principles concerning education that are plausible interpretations of the law—especially 
constitutional law.  Political philosophers are more likely to be interested in them as candidate 





overlap here, since ideas of justice and fairness seem to be built into certain constitutional ideas, 
like equal protection.  But the distinction is nonetheless important to keep in mind.  Few suppose 
that their preferred theory of distributive justice is already enshrined in constitutional law.  One 
could very well maintain, for example, that the most reasonable interpretation of most state 
constitutions supports only a right to an adequate education, and yet all the same insist that social 
justice requires a more thoroughgoing equity.  On the other hand, one might suppose that, in the 
abstract, justice only requires us to assure that everyone has an adequate education, but that, 
because the state constitution promises equality, justice in our society in fact requires adequacy 
and equality.28   
Besides candidates for legal constructions and moral ideals, distributive principles may be 
regarded as reasonable principles for practical public policy.  An obvious example is that a 
utilitarian might endorse a principle for distributing education that makes no reference to 
maximizing utility.  The distributive principle, in that case, is not really a moral principle, but a 
good rule of regulation.29  A more interesting possibility concerns someone who holds the view 
that educational inequalities are morally insignificant above a very high threshold of educational 
attainment.  Even if adequacy is the right ultimate moral principle, that very high minimum may 
only have a realistic chance of being met if the rich and the poor are forced into the same 
educational boat (cf. Minorini and Sugarman 1999: 206).  Therefore, just because adequacy is 
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education which will develop the full educational potential of each person.  Equality of educational opportunity is 
guaranteed to each person of the state" (Montana Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 1). 
29 The term “rule of regulation” is from G.A. Cohen (2008): 279-292.  Cohen thinks that Rawls conflates moral 





the right moral principle regarding the distribution of education, it does not immediately follow 





CHAPTER 13:  EQUAL TREATMENT AND EQUAL CHANCES 
 
13.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine two equity-based views as to what justice in the provision of 
education requires.  I begin with a discussion of the simple idea that justice has been done when 
public schools treat everyone equally, where that is understood to mean devoting the same public 
resources to all children.  This is a straightforward conception of horizontal equity (13.2).  
Finding this idea lacking in several ways, the bulk of the chapter is devoted to an examination of 
the more egalitarian idea that educational resources ought to be distributed so as to provide 
children of similar abilities and motivation the same chances of success in life.  This notion of 
vertical equity is probably most familiar to philosophers in the guise of John Rawls’s principle of 
“Fair Equality of Opportunity.”   
After teasing out some of its ambiguities (13.3), I consider what arguments might be given 
for a principle like Fair Equality of Opportunity (13.4).  The fundamental difficulty lies in 
explaining why we ought to insist on equal chances in life for people from different social 
backgrounds, but not for people of differing native abilities.  What is the rationale for treating 
social and natural disadvantages differently?  The most promising argument, which is the last I 
consider, is that socially caused inequalities are unfair because they constitute a form of unequal 
treatment.  This, however, appears to bring us back to where we began: that justice is done 





note.  However, at the end of Chapter 14, after having considered the virtues and limitations of 
the adequacy approach, I return to the question of the implications of the norm of equal treatment 
in educational justice.     
13.2  Equal Treatment and Narrow Equity  
Probably the simplest principle of educational justice says that the public schools ought to 
expend roughly the same resources on educating every child.  Because this principle focuses on 
equality of inputs, and ignores inputs outside the school, it may be characterized as a principle of 
narrow horizontal input equity.1  Since that’s a mouthful, I’ll refer to this simply as “Narrow 
Equity.”   Narrow Equity is attractive insofar as it is a straightforward application of the idea that 
the state is supposed to be fair and impartial in its dealings with its citizens.  Sometimes Narrow 
Equity is objected to on the grounds that it “ignores the fact that students have different needs” 
(Satz 2007: 628).  But if this only means that devoting the same public resources to children’s 
educations neither assures equal educational outcomes nor equal chances in life, then the 
proponent of Narrow Equity can concede the point without flinching.  For a writer like F.A. 
Hayek, for example, the classical liberal ideal of equality has always merely been that careers 
should be open to the talents.  This means, as Hayek puts it, “that all man-made obstacles to the 
rise of some should be removed, that all privileges of individuals should be abolished, and that 
what the state contributed to the chance of improving one’s conditions should be the same for 
all” (1960: 92, emphasis added).  This is fundamentally a principle of equal treatment.  It does 
not promise to make people materially equal or give them equal chances in life:     
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That so long as people were different and grew up in different families this [equal 
treatment] could not assure an equal start was fairly generally accepted [by classical 
liberals].  It was understood that the duty of government was not to ensure that everybody 
had the same prospect of reaching a given position but merely to make available to all on 
equal terms those facilities which in their nature depended on government action.  That 
the results were bound to be different, not only because the individuals were different, but 
also because only a small part of the relevant circumstances depended on government 
action, was taken for granted (ibid.). 
The present objection, then, is far from fatal.  But perhaps it may be recast as a reminder that 
what is morally fundamental is treating people as subjects of equal moral concern, not treating 
people in identical ways (cf. Dworkin 1978: 227).  Thus, a parent shows equal concern for her 
children, not by mechanically treating them in the same way, but by being equally attentive to 
their individual needs—“by recognizing,” as R.H. Tawney once put it, “that there are diversities 
of gifts, which require for their development diversities of treatment” (1931, 1964: 146).  
Understood this way, the objection at least casts doubt on the rationale for Narrow Equity.    
The same point can be pressed in a subtler way.  We can ask how we are meant to measure 
inputs.  Are we trying to equalize the amount of money we spend on each child?  Since the costs 
of tangible resources (like teacher salaries, transportation, and building maintenance) differ with 
local conditions and with economies and diseconomies of scale, equal dollar expenditure per 
pupil will lead to significant inequalities in the provision of what money can buy.  So should we 
instead be trying to equalize the tangible resources available to each student?  If we think it 
would be petty to require children in rural schools to make do with fewer classroom resources 
than their suburban peers simply because of the higher transportation costs in their district, then 
we are already assuming that it is sometimes appropriate to treat children in different 
circumstances differently.  But children’s circumstances differ in more important ways than in 





backgrounds often do not benefit from school as much as children from more privileged homes.  
If educational equality requires us to take into consideration the special transportation needs of 
children living in different kinds of communities, might we not also need to take into 
consideration the special educational needs of children coming from disadvantaged parts of 
society? 
A related but more decisive objection is that Narrow Equity is compatible with having no 
public school system at all.  But it is typically thought that one of the chief reasons for the 
existence of public education is to provide children from all backgrounds with opportunities that 
otherwise only the well-to-do could afford.  That suggests that there has to be more to justice in 
education than an evenhanded provision of public benefits.  Part of the point of public education 
is to remove the socio-economic barriers that would exist were education simply treated like a 
private consumption good.  Of course, someone of a libertarian bent could deny this and argue 
that public education is justified (if at all) solely by its instrumental contributions to society as a 
whole, and that it is not due to individuals as a matter of right.  On this view, justice only comes 
into the picture as a side constraint: since education also has important private benefits, justice 
requires that, if government provides education at all, it do so in an impartial way.  But most 
people think that the state’s duty in education is more substantial than that.  Parents have 
traditionally been recognized as having positive duties to support and educate their children (cf. 
Chapter 8).  The state, in turn, has a duty in its role as parens patriae either to ensure that parents 
are able to fulfill that charge or to find other means of meeting these basic needs.  In Brown v. 
Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that, in modern society, children can only be 





would seem that the state does have an obligation to children to ensure that education is 
accessible to every family, regardless of their financial means. 
13.3  The Idea of Equal Chances 
We’ve just observed that one of the traditional arguments for a public school system has been 
to provide educational opportunities to children from families of modest means so that, like their 
more privileged counterparts, they too may “succeed in life.”  A common way to think about this 
is to suppose that everyone ought to have equal chances for success in life, regardless of his or 
her starting point in society.  A central role of the public schools, then, is to help secure those 
equal chances by “leveling the playing field” for the disadvantaged.  This idea is perhaps best 
known to philosophers in the guise of John Rawls’s principle of “Fair Equality  of Opportunity.”  
Unlike formal equality of opportunity—the classical liberal ideal that careers should be open to 
the talents—“Fair Opportunity” (as I shall sometimes refer to it for short) holds that positions 
must also be open to all in the sense that all have a “fair chance to attain them.”  That is to say, 
“those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, 
should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system” 
(TJ: 73/63).   
Rawls, of course, does not claim that Fair Opportunity is all there is to economic justice.  
While Fair Equality of Opportunity is concerned with social mobility and access to unequal 
benefits, the Difference Principle constrains the magnitude of those social inequalities by 
requiring that the least-advantaged class of society be as well-off as possible.  However, at least 





gave it lexical priority over the Difference Principle.2  That means that lower living standards for 
the least-advantaged class could in principle be justified in order to improve social mobility.  
(Both Fair Opportunity and the Difference Principle are constrained by the lexically prior first 
principle of Equal Liberty.)3  Before considering the arguments that might be offered in support 
of Fair Opportunity, we need to make clearer the content of the principle and its implications for 
education. 
A) Equal prospects of success 
What does it mean to say that those with similar talent and motivation should have the same 
prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system?  Rawls understands a 
person’s “success in life” to signify her lifetime share of “primary social goods”—things like 
liberty, wealth, and power which a rational person is presumed to want more of rather than less, 
whatever her more particular values and desires (TJ: §15).  In a just society, Rawls assumes that 
everyone will enjoy the same scheme of basic liberties, but that “the powers and prerogatives of 
authority,” as well as income and wealth, will still vary in their distribution.  Inequality of power 
appears to be inevitable in an organized society where collective action is necessary; inequality 
of income is necessary to create incentives for work and simply to provide information through 
the price system as to how much different goods and services are desired.  Therefore, assuming 
the equal enjoyment of basic liberties, Rawls claims that the appropriate metric for measuring 
relative “success” is a person’s shares of the variable primary goods, like income and authority.  
Since Rawls is interested in evaluating the basic structure of society, he thinks we should go 
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about this by dividing society up into several representative social classes, characterized by their 
greater and smaller shares of income and power.  A person’s level of “success,” or social 
advantage, will then be measured in terms of his destination in the class hierarchy.  A person’s 
life chances or prospects, in turn, are defined as the initial chances that a person with given 
characteristics will end up in any given class (see 12.3.B and 12.4.B).         
Now Rawls does not say that every person must have equal life prospects, but only that there 
should be the same chances of success for those who are similarly talented and motivated, 
“regardless of their initial place in the social system.”  A group of people have equal opportunity 
when inequalities in their life prospects do not depend on their initial places in the social system, 
but only on differences of talent and motivation.  Strictly speaking, one can read Fair 
Opportunity in at least two different ways at this juncture.  Some read it to mean that “any two 
persons with the same native talent and the same ambition should have the same prospects of 
success in the competition for positions of advantage” (Arneson 1999: 77).  On this 
individualistic formulation, differences in distributive outcomes between two people should in 
principle be dependent solely on the factors of native talent and ambition.  One does not really 
need to add that social background should not affect distributive outcomes, since that is implied.  
This is a principle of vertical outcome equity: subgroups are defined by the degree of talent and 
ambition, and while inequalities of life chances are permissible between subgroups, they are not 
permissible within subgroups.   
But others read Rawls to mean that, if we look at a class of persons with the same native 
talent and ambition, then their social backgrounds should not be predictive of their lifetime 
incomes or class destinations (Fishkin 1980: 30-35).  If there are factors that affect distributive 





not social injustices, despite the fact that they cannot be traced to individual talent or ambition 
(TJ: 301/265).  On this second, statistical formulation the goal is to neutralize the differential 
influence of major structural features of society, not necessarily to eliminate the influence of all 
factors except effort and native talent.  This is not necessarily the same as eliminating all 
correlation of superior life prospects with social background, since social background could itself 
be correlated with differences in talent or motivation.  However, once talent and motivation have 
been controlled for, social background should not be predictive of class destination.  (If provided 
with all of the appropriate information, this could be measured by linear regression analysis.)  It 
is in this sense that life prospects should be class-neutral.  On this statistical interpretation, one is 
obliged to be specific as to which characteristics of a person’s “social background” ought to be 
neutralized.  In A Theory of Justice, Rawls was pretty clearly thinking of a person’s “initial place 
in the social system” solely in terms of socioeconomic or “income classes” (TJ: 73/63).  But 
today many would want to say that other characteristics, like sex or race, should not 
differentially affect a person’s life prospects either (see Okin 1989 and Pogge 1989).  And, 
indeed, in the Restatement, Rawls seems to assume that his principle does guarantee men and 
women of like talents and ambition equal life chances (2001: 162-168).  Which is the superior of 
these two interpretations: the individualistic or the statistical?  From an exegetical perspective, 
there is considerable textual evidence to support the statistical formulation as the better reading 
of Rawls, but which version of the principle is really better on philosophical grounds depends, 
naturally, on the balance of arguments. 
B) Talent 
So far we have been speaking as if it were quite clear what we mean by people who are 





speak of talent in two different ways.  Sometimes we refer to a person’s developed talents, and 
sometimes we refer to a person’s native ability to acquire developed talents.  For example, when 
we speak of a firm trying to retain talent, we mean that the firm is trying to keep employees with 
developed abilities that make them good at doing their jobs.  On the other hand, when Thomas 
Jefferson said that that the purpose of public schools is to “avail the state of those talents which 
nature has sown as liberally among the poor as the rich, but which perish without use, if not 
sought for and cultivated,”4 he was plainly referring to native, not developed, talents.  We would 
expect people with similar developed talents for marketable tasks to have equal chances of 
getting desirable positions where there is an efficient and non-discriminatory labor market.  
Rawlsian Fair Equality of Opportunity must therefore be understood as the principle that people 
ought to have the same chances of cultivating their native abilities into marketable developed 
talents with comparable levels of effort. 
We must also be careful to distinguish innate talent from a person’s present capacity to learn.  
Suppose we observe that, in the third grade, Alice and Ben have about the same degree of 
developed ability, but that Alice is a much faster learner than Ben.  As a consequence, we expect 
Alice to soon outpace Ben.  Does this show that Alice has more innate talent than Ben?  Not 
necessarily.  We should expect a person’s present capacity to learn to be affected by a wide range 
of factors, including healthy childhood development (beginning in utero), physical and emotional 
wellbeing, and past learning (cf. Barry 2005: ch. 5).  Perhaps, then, Alice has simply been “better 
primed” to learn in school than Ben.  By the third grade, this advantage may be essentially 
                                                          





entrenched:  prospectively, Alice really does have more potential than Ben.  Still, this doesn’t 
mean that Alice’s advantage is innate.  
If we cannot infer native talent from present learning potential, then how can we detect it?  
Actually, it’s quite obscure.  Historically, many people have equated innate intelligence with 
general intelligence as measured by IQ tests, but there is reason to think that early childhood 
environment could affect the development of general intelligence to some extent.  What if Alice 
and Ben had grown up in virtually identical environments, and we observed that Alice was still a 
faster learner than Ben?  Surely that would show that Alice has more innate talent than Ben.  
Again, not necessarily.  Perhaps Alice was predisposed to benefit more from that environment 
than Ben, while Ben was predisposed to benefit more than Alice from some other environment.  
In other words, organisms are born, not so much with definite traits, but with genotypes that 
react in various ways with environments to produce certain observed phenotypes.   
If we replace talk of inherited traits with talk of norms of reaction, how damaging is that to 
the ideal of equality of opportunity?  Brian Barry complains that, although these points have 
been commonplace in genetics for decades, “I am not aware of a single political philosopher … 
who discusses issues involving equal opportunity without assuming that it makes sense to ascribe 
to each person some measure of ‘native ability’ or ‘native talent’, understood as cognitive ability 
or talent” (2005: 124-125). Suppose we couldn’t make any sense of the idea of native ability or 
talent.  We would be left with the view that the only thing that justifies differences in life 
prospects are differences in people’s level of motivation.  This, indeed, is roughly Barry’s view.  
However, because he thinks that children cannot be held responsible for their level of motivation, 





Can we in fact make any sense of the idea of innate talent?  If not, then we can dismiss 
Rawls’s conception of Fair Opportunity summarily.  I want to suggest that in many cases we can 
make some sense of the idea, although it might bear less justificatory burden than has frequently 
been supposed.  Suppose we find that in “tough” environments, Ben outperforms Alice, while in 
“abundant” environments, Alice outperforms Ben.  However, we also find that both Alice and 
Ben perform better in “abundant” environments than in “tough” environments.  This scenario is 
represented in Table 1, where the numbers represent academic performance (albeit in an 
artificially precise and one-dimensional way).  
 Alice Ben 
“Tough” Environments 3 5 
“Abundant” Environments 8 6 
Table 13.1 
Even though the average performance of Alice and Ben is the same, it makes sense (suitably 
qualified) to say that Alice has more native academic talent than Ben, since Alice outperforms 
Ben in the environments where each performs at his or her best.   
Now suppose, instead, that Ben thrives on adversity and actually performs better in tough 
environments than in abundant ones; and yet, Alice still does better in “abundant” environments 
than Ben does in “tough” ones.  This scenario is represented in Table 2.     
 Alice Ben 
“Tough” Environments 3 5 






Saying that Alice has more native talent than Ben in this scenario is more likely to mislead, but 
(again) suitably qualified, it retains some sense.  
What if Alice and Ben’s norms of reaction are mirror images of one another, as in Table 3?      
 Alice Ben 
“Tough” Environments 4 5 
“Abundant” Environments 5 4 
Table 13.3 
In the abstract, it is pretty clear we cannot say that either is more naturally talented than the 
other.  But suppose now that the abundant environment is the one actually in place and that this 
cannot easily be altered, or that we have good reasons for keeping it in place.  Does it make 
sense to say that, given the parameters of the present environment, Alice is the more naturally 
talented?  It depends, of course, on what work we want talk of “natural talent” to do.  But I think 
it makes at least as much sense as a similar claim does in the following scenario.   
Suppose that Ben would have thrived in performing the most prestigious tasks in a hunter-
and-gatherer society, but lacks the predispositions to succeed in a highly literate technological 
society like our own.  Alice’s predispositions are just the reverse.   
 Alice Ben 
Hunter-and-Gatherer Society 3 6 
Technological Society 6 3 
Table 13.4 
Since we actually find ourselves in a technological society, it seems to make sense to say that 
Alice is more naturally talented than Ben, so long as we implicitly understand this only holds 





something similar for the case depicted in Table 3.  If we actually find ourselves in an abundant 
environment, then Alice is the more naturally talented, in the sense that she is more naturally 
suited to the existing environment.  So we can make some sense of the idea of native talent, even 
though it turns out to be a more complex and contingent matter than most political philosophers 
have assumed.  Whether this sense can bear any moral weight is another question, of course; we 
will come to that below.    
C) Motivation 
Having explored some of the difficulties in the notion of native talent, let’s consider what it 
means for two people to be similarly motivated?  Sometimes philosophers equate motivation 
with effort or ambition.  That is probably harmless enough as long as we are focusing on 
educational achievement up through high school, but it is potentially misleading when we turn to 
thinking about occupational status.  If Alice and Ben are equally talented, then there are two 
reasons consistent with Fair Opportunity why Alice might end up “more successful” than Ben.  
She might have put forward more effort and, for that reason, have outperformed Ben in 
competitions for the same positions.  Or she might have been more ambitious than Ben, in that 
she placed greater value on social advantages like income and prestige, and for that reason, the 
two sought different kinds of positions.  Perhaps Ben believed he had a calling as a school 
teacher, while Alice pursued a career in the law.  It would obviously be a mistake in that case to 
simply equate worldly ambition with effort, since Ben might well work as hard, or harder, than 
Alice.  Therefore, we should understand talk of two people being “similarly motivated” as 
encompassing these two separable dimensions of effort and ambition. 
We must also ask:   At what age may differences in motivation justify differences in life 





reaching some point of moral maturity and accountability, which may occur in a graduated or 
step-wise fashion.  How we answer this question hinges on the extent to which it is permissible 
for differences in motivation to affect academic achievement.  It is easy to see the appeal of 
option (b), since we generally don’t hold young children accountable for their choices—certainly 
not for choices that may impact the whole course of their lives.  Moreover, it is commonsense 
that children’s aspirations and characters are deeply shaped by their family and social 
backgrounds.  If it is unfair when a person’s social background directly limits his options, why 
shouldn’t it also be unfair when his social background indirectly affects his prospects in life by 
limiting his aspirations?  Some philosophers, like Barry, think it is patently unfair: “There is 
something very unrealistic,” he observes, “about a model of [children’s ‘choices’] that abstracts 
from parental encouragement and discouragement, peer pressure, and the attitude of other 
children in the school” (2005: 46; cf. Brighouse 2000: 127).  Now, one could judge that the 
social determination of character is so powerful that even as adults we cannot be held 
responsible for our choices.  But the concern about the social determination of children’s 
attitudes is pressing even if we insist that self-respecting adults must take responsibility for their 
characters and values (cf. Dworkin 2011: ch. 10). 
Rawls’s own position on this matter is difficult to puzzle out.  He clearly recognizes the 
problem.  At some points, he seems to agree that it is unfair for a child’s motivations to be 
affected by his social background, but that this just shows that Fair Equality of Opportunity can 
never be satisfied, and this is one reason why we ought to embrace the Difference Principle 
instead (TJ: 74, 301, 511/64, 265, 447-448).  But this does not appear to fit with his own more 
considered statements that Fair Opportunity has lexical priority over the Difference Principle.  At 





chances for those similarly endowed and motivated, the effect of social circumstances on a 
child’s motivation are consistent with that principle (TJ: 301/265).  That would successfully clear 
up the ambiguity, but principles of justice cannot simply be stipulated; there must be some 
rationale for defining equality of opportunity this way.  Finally, sometimes Rawls seems to think 
that he can dispose of the problem by emphasizing that Fair Opportunity does not require equal 
chances between individuals, but only between different sectors of society (what I called the 
statistical interpretation above):  “If there are variations among families in the same sector in 
how they shape the child’s aspirations, then while fair equality of opportunity may obtain 
between sectors, equal chances between individuals will not” (ibid.).  But this just sweeps under 
the rug the fact that the range of variation among families may not be evenly distributed across 
social sectors.  Differences between the average middle-class and working-class family may be a 
central cause of inequality of opportunity.5  And as before, the solutions to these difficulties 
cannot be stipulated; if the statistical interpretation is to be preferred, it must be given some 
rationale. 
Even if we understood what it means for two people to be similarly talented and understood 
what it means for them to be similarly motivated, we would still have to ask what it means for 
two people to be similarly talented and motivated?  Presumably Alice and Ben can be similarly 
talented and motivated, not just when the two are similarly talented and similarly motivated, but 
also when Alice is a little more talented than Ben, and Ben a little more motivated than Alice.  
Rawls doesn’t expand on this issue, but I think the following is a plausible rough picture.  At 
average levels of effort, people with the same innate talent in the same environments ought to 
                                                          





have comparable levels of achievement and therefore comparable life prospects.  Call this 
“Normal Expectations.”  Under Normal Expectations, developed talent ought to roughly track 
innate talent.  It follows, then, that careers ought generally to go to those with the most innate 
talent.  Permissible deviations from Normal Expectations are due to individual departures from 
average effort.  That is, if an individual puts forward more or less than average effort, then that 
ought to push him up, or knock him down, a few pegs in his life prospects from what his 
prospects would have been under Normal Expectations. 
D) Equal opportunity and the schools 
What implications does Fair Equality of Opportunity have for the educational system?  
Because it focuses on life prospects rather than on educational inputs, the consequences of Fair 
Opportunity for education are much less straightforward than are those of Narrow Equity.  Just 
what is required will depend on the particular role education plays in determining life prospects.  
For example, in largely agricultural societies, education may be relatively unimportant, and then 
Fair Opportunity would have little to say about its distribution.  On the other hand, in a society 
where the only barrier to equal life chances was the poor’s lack of access to schools, then Fair 
Opportunity might require nothing more than Narrow Equity.  If exclusive private schools gave 
one class special advantages in acquiring good jobs, then Fair Opportunity would give us a 
(defeasible) reason for abolishing or democratizing them.6  Inching our way closer to the real 
world now, if it should turn out to be more expensive to teach children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds up to the same standards, then Fair Opportunity might require compensatory 
expenditures in order to narrow the achievement gap as much as possible.   
                                                          





This leads to a second important way that Fair Opportunity differs from Narrow Equity.  
Narrow Equity is a principle exclusively governing the distribution of educational resources,7 
whereas Fair Opportunity is a principle that governs all the major social institutions as a single 
system—the basic structure.  The educational system is simply one component of this basic 
structure.  For this reason, Rawls does not assume that an educational system—no matter how 
well designed—could achieve Fair Opportunity all by itself.  For one thing, he thinks it is also 
necessary to prevent “excessive accumulations of property and wealth” both by means of 
progressive taxation and limits on inheritance (Rawls, TJ: 73/63 and §43 passim).  This means 
that there is always a question as to whether expenditures on compensatory education will be the 
most effective available means of equalizing life chances.  It may turn out, for example, that we 
could do more to close the achievement gap in education by ensuring that all children have good 
medical and dental care or by making high-quality day-care accessible to all working parents.8  
Or, if children living in poverty lag behind their peers educationally, the best policy may be to 
attack poverty directly—for instance, by raising the minimum wage or by providing generous 
child allowances.  In short, even when there is a close link between educational achievement and 
distributive outcomes, schools may not be the cause of the achievement gap or the best remedy 
for closing it. 
                                                          
7 Of course, a similar principle of horizontal equity could be applied to other domains as well—for example, to 
health care.  Moreover, the same reasoning may underlie employing the same principle in these different domains.  
The point in the text is simply that whether or not we employ horizontal equity to other domains, this does not affect 
the way the principle of Narrow Equity works in education. 
8 For an anecdotal account of how lack of basic medical and dental care affects educational achievement, see Kozol 
(1991): 20-21.  On importance of day-care, see Barry (2005): “Early, multidimensional high-quality child care 
sustained over several generations is the only possible route to the real equalization of opportunity.  This makes it 
more of a threat [to middle-class privilege] than any amount of fiddling around with the school system, since it is 
clear that, by the time children reach school middle-class advantage is already so entrenched under existing 





E) Equal opportunity and the family 
Of course, schools are not the only educational institutions in our society; the family, in 
particular, plays a critical role in educating children.  Indeed, to a very large degree, it is the 
family that creates the problem of unequal opportunities between children in the first place.  Not 
only do well-to-do families purchase formal educational advantages for their children (expensive 
houses in good suburban schools, private schools, tutoring, etc.), but the internal life of families 
has a large influence on a child’s educational success.  The day-to-day vocabulary of parents, the 
amount of time spent reading with children or helping them with homework, enriching extra-
curricular activities, the values of the family, parenting-style—all of these things confer 
educational advantages on some children over others thereby leading to unequal life prospects 
(see 12.3.A).  In this connection, Rawls observed that “Even the willingness to make an effort, to 
try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon happy family and social 
circumstances” (TJ: 74/64).  In an influential empirical study published about the same time as A 
Theory of Justice, Christopher Jencks and his colleagues estimated that “family background 
explains nearly half the variation in educational attainment” in America (Jencks 1972: 143).  
Moreover (as we have already observed) many of the educational advantages that families confer 
on children are correlated with social class.9  “Is the family to be abolished then?”  Rawls 
allowed that “Taken by itself and given a certain primacy, the idea of equal opportunity inclines 
in this direction.”10  Perhaps, in place of the family, children could be raised collectively in 
compulsory boarding schools.  We might roughly imitate the ancient Spartans who sent all boys 
to be educated in the barracks at age seven.  If this sounds extravagant, it may be noted that we 
                                                          
9 Jencks (1972): ch. 5; Marshall et al. (1997): esp. ch.5; Lareau (2005): esp. ch. 1. 






have already in large part shifted our care of the elderly from the family to collective institutions 
(Muñoz-Dardé 1999: 45 fn.10). 
Abolishing the family is obviously not a live policy option, but several philosophers 
interested in equality of opportunity have entertained it as a speculative question.11  Not 
surprisingly, they have all managed to locate reasons of one kind or another for not abolishing it.  
Some have offered the child-centered argument that only small family-like units can provide the 
care and intimacy necessary for fostering the capacities of moral personality in children that are 
fundamental to any just social order (Blustein 1982: 211-223; Muñoz-Dardé 1999).  Others stress 
the importance of individual families for preserving the cultural pluralism from one generation to 
the next that is an essential precondition to a meaningful exercise of personal liberty (Russell 
1929: ch. XIV).  Still others emphasize a parent-centered rationale:  that people have a basic 
right or interest in raising their offspring.12  Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, for example, 
argue that parenthood makes possible a valuable social good—namely, a certain kind of intimate 
relationship between an adult and a child—which is unique and not possible in other forms of 
human association (see my Chapters 9 and 10).  Consequently, a society with intact families but 
                                                          
11 Schrag (1976); Blustein (1982); Fishkin (1983); Ross and Schmidtz (2005); Muñoz-Dardé (1998; 1999; 2002); 
Brighouse (2000); Macleod (2002); Brighouse and Swift (2009). 
12 Certainly this right is widely recognized in rights declarations and in law.  Article 16 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, for example, maintains that “men and women of full age … have the right to marry and to found a 
family,” and that “the family … is entitled to protection by society and the State.”  And in Meyer v. Nebraska, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the rights “to marry” and to “establish a home and bring up children” are fundamental 
rights protected (implicitly) by the Constitution, which is to say, rights that cannot be legally abridged without the 
demonstration of a compelling state interest.  Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922).  See also Skinner v. 





less equality of opportunity would be better than one without families and more equality of 
opportunity.13   
However, even though the family is on all accounts sufficiently valuable to warrant 
protecting it at the cost of significant inequality of opportunity, that does mean that the state 
should not try to break or minimize the connection between families and the unequal advantages 
that lead to unequal life prospects.  And in this, the school system will surely have a large role to 
play.  Compensatory educational programs (it is hoped) can provide children from disadvantaged 
homes with skills other children learn in the home.  Racially and economically integrated schools 
(again, hopefully) will permit disadvantaged children to benefit from the aspirations, 
vocabularies, and cultural capital of their middle-class peers.  Brighouse goes so far as to argue 
that schools can even be beneficial by insulating advantaged children from their parents:  
“Compulsory equal state schooling can designate around 15,000 hours of each child’s life in 
which their parents could not be conferring on them opportunities superior to those which others 
will enjoy” (2000: 120).  Brighouse and Swift have also argued that equality of opportunity puts 
certain limits on the kinds of benefits that parents should bestow on their children.  For instance, 
even if exclusive private schools are available, the goal of equal opportunity gives parents a 
strong reason not to send their children to them, since conferring such advantages is not essential 
to realizing the value of the family (Swift 2003; Brighouse and Swift 2009). 
F) Equal opportunity within a complete theory of justice 
Our discussion of the family reveals that the ultimate implications of Fair Equality of 
Opportunity for social institutions depend in part on that principle’s role in a complete theory of 
                                                          






justice or political philosophy.  For instance, I have already noted that Fair Opportunity gives us 
a (defeasible) reason to abolish or democratize exclusive private schools.  But it might be argued 
(pace some egalitarians) that one part of a parent’s prior fundamental right to raise her children is 
to send them to private schools.  For instance, this right appears to be recognized by both the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights14 and by U.S. Constitutional law.15  Or to take another 
example:   By itself, Fair Opportunity is presumably consistent with devoting more educational 
resources to the gifted than to the mediocre student—or vice versa.  But for Rawls, once Fair 
Opportunity is secured, the Difference Principle kicks in.  As Rawls explains, “the difference 
principle would allocate resources in education … so as to improve the long-term expectations of 
the least favored.  If this end is attained by giving more attention to the better endowed; it is 
permissible; otherwise not.”  And in this connection Rawls cautions us against assuming that 
education is only of instrumental importance to people:  “Equally if not more important is the 
role of education in enabling a person to enjoy the culture of his society and to take part in its 
affairs, and in this way to provide for each individual a secure sense of his own worth” (TJ: 
101/87). 
13.4  Arguments for Fair Equality of Opportunity 
Although many people find Fair Equality of Opportunity an intuitively attractive principle, it 
is not so easy to find an argument for it.  In the remainder of this chapter, I consider in turn five 
possible arguments.   
                                                          
14 Article 26: “Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given their children.” 





A) The argument from the Original Position 
First of all, it is hard to see Fair Equality of Opportunity as an implication of Rawlsian 
contractualism.  I assume the basic outlines of Rawls’s argument from the “Original Position” 
are familiar:  Rawls holds that the principles of justice are those that would be chosen by fairly 
situated rational and reasonable people who are motivated to come to fair terms of cooperation 
with one another.  We can model this fair choice situation, he maintains, by thinking about which 
principles governing the basic structure of society would be chosen by mutually disinterested 
persons placed behind a “veil of ignorance,” which deprives them of any knowledge of their 
place in society or their particular values.  Now whether Rawls’s contractual arguments for the 
Difference Principle and the Principle of Equal Liberty are successful has been debated at length, 
but at least Rawls provides arguments on these counts.  However, Fair Equality of Opportunity, 
along with its priority over the Difference Principle, never receives such an argument at all.  And 
it is difficult to see how it could possibly be given one.  Giving Fair Equality of Opportunity 
priority over the Difference Principle amounts to treating inequalities due to social background 
as worse than inequalities due to differences in native endowment.  But why would the parties 
behind the veil of ignorance make that judgment, given that they are only concerned about their 
expected share of primary goods and do not know whether they are more likely to be 
disadvantaged by class or by natural endowment? (Nagel 1997: 311-312; Arneson 1999: 81-83; 
Pogge 1989: 168-173). 
Of course, implementing Fair Equality of Opportunity might turn out to improve the 
condition of the least advantaged.  Thus, if the parties in the Original Position chose to govern 
themselves by the Difference Principle, Fair Opportunity might be justified derivatively.  To 





individuals to positions where they could be of the most use to others.  Second, by removing 
barriers to entry for the most desirable skilled positions, the whole labor market should become 
more competitive and income inequality should flatten out somewhat (cf. Tawney 1931, 1964: 
150).  Third, having roughly equal chances of success in life might be an important basis of self-
respect for the least advantaged—although it is also conceivable that having low status in a 
genuinely meritocratic society would damage a person’s self-respect too, since one could not 
easily blame factors outside oneself for one’s circumstances.  These are important 
considerations, although they may have limits, since implementing Fair Opportunity could affect 
total productivity.  A school system that really “evened out class barriers” would by all accounts 
be very expensive and might reduce the social surplus available to benefit the least advantaged 
(Pogge 1989: 173).  These are, of course, empirical questions and cannot be decided a priori.  In 
any case, showing that Fair Opportunity helps satisfy the Difference Principle does not justify 
erecting it as an independent and lexically prior moral principle, as Rawls does (Barry 1973: 83; 
Arneson 1999).  Instead, it suggests that Fair Opportunity ought to be relegated to the status of a 
secondary norm, the relative strength of which is determined by the more general principles of 
justice (cf. Rawls TJ: 60/52). 
∴ 
  It may be that, in less careful moments, Rawls occasionally reasoned as follows.16  In 
presenting the second principle of justice (TJ: §12), Rawls initially introduces it as the principle 
that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably 
expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.”  
                                                          
16 This interpretation was suggested to me by the discussion of Fair Equality of Opportunity in Freeman (2007): esp. 





But both “everyone’s advantage” and positions “open to all” are ambiguous expressions, he 
explains.  “Everyone’s advantage” may be interpreted to refer to either an efficient (Pareto-
optimal) distribution or to one that is maximally advantageous to the least advantaged (the 
Difference Principle).  “Open to all” may be interpreted to refer to either formally open positions 
(“careers open to the talents”) or to Fair Equality of Opportunity.  Rawls then suggests that these 
two ambiguities can be crossed to yield four interpretations of the two principles, which are 
presented in Table 5 below. 
                                 
                              “Everyone’s advantage” 
 
     “Equally open” 
 
Principle of efficiency Difference Principle 
 
Equality as careers  
     open to talents 
 
 
System of Natural Liberty 
 
Natural Aristocracy 
Equality as equality  
     of fair opportunity 
 
Liberal Equality Democratic Equality 
Table 13.5: From Rawls (TJ: 65/57). 
Of the four, Rawls’s position is that of “Democratic Equality.”  What is interesting for our 
purposes is the interpretation that combines formal equal opportunity with the Difference 
Principle, “Natural Aristocracy.” “On this view,” Rawls explains, “no attempt is made to 
regulate social contingencies beyond what is required by formal equality of opportunity, but the 
advantages of persons with greater natural endowments are to be limited to those that further the 
good of the poorer sectors of society” (TJ: 74/64).  But what if the best way to promote the good 
of the least advantaged is by implementing—at least to some extent—Fair Equality of 
Opportunity?  Might the principle of Natural Aristocracy recommend implementing Fair 





in his description of the principle.  Instead, it is as if Rawls is imagining that the Difference 
Principle might be applied in two different kinds of societies: one in which there is Fair Equality 
of Opportunity and one in which there is not.   
Consider Figure 1, which depicts two production curves showing the possible distributions of 
primary goods between two representative persons X1 and X2 at various levels of output.17  The 
production curves illustrate the fact that different arrangements of the basic structure affect not 
only relative shares of the total social product enjoyed by each representative person, but the size 
of the total social product as well.  The diagonal line drawn from the origin signifies a perfectly 
equal distribution.  The origin marks, not the point where no one has anything, but where the 
production curves happen to depart from perfect equality.  As the two production curves are both 
Southeast of Perfect Equality, X2 is the less advantaged of the two representative persons.   
                                                          







The production curve that runs through points D2 and E2 represents the feasible distributions in 
a society that has implemented Fair Equality of Opportunity, whereas the curve that runs through 
points D1 and E1 represents the distributions in a society where “no attempt is made to regulate 
social contingencies beyond what is required by formal equality of opportunity.”  Both curves 
have a point that is the maximally efficient distribution on that curve (E), and a point that is most 
beneficial to the less advantaged representative person on that curve (D).  Let us say that we 
apply the principle of efficiency18 and the Difference Principle narrowly when we apply it only 
along a single production curve, not across curves.  We apply these principles broadly when we 
                                                          
18 Understood now in a maximizing, aggregative way (i.e., the Kaldor-Hicks point: the point that would be Pareto-
optimal if, hypothetically, gainers were to compensate losers).  Every point on the curves from D eastward is 





apply them across curves.  Applied broadly, efficiency picks out E2 as the just distribution, and 
the Difference Principle picks out D2.  I believe that a broad application of the Difference 
Principle is plainly the best interpretation of Rawls’s considered view.19   
Nevertheless, we may conjecture that in passages like section 12 of Theory of Justice, which 
contains Rawls’s most detailed discussion of Fair Equality of Opportunity, Rawls is implicitly 
thinking about the Difference Principle (and the principle of efficiency) as being applied 
narrowly.  One reason for thinking this is that, if Fair Equality of Opportunity really would 
typically improve the absolute position of the least advantaged (e.g., for the reasons mentioned 
above), then the principle of Natural Aristocracy (as Rawls has defined it in opposition to Fair 
Opportunity) is incoherent on a broad application of the Difference Principle.20  On the narrow 
interpretation, however, it makes some sense to say that one applies one or the other 
interpretation of equal opportunity first—that sets the parameters of the production curves—and 
then one applies either the principle of efficiency or the Difference Principle.  Furthermore, on 
the narrow construal of the Difference Principle (and only on that construal), it is possible to say, 
as Samuel Freeman does, that Fair Equality of Opportunity actually “advances the absolute 
position of the worst-off in ways not provided by the difference principle.”21  
                                                          
19 This is perfectly clear in the Restatement: “there are, in general, different [production] curves for different 
schemes of cooperation; and some schemes are more effectively designed than others.  One scheme is more 
effective than another if its [production] curve always gives a greater return to the less advantaged for any given 
return to the more advantaged.  Other things being equal, the difference principle directs society to aim at the highest 
point on the [production] curve of the most effectively designed scheme of cooperation” (Rawls 2001: 63). 
20 Of course, it is conceivable that these circumstances would not hold and that point D on the Fair Equality of 
Opportunity production curve would be better for the least advantaged than point D on the Formal Equality of 
Opportunity production curve. 
21 “FEO [Fair Equality of Opportunity] advances the absolute position of the worst-off in ways not captured by the 
difference principle: Compare two societies with the difference principle which differ in that the first ‘Democratic 
Equality’ has FEO whereas the second, ‘Natural Aristocracy,’ has only formal equality of opportunity… Because of 






B) Fair Opportunity and pure procedural justice 
At one point, Rawls tells us that “It is evident that the role of the principle of fair opportunity 
is to insure that the system of cooperation is one of pure procedural justice.  Unless it is satisfied, 
distributive justice could not be left to take care of itself, even within a restricted range” (TJ 
1971: 87).22  How should we understand this remark?  Is this an independent argument for Fair 
Equality of Opportunity?       
Rawls distinguishes two ways that procedures may be related to just outcomes.  In some 
cases, the justice of outcomes are defined by some criterion independent of the procedure by 
which we derive the outcome.  The procedures in these cases are merely heuristics or ways of 
approximating the right result.  For example, we think that the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant in a criminal trial is a fact independent of the verdict of the jury; the procedures of the 
jury trial are our ways of trying to reach the right outcome.  In some rare cases procedures can be 
designed that are sure to reach the independently defined right outcome.  These are cases of 
perfect procedural justice.  Rawls’s example is the method of slicing up a cake in equal portions 
by having the person doing the slicing take the last piece.  But in most cases, like the criminal 
trial, the procedure is not sure to reach the right outcome.  These are cases of imperfect 
procedural justice.  Although perfect and imperfect procedural justice are distinguished by the 
reliability of the procedure, they are fundamentally alike in that the right or fair outcome is 
judged by a criterion independent of the procedure.  In other cases, outcomes are fair because 
they are the outcome of a fair procedure.  Rawls calls these cases of pure procedural justice.  An 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Not only do these benefits directly benefit members of the worst-off class (who otherwise cannot afford them), but 
they also allow society to call upon a larger pool of trained skills and abilities, thereby improving overall 
productivity and output.  A society of Democratic Equality is then more prosperous in the aggregate than is Natural 
Aristocracy” (Freeman 2007: 130). 





example is gambling.  When people make bets in a game, the fair distribution of cash at the end 
of the game is determined solely by the actual results of playing the game (TJ: 85-86/74-75).   
Rawls invokes this distinction because he wants to treat “the question of distributive shares 
as a matter of pure procedural justice” (TJ: 84-85/74).  This does not mean that the shape of the 
basic structure, including the expectations of representative social positions, is one of pure 
procedural justice.  The principles of justice provide us with the criteria to evaluate the basic 
structure.  Rather, the role of pure procedural justice lies in determining the destination of each 
particular individual in the just social structure.  Independent of the actual bargains and 
exchanges people make within these fair background institutions, no particular individual is 
entitled to any particular place in the distribution of goods.    Rawls means to distinguish his 
view from utilitarianism (as well as desert-based theories) in this respect.  Utilitarian political 
theory seems to be committed to be a version of imperfect procedural justice.  The goal is to 
design social institutions such that goods are distributed to satisfy as greatly as possible the 
actual preferences of particular individuals.  Rawls insists that, on his view, “no attempt is made 
to define the just distribution of goods and services on the basis of information about the 
preferences and claims of particular individuals”; “the distribution that results is a case of 
background [or pure procedural] justice on the analogy with the outcome of a fair game” (Rawls, 
TJ: 304/265 and 2001: §14). 
In light of this, what are we to make of the claim we began with:  that “the role of the 
principle of fair opportunity is to insure that the system of cooperation is one of pure procedural 






To see [Rawls’s] point, suppose that there is in place an economic system satisfying the 
difference principle, … [and] there are no … legal constraints on entry into favorable 
positions, but still opportunities are largely determined by social connections, class 
membership, and class bias.  Hence children of those better off largely monopolize 
desirable professional positions, … while all socially less-advantaged children [fall 
behind] due to a lack of fair educational opportunities and an absence of family and other 
social networks.  [I]n the absence of fair educational opportunities, and because of class 
discrimination, there will be fewer qualified people to compete for positions, and 
desirable positions will demand a premium, aggravating inequality between income 
groups, and limiting the relative and absolute wealth of the less advantaged (Freeman 
2007: 129, emphases added).23   
If Freeman is correct and this is what Rawls is getting at, then we have another case where Fair 
Equality of Opportunity is treated as an independent and prior principle when the Difference 
Principle is applied narrowly.  In that case, the argument for Fair Equality appears to be (as 
Freeman suggests) that it improves the relative and absolute wealth of the less advantaged, and 
(in my terms) is endorsed by a broad application of the Difference Principle.  If that’s so, then 
all the points made in the previous section apply here as well.   
On this reading, when Rawls says that “unless [Fair Opportunity] is satisfied, distributive 
justice could not be left to take care of itself, even within a restricted range,” what he means is 
that the allocation of fair distributive shares could not be left to the free market for the most part, 
unless the labor market were kept competitive by employing all human resources to their full 
potential.  If the market were perfectly competitive, then wages would be adjusted so that every 
job is roughly equally attractive, taking into consideration the inherent appeal, burdens, and the 
necessary prior investments in training, specific to each position; the only exception would be 
special premiums placed on scarce natural talents.  These inequalities due to natural differences 
                                                          





as well as those caused by imperfections that kept the labor market from being perfectly 
competitive could be mitigated by means of a social minimum.24 
C) The argument from self-realization 
In the previous section, I mentioned some of the ways that Fair Equality of Opportunity 
might be thought to improve total productivity and efficiency.  But in Rawls’s most direct 
statement on the matter, he insists that efficiency is not the primary justification for Fair 
Opportunity.  Instead, he argues that Fair Opportunity is of principal importance, because 
without those opportunities, even if the situation of everyone can be otherwise improved, some 
will be “deprived of one of the main forms of the human good,” which is “experiencing the 
realization of self which comes from a skillful and devoted exercise of social duties” (TJ: 84/73).  
One puzzling aspect of this argument is that self-realization does not seem like a typical 
Rawlsian primary good—an all-purpose good that people tend to desire more of whatever else 
they want.  Therefore, it is not clear how citizens can appeal to this argument in their public 
deliberations with one another in the way Rawls thinks they should.  Perhaps one could argue 
that self-realization is one of the “social bases of self-respect.”  But, from Rawls’s point of view, 
there is some danger of opening the door to full-blown perfectionism with this move.  Part of the 
point of measuring expectations in terms of primary goods in the first place is that it permits the 
principle of justice to abstract from citizens’ various thick conceptions of the good.25  But self-
realization looks like a particular thick conception of the good.26  Isn’t this precisely the sort of 
                                                          
24 There is some textual support for this interpretation at Rawls, TJ (1971): 87, 307.  Although the latter passage is 
reproduced in the revised version TJ (1999): 270, the former passage has curiously been deleted TJ (1999): 76. 
25 Rawls TJ: §§15, 60; (2001): §17. 
26 A similar criticism is made in Barry (1973): 83-86.  Barry objects that Rawls is illicitly smuggling in substantive 





value that ought to be excluded by the veil of ignorance.  If we permit this kind of appeal to self-
realization, might not others just as well argue that an essential part of self-respect is an 
environment free of “degrading” activities?    
Essentially the same point can be made in a different way.  In sections 40 and 86 of A Theory 
of Justice, Rawls argues that acting in accordance with the principles of justice chosen in the 
Original Position expresses our true natures as free and equal rational persons, and that one 
source of stability for a just society is the fact that people regard a life that expresses their true 
natures as a part of their good.  This mitigates the so-called “dualism of practical reason,” 
according to which our sense of justice and self-interest can come into conflict with one 
another.27  Now plainly this “Kantian Interpretation” is, at bottom, a theory of self-realization—
albeit one where the “self” that is realized is a universal human Self, not a personal or 
idiosyncratic one.  But in his later work, Rawls retracted this line of argument, on the ground that 
this theory of stability was incompatible with the spirit of Justice as Fairness, which aimed to 
abstract from the content of different conceptions of the good and different “comprehensive 
doctrines” that are held by reasonable citizens of liberal societies (Rawls 1993, 1996: xviii-xix).  
This suggests that an appeal to self-realization in support of Fair Equality of Opportunity is also 
incongruent with the “political not metaphysical” spirit of Justice as Fairness. 
Although the foregoing objection has some merit, it is not decisive.  Here is the way to parry 
it.  The argument is not that Fair Equality of Opportunity is essential to promoting the 
perfectionist end of self-realization.  Rather, the argument is that any account of social justice is 
                                                          
27 The notion of the “Dualism of Practical Reason” is coined and discussed in Sidgwick (1907): 404 fn. 1, 507-509.  






going to have to take into account the reasons why people actually value particular kinds of 
goods.  A theory of justice that treated desirable positions and the opportunities to attain them 
purely as the means to earn income would be psychologically and sociologically deficient.  
Rawls, therefore, is simply acknowledging the fact that our occupations play an important part in 
defining our practical and social identities and in shaping the directions in which we develop our 
abilities,28 and that it is in large part because people care about these identities and their self-
development that they value some positions more than others.  It is because work so plainly has 
this formative and self-actualizing aspect, especially in modern society, that it is important that a 
theory of justice not look at the distribution of positions solely from the perspective of 
distributing and maximizing material wealth.     
Let us allow, then, that “the realization of self that comes from a skillful and devoted exercise 
of social duties” is a worthy political ideal.  The next question is whether this really constitutes 
an argument for Fair Equality of Opportunity.  First of all, the appeal to self-realization in the 
performance of social duties seems to speak in favor of meaningful work and dignified working 
conditions in all forms of employment.  It is odd to think the way to satisfy this ideal is to assure 
everyone an equal chance for meaningful and dignified work (and thus an equal chance of 
meaningless and undignified work).  Increasing competition for important social positions will 
not evidently increase the number of those positions.   
That said, it does make sense to think that an important part of self-realization is having real 
options with respect to employment.  To be sure, having a range of options is not strictly 
necessary for self-realization.  There have surely been people who have experienced the kind of 
                                                          






realization of self at issue—the sense that “this is what I was born to do”—without having had 
any other viable options in life.  But we also know that a life of forced choices can alienate 
people from the lives they lead.  And this seems particularly true in the modern world, where 
people have come to expect that they should be, in a significant way, the authors of their own 
lives.  This no doubt requires more than formal freedom of occupation.  A life of bleak prospects, 
even absent formal exclusion and overt discrimination, is a formidable barrier to self-realization.  
Without effective access to education, for example, people will be unable to develop their talents 
and therefore unable to have much power to choose their own course in life.   
But is it the comparative inequality of life prospects that is the barrier, or is the lack of 
sufficient or adequate opportunities?  It is easier to see how self-realization underlies an 
argument for sufficient opportunity than equality of opportunity.29  Suppose some people have 
more options in life than I do.  How could the mere act of eliminating some of their options 
improve my prospects for self-realization?30  More to the point, although it is possible to have 
more and more opportunities, it is not clear that past a certain point, additional opportunities 
necessarily make us any more capable of self-realization.  However, as Debra Satz observes, this 
conclusion surely requires one qualification:  “Although an adequacy standard does not insist on 
strictly equal opportunities for the development of children’s potentials, large inequalities 
regarding who has a real opportunity for important goods [may] relegate some members of 
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citizens to [what is in effect] second-class citizenship,” and this would threaten to undermine the 
good of self-realization (2007: 637, emphasis added).31 
D) The argument from merit and moral arbitrariness 
Another line of argument for Fair Opportunity appeals directly to its meritocratic character.  
In contrast to the argument from self-realization, this argument has the virtue of appealing 
directly to comparative chances in life.  Rawls seems to suggest such an argument at one point 
(TJ: 71-75/62-64), but it had been made previously and at greater length in Tawney’s Equality.  
According to Tawney:  
The inequalities of the old régime had been intolerable because they had been arbitrary, 
the result not of differences of personal capacity, but of social and political favouritism.  
The inequalities of industrial society were esteemed, for they were the expression of 
individual achievement or failure to achieve.  So it was possible to hate the inequalities 
most characteristic of the eighteenth century and to applaud those most characteristic of 
the nineteenth. (1931, 1964: 102) 
But the problem with this new liberal view, as Tawney explains, is that it focused exclusively on 
removing formal disabilities and ignored how individuals acquire the abilities they need to 
succeed.  Even if the market does distribute advantages to the most qualified, social inequalities 
will still be unfair if the education necessary for acquiring those qualifications is unaffordable for 
some.  After all, parental wealth hardly seems less arbitrary from a moral point of view than 
noble lineage (cf. Williams 1976).  Classical liberalism, so the argument goes, turns out to be 
philosophically unstable.  It prides itself for the rationality of making wealth depend on 
individual merit, but then it ignores the arbitrary way by which the talents of some are 
developed, while those of others are left to lay fallow.  “In proportion as the capacities of some 
                                                          





are sterilized or stunted by their social environment, while those of others are favoured or 
pampered by it,” Tawney concludes, “equality of opportunity becomes a graceful, but attenuated 
figment” (1931, 1964: 104).  Drawing on Tawney’s analysis, Brian Barry reaches a similar 
verdict:   
What we have here is an ideology: it cloaks the status quo with legitimacy through a 
process of mystification.  For it has the effect of building into the limited claim that some 
appointment was fair the far more grandiose claim that the successful candidate was 
distinguished from very many others only by pursing a course of action that it was 
equally open to any of them to have taken (2005: 40). 
 Now ideologies typically work because they appeal to genuinely attractive moral ideals.  For 
this reason, an effective way to subvert them is to take those ideals at face value and demand that 
measures be taken that are actually sufficient to realize them.  Fair Equality of Opportunity is 
often understood in this way: it simply takes meritocratic ideals seriously and carries the logic of 
classical liberalism to its logical, more egalitarian conclusion.  Adam Swift makes the case for 
equal educational opportunity turn on precisely this point: 
People should do well or badly in life on their own merits…. Someone’s chances of 
getting into a good university, or to a university at all, shouldn’t depend on whether her 
parents are able and willing to send her to a private school.  It should depend on how 
intelligent she is, and how much effort she’s prepared to make when applying that 
intelligence.  The kind of equality of opportunity we’re talking about here is meritocratic: 
people with the same level of merit—IQ + effort—should have the same chances of 
success.  Their social background shouldn’t make any difference (Swift 2003: 42, 24). 
But one can certainly ask why it is important that people do well or badly in life on the basis 
of their own merits.  The most natural suggestion is that otherwise people don’t get what they 
deserve.  “The moral basis of equality of opportunity,” Harry Brighouse argues, is “grounded in 
the concept of desert” (2000: 124).  “Where social institutions license social rewards,” he 





from the rewards deserve to in some sense.”  A person can only be said to deserve his success in 
life to the extent that that individual can be held responsible for her level of success.  And to the 
extent someone’s success is “due to their family background circumstances, or their family’s 
choices, it is unreasonable to hold the competitor responsible” for his or her success to that 
degree.  Now, since being better educated is one important advantage in the competition for 
positions, a person cannot deserve his success in that competition to the extent that he received a 
better education than others because of the choices or resources of his family.  Thus, educational 
inequalities due to family background and family choices are unjust (Brighouse 2000: 117-118). 
Of course, the glaring defect in this argument is that native endowment is not deserved either.  
Hayek thought this a serious weakness in egalitarian thought.  “Egalitarians generally regard 
differently those differences in individual capacities which are inborn and those which are due to 
the influence of environment.”  But they are in the same boat: “Though either may greatly affect 
the value which an individual has for his fellows, no more credit belongs to him for having been 
born with desirable qualities than for having grown up under desirable conditions” (Hayek 1960: 
89).  Rawls recognized this as well: “once we are troubled by the influence of either social 
contingencies or natural chance on the determination of distributive shares, we are bound, on 
reflection, to be bothered by the influence of the other.  From a moral standpoint the two seem 
equally arbitrary” (TJ: 74-75/64-65).   
Hayek, and later Nozick, concluded from this that it was a mistake to think of material 
“rewards” as corresponding to moral merit at all.  Instead, a person’s income should be 
understood to signify only how useful a person is judged to be by others.  It does not matter that 
the degree of one’s usefulness is a contingent and largely morally arbitrary matter (Hayek 1960: 





that material inequalities are unjust whether they arise from social contingency or from the 
“natural lottery” of innate endowment.  When are inequalities not morally arbitrary?  The 
intuition, here, is that inequality is not morally arbitrary when it is a consequence of choices for 
which people can be held responsible (cf. Nagel 1991: 71).   
This, of course, is essentially the perspective of that family of positions known as “Luck 
Egalitarianism,” which can be understood as a particularly radical brand of equality of 
opportunity (cf. Mason 2001).  If educational attainment is highly correlated with social 
inequality, then Luck Egalitarianism seems committed to equal educational attainment for all, 
except insofar as inequalities can be attributed to a student’s accountable choices.  To the extent 
that we are skeptical that minors can be held accountable for their choices, we are led to the view 
that educational equality means equal academic attainment for all.  This, as we have seen, is 
essentially Barry’s conclusion: that “we should regard the demands of social justice as being met 
to the extent that there are equal educational attainments at the age of 18” (2005: 47). 
Some try to salvage the moral relevance of the distinction between inequalities in capacity 
that are inborn and those that are due to environment by arguing that the difference is not one of 
principle but of practicality.  Even if we can benefit the naturally disadvantaged to some extent 
by devoting additional resources to their educations, it seems wrong to aim so high as equal 
educational achievement.  As Brighouse explains, this “would have the consequence that we may 
completely neglect the education of the extremely talented, devoting all educational resources to 
the least talented who may never reach the level of achievement that the most talented can reach 
with very little input….  Even more counter-intuitively, if the least talented are sufficiently 
untalented, even the averagely and below averagely talented will be neglected educationally” 





But it is an error to think that such pragmatic considerations will support a distinction in the 
way we treat naturally and socially caused inequalities in capacity.  We are tempted to make this 
mistake, because we think of our environments as changeable, while our genes seem immutable.  
(I leave aside here the speculative question concerning equal opportunity and genetic 
enhancement.)  But the relative mutability of the initial causes tells us nothing about the relative 
mutability of the consequences.  A child with an innate cognitive disability may be able to 
benefit much more from extra help at school than a naturally gifted child who has suffered from 
poverty-induced educational neglect (Jencks 1988: 523). 
The conclusion to which we are driven by the foregoing considerations is that an argument 
from merit or desert cannot ground Fair Equality of Opportunity.  But might Fair Opportunity, 
like the classical liberal view critiqued by Rawls and Tawney, just be another incomplete follow-
through of the core idea that inequalities should not morally arbitrary?  Should we, for this 
reason, accept some version of Luck Egalitarianism?32  I shall suggest three reasons, specific to 
the domain of education, why I think we should resist that conclusion.33   
First, observe that Luck Egalitarianism is supposed to look attractive compared to simple 
equality, because it permits inequalities that arise from people’s different choices and (on some 
views) their different characters.  In this way, it is less procrustean than simple equality.  But if 
children cannot be held accountable for their choices and characters, then in childhood Luck 
Egalitarianism is every bit as procrustean as simple equality.  Different educational outcomes 
could only be eliminated, as Amy Gutmann points out, “by eradicating the different intellectual, 
cultural, and emotional dispositions and attachments of children” (1987: 133).  Even though 
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children are not accountable for this diversity, we are not necessarily wrong to value it.  Looking 
upon this diversity as something that needs to be uprooted in the name of a more competitive 
society seems very misguided.  The second point is the reverse of the first.  It seems wrong to 
think that an adolescent who is morally accountable for his choices should be made to shoulder 
full responsibility for them.  We don’t treat responsible students unjustly when we give the 
irresponsible ones second and third chances.34  Third, although compensating people for bad luck 
has a certain appeal, our intuitions about good luck are not symmetrical.  When we discover a 
musical or mathematical prodigy, for instance, we don’t think it is a good idea to deprive him of 
educational opportunities to ensure that he doesn’t end up with life prospects any better than the 
rest of us.  But if we focus on equality of fortune, then there is no real difference between good 
and bad luck.  As Matt Cavanaugh puts it, “A stroke of good luck for me just is a stroke of bad 
luck for you, since what it does from your point of view is leave you worse off through no fault 
of your own” (2002: 97-98).  If we intuitively revolt at that conclusion, then that suggests that 
what we really care about is not equality of fortune, but the mitigation of serious misfortune.   
I admit that these are not decisive arguments against Luck Egalitarianism.  This is 
particularly because many Luck Egalitarians are value pluralists and think that justice has to be 
balanced with other values.35  They would agree that insisting on the just outcome in every case 
would be cruel and narrow-minded; that, after all, is supposed to be the moral of the Merchant of 
Venice.  On their view, while it is appropriate to balance justice with compassion and other 
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values, it is mistaken to make such compromises internal to the principle of justice.36  We are 
better off, on their view, with many clearly defined values and principles that can be balanced 
against one another in particular cases, rather than a couple of murky all-purpose rules into 
which we’ve tried to stuff all good things.  When I look at the issue in this way, I am tempted to 
concede to the Luck Egalitarians that they are right about the value of fairness in the most 
abstract, cosmic sense.  But, at the same time, it seems to me a serious mistake to identify this 
austere conception of fairness with the traditional subject of social justice.37  “Justice,” as Nagel 
has observed, “plays a special role in political argument: to appeal to it is to claim priority over 
other values.  Injustice is not just another cost; it is something that must be avoided, if not at all 
costs, then at any rate without counting the costs too carefully” (1997: 303).  The Luck 
Egalitarian conception of justice can be vindicated against the previous objections only at the 
price of depriving it of this priority and transforming it into a potentially weak pro tanto 
consideration. 
Finally, before we leave the argument from merit, let me say something about one final 
response one could make to Hayek’s point that innate differences in ability are every bit as 
undeserved as differences in ability due to social background.  One might accept the premise, 
agree that natural and social advantages are morally on a par, but argue that both Hayek and the 
Luck Egalitarians draw the wrong conclusion from this.  Hayek is wrong in drawing the 
conclusion that inequalities resulting from these contingencies need no justification, or none 
except that they are the result of free exchanges between individuals.  Rawls’s efforts to show 
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that the distribution of goods that results from free exchanges in a laissez-faire market are 
heavily influenced by morally arbitrary factors are best understood as an attempt to undermine 
any temptation to treat them as self-justifying or morally privileged (cf. Scheffler 2003: 24-31).  
But the Luck Egalitarians are wrong in drawing the conclusion that such morally arbitrary 
inequalities should be eliminated.  The proper conclusion, on the present view, is that 
inequalities in natural talents and social circumstances can be justified by being put to everyone’s 
advantage.  In at least one passage, Rawls argues for this position:  
No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in 
society.  But it does not follow that one should eliminate these distinctions.  There is 
another way to deal with them.  The basic structure can be arranged so that these 
contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate.  Thus we are led to the difference 
principle if we wish to set up the social system so that no one gains or loses from his 
arbitrary place in the distribution of natural assets or his initial position in society without 
giving or receiving compensating advantages in return (TJ: 102/87). 
This, however, again raises the question as to why Rawls does not believe that the Difference 
Principle wholly replaces Fair Equality of Opportunity, at least at the most fundamental level.     
E) The argument from equal treatment 
A different kind of argument for Fair Equality of Opportunity is this: It is because society is 
responsible for causing social disadvantages, but not for causing natural disadvantages, that it is 
more important to eliminate socially-caused inequalities than naturally-caused ones.  As Nagel 
points out, there are two diametrically opposed views that one could take on inequalities caused 
by nature: “as a factor for which individuals are not responsible and whose inequities society 
must therefore correct, or as a factor for which society is not responsible and whose unequal 





naturally leads to the first view; but if we emphasize the importance of society treating 
individuals equally, then the second view may seem plausible.38   
Of course, for this argument to even get off the ground, we have to reject a certain version of 
the doctrine of negative responsibility:  that society is as responsible for the inequalities that it 
allows as it is for those that it directly causes.  Christopher Jencks, for example, denies that 
society is free from responsibility with respect to inequalities in native endowment, since “we 
have ‘chosen’ not to limit the fertility of the genetically disadvantaged” (1988: 523).39  But 
whatever the merits of the doing/allowing distinction in general, it seems to have special appeal 
when we are thinking about equality.  Suppose that there are two groups of farmers living in 
different regions of the country who do not have any direct economic relations with one another.  
Suppose further that there are no laws preventing the farmers from relocating from one area to 
the other, although it would be expensive for them to do so.  It seems plausible to say that, if one 
area is more fertile than the other, and as a result one group of farmers is better-off than the 
other, then this is an inequality bestowed by nature, even though the government could choose to 
redistribute income equally.  On the other hand, in a second scenario, if the two groups of 
farmers are initially equally well-off, but the government then arbitrarily decides to tax one 
group much more heavily than the other, then this does seem be a socially caused inequality.  It 
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centres on equal treatment rather than the avoidance of inequality in the broadest sense” (305-306). 
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is reasonable to think that the inequality in the second scenario is more unjust than the former 
because it is caused by unequal treatment.   
Notice, however, that someone accepting this conclusion is not also committed to the view 
that we have no obligations to aid others unless we are responsible for their circumstances.  We 
presumably also have (at least) the natural duty of mutual aid that requires us (especially as a 
community) to relieve people from suffering or distress regardless of the cause of their 
hardship.40  The present argument is only that inequality, in itself, is unjust only (or especially) 
when it is the result of unequal or unfair treatment.41   
One complication for this position is that the important cases for thinking about equality of 
opportunity are not ones where natural causes create inequalities independently of social 
institutions.  Rather we are dealing with cases where, as Nagel observes, “a natural difference 
between people interacts with social mechanisms in such a way that it gives rise to differential 
advantages or disadvantages—even though the mechanisms do not specifically aim to produces 
any such correlation” (1997: 304).  It is not simply a natural phenomenon that people who tend 
to be better at writing and arithmetic (for example) tend to have a larger share of social goods.  It 
is because these talents are in greater demand given the social systems of production, 
organization, and consumption that we happen to have in place.  If we had a different system in 
place, different natural attributes might attract a larger share of goods.  Nagel argues that, in spite 
of this, it still makes sense to say that an inequality is due to nature when it is produced through 
an interaction of the natural differences of individuals and social institutions which would be 
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difficult to change and which do not aim to produce inequality, but rather have an independent, 
legitimate purpose.  As Nagel sees it, the educational system is a good example of this:  
“Educating individuals to the limit of their capacity is a legitimate aim, and social inequality 
generated in the pursuit of a legitimate aim is not unjust if natural differences among the persons 
involved are its primary cause” (316). 
With respect to education, then, the principle of equal treatment implies that society has a 
duty to provide equal educational opportunities to all students, regardless of family or social 
background.  At first glance, this might seem to return us to where we began:  narrow horizontal 
input equity.  But we must remember to take into account those socially caused inequalities that 
arise in the private sphere.  If society provides more educational advantages to some children in 
the home than others, then society has a duty to try to even out that inequality in the schools 
through compensatory education.  However, if due to variation of native potential children differ 
in their degree of educational attainment and thus their prospects as adults, then that inequality is 
not unjust.  By the same token, if students with more native potential can benefit from more 
higher education than those with less, then it is not unjust if society devotes more educational 
resources to the more naturally talented than to the less naturally talented.  Nagel thinks that this 
deontological norm of equal treatment might explain why the proponent of Fair Equality of 
Opportunity holds the otherwise mysterious idea that justice in education requires evening out 
differences in social background, but not differences in native talent:  “Once the society provides 
fair equality of opportunity,” he explains, “it is nature, not society, that is responsible for the 





Although Brighouse  officially defends his conception of equal opportunity on the basis of 
desert (as we saw in the previous section), there is one passage in particular where he really 
seems to be appealing to the different norm of equal treatment: 
Equal opportunity is desirable as a way of implementing a presumption of the equal 
moral worth of all persons.  This is an individualist criterion: having society devote less 
resources to someone’s life for arbitrary reasons is not much less of an assault on his 
moral standing than having society license such discrimination on other bases.  Yet 
having less devoted to someone’s life simply because he had the misfortune to be born to 
the Glums [a ‘poverty-stricken and inattentive’ family] rather than to the Lyons [a 
‘financially successful and attentive’ family] seems to be an arbitrary reason.  So equal 
opportunity, properly understood, is inhibited by the family.42 
This passage, observe, does not appeal to factors that are beyond the control of the individual 
child (as an argument from desert would), but rather to the way that society treats children 
unequally if it devotes fewer educational resources to some children than to others.  One way for 
society to treat children unequally is for the public school system to devote fewer resources to 
some children than to others on a discriminatory basis, as in segregated or arbitrarily unequal 
schools.  But hardly less disrespectful, Brighouse argues, is a system in which society devotes 
fewer educational resources to some than to others through the private sphere of the family.  If 
the Lyons devote more resources to their children’s education than the Glums devote to that of 
their children, then society has not treated the Lyon and the Glum children equally.  So 
understood, the principle of equal treatment seems well-suited for deriving Brighouse’s own 
conclusions: that the state ought “to expend more educational resources on the children of the 
socially disadvantaged children so that they face similar prospects for material and educational 
success to those of children from wealthier backgrounds,” but that with respect to children 
burdened by natural disadvantages, while some extra educational resources may be justified, 
                                                          





“equal prospects for material and educational success do not seem to be the appropriate goal” 
(2000: 131; see also 138-140). 
∴ 
The key question is whether it is really appropriate to think of all the inequalities that arise 
from individual families as cases where “society” has treated individuals unequally.  This 
argument looks more straightforward than it really is, because of our way of talking about 
“socially caused” inequalities.  When we speak of an inequality as having a social—as opposed 
to natural—cause, we usually simply mean to say that it is the result of human actions.  But it 
requires further argument to show that all inequalities with social causes in this broad sense are 
cases where individuals have been treated unequally by some entity called “society.”     
To see this, let us begin with a trivial example.  It is plausible to suppose that parents may 
make different reasonable judgments about how much television their children may watch per 
week.  Suppose that Perkins has a son and a daughter very close in age.  The principle of equal 
treatment suggests that, absent any special reason to do otherwise, Perkins ought to apply the 
same household rules to both of his children—in this case, that they are permitted to watch five 
hours of television per week.  If Perkins allowed his daughter to watch seven hours, and his son 
only five, then absent some special justification (e.g., the daughter is being rewarded for good 
behavior), the son will have a reasonable grievance against his father.  Now suppose that the 
neighbor, Quinsby, has children the same age as Perkins’s, but that he lets them each watch 
seven hours of television a week.  Even though the stakes in this example are indeed trivial, it is 
clear that the norm of equal treatment applies within each family.  But it does not seem to apply 





unfairly, in that Quinsby’s children are permitted to watch more television than they are.  Perkins 
treats his children equally, and Quinsby treats his children equally.  There is no agent that is the 
union of Perkins and Quinsby whose actions must treat all four children equally.  We would not 
be convinced if the Perkins children mounted the following argument:  “The number of hours of 
television a child is permitted to watch is not a natural fact; it is a socially imposed rule, which 
could be changed.  Because this rule is socially imposed, it is unfair if society treats us 
differently than the Quinsby kids, if there is no relevant difference between us.”  While the 
premise is true—household rules are not the work of nature—the inference that “Society” has 
treated them unequally, and therefore unfairly, is implausible.  It is better simply to say that this 
is a case where two different legitimate authorities have employed their reasonable discretion 
differently.  Although it is through no fault of their own that the Perkins children get to watch 
less television than the Quinsby children, and though the Quinsby children in no way deserve to 
watch more television, the emergent inequality is not a case of unfair treatment.  
Although this example deals with a relatively inconsequential matter, the principle can be 
generalized to more important cases.  Many decisions can be made in more than one reasonable 
way.  This is particularly true when we are dealing with quantitative trade-offs—for example, 
how much of one’s resources or energy to devote to one good as opposed to another.  
Nonetheless, when an authority has to make a decision, there is typically a duty to treat those 
subject to that authority in a fair and evenhanded way.  For example, although it may be true that 
both the five-hours- and the seven-hours-of-television-per-week rules are reasonable in 
themselves, it would be unfair if Perkins applied one rule to his son and another rule to his 
daughter, absent some special justification.  Perkins could not excuse his action simply because 





applying the household rules.  But when authority is decentralized, and authorities use their 
discretion to make different reasonable choices, the inequalities that emerge across jurisdictions 
are not necessarily cases of unequal treatment.  Call this the Emergent Inequalities Thesis. 
One implication of the Emergent Inequalities Thesis is that inequalities of opportunity that 
arise from the different decisions of private families are not necessarily unjust.  For example, if 
Perkins values education more than Quinsby, and therefore spends more of his free-time or 
disposable income on enriching his children’s education than does Quinsby, then that is not ipso 
facto unjust—even though the inequality between the Perkins and Quinsby children does not 
track any morally relevant difference.  Obviously, the difference between the Perkins and 
Quinsby children is not one of innate potential; the Perkins children enjoy a culturally 
transmitted advantage that the Quinsby children lack.  But this culturally transmitted advantage 
nonetheless has the same moral character as a naturally transmitted advantage, since it is not the 
outcome of unequal treatment. 
I consider this an attractive implication.  Suppose Quinsby, Perkins, and Roxy each have a 
child in the same grade.  Assume that the Quinsby child is more naturally gifted intellectually 
than the Perkins and Roxy children, who are of ordinary intelligence.  Now it turns out that 
Quinsby and Roxy meet ordinary expectations in how they divide their time between helping 
their children with their schoolwork and pursuing their own non-parenting projects.  As a 
consequence, Quinsby’s child performs better in school than Roxy’s.  Perkins, on the other hand, 
sacrifices his own non-parenting projects to devote an extraordinary amount of time helping his 
child with his school work.  As a consequence, the Perkins child performs better in school than 





Proponents of Fair Equality of Opportunity (especially those who accept an individualistic 
interpretation—cf. 13.3.A) would say that this is prima facie unjust.  In fact it is as unjust as if 
the school had sent home a paid tutor with the Perkins child but not with either the Roxy or 
Quinsby children.  In both scenarios Society is devoting more resources to the education of the 
Perkins child than to that of the Quinsby or Roxy children.  Not only does this seem implausible, 
but it also seems unattractively individualistic.  In theory any gift, any beneficence beyond what 
one is morally required or expected to bestow, and which might have significant implications for 
someone else’s chances in life, is unfair to all those people who weren’t benefited and cannot 
expect a like benefit from someone else.           
True, such philosophers would typically allow that what Perkins is doing is, all things 
considered, morally permissible.  But this is not because his extra tutoring does not lead to an 
injustice or unfairness.  Rather, it is because it is permissible for parents to act partially toward 
their own children, and therefore depart from strictly impartial justice.  Adam Swift puts it this 
way: 
Most evenings, I read a bedtime story to my kids.  I am showing a special, partial interest 
in my children.  I know that reading to them gives them advantages that will help them in 
the future, advantages not enjoyed by less fortunate others.  It is unfair that they don’t get 
what mine do.  The playing field is not level; our bedtime stories tilt it in their favour.  
Even so, few would advocate that they be banned.  Bedtime stories are on the right side 
of the line [of permissible parental partiality] (Swift 2003: 9; cf. Brighouse and Swift 
2009).   
I agree that Swift’s bedtime stories are unfair in the cosmic sense latched onto by Luck 
Egalitarians.  But by the same token, it is equally unfair if Professor Swift has transmitted to his 
children genes that are better than average for getting ahead in the world.  But that is not Swift’s 
view.  As we saw above (13.4.D), Swift thinks that it is fair for people to get ahead either on 





desert (as the Luck Egalitarians can), the only plausible argument is one, like Nagel’s, appealing 
to equal treatment.  And the objection that I am making is that it is implausible to regard such 
emergent inequalities as instances of unequal treatment at all.   
∴ 
I do not want to pretend that the last word about fair opportunity and the family has been said 
here.  But by way of conclusion, I wish to look at one more apparent implication of the Emergent 
Inequalities Thesis.  That is, it seems that we are unable to say that the inequalities that emerge 
from decentralized school-finance systems constitute unequal treatment either.  We have seen 
that the Supreme Court appealed to something like this reasoning in San Antonio v. Rodriguez 
(11.3.B).  That is, the Court agreed that school-finance systems based on taxes raised in local 
districts led to an arbitrary pattern of educational provision across the state.  But the Court denied 
that this violated the principle of equal treatment enshrined in the Equal Protection clause, for 
“any scheme of local taxation—indeed the very existence of identifiable local governmental 
units—requires the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary.”43      
Now it really does seem as if we are back to where we began in this chapter:  Narrow 
Horizontal Input Equity.  And, of course, the objections leveled against that position in 13.2 have 
not gone away.  So this chapter closes in a sort of Socratic aporia.  By pursuing the idea of equal 
educational opportunity, we seem to have traveled in a circle from the principle of equal 
treatment to that of equal life chances and back again to equal treatment.  In the next chapter, we 
examine the adequacy approach in order to see if it holds better promise for a compelling theory 
of educational justice.  In Chapter 15,  I will return to the idea of equal treatment, and argue that 
                                                          





it is one element in an attractive theory of educational justice, which also incorporates elements 





CHAPTER 14:  DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP  
AND EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 
14.1  The Idea of Adequacy 
In the previous chapter, we examined the view that a just educational system is either one 
that treats children equally or one that assures children equal chances in life in some sense.  In 
this chapter, we turn our attention to the idea that a just educational system is one that provides 
all children with an adequate education.  I begin in this section with a general discussion of the 
adequacy approach.  In the following sections, I examine four different attempts to articulate a 
philosophically principled conception of an adequate education. 
∴ 
Whereas equity concepts are typically understood to be relative or comparative in nature, 
adequacy concepts are said to be concerned only with absolute levels.1  They are, therefore, what 
philosophers sometimes call “sufficientarian” theories of distributive justice, applied to the 
domain of education.  Harry Frankfurt characterized the “doctrine of sufficiency” as the view 
that, “With respect to the distribution of economic assets, what is important from the point of 
view of morality is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough.  If 
everyone had enough, it would be of no moral importance whether some had more than others” 
(1988c: 134-135).  Similarly, adequacy conceptions in education maintain that it is imperative 
                                                          
1 Berne and Stiefel (1999): 22; Minorini and Sugarman (1999b): 189; Reich and Koski (2006): 550; Odden and 





that some minimum threshold of education is met for all students, while inequalities beyond that 
minimum are permissible. 
This minimum threshold is usually characterized in terms of what is necessary in the way of 
educational resources to produce certain outcomes—either in terms of educational attainment or, 
more broadly, in terms of the basic capabilities and functionings necessary for social life.2  Even 
though adequacy conceptions are often contrasted with conceptions of educational equality, they 
can also be understood as particular interpretations of equal opportunity—namely, as “an equal 
opportunity for a sound basic education,” as one court put it,3 or as “an equal opportunity to learn 
to high performance standards” (Odden and Picus 2008: 75).  In this respect as well, the 
adequacy approach can be compared to many sufficiency theories of social justice, which insist 
that everyone have access to the resources sufficient for what is variously described as “equality 
of status,” “equal dignity,” or “democratic equality” (Marshall 1964; Anderson 1999; Nussbaum 
2000: 86; 2006: 291-295). 
The adequacy approach has many virtues.  First, by focusing on educational and social 
outcomes, it avoids fetishizing the means of education and instead concentrates on the ultimate 
purposes of education.4  In this way, the adequacy approach is more closely allied with the 
philosophy of education than simple input theories are.  That is, one cannot know what social 
justice in education requires without a theory of the social role of education.  Arguably, then, the 
adequacy approach is just the classical approach to education in social philosophy, as we find it 
                                                          
2 For more on the adequacy approach in general, see 11.4.E.  For more on the role of adequacy in school-finance 
litigation, see 10.3.D. 
3 Vincent v. Voight 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000). 





variously developed in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Dewey.  Second, unlike 
narrow equal input theories, the adequacy approach can explain what would be unfair about 
abolishing public support of education altogether or of supporting it at miserly levels (Satz 2007: 
640).  Third, adequacy accounts do not recommend “leveling down” as strict equality-based 
conceptions do:  if one cannot benefit the positively disadvantaged by taking away educational 
resources from the more advantaged, adequacy accounts typically say that there is nothing 
objectionable about some children receiving better educations than others.  Fourth, unlike 
horizontal outcome equality, the adequacy approach is not in tension with the diversity of student 
ability and disposition (Gutmann 1987: 133).  It accepts as wholly appropriate that, past a 
minimal threshold, students will achieve at different levels.  Fifth, unlike strict equality 
approaches, the adequacy approach does not seem to be in much tension with other educational 
values.  Conceptions of equality are what we might call “voracious principles” in that, left 
unchecked, they exclude any consideration that would disrupt an equal distribution.  Of course, 
we can make trade-offs between equality and other values, but equality does not itself make 
room for those other values.  Adequacy, on the other hand, can make room for other values.  For 
example, so long as an adequate education is guaranteed to all, adequacy approaches would 
permit devoting extra resources to the best students on grounds of efficiency or perfectionism 
(Gutmann 1987: 137; Satz 2007: 632, 634).  A special case of this is the sixth virtue:  unlike 
outcome equality and broad input equality, the adequacy approach is consistent with recognizing 
that parents and local communities may have different values and aspirations in education.  
Beyond the threshold of adequacy, this approach permits families and communities to exercise 





public or private pursuits.5  Seventh, the adequacy approach may seem to give more sensible and 
realistic advice about educational goals for students with different abilities and levels of 
advantage.  That is, on the one hand, it is not enough to equalize inputs and then let the chips fall 
where they may; different inputs may be required to make an adequate education possible for 
differently situated students.  But, on the other hand, we are not obliged to quixotically strive for 
equal educational outcomes above the minimal threshold.  Eighth and finally, even if adequacy is 
not all there is to justice in education, it may at least be a good theory for thinking about the most 
indecent injustices which are the most urgent to rectify.  In this respect, it may have the 
advantage of attracting an overlapping consensus amongst people who disagree about the 
importance of input or outcome equality.  If, as seems likely, our educational system falls short 
even of this standard of minimal decency, then practically speaking, developing an ecumenical 
account of adequacy would be much more important than working out the details of a more 
controversial, possibly utopian, egalitarian theory.6 
Many regard the most serious challenge to the adequacy approach to be that it fails to take 
into account the positional aspect of education.7  As Brighouse and Swift explain, positional 
goods are “goods with the property that one’s relative place in the distribution of the good affects 
one’s absolute position with respect to its value” (2006b: 472).  Of course, education, like many 
goods, is not wholly positional: more education may make one more productive and confer the 
                                                          
5 Gutmann (1987): 144; Anderson (2007): 615, 618; Satz (2007): 634, 641.  
6 This is the way that Martha Nussbaum characterizes her capabilities-approach to social justice.  See Nussbaum 
(2000): 75; (2006): 75-76, 274, 291-295.  Satz emphasizes that adequacy accounts of education “explain why some 
inequalities require greater remedial attention than others,” although she also thinks that adequacy suffices for 
educational justice (2007): 640-641.   





benefits of culture.  But it does seem to have a strong positional aspect.  Reich and Koski 
articulate the positional-good objection to the adequacy approach in a particularly forceful way:  
“[T]he value of education to its holder depends in part on how much education other 
people possess.  Education is central to concerns about equality of opportunity, 
opportunities to gain admission to college and professional schools, and opportunities to 
compete for high-paying and high-status jobs in the marketplace.  Roughly speaking, the 
more education a person possesses, the greater the positional advantage of that person in 
the competition for college admission and economic success.  If this is true, then the 
adequacy framework is, to put it bluntly, inadequate because adequacy tolerates wide 
inequalities above the specified threshold of educational opportunity and proficiency, and 
inequalities above this threshold will disadvantage those in the bottom end of the 
distribution” (2006: 550). 
It may seem as if the adequacy approach could easily deal with this objection.  If one’s relative 
place in the distribution of education truly affects the absolute value of education, then what 
counts as an adequate minimal education can simply take that into account.  To some extent, as 
we shall see, this is precisely what several of the most sophisticated philosophical defenses of the 
adequacy approach do.  But critics would insist that this is not how adequacy concepts are 
actually being deployed in educational policy: they are substantially ignoring the positional 
character of education.  Moreover, if the adequacy approach does take the positional aspect of 
education into account, there is a real question as to whether it can avoid collapsing, in practice, 
into an equity-based theory (cf. Brighouse and Swift 2006b).    
The other fundamental challenge to the adequacy approach lies in simply explaining, without 
excessive vagueness, what an adequate education would look like.8  Adequate for what?  As 
Frankfurt observes,  “Calculating the size of an equal share is plainly much easier than 
determining how much a person needs in order to have enough” (1988c: 137).  In educational 
                                                          
8 The problem has puzzled education experts as well as philosophers.  Cf. National Resource Council (1999): ch. 4; 





policy discussions, especially in our era of standards-based reform, the practical focus is often on 
attaining a certain level of minimum passing grades on state achievement tests (Berne and Stiefel 
1999: 22).  But this would make no sense unless it were believed that the achievement tests are 
measuring something of value outside the walls of the school.  Hence, at least amongst 
philosophers, the dominant strategy is, as Debra Satz puts it, to try to “derive … the nature and 
content of educational adequacy from the requirements for full membership and inclusion in a 
democratic society of equal citizens” (2007: 636).  Particular theories differ in their 
understandings of what these requirements are.  Let us now examine some of the alternatives. 
14.2   The Compliance Principle  
How might an adequate provision of education be defined in a more principled way?  In the 
landmark Supreme Court case San Antonio v. Rodriguez, the plaintiffs argued that funding public 
schools substantially through local property taxes violated the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in that it discriminated between children on the basis of local property 
wealth.  As a consequence, they claimed, children in poorer districts were less well prepared to 
effectively exercise their right to vote and First Amendment freedoms.  The Supreme Court 
rejected that argument in a 5-4 decision, in part because the majority denied that the U.S. 
Constitution could be interpreted to guarantee, as a matter of individual right, “the most effective 
speech or the most informed electoral choice.”9   
Randall Curren (1994) suggests that the principle of equal protection under the law might 
more convincingly be employed to establish a minimum threshold of educational adequacy.  
                                                          





According to his argument, the law does not equally protect all unless all are enabled to comply 
with it.  But people cannot generally be expected to comply with the law unless they have 
received an education sufficient to prepare them for at least one viable occupation and to foster 
basic moral development and social integration.  Therefore, Curren argues that “a fundamental 
requirement of justice is that the state not put some citizens more at risk than others of suffering 
a loss or suspension of fundamental rights [by means of incarceration] through unequal 
distribution of goods whose distribution it has a duty to oversee.”  This is supposed to establish a 
baseline of education adequate to give all students “a reasonable prospect of complying with the 
law.”  Call this the Compliance Principle.  Although Curren does not put it this way, his 
argument can be understood as an extension to the state of the traditional parental duties in 
natural law theory to enable children to know right from wrong and to provide for themselves as 
adults.10   
Whatever else one might say about it, one can hardly fault the Compliance Principle for 
being too ambitious.  The interesting question is whether the state has further educational 
obligations than this.11  Notice that the argument does not even oblige the state to actually ensure 
“reasonable prospects for complying with the law,” but rather only to ensure that inequalities in 
the distribution of goods under the state’s control not put citizens at risk of losing their liberty.  
This suggests that (on common assumptions) compensatory funding to poor communities with 
                                                          
10 Cf. Pufendorf, LNN: IV.xi.4-7, VI.ii; Locke, 2T: II.vi; Kant, MM: 6:280-282.  See my Chapter 8.  However, most 
natural law theorists thought that parents had a duty to provide for their children proportional to their means.  There 
is no proportionality component in Curren’s argument. 
11 I should be clear, Curren readily grants that justice may demand more than the Compliance Principle.  He only 
claims that meeting the Compliance Principle is particularly urgent and that parts of the American school system 





greater needs might not be required by this argument.12  Moreover, the argument would seem to 
be compatible with an educational system that enabled very little upward social mobility, as long 
as it prepared everyone for some form of work.  Curren might deny that charge on the grounds 
that “demoralizing stratification” undermines the development of law-abidingness, as is 
evidenced by its correlation with higher crime rates.  But this just shows how much is riding on 
how we interpret the morally loaded notion of having “reasonable prospects” for complying with 
the law.  The conservative will think that everyone has reasonable prospects to comply with the 
law so long as neither he nor his family are in abject need, while a radical socialist may think that 
any state-licensed inequalities are grounds for revolution.  If the burden of the argument is going 
to rest on the reasonably demoralizing effects of inequality in education past a certain threshold, 
then a proponent of the Compliance Principle is going to have to say more about where that 
threshold lies.  Moreover, if people have good reason to be demoralized by a certain amount of 
social inequality, then maybe we had better appeal directly to the injustice of that inequality, 
rather than focusing exclusively on uncertain subjective reactions to it.      
14.3   The Democratic Threshold Principle 
A) The Democratic Threshold 
Amy Gutmann defends what appears to be a more robust conception of adequacy.  She 
argues that inequalities in the distribution of education must be constrained by what she calls the 
Democratic Threshold Principle.  This principle requires that “democratic institutions allocate 
                                                          
12 It is possible that Curren would argue that the state is responsible for putting young people at risk of 
noncompliance with the law whenever they are, in fact, at risk, and it is in the power of the state to alleviate that 
risk.  This would justify compensatory educational spending.  However, to speak of an “unequal distribution of 
goods whose distribution [the state] has a duty to oversee” is to invoke the same language that a classical liberal like 





sufficient resources to education to provide all children with an ability to participate”—or as she 
sometimes puts it—“participate effectively in the democratic process” (1987: 136, emphasis 
added).  Inequalities between schools beyond the democratic threshold would “not be morally 
suspect” (144).  This leaves substantial room for parents and communities to exercise discretion 
in educational goals past that threshold.13  Gutmann’s argument therefore bears some 
resemblance to the traditional republican brief for public education.  In Chapter 11, recall, we 
found Thomas Jefferson arguing that the state ought to provide three years of free schooling to 
every child, as that would impart to everyone sufficient learning “as will enable him to read and 
to vote understandingly on what is passing.”14  Gutmann’s own idea is that, while democratic 
communities share broad moral authority with parents to decide what goals to pursue in the 
education of children, they do not have the authority to deprive children of the skills and 
knowledge they will need to participate in democratic decision-making themselves as adults.15  
You might think of this as an intergenerational analogue to the principle that a democratic 
majority does not have the authority to disenfranchise the minority of its right to vote.   
                                                          
13 In fact, Gutmann’s concrete policy proposals might lead to considerably more inequality between districts than 
now exists.  Gutmann says that it would be better to fund schools up to the adequacy threshold at the state level, and 
then to permit local supplementation on top of that.  In this way, trade-offs between primary education and other 
expensive public goods (like highways and universities) would be framed in a more transparent way, whereas now 
opposing local referenda on increased spending on schools is “the most effective and obvious means by which 
citizens can register their desire to slow down government spending and taxation” (141).  But, although Gutmann 
calls her proposal a “foundation plan,” it really sounds more like a system of block grants (see my 11.2.B).  In 
traditional foundation programs, the state transfers less money to wealthy districts than to poor districts, and 
therefore offsets some of the inequality between them.  But if local districts are permitted to simply supplement 
block grants from the state, then none of the inequality between districts is directly offset by state revenue.  (Of 
course, there may be some indirect offsetting, if the block grants are funded through progressive taxes that 
effectively redistribute money from the wealthier districts to the poorer ones.)   
14 Letter to Littleton Waller Tazewell (Jan. 5, 1805) in Jefferson (1984): 1149-1150.   
15 Surprisingly, Gutmann draws very sparingly on the philosopher most interested in the role of education in 
democracy, John Dewey.  You would have thought that Dewey’s Democracy and Education would have been an 
important book for the author of Democratic Education, but most of Gutmann’s scattered remarks on Dewey are 






This is an elegant argument, but it is hard to believe that democratic participation is the only 
activity for which a justly adequate education must prepare children.  Surely, a minimally 
adequate education must also ensure that children learn the skills they will need for work and 
managing their personal lives.16  Gutmann’s reasons for giving such primacy to democratic 
participation are ultimately unpersuasive.  First, she claims that if people “were educated to 
exercise their rights and to fulfill the responsibilities of democratic citizenship, these future 
citizens collectively could decide whether to change the way that social institutions (including 
schools) structure their life chances” (148).  But this is unsatisfactory for two reasons.  Once 
these citizens are adults, they can’t determine the ways that schools structured their life chances; 
the democratic solution comes too late for them.  Furthermore, the citizens in whose interests it is 
to change the educational system may neither be in the majority nor be able to win the majority 
to their view.  Are we to assume that this simply could not happen in a genuinely democratic 
society?  Another of Gutmann’s arguments for the sufficiency of the Democratic Threshold is 
that it is a mistake to require that an adequate education prepare students for getting jobs, since 
jobs might be unavailable for macroeconomic reasons that have nothing to do with the quality of 
education.  The point is well taken, but the same is true of democratic participation:  citizens 
might be deprived of the ability to govern themselves for reasons that have nothing to do with 
their educations.  The right focus for an adequacy approach, therefore, seems to be on whether 
                                                          
16 Compare the much richer and more imaginative account of an adequate education developed by the Kentucky 





the school system is successfully conferring the capabilities necessary for work, personal life, 
and democratic participation.17 
B) Justice and legitimacy 
Although Gutmann describes her account of “democratic justice” (127, 138-139)  as a rival 
to “standard interpretations of equal opportunity” that focus on socio-economic “distributive 
goals” (287-288), her theory may be better understood as one concerning the bounds of 
democratic legitimacy in educational policy.  On that revisionary reading, her account would 
operate at a different, more fundamental level than most liberal-egalitarian theories of education.  
To explain:  On most views, justice and legitimacy are distinct notions.  Justice is primarily 
concerned with the protection of rights and the fair distribution of benefits and burdens.  
Legitimacy, on the other hand, is primarily concerned, not with the content of the best policy, but 
with who has the authority to implement his or her will?  Most believe that a political action can 
be less than perfectly just and yet still be legitimate for all that.  A regressive tax law might be 
unjust, but that alone does not make it illegitimate.  Likewise, the justice of a policy, considered 
in the abstract, is not sufficient to make it legitimate to implement by any means.  Abolishing 
capital punishment may be what justice requires, but that does not give the president the 
legitimate constitutional authority to abolish it in the states that still practice it.  Although justice 
and legitimacy are distinct notions, they are also connected in complex ways.  It is unjust, for 
example, to usurp legitimate authority, even for the sake of implementing a policy that is, in the 
abstract, more just.  Conversely, legitimacy may depend on the minimally just exercise of 
                                                          
17 As, for example, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin did when it described a “sound basic education” as one “that 
will equip students for their roles as citizens and enable them to succeed economically and personally.”  Vincent v. 





authority.  A procedurally unimpeachable act of government may be illegitimate if it blatantly 
disregards the basic rights of some part of its population.18 
With that distinction in mind, I suggest that we interpret Gutmann’s Democratic Threshold 
Principle, not as a complete theory of justice in education, which would be in competition with 
standard conceptions of equal opportunity, but as the minimal condition of justice that must be 
satisfied for democratic decisions about education to be legitimate.  This would arguably be a 
better way of justifying the primacy that Gutmann wants to give to education for democratic 
participation.  The idea would be that the legitimacy of democracy depends on everyone having a 
part in making collective decisions.  Just as democracy cannot be true democracy if it 
disenfranchises one part of the population, it cannot be legitimate if it deprives future citizens of 
the education they need to participate effectively.  Although this reading is admittedly not 
consistent with everything that Gutmann says, it is faithful to her intention to take seriously the 
problem of how to decide which educational policies to implement, given that we disagree about 
their justice (1987: 135-136).   
If this reading is plausible, then we need to distinguish much more carefully than Gutmann 
does between two kinds of legitimate democratic decisions, which, following Ronald Dworkin, 
we can call “choice-sensitive” and “choice-insensitive” decisions (2000: 204-205).  Choice-
sensitive decisions are those in which the justice of the decision depends on the preferences of 
the political community.  For example, in the abstract, it seems that it is neither just nor unjust to 
use public land for development rather than for a park.  Which alternative is just depends on the 
preferences of the community.  If more people want the site turned into a park, then (other things 
                                                          





equal) that is the just thing to do.  Suppose I wanted the land used for development, but that the 
majority wants a park.  It makes no sense for me to say that the community’s decision was 
unjust.  But often we use democratic procedures to settle disagreements about what is just 
independently of our opinions—not to determine what is, in fact, just or fair (cf. Waldron 1999: 
ch. 7).  These are choice-insensitive decisions.  For instance, we may disagree about the justice 
of a proposed tax cut.  Here the democratic decision reflects the community’s judgment as to 
what is just; it does not settle the question as to what is just.  Suppose I am in the minority in 
opposing the tax cut.  After the decision is made in favor of the tax cut, I can still complain that 
the tax cut was unjust, even while conceding its legitimacy.  Gutmann often speaks as if all 
democratic decisions about education are choice-sensitive, so long as the Democratic Threshold 
is met (cf. Gutmann 1987: 136-137, 144).  But it seems more plausible to say that, past the 
Democratic Threshold, democracies can legitimately enact unjust educational policies. 
C) The determinacy of the Democratic Threshold 
The Democratic Threshold Principle cannot, in any case, yield a satisfying account of 
educational adequacy unless it is determinate enough to generate substantive educational 
requirements.  But whether it can do so is questionable.  Moreover, how we interpret the 
stringency of those requirements may turn on whether we read the Democratic Threshold as a 
principle of legitimacy or of justice.  If it is merely a principle of legitimacy, then the 
requirements will presumably be much weaker.  
It seems that relatively little education is necessary to cast a vote, as is evident from the fact 
that we have decided that it is unreasonable to require voters to pass literacy tests (though of 
course these were actually being used in bad faith).  Therefore, if the principle is to have any 





point, Gutmann suggests that the threshold may best be determined through democratic 
procedures (137).  But we have to be able to at least articulate the threshold independently of 
democratic outcomes, if that threshold is going to be a check on democratic discretion.  Effective 
participation cannot mean actually producing the political outcomes one desires; where there is 
political disagreement, that is not a universalizable principle.  In his dissent in San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez, Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out that educational attainment was strongly 
correlated with voting turnout (see 11.3.B).19  But voter turnout would not be a good metric for 
the Democratic Threshold either, since we could sever the connection between education and 
electoral turnout without changing the educational system—for example, by making voting 
mandatory (as in Australia) or by giving voters a small honorarium (as we do with jurors).   
Another approach would be to define effectiveness as the capacity to know one’s true 
interests.  On this view, the central problem of democracy is that citizens are too easily misled by 
superficial journalism and political spin to recognize where their true interests really lie.20  The 
solution, it may be supposed, is to give them an education that makes each savvy enough to 
search for reliable sources of information and to think critically about the issues of their day.  
The potential pitfall here is striving after the mirage of the “omnicompetent citizen”—the citizen 
who is expected to have an informed opinion on every major issue of public concern (Lippman 
                                                          
19 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 114.  Justice Marshall invoked this point to make a different argument than Gutmann’s.  
He claimed that, because education had a disparate impact on the exercise of constitutional rights, the local 
financing of schools in Texas ought to be held to “strict scrutiny” in determining whether it violated the Equal 
Protection clause.  On that standard, the state would have to show that the existing school finance system not only 
had a “rational basis,” but that it was necessary for pursuing a “compelling state interest,” and that there was “no 
less discriminatory” means of achieving that interest.   
20 In the 1920s, Dewey could already write, “We seem to be approaching a state of government by hired promoters 





1922: 173, 229).  This seems unrealistically ambitious given the complexity of modern issues 
like geopolitics, macroeconomics, and climate change (cf. Curren 1994).  
Harry Brighouse suggests that we might interpret Gutmann’s effectiveness standard by 
drawing on an account of political influence developed by Dworkin.  Suppose at first that we 
know nothing about the electorate’s views on some issue.  Then we discover the view of one 
individual, P.  P is an effective participant “if, having discovered he intends to make efforts to 
get his view implemented, we should assign a higher probability than before that his view will be 
adopted.”21  The greater the increase in our probability estimate, the more effective that person’s 
participation is judged to be.  Although this gives us some metric of political effectiveness, it 
doesn’t come close to solving the problem of defining an adequate threshold of effective 
democratic participation.  As Dworkin rightly points out, we cannot say that everyone has a right 
to equal political effectiveness or influence.  Although there may be some illegitimate forms of 
political influence, it is not unjust if (say) the conservative journalist David Brooks happens to be 
more politically influential than his liberal colleague Mark Shields.  Nor is there any obvious 
minimal level of effectiveness, so understood, that individuals are entitled to, beyond having the 
right to vote their own minds.  In any case, almost everyone who is not a complete social outcast, 
however uneducated, has some influence on the minds of his immediate circle of acquaintances.  
But that, once again, is surely too weak of a standard. 
These critical remarks should not be taken as suggesting that the Democratic Threshold 
Principle is empty.  Gutmann reasonably suggests that citizens must be provided an education 
sufficient to enable them to read newspapers, have some understanding of the national economy, 
                                                          
21 Brighouse (2000): 132-133, quoting Dworkin (1987), which is reproduced with minor changes in Dworkin 





and to think critically about important political choices (147).  Moreover, Gutmann argues that 
the Democratic Threshold is to be understood as having a comparative aspect: “the threshold of 
an ability to participate effectively in democratic politics is likely to demand more and better 
education for all citizens as the average level and quality of education in our society increases” 
(139).  In the same vein, Satz argues that to fulfill our duty as jurors, democratic citizens “need 
not only to comprehend and apply concepts like ‘reasonable doubt,’ ‘negligence,’ and 
‘probability,’ and be able to analyze statistical tables and graphs, but also to have the capability 
of responding to the arguments of other jurors during their deliberations” (2007: 636).  While it 
is true that being the member of a jury is the most intellectually demanding contribution that 
many individuals will make in their capacity as citizens, it strikes me as odd to argue that 
children are entitled to an education in elementary probability and fundamental legal concepts 
because they may serve on a jury a couple of times over the course of their lives.  That seems 
like too frail peg to hang the individual’s right to an education. 
The present objection, then, is that “effective democratic participation” is an uncomfortably 
vague standard to ground a conception of what kind of education society owes to every child.  
When the Supreme Court entertained a similar argument in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, the 
majority accepted the premise that some “identifiable quantum of education” may be necessary 
in order to meaningfully exercise First Amendment rights and the right to vote.  But, as I’ve 
already mentioned, the majority denied that the U.S. Constitution could be interpreted to 
guarantee “the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice,” and further denied 
that the plaintiffs had established that the basic education that Texas did guarantee “fails to 





enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process” (see 11.3.B).22  
Since written media is such an important part of political communication in modern countries, I 
think we may safely say that the legitimacy of modern democracies is threatened by a failure to 
impart functional literacy to virtually all students.  On the other hand, you need not agree with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez to appreciate that the vagueness of the “effective 
democratic participation” standard beyond functional literacy makes it extremely difficult to 
demonstrate that schools are, in fact, failing children.23 
14.4  The Democratic Elite 
A) The idea of a Democratic Elite 
This vagueness objection to a democratic theory of educational adequacy has been somewhat 
remedied in a thoughtful way by Elizabeth Anderson.  Instead of thinking exclusively about the 
capabilities that all democratic citizens need, Anderson suggests that we must also think about 
the qualifications of the “democratic elite.”  By “elites” Anderson means those who “occupy 
positions of responsibility and leadership in society:  managers, consultants, professionals, 
politicians, policy makers.”  In a Rawlsian spirit, she argues that elites in a democratic society 
must perform their roles in a way such that “the inequalities in power, autonomy, responsibility, 
and reward they enjoy in virtue of their position redound to the benefit of all, including the least 
advantaged.”  For this, it is important that the elites have the technical knowledge conferred by 
higher education; but this alone is not sufficient.  Collectively, they also need to be aware and 
responsive to the interests and problems of people from all sectors of society and know how to 
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interact respectfully with them (2007: 596).  But, unlike merely academic—“third-person”—
knowledge, these are not competencies that can be taught in a classroom.  Drawing on studies in 
the psychology of stereotyping and discrimination, Anderson argues that these are forms of 
knowledge that depend on first-person experiences and second-person interactions with others 
from different walks of life (607).  This means that, if the elite is really to be responsive to and 
capable of serving all, its ranks must be drawn from all demographic groups, and from people 
who have experience in face-to-face interaction with individuals from different backgrounds.24 
“Working backward from the requirements for a qualified elite,” Anderson argues that “we 
can derive a standard of fair educational opportunity to which all social groups should be 
entitled.”  Because it is essential that the democratic elite recruits individuals from every sector 
of society, members of all social groups must have effective access to higher education.  
Anderson says that “this entails that every student with the underlying potential should be 
prepared by their primary and middle schools to be able to successfully complete a college 
preparatory high school curriculum… This yields a high but not unattainable sufficientarian 
standard for fair educational opportunity.”  So long as this sufficientarian threshold is met for all 
students, further inequalities in education provided by parents and local communities are morally 
unobjectionable (614-615).  However, the ability of socially and economically privileged groups 
to convert their wealth into educational and social advantage will be limited in two ways.  First, 
because a democratic elite must have experience in diverse settings, people from all sectors of 
society should be educated together in racially and economically integrated schools.  Advantaged 
communities, therefore, cannot be permitted to segregate themselves in neighborhood schools 
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that effectively exclude members from disadvantaged groups (597-598, 617-619).  Second, 
formal education is only one qualification for membership in the democratic elite; having first-
person experience as a member of a disadvantaged group is another of comparable importance.  
Although meritocracy is often thought to be incompatible with affirmative action (cf. Fishkin 
1981), Anderson’s argument suggests that integration of educational and social institutions is 
actually required by a proper understanding of meritocracy.  If colleges employ admissions 
procedures that give weight to the importance of democratic integration, then the disadvantaged 
have a qualification that the wealthy and privileged cannot buy (Anderson 2007: 616-617).  This 
would help break the dominance that money now has over access to higher education. 
By connecting the importance of recruiting members from all social groups into higher 
education, Anderson is able to give an account of democratic adequacy in primary and secondary 
education that is more determinate and more demanding than Gutmann’s Democratic Threshold 
Principle.25  Again, there are Jeffersonian echoes here.  Jefferson, too, thought that the country’s 
leaders would need more than the common share of education, and that a public school system 
could help draw the “best geniuses” from every class into that elite (see 11.2.A).  However, 
Anderson’s idea of the nature of the leadership potential is quite different than Jefferson’s, and 
therefore so too are her educational ideals.  Jefferson seems to have believed that exceptional 
native capacities for developing talent and virtue were distributed across society, so that it would 
be a waste not to tap the potential that every class had to offer.  Once that potential is discovered, 
knowledge is imparted to the student in the schools.  There is little sign that Jefferson believed 
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that children from different sectors of society would bring with them different kinds of first-hand 
knowledge that would be useful to them in their role as elites.   
Anderson’s view in this respect seems to owe much more to Dewey, although she does not 
explicitly draw that connection in this essay.  Dewey too thought that technical knowledge is 
only one part of the knowledge that elites need.  Familiarity with the needs and understandings 
of different sectors of society is just as crucial—probably even more so.  And an elite cannot 
gain this familiarity if they form an exclusive class isolated from the rest of society (Dewey 
1927: 206).  What is needed, then, is a leadership class that facilitates more effective 
communication between different parts of society and helps break down “those barriers of class, 
race, and national territory which keep men from perceiving the full import of their activity”; in 
particular, the effects—direct and indirect—that their activity has on the interests of other parts 
of society (Dewey 1916: 87, 344).  For this reason, Anderson insists that it is not possible to 
educate a democratic leadership class by removing them from their communities and putting 
them into elite institutions.  Every school needs to be capable of providing an adequate education 
to produce its own leaders. 
Hegel, it is worth observing, had assigned a somewhat similar leadership role to the 
representatives of the “Estates” in the legislature.  Hegel would have agreed with Dewey that the 
central political problem lies in “discovering the means by which a scattered … and manifold 
public may so recognize itself as to define and express its interests,” and from there, generate a 
“general will and social consciousness.”26  According to Hegel, “it is extremely important that 
the masses should be organized, because only then do they constitute a power of force; otherwise 
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they are merely an aggregate, a collection of scattered atoms.  Legitimate power is to be found 
only when the particular spheres are organized” (PR: 290A).  In particular, Hegel thought that 
representatives of the agricultural, business, and civil service sectors could bring to the 
legislature their first-hand knowledge of their own estate’s “special needs, frustrations, and 
particular interests.”  In this way, the particular, limited perspectives of each estate could be 
brought to the attention of the whole public.  Then, through parliamentary deliberation on public 
policy with other representatives, the delegates could forge the “universal interest” of the 
community (PR: 301-302, 311).   
Dewey, as well as Anderson, may be read as modernizing and democratizing Hegel in two 
ways.  First, Hegel seems to assume that our political perspectives and interests will be shaped 
largely by our basic functional role in the horizontal division of labor (i.e., agriculture, trade and 
industry, or the civil service).  Dewey and Anderson believe, not only that social divisions are 
more complex and varied than that (e.g., it seems like a mistake to assume that landlords and 
peasants, or capitalists and workers, will have the same interests), but more interestingly, that 
each of us is shaped by our membership in multiple social groups (Dewey 1927: 147; Anderson 
2007: 598-599).  (For example, I may identify as a Black, liberal, Christian, professional class, 
gay man.)  Second, whereas Hegel seems to have understood deliberation and political will-
formation occurring primarily within the parliament, Dewey and Anderson see communication 
and deliberation between different social groups occurring at many different levels and in many 
different quarters by all citizens—especially in common schools and universities.     
By focusing on the role of a leadership class, Anderson also gives us some guidance as to 
how education might enhance the intelligence of a democracy without vainly striving to create 





The one that Anderson concentrates on is that leaders will be capable of drawing on detailed 
personal knowledge of the needs and perspectives of their communities (and will be motivated to 
do so) in dealing with the members of that community and in representing their concerns in 
deliberation with other elites.  But there is another role which leaders can play:  they can help 
their “constituents” focus, recognize, and articulate their interests (cf. Dewey 1927: 123).  For 
example, Martin Luther King, Jr. did not just transmit knowledge of the interests of the African-
Americans to the rest of American public.  He helped the African-American community 
understand what it really wanted, what its demands and expectations as a group would be, and he 
helped that community act together as a relatively coherent body.  In this way, a Democratic 
Elite is essential to political will-formation at two levels.  First, in helping smaller publics 
recognize themselves, and second, in helping the larger public recognize its constituent parts. 
B) Objections and limitations 
I have just now been discussing some of the virtues of Anderson’s account of a Democratic 
Elite, including some of those aspects left undeveloped by Anderson herself.  Now I turn to 
certain objections to and limitations of the position.  One way that Anderson’s conception of a 
democratic leadership class differs from that of many previous thinkers is that it is not limited to 
public offices.  But for this very reason, it may be objected that insufficient attention is paid to 
two different ways that elites benefit society.  Public office-holders benefit society by 
intentionally trying to serve the public interest and to solve people’s problems.  That these elites 
be sensitive and responsive to the interests of all sectors of society is indeed crucial.  But to a 
considerable extent, the elites in the private sector serve the public interest by looking for profits 
for themselves and for shareholders.  In this way, they provide goods and services that the 





that Anderson focuses on are nearly so important of virtues for the elites of the private sector—
excluding at least the service professions, like law and medicine.  For example, would energy 
companies provide better service to minority customers, if the leadership of those companies was 
more diverse?  That seems doubtful.27  (Unless those in the private sector allow animosity toward 
another group override market motives—for example, by charging Blacks more than whites for 
the same products and services).   
Of course, this contrast between the motives of the public and private sectors can be 
exaggerated.  Some political scientists will emphasize the importance of self-interest in 
promoting the interests of those in the public sector as well.  And the elites in the private sector 
must at least have enough sensitivity to the preferences of various demographic groups to know 
which goods and services will be in demand.  But, at least in the private sector, this socially 
distributed knowledge can be gathered through other means, such as focus groups and surveys, 
that would leave unaffected the demographic composition of the corporate leadership.   
Even if it is true that the elite in the private sector does not need to be diverse in order to 
serve diverse groups of society, that does not diminish Anderson’s case for diversity in public 
offices nor perhaps in the service professions (e.g., law, medicine, teaching).  But it does mean 
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that fewer members of disadvantaged groups would need to be recruited to the ranks of the elite 
in order for them to carry out their purpose of benefiting all.  That would suggest that (as far as 
the present argument goes) we could tolerate considerably lower rates of college admission for 
disadvantaged groups than Anderson claims, and that weakens the “egalitarian implications” of 
taking seriously the requirements of a democratic elite (596).   
There is a deeper question about the kind of argument that Anderson has offered.  Consider a 
rival, conservative theory about the education of the elite.  Hayek, for instance, once argued that  
[T]here is … good reason to think that there are some socially valuable qualities which 
will rarely be acquired in a single generation but which will generally be formed only by 
the continuous efforts of two or three…  Granted this, it would be unreasonable to deny 
that a society is likely to get a better elite if ascent is not limited to one generation, if 
individuals are not deliberately made to start from the same level, and if children are not 
deprived of the chance to benefit from the better education and material environment 
which their parents may be able to provide (1960: 90). 
Now suppose that an egalitarian government came to power and tried to prevent families from 
passing on educational advantages to their children.  A conservative like Hayek would think this 
foolish no doubt, but he could not claim, on the basis of this argument, that the children from 
privileged families were being treated unfairly.  If there is any injustice done, it is an injustice to 
all those members of society who would have benefited from the education of a more talented 
elite.  Anderson’s argument, though different in the details, has essentially the same structure.  
Denying educational opportunities to members from disadvantaged groups is not unfair to them; 
if there is an injustice done, it is only an injustice to society as the beneficiary of a more sensitive 
and responsive democratic elite.  Although Anderson’s account of educational adequacy is a part 
of a theory of distributive justice (i.e., elite positions are justified only insofar as they serve the 





distribuendum in its own right.  Therefore, those denied educational opportunities cannot claim, 
on the basis of this argument, to have been personally wronged.   
Notably, although both Jefferson and Dewey saw public education as having a central role in 
creating the conditions for a well-functioning republic or democracy, neither seems to have 
thought of these conditions as a good to which an individual might have a personal right.  Rather 
a well-functioning social order seems to be a collective good, which we all have reason to 
promote, but to which no one is entitled as an individual (cf. Raz 1986: 198-207).  Although 
Anderson has elsewhere expressed dissatisfaction with the current philosophical tendency to 
reduce all political questions to “the distributive paradigm,”28 one might wonder whether she has 
not allowed herself to be too influenced by Rawlsian political philosophy in this particular.  
Perhaps the concepts of “justice” and “fair opportunity” are ultimately too individualistic for 
outlining a democratic theory education. 
Anderson claims that her argument for integrated education and an integrated elite has 
“demanding egalitarian implications”—and that seems right, but one wants to know whether 
these egalitarian implications are supposed to be intrinsically valuable, or just interesting 
byproducts of educating a democratic elite.  If they are supposed to be intrinsically valuable, 
Anderson’s argument doesn’t explain why.  Moreover, although Anderson sees herself practicing 
non-ideal theory, “constructing workable criteria for our currently unjust world” (621), her “two-
birds-with-one-stone” strategy carries certain practical risks.  Namely, it loses sight of the fact 
that there are, in fact, two birds (cf. Barry 2001: 209).  Suppose it proves politically impractical 
to thoroughly integrate education and the elite ranks of society.  Should we nonetheless devote 
                                                          





extra resources to educating the disadvantaged to help them compete for mid-level (rather than 
elite) positions?  Anderson’s argument cannot easily explain why we should.  Or, alternatively, 
suppose it turns out to be possible to produce a sensitive and responsive democratic elite without 
a more egalitarian and integrated educational system.  Perhaps we really could create such an 
elite without thorough social integration, but through mere tokenism of disadvantaged groups, or 
by encouraging privileged students to volunteer after school in disadvantaged neighborhoods.  
Anderson may be right in thinking that these measures would not be sufficient (617), but if they 
were, her argument would not be able to explain why we still have a duty to improve the 
educational opportunities of disadvantaged students.   
14.5  The Democratic Citizenship Threshold 
A) The idea of Democratic Equality 
Even if the argument for a Democratic Elite has more limited implications for fair 
opportunity in education than Anderson suggests, the larger theory of Democratic Equality that 
she has developed elsewhere (1999) does seem to have the resources for a promising account of 
educational adequacy.29 Anderson thinks that contemporary political philosophers—especially 
those she dubs “Luck Egalitarians”—have exaggerated the importance of an equal distribution of 
income and wealth in theories of justice at the expense of the more important social relations of 
equality.  In doing so, she attests, they have lost touch with the historical aim of egalitarian 
movements, like the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, the disabilities movement, 
                                                          





the gay-and-lesbian movement, and so on.30  For these movements, inequality has been 
understood primarily, not as equality in the distribution of goods, but as a relation “between 
superior and inferior persons,” where superiors dominate, exploit, marginalize, demean, or inflict 
violence upon their “inferiors” (1999: 312-113).  Democratic Equality seeks to reestablish that 
connection to what we might call “movement egalitarianism.”  It’s ideal of equality is a social 
order expressive of equal respect—a society in which individuals stand together as equal 
citizens, as opposed to an oppressive, hierarchical one (289, 315).   
Anderson understands this equality to have two aspects: negatively, it means freedom from 
oppression; and positively, it means the ability to function as an equal in society (1999: 312-313, 
317-318; 2007: 620).  From this basic picture of equality, we can derive the requirements of 
justice.  Generally speaking, what citizens owe to one another as a matter of justice is, neither 
equality of goods, nor the correction of the cosmic “unfairness” of nature, but equality in the 
basic social conditions—or capabilities—necessary to enable people to function as equal 
citizens, free from oppression (1999: 320, 314, 316, 288).31  That’s the basic idea.  But what 
precisely does it mean to be free from oppression and to be capable of functioning as an equal 
citizen?   
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B) Freedom from oppression 
That equal citizens do not oppress one another seems reasonable enough.  Following the lead 
of Iris Marion Young (1990), Anderson unpacks the idea of freedom from oppression as follows: 
Equals are not subject to arbitrary violence or physical coercion by others.  Choice 
unconstrained by arbitrary physical coercion is one of the fundamental conditions of 
freedom.  Equals are not marginalized by others.  They are therefore free to participate in 
politics and the major institutions of civil society.  Equals are not dominated by others; 
they do not live at the mercy of others’ wills.  This means that they govern their lives by 
their own wills, which is freedom.  Equals are not exploited by others.  This means they 
are free to secure the fair value of their labor.  Equals are not subject to cultural 
imperialism: they are free to practice their own culture, subject to the constraint of 
respecting everyone else (1999: 315). 
Many of these notions stand in need of more elucidation than Anderson has given them.  No one 
is for exploitation, but as the Marxist tradition has discovered, it is not easy to give an account of 
what the “fair value” of labor really is (cf. Elster 1985: ch. 4).  Similarly, no philosopher today is 
in favor of domination, but we disagree about what power relations constitute domination.  For 
instance, must the workplace be organized democratically if employees are not to be dominated 
by their employees?   
Although the theory remains incomplete at present, Anderson’s main point seems correct.  
There has been an overemphasis in recent political philosophy on the idea of “compensating” 
people for misfortunes—typically with extra income.  Anderson insists that inequality takes 
many specific forms and remedies must be type-specific.  Thus, it is wrong-headed to think that 
we ought to “compensate” the disabled with extra income for their bad luck.  What we owe to 
the disabled is accommodation that enables them to be included as valued members of society.  
Furthermore, Anderson insists (contra libertarians) that democratic “freedom” cannot be reduced 
to mere negative liberty.  Individuals also need access across a complete life to the means and 





marginalization.  For instance, workers need unemployment support, if they are to have the 
freedom to leave an oppressive employer and look for another job, without starving or losing 
their home in the meantime.  Or again, women need to have access to economic support for 
themselves and their dependents, either through work or some sort of child allowance, if they are 
to be free to leave abusive domestic relationships (cf. Okin 1989: ch. 7).  And yet, more than 
access to external means is necessary to enable people to avoid oppressive relationships.  
Enduring relations of oppression almost always have a large psychological component:  
“inferiors” are made “to know their place.”  In a society of equals, therefore, individuals need 
certain qualities of mind and character to resist that psychological domination.  For instance, to 
avoid servile deference to their supposed superiors, individuals need the education, self-
confidence, and self-respect to think and judge matters for themselves (1999: 316-318).   
Freedom from oppression, once again, is the negative aim of Democratic Equality.  Anderson 
says that there is also the positive goal of enabling individuals to participate as equal citizens in a 
democratic society.  Since Anderson characterizes inequality as rooted in a hierarchical social 
order, one might  think that, so long as citizens are free from arbitrary violence, domination, 
exploitation, marginalization, and cultural imperialism, then they stand as equals with respect to 
one another.  On this interpretation, the negative and positive aims of Democratic Equality would 
be just two ways of describing the same basic status of freedom amongst equals.  This would 
make it all the more important to offer a sustained account of what forms of oppression like 
domination, exploitation, and marginalization actually consist in.  But this is evidently not 
Anderson’s own interpretation of Democratic Equality.  She says quite explicitly that “While the 






Anderson’s account of what it means to be an equal citizen in a democratic society, beyond 
freedom from oppression, is at once rich, suggestive, and difficult to pin down with precision.  
What is clear is that she is tapping into an expansive conception of “social citizenship,” which 
encompasses not only political participation, but also “full membership” in civil society, and yet 
which at the same time permits significant inequality in income and wealth (cf. Marshall 1964: 
113).  Debra Satz has recently defended a similar view: “I define citizenship, following T.H. 
Marshall, in terms of the political, civil, and economic conditions that are needed to make one a 
full member of one’s society.  Citizens are equal in terms of their status as full members, 
although they may be unequal along other dimensions such as income and wealth” (2007: 636).  
While attractive in many ways, such a view is bound to be difficult to articulate.  Classical 
liberalism has historically been criticized on the left for erecting a formal realm of legal and 
political equality that stood over against the enormous inequalities produced by the market 
economy.  The radical solution is to abolish this separation and extend the principle of equality 
to all spheres of life.  Philosophers like Anderson and Satz appear to want an intermediate 
position: extend the principle of equality beyond the formal equality of classical liberalism, but 
not so far as to eliminate all substantial inequalities of income and wealth.  Such intermediate 
positions, while perhaps reasonable, are often difficult to defend philosophically, as they can 
easily appear to be unstable compromises between two principled extremes.  But let us examine 
the ideal of Democratic Equality in more detail by looking, first, at the idea of a democratic civil 
society, and then that of democratic citizenship in the political arena.       
C) Democratic civil society 
Anderson tells us that one of the achievements of the civil rights movement was to vindicate 





“excluded or segregated within the institutions of civil society, or subject to discrimination on 
the basis of ascribed social identities by institutions in civil society, has been relegated to second-
class citizenship, even if its members enjoy all of their political rights” (317).  Now writers 
define “civil society” in different ways.  Hegel and Marx, for example, used the term to refer 
roughly to the economic sphere of society (along with its legal substructure and stabilizing 
mechanisms).  This is one part of Anderson’s picture; she says that one aspect of Democratic 
Equality is “participation as an equal in a system of cooperative production” (321).  But her 
understanding of civil society includes more.  She says that by “civil society” she means the 
sphere of social life “open to the general public and … not part of the state bureaucracy”: 
Its institutions include public streets and parks, public accommodations such as 
restaurants, shops, theaters, buses and airlines, communication systems such as 
broadcasting, telephones, and the Internet, public libraries, hospitals, schools, and so 
forth.  Enterprises engaged in production for the market are also part of civil society, 
because they sell products to any customer and draw their employees from the general 
public (317).  
For the sake of convenience, let me postpone discussion of what it means to participate as an 
equal in a system of cooperative production and take up first the question as to what is entailed 
by equal citizenship in other parts of civil society. 
 The central idea, here, appears to be that, in a democratic civil society, people are not 
segregated from one another nor excluded from mainstream society.  Of course, the first thing 
Americans think of in connection with segregation and exclusion is the Jim-Crow South.  But 
that is only one of the most egregious examples of the kind of injustice that Anderson is drawing 
to our attention.  It is obvious to us now that a democratic society cannot tolerate the sorts of 
legal segregation struck down by Brown v. Board of Education.  But that is surely not sufficient.  





First, there must be laws enacted to prevent proprietors from excluding groups on a 
prejudicial basis from premises that are “open to the public.”  Next, there must be vigilance that 
public authority is not used to practice segregation in less overt ways.  For example, care must be 
taken that zoning laws are not used to enforce residential, and thus, educational segregation (cf. 
Anderson 2007: 619).  Moreover, measures must be taken to actively integrate groups that are 
involuntarily isolated from mainstream society.  Once again, this means that racial isolation in 
schools must be actively combatted.  The point is not, of course, that Black or Hispanic children 
need to be around white children, because the latter are somehow superior to the former.  Rather 
the idea is that, as one writer has put it “black children [need] access to majority culture, so that 
they negotiate it more confidently…. It is foolhardy to think black children can be taught, no 
matter how well, in isolation and then have the skills and confidence as adults to succeed in a 
white world where they have no experience.”32  This does not mean that minorities—like some 
Orthodox Jews or the Amish—that voluntarily insulate themselves from mainstream culture 
must be integrated against their will. (However, this does raise a difficult problem that deserves 
more attention.  How can we both allow communities to insulate themselves from external 
influences, while preventing privileged cultural groups from protecting those privileges by 
excluding disadvantaged populations?)33  Finally, I think a view such as Anderson’s is 
committed to an ideal of civic friendship or civility.  For instance, to take an issue of current 
relevance,  gays and lesbians should not experience hostility in public places for being open 
about their sexual orientations (1999: 320).  That does not mean that everyone has to agree about 
sexual mores; only that in public no one need be afraid for their safety or be exposed to open 
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contempt.  (Of all of these provisions, however, one may fairly ask whether they really go 
beyond abolishing oppression and marginalization.)  
Now, let me turn to the matter of what it means to participate as an equal in a system of 
cooperative production.  One thing that is clear is that Anderson means to rule out workplace 
discrimination, even amongst the more privileged sectors of the social structure.  In fact, this is 
the main example Anderson gives to explain the respect in which equal citizenship goes beyond 
freedom from oppression.  If all that mattered were having the capabilities necessary to avoid 
oppression, then Democratic Equality could not object to discrimination amongst the relatively 
privileged, such as “the glass ceiling for female executives.”34  But, in fact, Democratic Equality 
also aims at “enabling all citizens to stand as equals to one another in civil society, and this 
requires that careers be open to talents” (316-317).   
In case that sounds too mild, I suspect we can also attribute to Anderson what Cass Sunstein 
has called the “anticaste principle”: “the anticaste principle forbids social and legal practices 
from translating highly visible and morally irrelevant differences [like race or sex] into 
systematic social disadvantage, unless there is a very good reason to do so” (1994: 2411).  
Anderson would almost certainly agree that people are likely to suffer serious insults to their 
self-respect when they are members of a group with highly visible characteristics that is 
systematically subordinate in society—even if the individual herself does not occupy a 
subordinate position (Sunstein 1994: 2430; cf. Anderson 2007: 598-600).  In societies where 
inequality is significantly correlated with race and sex, a formal nondiscrimination principle 
                                                          
34 Is this really true?  Is not gender discrimination, even in high positions, a form of exclusion and marginalization 
within an otherwise privileged sphere?  Again, the lack of any account of oppression makes the question impossible 





would be an insufficient remedy.  It would be necessary to tackle the causes of “caste” 
stratification more directly, and one can hardly imagine a more important way of doing so than 
by integrating the schools by class and race. 
What else is necessary to be capable of functioning as an equal participant in a system of 
social production?  Anderson says that this requires “effective access to the means of production, 
access to the education needed to develop one’s talents, freedom of occupational choice, the right 
to make contracts and enter into cooperative agreements with others, the right to receive the fair 
value of one’s labor, and recognition by others of one’s productive contributions”35 (1999: 318).  
I shall beg off exploring all of these here.  Some I have already touched upon, some are 
uncontroversial, and some are simply peripheral to my main subject.  It will suffice here to say 
something about the importance of having an education to develop one’s talents.  As a general 
proposition, no one today disputes this.  The whole purpose of this chapter is to ascertain 
whether philosophers can shed any light on what a principled threshold for an adequate 
education might look like.  While I have been arguing that Anderson’s larger picture of 
Democratic Equality does indeed have important implications for educational policy, I do not 
think that her remarks on this particular point add much.   
Anderson suggests that adequate development of skills implies that everyone should attain “a 
high school diploma or its equivalent, representing real twelfth-grade-level achievement,”36 and 
                                                          
35 I take it that by “recognition of one’s productive contributions,” Anderson especially has in mind recognition of 
the productive labor that people—especially women—do outside the cash economy, especially in caring for 
children, the household, and other dependents (cf. 1999: 323-325).  This is an important question for thinking about 
the relation between the family and the rest of society, but I am unable to take up the question in a satisfactory way 
here.   
36 I shall not repeat here the difficulties inherent in such “norm-referenced” standards that I raised in 12.4.E, though 





that, though there need not be equal opportunity for higher education, “every student with the 
underlying potential” should be prepared for going on to college (2007: 620, 615).  Satz makes a 
similar claim: “While my conception of adequacy does not require that everyone have the level 
of education necessary to gain entry into the top law schools, it does require that everyone with 
the potential have access to the skills needed for college” (638).  But what does it mean to speak 
of those with the potential for college?  Does that mean we abstract from all social influences?  If 
not, then the proposal has limited implications for reform.  If so, then I suspect that the children 
with the “underlying potential” for college—at least, on present standards—is extremely high.  
At public high schools in wealthy suburbs, nearly everyone goes on to college, and this is not 
because of their exceptional native talents, but because this is what is expected of them.  Sending 
everyone to college hardly seems the most reasonable solution.  While there may be some gains 
in productivity, it is likely that we would also ratchet up the unproductive educational arms-race 
yet another level.  And that is a race that those from advantaged backgrounds are likely to win.  
Anderson and Satz have done admirable work in helping us see ways in which education is not 
merely a private and positional good—that in many ways the education of each can redound to 
the good of all.  But we cannot simply wish away that positional character of education either.    
 Finally, we come to the difficult question of social status.  In discussing how much income 
inequality is permissible, Anderson says that this would “depend in part on how easy it was to 
convert income into status inequality” (1999: 326).  Satz, working within a similar framework, 
connects the issue of status directly to educational opportunity and social mobility:  
Although an adequacy standard does not insist on strictly equal opportunities for the 
development of children’s potentials, large inequalities regarding who has a real 
opportunity for important goods above citizenship’s threshold relegate some members of 
society to second-class citizenship, where they are denied effective access to positions of 





opportunities are not at such a relative disadvantage as to offend their dignity or self-
respect, relegate them to second-class citizenship, cut them off from any realistic prospect 
of upward mobility, or deprive them of the ability to form social relationships with others 
on a footing of equality (2007: 637-638).   
If by status inequality, Anderson and Satz mean the differences in prestige that now exist 
between social classes, then Democratic Equality might be radically egalitarian—it may require 
even a classless society.  Presumably, Anderson and Satz would say that there is a difference 
between the basic respect individuals have as citizens, and the inequalities of prestige that 
individuals have as members of particular social classes.  That may be so, but the harder you 
drive the wedge between respect owed to citizens and class prestige, the less handle you are 
going to have on economic inequality of any magnitude from this direction.   
 But the larger difficulty is that perceptions of social status and the social bases of self-respect 
seem to be quite subjective.  There are at least two psychological mechanisms to take into 
account here.  First, where expectations of social mobility are relatively low, people may resign 
themselves to a certain station in life, and see that station both as natural and as possessing its 
own form of honor (cf. Rawls, TJ: 547/479).  With rising expectations, on the other hand, people 
begin to compare their situation with that of more privileged groups, and the sense of dignity in 
one’s own humbler station may be undermined.  The second mechanism works in the opposite 
direction: above a certain threshold of social mobility, people may have irrationally high 
expectations for their own chances of advancement or that of their children (cf. Elster 1983: 
139).  This may have the effect of enhancing their conception of their own social status.  
Generally, the more one’s theory of justice relies on subjective attitudes, the more the theory is 
beholden to problems of adaptive preferences and wishful thinking.  Ironically, these are 





subjective welfare, is supposed to avoid (cf. Anderson 1999 and Nussbaum 2000: ch. 2).  But if 
you try to define capabilities in terms of what is necessary for people to achieve a certain 
subjective attitude about their social status, then that theoretical virtue is forfeited. 
At this point, a comparison with Rawls may be apropos.  Self-respect, of course, plays a 
central justificatory role in Rawls’s theory of justice as well (TJ: §67).  However, he claims that, 
in Justice as Fairness, no one has cause to feel his self-worth affronted by the social structure, 
because things could not be arranged differently without making the position of the least-
advantaged worse off than it is now.  Therefore, Rawls gives us an interpretation of what a 
society based on mutual respect might be understood to consist in (TJ: §87).  He does not say 
that we should adjust socio-economic inequalities until no one feels like a second-class citizen.  
True, he does somewhat reluctantly allow that “theoretically we can if necessary include self-
respect in the [index of] primary goods … which defines expectations” (TJ: 546/478).  But this is 
an “unwelcome complication” to be resorted to only in the extremity; it would be a gross 
misinterpretation to suppose that this direct appeal to ordinary perceptions of self-respect 
comprised the heart of Rawls’s theory. 
D) Political participation 
We have been discussing the ideal of a democratic civil society.  We now turn to the more 
narrowly political aspect of democratic citizenship.  Of course, these are not two entirely 
separate subjects.  A crucial part of political participation is engagement in institutions of civil 
society, especially those that form part of the deliberative “public sphere,” like the media, the 
internet, schools, and universities.  Since we are primarily interested in the educational 
implications of Democratic Equality,  I shall not dwell on the relatively uncontroversial aspects 





rights.  Moreover, we have already discussed that part of Anderson’s view concerned with the 
Democratic Elite; here we are interested in whether Anderson has anything to add to Gutmann’s 
related conception of the Democratic Threshold Principle.  Anderson’s most distinctive claim is 
that “Democratic equality regards two people as equal when each accepts the obligation to justify 
their actions by principles acceptable to the other, and in which they take mutual consultation, 
reciprocation, and recognition for granted” (Anderson 1999: 313).   
Here is how I would construe that claim.  Many theories of morality hold that we can 
understand “what we owe to each other” by considering what principles informed and uncoerced, 
reasonable people would agree to (cf. Barry 1995: 67-72; Scanlon 1998: ch. 5).  To take one 
example, Habermas holds that valid norms are those that would be approved by all participants 
in an ideal speech situation, where (amongst other things) every subject competent to speak is 
allowed to raise any issue and be heard by all (1990: 66, 89).  As I read Anderson, Democratic 
Equality is to be understood as implementing the social preconditions that enable citizens to 
participate in social and political dialogue that approximates an ideal speech situation.  In 
particular, no one is to be silenced because of her race, sex, or class, and “no one need bow and 
scrape before others or represent themselves as inferior to others as a condition of having their 
claim heard” (Anderson 1999: 313).  To the extent that political dialogue is compromised or 
distorted by the marginalization or inarticulacy of certain perspectives, then to that extent society 
has failed to foster the capabilities that Democratic justice requires.        
Admittedly, that is not a very precise standard, but perhaps it does as much as we can hope in 
giving us some guidance for framing our arguments.  For example, if the concerns of the 
American Hispanic community seem underrepresented in mainstream political dialogue, then we 





them.  For instance, is the main problem a language barrier?  In that case, we need to find ways 
to help the Spanish-speaking and English-speaking communities communicate with one another.  
How best to do this is an empirical question.  It may require more intense instruction in English 
in largely Hispanic schools, more thorough integration of Spanish-speaking and English-
speaking children in the schools, or any mixture of other strategies.   
One interesting implication of this is that effective democratic participation may best be 
understood as a characteristic of groups, not of individuals.  We have seen that it is very difficult 
to say what—other than literacy and a basic knowledge of government—is adequate to enable an 
individual to be an effective participant in the democratic process (11.3.B. and 14.4.C).  But 
perhaps we ought to be looking at the effective political participation, not of individuals, but of 
various “micro-publics,” each defined by shared generalizable interests.  In that particular micro-
publics may be politically marginalized, the issue of effective democratic participation is a 
matter of social justice.  But, because effective voice in the public sphere is not an individual 
good, it is not the sort of good that is easily handled within liberal theories of distributive justice.  
Rather, it is more akin to the collective interests that a group may have in the survival of its 
language or culture.  Such collective interests may be fit goals of legislation, but they are not the 
sorts of interests we typically imagine to be protected by the courts.        
In any case, Anderson is vulnerable to a serious objection at this point.  She presents her 
theory of Democratic Equality as if it is an alternative to other theories of justice, like that of 
Rawls or the Luck Egalitarians.  But now it seems that her theory (perhaps like Gutmann’s) is 
really operating at a different level.  For once we have established the social conditions necessary 
for citizens to be able to present their claims to one another on equal terms, there is still the 





social institutions to one another as equal citizens, that it is unjust if anyone suffers from a 
disadvantage through no fault of their own, or that it is unjust if social institutions could be 
rearranged so as to improve the expectations of the least advantaged.  It seems odd to think that, 
once we have established the conditions for ideal deliberation as well as we can, we will then 
have no further claims to present to one another.  Suppose that the schools are of sufficient 
quality that everyone is fully prepared to engage in democratic deliberation and participate in 
civil society, and yet, because of reliance on local property taxes, some schools are considerably 
superior to others.  As a result some children enjoy competitive and cultural advantages in public 
schools not available to other public-school children.  It seems quite reasonable that someone 
might argue that this system failed to treat all children as equal citizens, not because it failed to 
foster the capabilities for equal citizenship, but simply because there were fairer ways of 
structuring the system of school-finance.  Ultimately, then, I believe that while Anderson has a 
strong argument for having a theory of the most urgent forms of injustice, she cannot possibly 
have offered a complete theory of justice.  
Someone might respond to that objection in the following way.  Some democratic theorists 
have suggested that it is actually undemocratic for the philosopher to attempt to settle substantive 
political questions from his armchair, since they are properly resolved through democratic 
deliberation and procedure.  This, someone might say, is why Anderson is correct to offer no 





prerogative of democratic decision-making.  The philosopher, on this view, can go no further 
than to propose the conditions necessary for claims to be presented in open dialogue.37   
This view seems to me quite mistaken.  Philosophers can sensibly offer theories at different 
levels (see 14.4.B).  Democratic theorists are not wrong to be interested in questions about 
rational political will formation, but they are wrong to think that there is nothing else for a 
philosopher to do.  If there can be any real democratic deliberation, as opposed to people simply 
voting their preferences, then there must be reasons that can be given for why one policy is 
superior to another.  The political philosopher is simply making a contribution to that 
deliberation, albeit at a more abstract and systematic level than is typical of most political 
discourse.  To give an account of what seems to be the most reasonable position is not 
tantamount to saying—as these democratic theorists suggest—that the philosopher ought to rule 
instead of the people.  Rather, it is to take seriously the premise of deliberative democracy, 
which is that politics ought to be responsive to reasons, not merely to power and rhetoric.  
                                                          
37 For instance, Habermas criticizes Rawls for trying to settle substantive questions of distributive justice rather than 
leaving these to actual processes of democratic will formation:   
“I propose that philosophy limit itself to the clarification of the moral point of view and the procedure of 
democratic legitimation, to the analysis of the conditions of rational discourses and negotiations.  In this 
more modest role, philosophy need not proceed in a constructive, but only in a reconstructive fashion.  It 
leaves substantial questions that must be answered here and now to the more or less enlightened 
engagement of participants.”   
Habermas allows that philosophers may participate as “intellectuals,” but he insists that they may not pose as 
“experts” (1995: 131).  I don’t really understand that distinction in this context.  If the attitude of the expert is “Trust 
me: You don’t have to think about it yourself,” then nothing seems further from true philosophy than posing as an 
expert.  
To give another example, while Gutmann makes the accurate observation that many liberal theories of educational 
justice have ignored questions about educational authority and legitimate decision-making, she is wrong to think that 
liberal philosophers are “profoundly undemocratic,” in that they (allegedly) suggest “we need a philosopher-king … 
to impose the correct educational policies, which support individual autonomy, on all misguided parents and 





Indeed, what could be more deliberative and dialogical than the kind of thorough and relatively 





CHAPTER 15:  ELEMENTS OF EDUCATIONAL JUSTICE 
15.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, I argue that an attractive theory of educational justice will have elements 
drawn from both the equity and adequacy approaches, which we have been exploring in the 
previous two chapters.  I begin with a summary of my conclusions regarding the adequacy 
approach from the last chapter.  In particular, I endorse the basics of Elizabeth Anderson’s theory 
of “Democratic Equality,” although I express some reservations and offer a few constructive 
remarks.  Then, returning to the criticism of Anderson I made at the end of Chapter 14, I argue 
that the chief shortcoming of the adequacy approach is its failure to pay sufficient attention to the 
norm of equal treatment.  This leads us back to the problem discussed at the end of Chapter 13:  
when do inequalities amount to unequal treatment?  Most pressing is the question as to whether 
inequalities that emerge from decentralized school-finance systems involve unequal treatment.         
15.2  Adequacy 
I believe that we should accept Elizabeth Anderson’s fundamental claim that justice is 
properly concerned with creating and maintaining the preconditions of a community in which 
citizens stand in relation to one another as equals—not with ensuring that everyone gets what 
they deserve in some cosmic sense (14.5.A).  And she and others are right to maintain that this 
can help inform a theory of educational adequacy.  All the same, as we saw in the previous 





stand as equals is very difficult to do.  Indeed, we should be upfront about exactly what kind of 
task we are setting for ourselves:  We are trying to explain how unequal individuals can be in 
socio-economic terms and yet still count as fully equal citizens of a democratic society.  I am of 
two minds about the prospects of this project.  On the one hand, I am skeptical that any final 
answer to such a problem can be given.  When one generation achieves the “basic equality” that 
the previous generation aspired to, it seems to be human nature to freight remaining inequalities 
with the status significance that once attached to the old.  On the other hand, I also believe that 
any political theory that did not try to address this problem—how unequal can equals be—would 
be either utopian or complacent. 
I have already had much to say in the previous chapter about different components of a 
theory of educational adequacy, both constructive and critical.  I will not rehash those points 
here, but only offer my primary negative and positive conclusions. 
A) Negative conclusions 
First, although justice is committed to a society founded on mutual respect, I believe we do 
well to appeal as little as possible to subjective perceptions of respect.  The proper goal is to 
develop a theory of justice that is a compelling interpretation of mutual respect; not to cater to 
current beliefs about what mutual respect involves.  Of course, we cannot proceed without some 
input concerning prevailing understandings of the significance of certain goods.1  But that is only 
the first stage of theory construction; not the content of a practical principle.   
Next, Anderson and Debra Satz are surely right to believe that the single reform that would 
do more good in more ways than anything else in American education would be thorough racial 
                                                          





and economic integration of the schools.  However, as we saw in Chapter 11, this is not a new 
idea.  In 1835, Thaddeus Stevens was calling for common schools for the “rich and the poor 
man’s sons,” where all would be educated together in “perfect equality” (11.2.B).  Because it has 
proved so difficult to implement educational integration, it is important to distinguish between 
means and ends, as the optimal means may be politically infeasible.  No feature of education 
seems more ubiquitous across societies than that those of higher status loathe their children 
mixing with their social inferiors.  Bertrand Russell noted that he had “seen prominent English 
Socialists foam at the mouth of the suggestion that all children ought to go to [common] 
elementary schools.  ‘What? My children associate with the children of the slums?  Never!’” 
(1929: 207).  In trying to gauge how realistic a goal educational integration is for the United 
States, it is not enough to speculate on the extent to which the racially charged firestorm over 
busing has sufficiently died down.  We must also take into consideration the fact that a large 
number of politically active middle-class families have paid a premium on their homes in order 
to get their children in with the “right crowd.”  As in the busing controversy, integration would 
lead those families to feel as if they had been suckered: that “the rules” had been changed in the 
middle of the game to their disadvantage.  I am not saying that political philosophy should be 
guided by opinion polls, nor that incremental progress in integration is hopeless.2  The point is 
merely that the extreme difficulty of integrating schools makes it all the more important that we 
understand the goals we hope to achieve, so that they can be pursued by multiple avenues. 
The final precaution is that we must avoid assuming that democratic participation is an 
individual good, which is easily assimilated to a theory of distributive justice.  True, we would 
                                                          
2 Consider the wise remarks of Gary Orfield as recounted in Kozol (2005): “If you start with the hardest cases in the 
country you’re not going to come up with the right answers.  You don’t need to desegregate New York in order to 





perpetrate an injustice against an individual by denying her the very basic capabilities—
particularly, literacy—necessary to participate in the democratic process.  But for the most part, 
effective democratic participation is a collective good of a public: either that of the whole public, 
or that some smaller group united by common interests, which I have called a “micro-public” 
(14.5.D).  This has an important practical implication.  A strong state can be more tolerant of 
families that do not cooperate in promoting collective educational goals than it can be of families 
that do not provide their children with the education they are individually owed as a matter of 
justice.  For instance, because certain religious groups shun politics and want little to do with the 
rest of society, their members are not ideal democratic citizens; a society made up entirely of 
such groups could not be democratic.  But if such communities nonetheless provide their 
children with the education justice requires, then we may be able to tolerate the fact that such 
communities do not impart democratic values to their children, as long as the stability of a just 
society is not thereby endangered.3  On the other hand, if a cultural group’s educational practices 
is undermining the effective political voice of a sub-population of that group (like women), then 
less leniency may be appropriate. 
B) Positive conclusions 
Turning now to my positive conclusions about adequacy.  Anderson provides us with a 
useful framework from which to start when she suggests we think about the capabilities 
necessary for three aspects of individual functioning: as a human being capable of forming 
relationships with others in public and private, as a participant in a system of cooperative 
production, and as a citizen of a democratic society (1999: 317, 318).  This, I believe, fits well 
                                                          
3 In this respect, my view is more accommodationist than, for example, that of Arneson and Shapiro (1996), who 





with the ideal of respect for life-authorship which I defended in Chapter 5 (5.3.B).4  I described 
that as the social duty to recognize individuals as possessing the authority to make their own 
choices about the kind of life to lead, especially with respect to the major social roles they 
undertake.  And for this, I argued,  more than negative liberty is necessary:  we must also foster 
the capacities in the young that will enable them to make life choices as adults, and we must 
maintain the social conditions—like access to education, good jobs, and birth control—that 
ensure an adequate range of options for making meaningful choices about the contours of their 
lives.   
Of course, this leads us back to the vast question of how to define an adequate range of 
options.  I have little to add here to my remarks in Chapter 5:  namely, that an adequate range of 
options will have to be defined by articulating valuable activities that exercise basic human 
capacities for such things as knowledge and understanding, for artistic production and aesthetic 
appreciation, for religious and spiritual expression, for participation in intimate groups, in 
community, and in the wider culture, for raising children, for productive work, and for play (see 
5.5.B).  Such an account will be laborious to elaborate and will involve philosophical reflection 
on material drawn from various disciplines in the social sciences and humanities.  It is also the 
sort of project that we can hardly hope to be completed by a single philosopher; the very nature 
of the subject calls for multiple perspectives.  Chapter 10, which examined the ways that 
committed romantic relationships and parenting can contribute to a fulfilling modern life, is one 
modest contribution to this research program.  The examination in the previous chapter of 
various thresholds of educational adequacy is another.        
                                                          





The hardest part of an account of educational adequacy concerns opportunities for attaining 
desirable positions in the economy.  Once again, the adequacy approach is faced with the 
difficulty of finding a principled middle-ground between classical liberal and standard egalitarian 
theories of equality of opportunity:  that is, between theories that require only formally open 
positions, and those that require that real opportunities be equal for all (see Chapter 13).  
Adequacy theorists like Satz are fond of saying that a democratic society cannot tolerate a 
society composed of “fixed and frozen ranks, where ‘each person is believed to have his allotted 
station in the natural order of things.’”5  But it must be kept in mind that the incidence of upward 
mobility does not require—and historically has not much depended on—the ability of children 
from lower classes to compete with the children from the upper or middle classes.  If the demand 
for professional or managerial positions sufficiently grows due to structural changes in the 
economy, then children from the lower classes are bound to be recruited into it (Marshall et al. 
1997: ch. 2).  Do we want to say that the upward mobility due to economic growth is sufficient 
for “adequate opportunity”?   
Again, the only way forward on this front that I can see is to think about what range of career 
offerings might give people a meaningful ability to shape the kinds of lives they will lead, and 
thereby exercise meaningful life-authorship.  This would mean having opportunities to exercise 
different kinds of capacities, as well as choices regarding trade-offs between income and other 
goods like leisure, security, autonomy, and meaningful work.  The problem is that, where a 
segment of the population has very different educational opportunities than the rest, the 
educationally privileged have a corner on the market for the most skilled, and often most 
                                                          
5 Satz (2007): 643, quoting Rawls, TJ: 547/479.  Actually, the quotation is taken out of context in an ironic way.  
Rawls is in the midst of saying that there may be very little damage to subjective perceptions of self-respect in a 





intrinsically rewarding, positions.  As a result, those positions also command the highest 
incomes.  Meanwhile, the less well-educated face stiffer competition for relatively undesirable 
positions, and therefore they bid one another down for wages and other benefits.  If the least-
advantaged positions in the economy are inadequate to sustain what we would regard as a 
sufficiently good life, then over the long term the solution would seem to be a more competitive 
and integrated labor market which would compress inequality of compensation, and more 
importantly, raise that of those on the bottom.6  The moral of the story, then, is that we should 
not be too quick to assume that an adequacy or sufficiency theory of social justice will lead to an 
adequacy theory of educational justice.  It may be that the only way to make sure that everyone 
has “enough” in life, is to provide everyone with nearly equal educational opportunity (see 
12.4.C and 13.4.A, B).  Naturally, the extent to which this is true is an empirical question, but it 
is my impression that many philosophers have failed to recognize this possibility.7 
An easier, but no less important, matter for the idea of educational adequacy is that of giving 
every student access to our collective cultural and scientific heritage and the opportunity to 
participate in arts and crafts (cf. Marshall 1964: 78).  This was the sort of social exclusion that 
bothered many Victorian social thinkers and reformers: that the conditions of the working class 
led to a brutish life cut off from appreciation of beauty and enlightenment—activities which lent 
grace and spiritual substance to life at very little cost.  Unfortunately, (with the notable exception 
of science) these are precisely the parts of the curricula that have suffered most in struggling 
                                                          
6 Cf. Tawney (1931, 1964): “The element of monopoly, which necessarily exists when certain groups have easier 
access than others to highly paid occupations, would be weakened, and the horizontal stratification, which is so 
characteristic a feature of English society, would be undermined.  While diversities of income, corresponding to 
varieties of function and capacity, would survive, they would neither be heightened by capricious inequalities of 
circumstances and opportunity, nor perpetuated from generation to generation by the institution of inheritance” 
(150). 





schools under the current regime of standardized testing.  Part of the cause of this is the notion 
that such subjects are merely ornamental and quite secondary to serious, more practical studies.  
But in part it is also due to the fact that such subjects are not easily tested.  Jonathan Kozol 
observes that:  
The virtual exclusion of aesthetics from the daily lives of children in these schools is 
seldom mentioned when officials boast that they have pumped the scores on standardized 
exams by three or four points by drilling children for as many as five hours in a day... 
[B]ut the stripping away of cultural integrity and texture from the intellectual experience 
of children, denial of delight in what is beautiful and stimulating for its own sake and not 
for its acquisitional equivalents, is a perennial calamity (2005: 119-120). 
The result, as Kozol well recognizes, is not only that these children miss out on appreciation of 
the beautiful.  Dewey warned that the desire for “speedy, accurately measurable, correct results” 
easily leads to a mechanical approach to education that discourages independent thinking, 
especially about values and their relation to human life and society (1916: 175, 288-290, 316-
319).8 In the extremity, educators begin to think of themselves as “in the business of developing 
minds to meet a market demand,” which are either incapable or disinclined to interrogate the 
conditions prevailing in their society.9  In short, a decent theory of educational adequacy would 
not draw its pedagogy from Mr. Gradgrind.  Matthew Arnold is a better guide on the value of a 
liberal education:  
                                                          
8 Cf. Kozol (2005): “ ‘If you do what I tell you to do, how I tell you to do it, when I tell you to do it, you’ll get it 
right,’ says a South Bronx principal observed by a reporter from the The New York Times in laying out a memorizing 
rule for math to an assembly of her students.  ‘If you don’t you’ll get it wrong.’”  This is the voice, this is the tone, 
this is the rhythm and didactic certitude one hears today in inner-city schools that have embraced a pedagogy of 
direct command and control” (64).  “The head of a Chicago school … who was criticized by some for emphasizing 
rote instruction which, his critics said, was turning children into ‘robots,’ found no reason to dispute the charge.  
‘Did you ever stop to think that these robots will never burglarize your home?” he asked, and ‘will never snatch your 
pocket books… These robots are going to be producing taxes” (97-98).  See also Ravitch (2010): esp. ch. 6.   
9 Kozol (2005): 96, quoting a principal’s speech to corporate executives, reported on in the Wall Street Journal, 





[Culture] does not try to teach down to the inferior classes; it does not try to win them for 
this or that sect of its own, with ready-made judgments and watchwords.  It seeks to do 
away with classes; to make the best that has been thought and known in the world current 
everywhere; to make all men live in an atmosphere of sweetness and light, where they 
may use ideas, as it uses them itself, freely,—nourished and not bound by them (Culture 
and Anarchy, ch. 1, p. 70).     
15.3  Equality 
A) Equal treatment 
In Chapter 14, I endorsed Anderson’s claim that equals accept the obligation to justify their 
actions and shared institutions to one another (1999: 313).  But at the end of that chapter I 
argued, pace Anderson, that there is no reason to think that such justifications will only appeal to 
equality in the basic capabilities necessary for avoiding oppression and participating as an equal 
citizen in a democratic society (14.5D; cf. Anderson 1999: 316).  In particular, there is surely a 
presumption that the state will not, without good reason, contribute more to improving the 
condition of some than to that of others (cf. Hayek 1960: 92).  I cannot justify to my daughter 
devoting fewer resources to her education than to that of my son on the grounds that what I have 
provided to her is fully adequate.  Neither, then, can the state justify lavishing resources on the 
education of some, while spending only what is adequate on the education of others.  In short, 
equal citizens expect their government to abide by a norm of equal treatment.   
What, then, does the norm of equal treatment require?  Clearly, it rules out invidious 
discrimination on the basis of “arbitrary” characteristics like sex and race.  And the adequacy 
theorists, of course, assume this as well.  But is that all that the norm of equal treatment requires?  
At the end of Chapter 13, I argued that “emergent inequalities”—i.e., inequalities that emerge 





necessarily violate a norm of equal treatment.  Once again, if I treat my son and daughter 
differently for no good reason, then that would be unfair.  But if my neighbor confers more 
benefits on his children than I confer on my own, then no one is treated unequally, and no clear 
injustice has been done to anyone.  I called this the “Emergent Inequalities Thesis.”  And I 
argued that its implications for the family are, for the most part, attractive.   
But I also said that we may begin to worry when we discover that a similar argument seems 
to apply to local school districts.  If Riverwood confers more educational advantages on its 
children than Flatfield, then no one (it seems) is treated unequally, and no injustice has been 
done.  This was essentially the reasoning that the Supreme Court relied on in San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez to argue that, though the pattern of public school funding in Texas was, in a manner, 
arbitrary, it was not objectionably so, since “any scheme of local taxation—indeed the very 
existence of identifiable local governmental units—requires the establishment of jurisdictional 
boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary.”10 
Our acceptance of certain adequacy standards is one way of limiting the inegalitarian 
implications of the Emergent Inequalities Thesis.  That thesis says merely that relative 
inequalities arising from decentralized decision-making are not unjust insofar as the norm of 
equal treatment is concerned.  But the positive duty to ensure that others have access to the 
social conditions necessary for equal citizenship makes no reference to jurisdictions, and 
Anderson makes a good case for regarding this as a part of social justice.  Suppose Flatfield 
cannot provide its children with an adequate education.  If Riverwood has resources left over 
after providing its children with an adequate education and meeting other needs, then that district 
                                                          





has a presumptive moral duty to aid Flatfield.  This redistribution is morally required, not 
because the relative inequality between Riverwood and Flatfield is inherently unjust, but because 
it would be unjust to permit the absolute deprivation of Flatfield, were it possible to alleviate it.  
This helps solve the problem we encountered in Chapter 13:  that the norm of equal treatment by 
itself seems unable to explain why a poorly funded, but equal, educational system—or even no 
public educational system at all—is unjust (see 13.2; see also 11.3.B on the California school 
system after Proposition 13). 
So, taking the adequacy requirement into account, the Emergent Inequalities Thesis suggests 
that inequalities between jurisdictions are not unjust, so long as all jurisdictions are enabled to 
make adequate provision.  This, I believe, is essentially where adequacy theories leave us.11  But 
they fail to take into consideration the fact that the whole school-finance system needs 
justification.  It is not enough to ask whether there has been any unequal treatment, given the 
system of distribution actually in place.  We also have to justify why we shouldn’t adopt a 
different way of funding education that would have different distributive implications.   
B) A presumption of horizontal equity 
Focusing on the American context, let us begin at the state level, which is the site of the 
greatest controversy historically.  Why shouldn’t the states simply disburse equal tax revenues 
                                                          
11 Cf. Gutmann (1987): “The democratic standard of distribution gives local districts the freedom to supplement 
state funds with their own, as long as state and federal governments guarantee a level of funding for all districts 
sufficient to bring every child to the democratic threshold.  Inequalities above this threshold would not be morally 
suspect.  A well-financed Foundations Program, for example, would leave wealthier districts with a greater capacity 
than poorer ones to raise money above the threshold.  Wealthy districts should not be prevented from surpassing the 
learning threshold” (144).   
Debra Satz (2007) is more hesitant, but ultimately adopts much the same view: “There is a strong prima facie case 
for the equal public provision of education; as Brown put it, education must be provided by the state ‘on equal 
terms’… Nevertheless, ‘on equal terms’ is a complex idea... I have endorsed an understanding of this phrase that 
links it to the equal status of citizenship.  And I have argued that such equal status can be compatible with unequal 





per pupil to every district or school, allowing for departures in order to meet the adequacy 
threshold and possibly taking into account regional prices differences, economies and 
diseconomies of scale, etc.?  Why should the wealthier community of Riverwood receive more 
tax revenue per pupil—even by means of the local property tax—than the poorer community of 
Flatfield?  It seems as if there should be a presumption of “narrow horizontal input equity”12 
(henceforth, just “horizontal equity”).  Departures from that presumption may be justifiable—
like the necessity of unequal resources to meet the adequacy threshold.  But departures do seem 
to require some justification. 
Someone might object to that way of framing the question.  This critic would argue that his 
community ought not be obliged to pay taxes for another community’s schools:  “Let Flatfield 
fund their own schools; Riverwood money should stay in Riverwood!”  There is no question that 
such attitudes often carry the day politically.  But, stated so flatly, the argument makes little 
sense.  On the one hand, it appears to accept that citizens within a school district have the 
responsibility to share the costs of supporting schools, which will make available the same 
quality of education to every child.  Therefore, we have apparently already rejected the argument 
I alluded to in Chapter 11:  that the state “might as well take a man’s ox to plough his neighbor’s 
fields as to take a man’s money to educate his neighbor’s children.”13  But then our critic’s 
argument insists that this responsibility only extends as far as the local community.  This looks, 
at least at first blush, like an arbitrary and unstable position.  After all, school districts are not 
sovereign entities.  They are “quasi corporations … created as instrumentalities of the states in 
                                                          
12 “Narrow” because we are restricting our attention to public inputs.  By “inputs,” I mean roughly resources.  See 
12.3A and 12.4A.  






order to facilitate the administration of government.”  As such, their powers, including the power 
to tax, are only such as are prescribed by statute.14   
This potentially sets the problem of intra-state inequalities on a considerably different footing 
than interstate inequalities.  States are not mere administrative entities that were created by 
Federal statute.  While not fully sovereign states, they do have some of the marks of sovereignty.  
As a result, inequalities between states share something of the character of global inequalities, as 
well as the attendant philosophical questions.  Ultimately, I do not have a worked-out view about 
educational inequalities between states, once the adequacy threshold is met.  It may be that all 
the arguments that apply to interdistrict inequalities apply equally to interstate inequalities—but 
then they may not.  To determine this, one would have to come to grips with the political theory 
of federalism, and I do not presently have solid views on this.  Therefore, I shall have no more to 
say specifically about interstate inequalities in education. 
With respect to state school-finance systems, however, a presumption of horizontal equity 
seems like a fitting expression of the idea that the state should not play favorites, but should 
instead adopt policies that take into equal consideration the claims of all citizens.  Once again, 
there will surely be justified departures from that presumption, but the burden of proof lies on 
those departures.  In the next section, I shall consider whether allowing local communities to 
exercise substantial control over the funding of their schools constitutes a justified departure 
from the presumption of horizontal equity.  More particularly, the argument I want to consider is 
that justice would be done so long as there were a foundation plan that ensured every school 
                                                          
14 Wise (1967): 98, quoting Newton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools (Chicago: University of Chicago 





sufficient resources for meeting the adequacy threshold.15  Local communities would then be 
permitted to supplement the foundation level through local tax revenues as they saw fit. 
15.4  Arguments for Local Control 
A) Public goods and fiscal federalism 
First, in support of local control over school finance, someone may insist that there is a 
general presumption that public goods ought to be paid for by the community that benefits from 
them.  Joseph Stiglitz explains this principle of “fiscal federalism” as follows:   
For some kinds of goods there is a strong presumption for federal provision.  These are 
national public goods, whose benefits accrue to everyone in the nation.  In contrast, the 
benefits of local public goods accrue to residents of a particular community.  National 
defense is a national public good; traffic lights and fire protection are local public goods 
(1999: 733). 
Why should there be such a presumption?  The chief arguments appeal to efficiency.  Economic 
theory tells us that decentralized markets are typically more efficient than centralized 
distribution.  In a perfectly competitive free market, people will make mutually beneficial 
exchanges until no further exchanges can be made without making some people worse off.  
Where distribution is controlled by the government, on the other hand, it is extremely difficult to 
acquire enough information about individual preferences to produce the right amount of the right 
kind of goods to meet demand.  But not all goods are efficiently supplied by the market.  
Exchange depends on being able to exclude people from benefiting from a good unless they pay 
for it.  And it is in the nature of public goods (like national defense) that it is difficult to exclude 
free-riders.  As a result, the market will tend to undersupply non-excludable goods, since there is 
                                                          





little or no return for them.  This is inefficient, if people would have paid for the good, had it 
been excludable.  Governments can give people more of what they really want by funding public 
goods through the taxation of the beneficiaries at roughly the level that those beneficiaries 
hypothetically would have paid for the benefit, were it an excludable good.  But public goods 
may serve larger or smaller populations.  The whole country is a beneficiary of national defense, 
so only the national government can solve the associated market failure.  A fire department, 
however, may only benefit the local community, so that is a market failure that local 
governments can remedy.   
True, we could have a national fire brigade, instead of local fire departments.  But if people 
in different localities prefer different baskets of public goods, then local provision can be more 
responsive to those local preferences than broad uniform provision would be and, thus, more 
efficient.  Moreover, local authorities are likely to have better knowledge of local conditions than 
more distant central authorities, which also makes them better at satisfying local wants.  Finally, 
local provision may be more efficient, insofar as it is possible for people to move to the 
communities that provide the basket of public goods most to their liking (the “Tiebout 
Hypothesis”) (Stiglitz 1999: chs. 4 and 26).  Milton Friedman puts the point this way: 
If government is to exercise power, better in the county than in the state, better in the 
state than in Washington.  If I do not like what my local community does, be it in sewage 
disposal, or zoning, or schools, I can move to another local community, and though few 
may take this step, the mere possibility acts as a check.  If I do not like what my state 
does, I can move to another.  If I do not like what Washington imposes, I have few 
alternatives... (1962: 3). 
I have no quarrel with these arguments in the abstract.  The main problem lies in trying to 
apply them to the case of public education.  First of all, regarding the Tiebout Hypothesis, it is 





schools and property taxes.  But to the extent that zoning restrictions (like those on the 
construction of multifamily dwellings) prevent families with low incomes from moving into 
communities with good schools, the freedom of movement that the Tiebout Hypothesis assumes 
does not exist.  Granted, a libertarian like Friedman might find such zoning laws an 
objectionable restriction of liberty and of the market, but as long as they do in fact exist, the 
Tiebout Hypothesis does not provide a strong argument for the local funding of schools.  
More fundamentally, in most regions, education is not even a very pure case of a public good 
(in the economic sense). Colleges and private schools make it abundantly clear that it is quite 
easy to exclude pupils who do not pay the tuition (Stiglitz 1999: 426; Tooley 1995: chs. 6-7). 
The most important arguments for public education (as we have seen throughout Part III) appeal, 
not to market inefficiencies, but to collective goals and considerations of justice.16  These values 
do not seem to have any relevance to the principle of fiscal federalism.  I grant that not all of the 
benefits of education accrue directly to the student, and this could, theoretically, lead to 
underinvestment.  However, the mere existence of positive and negative externalities would not 
demonstrate that the market is operating inefficiently.  The crucial question is whether these 
externalities will be the happy byproducts of private investment in education, or whether their 
realization requires some kind of public intervention.  Because there are such large and relatively 
immediate private gains to be had from education, it seems unlikely that many parents will 
intentionally choose to “free-ride” on the rather distant positive externalities that come from the 
education of other people’s children. 
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But now we can imagine a slightly different argument.  The problem is not one of inefficient 
underinvestment, but of an equitable way of shouldering the costs of collective goods.  That is, if 
education confers positive externalities on the community, then it is only fair if all the members 
of the community that benefit from those externalities also do their part in contributing to the 
schools.  Now this is not obviously a good argument:  Must I help shoulder the costs of my 
neighbor’s garden, since it improves the view out my back window?  But let us set that objection 
aside; I suspect that there is something to the argument in at least some contexts.  The problem, 
however, is that, whatever might have been true in the past, it has little relevance to education 
under contemporary conditions.  First, many Americans do not live in the community in which 
they grew up.  This is especially true of those with the most education.  Therefore, communities 
with growing populations of educated people are benefiting from the educational expenses of 
communities with dwindling populations.  Second, we clearly benefit—economically, culturally, 
and politically—from the education of people who are not our neighbors.  The bottom line, then, 
is that if you begin with the argument that support of schools should be linked to the impact of 
their externalities, then you are not going to end up with a conclusion for local funding. 
B)  Social choice and efficiency 
Even if education is not a very pure public good (again, in the economist’s sense), someone 
may mount the following social-choice argument.  So long as communities do differ in how 
much they want to spend on education relative to other public services and private consumption, 
it remains true that local decision-making about funding would be more efficient in the 
satisfaction of preferences than more centralized control.  One concern about this argument is 
that it attends more to the preferences of adult taxpayers than to the interests of children.  





conclusion of this argument is not local control, but a free market.  We could institute a system 
of vouchers to ensure that all children had access to an adequate education, and then let parents 
top-up the vouchers as much as they pleased (cf. Friedman 1962: ch. VI).  Different schools 
would then cater to parents with different tastes (and ability to pay)  for education.  This would 
be the most effective way of satisfying individual preferences.     
Why not follow this argument where it leads and simply endorse a voucher system?  There 
are, I think, at least two reasons.  The first is a pragmatic, political argument.  The voucher 
would transparently redistribute money from the wealthier to the poor families.  The wealthier 
families therefore would have a personal interest in the vouchers being worth as little as possible, 
as that would free up more of their income to spend on their own children’s education.  And this 
may make it difficult to sustain the political will to ensure that the vouchers really do make an 
adequate education available to all.  In this way, a voucher system may erode support amongst 
the most powerful sectors of society for anything but the most meager public provision for 
education.  The second, and I think more powerful, argument is that this kind of voucher system 
would spell the death of the common school.  Even more so than is the case today, children of 
different means and backgrounds would no longer be educated side-by-side, but instead with 
children of like-minded parents of similar means.  Nothing could more antithetical to the 
concerns for civic unity that motivated the pioneers of common schools (see 11.2.A).  As 
Stephen Macedo pointedly observes, “The health of our political society requires that we learn 
how to negotiate cultural boundaries and promote wider sympathies among citizens.”  And 
“where,” Macedo asks, “will this is work be done if not in the common schools?” (2000: 263).17  
                                                          





If we accept these arguments, then we have at least a provisional case against voucher systems.  
But perhaps that means that local control over public schools is an attractive way of balancing 
efficiency with the democratic-communitarian case for common schools.  I shall return to this 
question in 15.5. 
C) Local experimentation and participation  
I now turn to arguments that appeal to the goods of local experimentation and of local 
democratic participation.  First, it will be argued that local control over schools permits 
experimentation and innovation, which are conducive to social problem solving.  This is the 
“locality as laboratory” theory, first posed in those terms by Justice Brandeis in defense of the 
prerogative of state legislatures: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”18  Much the same argument could 
be made at a more local level.   
The second argument appeals to the good of local democratic participation.  In part, 
democratic participation has an educative role.  By drawing individuals out of their own private 
concerns and putting them in dialogue with their neighbors over matters of common concern, 
democratic participation fosters the mutual respect and public spirit which free institutions 
depend upon (cf. Tocqueville, DA: I.ii.8, II.i.7).  Furthermore, democratic participation might be 
held to be intrinsically valuable, insofar as it allows people to actively govern themselves (cf. 
Rousseau SC: II.6 ).  And in fact, local control over schools seems well-suited to giving 
                                                          





individuals an opportunity to take part in democratic self-governance over an issue that is of 
great importance to them (cf. Gutmann 1987: 74, 96).19   
One objection to both of these arguments is that local decision-making over pedagogy and 
curricula need not be connected to local funding.  States might disburse funds and permit local 
districts to allocate that money as they see fit.  But perhaps that is politically naïve: it will be 
replied that “He who pays the piper calls the tune.”  So set that objection aside for now; we will 
assume that local control over the content of education assumes a significant measure of control 
over funding.   
In itself, the local-experimentation argument is a perfectly good consequentialist argument.  
In its strongest form, it would assume a Rawlsian character: since we will all be better off,20 
including the least-advantaged, if we allow local communities the freedom to experiment with 
their schools, the resulting inequalities should not be regarded as unjust.  On the other hand, it 
would not be very convincing to argue that local control is justified, even though it only helps 
those in wealthy districts.  Again, the burden of proof here must lie with those who support 
institutions that involve departures from equality; they have to show that these departures really 
are good for everyone.  Finally, even if some local control over funding is necessary to give 
districts the autonomy necessary to innovate, this is not an all-or-nothing affair:  it is a question 
of finding how much local funding and control is necessary to permit that amount of innovation 
that would be beneficial to everyone.  Even if some innovation might justify some inequality, a 
lot of innovation might not justify a lot of inequality.  Similar points apply to the argument from 
                                                          
19 Cf. also Walzer (1983): “Politics is always territorially based; and the neighborhood (or the borough, town, 
township…) is historically the first, and still the most immediate and obvious, base for democratic politics.  People 
are most likely to be knowledgeable and concerned, active and effective, when they are close to home” (225). 





democratic participation.  Insofar as everyone is better off with the opportunity to engage in local 
democratic decision-making, even if this necessarily leads to some inequality between 
communities, then such inequalities may be justifiable and not amount to unequal treatment.  But 
this is probably not a matter of all-or-nothing either.  Surely most people would be willing to 
trade some degree of democratic control for large enough increases in the resources available to 
their schools.       
15.5   Equal Treatment and Adequacy:  A Combined Approach 
A) Power equalization + a foundation plan 
The conclusion I draw from the foregoing is that there are reasonable arguments for giving 
local communities some control over school funding.  The strongest of these, in my opinion, is 
the social choice argument:  local control permits communities to make their own judgments as 
to how much they value education relative to other public services and private consumption.  
Insofar as local experimentation and local democratic participation really do require control over 
funding (and those are empirical questions), these arguments supplement the case for local 
control.   
But this case does not support giving local communities access to unequal tax bases.  If 
Riverwood has better schools than Flatfield, because the citizens of Riverwood have chosen to 
tax themselves at a higher rate than Flatfield, then (other things equal) it does not seem as if the 
citizens of Flatfield have a legitimate complaint of unequal treatment.  The state has simply 
given local communities discretion in determining what is a reasonable amount of money to 
spend on education, and then those communities have made different choices.  This truly is what 





suppose that Riverwood has better schools than Flatfield, because Riverwood has a higher per-
pupil property assessment.  Now it seems like Flatfield can legitimately object that the state is 
treating children in poor districts unequally vis-à-vis their peers in wealthier districts.  Why?  
Because state laws authorize wealthy districts to draw on larger revenue sources than poor 
districts.  That does seem like a case of unequal treatment, since the rules could be drafted in a 
different way that made the same tax bases available to all.    
This suggests that a fair solution would be to equalize the revenue-generating power of each 
district.  In such a power-equalization scheme, every district would have access to the same 
revenue per pupil for any given tax rate (cf. Coons et al. 1970).  The simplest way for this to 
work is as follows.  First, we find the local district with the highest per-pupil property assessment 
(or tax base) in the state.  This becomes our key district.  Suppose this is Riverwood and the tax 
base is $100,000 per-pupil.  That means that if Riverwood taxes itself at 2%, it will raise $2000 
per pupil.  Now the state says that it will use its general revenues to guarantee that every district 
can operate as if it had the same tax base as the key district—in this case, Riverwood.  Suppose, 
then, that Flatfield has a tax base of only $50,000 per pupil.  Without power-equalization, if 
Flatfield taxed itself at 3%, it would raise $1500 per pupil.  On the other hand, if Flatfied had 
possessed the same tax base as Riverwood, then it would have raised $3000 per pupil with the 
3% tax.  With power-equalization in effect, therefore, the state distributes out of its general 





This might be an expensive program.  We could make it more affordable by setting the 
guaranteed tax base lower and then recapturing “excess revenues” from wealthier districts.21  For 
example, in between Riverwood and Flatfield, there is a community called Middlebury.  It has a 
tax base of $75,000 per pupil.  Now the state picks Middlebury out as the key district:  every 
district will operate as if it had a tax base of $75,000.  Riverwood still taxes itself at 2%.  Initially 
it raises, as before, $2000 per pupil.  But it may only keep ($75,000  2% = ) $1500.  The 
remaining $500 is recaptured by the state and used to fund aid to other districts.  Meanwhile, 
Flatfield continues to tax itself at 3%.  From its own tax base, it raises, as before, $1500 per 
pupil.  Had it possessed the tax base of Middlebury, it would have raised ($75,000  3% = ) 
$2250 per pupil.  Therefore, the state sends to Flatfield ($2250 – 1500 =) $750 per pupil.  If we 
assume that Flatfield and Riverwood have the same number of pupils, then the state only has to 
pay Flatfield ($750 – $500 = ) $250 per pupil; considerably less than the $1,500 per pupil when 
we used the wealthiest district as our key district.  If we knew more about the districts in our 
state—their tax bases, populations, and anticipated tax rates—we could, if desirable, design a 
system over time that would be expected to break even.  If poor districts were taxing themselves 
at excessively high rates, such that the state was having to pay out much more aid than it was 
bringing in through taxes, then it may be necessary to cap property tax rates—which many states 
already do anyway.  
                                                          
21 The power-equalization (or guaranteed tax base) formula is as follows:              
 Ga = r (GTB – LTB) Ga = State GTB aid per pupil   r = Local property tax rate               
GTB = Guaranteed tax base   LTB = Local tax base 
If GTB–LTB  0, then Ga  0.  That means that, instead of receiving state aid, this district will have that amount of 
its per-pupil revenue recaptured by the state to redistribute to poorer districts.  (I have adapted this formula from 





Because we also want to make sure that all children receive an adequate education, we 
should combine this power-equalization scheme with a foundation program.  (To be sure, for all 
the reasons explored in this chapter and Chapter 14, adequate revenue is not all there is to an 
adequate education; but it is a part.)  Under the foundation program, the state would set a 
foundation level of revenue per pupil deemed sufficient to educate the average child up to the 
level of adequacy.  A district that was unable to raise the foundation level at the participation tax 
rate, would receive state aid to make up the difference.22  Districts that raised more than the 
foundation level at the participation rate would have those revenues recaptured by the state to 
redistribute to poorer districts.  Revenue raised at rates above the participation rate would then be 
subject to power-equalization, as above.23  We need not explore all of the technical details of 
such a program here.  The question we are interested in is whether there are any philosophical 
objections to such a system for funding public schools.  Would not such a system satisfy the 
desiderata of (i) a common school system that (ii) satisfies the norm of equal treatment, (iii) 
ensures an adequate education for all, and (iv) allows local communities significant autonomy 
over educational spending? 
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 Fa = F –(pr  LTB) Fa = State foundation aid per pupil   pr = participation tax rate 
F = Foundation level per pupil   LTB = Local tax base 
If F –(pr  LTB)  0, then Fa  0.  That means that the district does not receive aid, but has this amount of its 
excess revenue recaptured by the state to redistribute to poorer districts.  Adapted from Odden and Picus (2008): 
289. 
23 The formula for power-equalization of revenues above the participation tax rate is as follows:              
 Ga = (r – pr) (GTB – LTB) Ga = State GTB aid per pupil   r = Local property tax rate               
pr = participation tax rate 
GTB = Guaranteed tax base   LTB = Local tax base 





B) Objections and replies 
My argument throughout this chapter will suffice as my case against the objection that the 
proposal would permit too much redistribution.  In general, the difficulty of any such objection 
lies in avoiding the unstable position to which I have already alluded.  On the one hand, such an 
objection accepts that, within the district, citizens will share, according to ability to pay, the costs 
of providing an equal public education for all.  But on the other hand, it insists that this principle 
of the public school should go no further than the boundaries of the district.  The historical result 
of this attitude has been to erect what is, in effect, a cloistered private school system in the 
suburbs, operating under public auspices.24  Simply unmasking this system for what it is, is 
probably the most effective indictment one can make of it.   
It may be objected that I have failed to take into account the fact that some students are more 
expensive to teach than others (e.g., disabled, bilingual, or economically disadvantaged 
students).  But we can accommodate this through a “weighted pupil” system.  For example, a 
bilingual student might count in our formula as 1.5 pupils.  Formally, we can take into account 
any justified departure from the presumption of horizontal equity either by adjusting pupil 
weights or by other accounting tricks (like regional cost indexes for dealing with price 
differences).  But note that I have not tried to give a complete theory of all of the justified 
departures from the presumption of horizontal equity.   
Let me briefly expand upon that point.  In Chapter 14, I argued that one appealing feature of 
the adequacy approach is that it is not necessarily in tension with other educational values, and in 
                                                          
24 Here I echo the words of former U.S. Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel:  “The nation in effect does not 
have a truly public school system in a large part of its communities; it has permitted what is in effect a private 
school system to develop under public auspices.”  The Necessary Revolution in American Education (New York: 





this way contrasts favorably with liberal-egalitarian principles of equal opportunity (see 14.1).  
My combined approach shares this characteristic with the adequacy theories.  But my combined 
approach achieves this in a different way than the adequacy approach.  The adequacy approach is 
compatible with other educational values because it imposes no constraints above the adequacy 
threshold.  My combined approach is compatible with other educational values, but only insofar 
as those values are justifiable departures from horizontal equity.     
What other departures from horizontal equity might be justifiable?  I do not think we should 
depart from horizontal input adequacy to try to achieve equal outcomes.  Once we have focused 
our attentions on providing everyone with an adequate education, it seems quite acceptable that, 
beyond that threshold, children will perform at different levels due to differences in ability and 
disposition (see 14.1).  This is another aspect of the adequacy approach we should incorporate.  
The most compelling departures from horizontal equity will be those which would benefit 
everyone in the long run.  For instance, perhaps if we devoted more resources to the most 
promising students, then we will all benefit from their future productivity, leadership, or cultural 
contributions.  More controversial, but not wholly implausible, would be purely perfectionist 
considerations.25  Perhaps it would be worthwhile to spend extra resources on students who will 
excel in certain scientific or cultural endeavors, not because it benefits all of us personally, but 
simply because it is good for such excellence to exist.  In any case, even if these departures from 
horizontal equity were justifiable, neither would be owed to the direct beneficiaries as a matter of 
justice to them.  
                                                          





What does seem a matter of justice is that the school ought to aim to benefit each student.  
That means that schools might have to take special measures if the most intellectually advanced 
students are to gain from attending school; this could require departures from horizontal equity.26  
I don’t mean that advanced or gifted students deserve a superior education, so that they can pull 
even further ahead of their peers.  I only mean that everyone ought to benefit by going to school, 
and that we should reject the suggestion that Harry Brighouse makes to the effect that one 
advantage of “compulsory equal state schooling” is that it “can designate around 15,000 hours of 
each child’s life in which their parents could not be conferring on them opportunities superior to 
those which others enjoy” (2000: 120).  This seems to me a perverse idea of a school: a place 
where we can prevent children from having their potential developed too much. 
Now, in closing, let me consider what may be the most serious line of criticism of the 
combined approach.  The classic American school-finance problem has been that communities 
with high tax bases have been able to tax themselves at low rates and yet bring in more revenue 
per pupil than communities with low tax bases and high tax rates.  That has seemed to many 
people very unfair.  However, in some states where some measure of power-equalization has 
been enacted, the result has been that poorer communities have given themselves tax relief, while 
wealthier communities have raised their taxes, in order to retain a competitive edge in education 
(Odden and Picus 2008: 19-24).  Some object that this is unfair to the children in the poorer 
districts.  After all, the children don’t have any choice in the matter.     
                                                          
26 But, then, maybe not.  Perhaps a more creative technique would be to have the most advanced students teach the 
less advanced ones, if that could be made beneficial to both.  Cf. Michael Walzer (1983) on Japanese schools: “It 
can’t be said that the brighter children are held back by such procedures.  Student-teaching is a form of recognition; 
and it is also a learning experience for the ‘teacher’ as well as the student, an experience of real value for democratic 






I have argued here, and more extensively in Chapter 13 (esp. 13.4.D. and 13.4.E.), that such 
emergent inequalities, while perhaps unfair in a cosmic sense, are not intrinsically unjust.  
Insofar as we fear that extremely large inequalities will render the education of some children 
inadequate, then the ideal solution is to raise the foundation level.  This would have the effect of 
redistributing revenues from wealthier districts to poorer ones.  True, one might worry that it 
would be difficult to muster the political will to raise the foundation level: if the wealthier 
communities have just voted to give themselves a competitive edge, then why would they 
support having it taken away from them again?  Of course, this depends on how much political 
clout the wealthier communities have.  But if local control over school-finance is not compatible 
with a politics that can sustain the adequate education for everyone which social justice requires, 
then local control is not in everyone’s interests and is not justifiable.  For the sake of argument, I 
shall assume that this pessimistic conclusion is not warranted.  
We are, however, forced to ask why these poorer communities are choosing to spend less on 
education than the wealthier communities.  There are many possibilities, but let us restrict our 
attention to two.  The first is that they simply have different preferences.  Given that the 
existence of different preferences is central to the argument for local control over funding in the 
first place, this cannot be very alarming.  But it would be surprising if part of the explanation 
were not that it is a greater sacrifice for the less-well-off to devote more of their income to public 
services like education than it for the better-off.  This is the problem of marginal utility.  This 
does seem problematic, for the system still seems rigged to be more beneficial to the wealthy 
than to the poor.  In part, differences in marginal utility should be offset by the fact that the state 
matching funds from the power-equalization scheme will make every dollar the less-well-off 





But that may not entirely offset the problem.  Unfortunately, it seems very difficult, if not 
impossible, to disentangle the effect of marginal utility from simple differences in preferences.  I 
do not have a neat solution to this problem.  The standard way to handle marginal utility in the 
tax context is to make taxes more progressive.  Typically, this is a rough-and-ready way of 
handling the problem (Coons et al. 1970: 220-222).  I do not know whether there is any other 
alternative.  So long as school districts are economically segregated and the problem of marginal 
inequalities cannot be sufficiently offset through various adjustments, that is an argument against 
local control.    
∴ 
In closing, it will be useful to review how my combined proposal goes beyond the adequacy 
approach.  Once the adequacy threshold is defined, adequacy theories impose no limits on 
inequalities beyond that threshold.  I argued that this cannot be a complete theory of educational 
justice, because the state surely has an obligation to treat citizens equally (see 14.5.D).  This is 
the norm embodied in the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (see 11.3).  The 
state cannot intentionally set out to benefit some more than others for no good public reason and 
then excuse itself by pointing out that no one has “less than enough.”  This puts a constraint on 
inequalities above the adequacy threshold.  Every such inequality must be justified to everyone.   
But, according the Emergent Inequalities Thesis, inequalities that arise from multiple 
jurisdictions making different reasonable decisions do not amount to unequal treatment (13.4.E).  
It might seem then that there is nothing objectionable about inequalities between school districts.  
But I argued in this chapter that this simply took the decentralized system of school-finance for 





for significant local control over school-funding, but no good arguments for permitting districts 
to draw from unequal tax bases.  That is how we ended up with our combined approach: first, 
secure an adequate education for all, and then give districts equal power to supplement that 
baseline.  Then the inequalities that result between districts are truly emergent and therefore not 
unjust.   
Finally, I may note that adequacy theorists like Elizabeth Anderson and Amy Gutmann have 
said that they, too, could endorse power-equalization.  But neither Anderson nor Gutmann 
explains how this follows from anything in their accounts, as opposed to being an expression of 
their personal reasonableness and good-will.27  What we have sought to do here is give an 
argument for power-equalization above the adequacy threshold.  Perhaps this is what Anderson 
and Gutmann really had in the back of their minds all along.  In that case, we can happily admit 
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local control over school financing with a redistribution of resources that enables poorer districts to raise students up 
to the threshold” (141).  But a well-funded foundation plan could serve both of those purposes as well.  Gutmann 
does not explain why local spending above the adequacy threshold should be constrained by power-equalization. 
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met (618 fn. 41).  Her first sentence is correct, but I do not see how her conclusion follows from any argument she 
has given us.  Why is it unfair for different communities to draw on vastly unequal tax bases, after the adequacy 
threshold for Democratic Equality has been met.  It seems to me that this admission would require Anderson to 
significantly revise her theory of Democratic Equality (see 14.5.D).  Perhaps that is why the comment is relegated to 






Problems regarding the education and governing of children in a liberal society may at first 
seem peripheral to the main concerns of contemporary social and political philosophy.  But this 
is an illusion, perhaps engendered by a tendency to think of the sphere of the political as 
concerning the relations between heads of households, each of whom governs his own family on 
his own terms.  After all, the subject matter of political philosophy is not the same as that of 
politics; political philosophy must define what is, and what is not, a proper question for ordinary 
politics.  For example, liberals think that the law has no business prying into what citizens read.  
In that regard, what each citizen reads does not belong to the domain of the political for the 
liberal.  And yet, the defense of this circle of personal liberty and privacy is a central concern of 
liberal political philosophy.  Similarly, even if we thought that childrearing were properly a 
completely private affair of families, political philosophy would have to defend drawing the 
boundaries of the public and the private in just that way.   
More to the point, this notion that children belong to some private sphere entirely shielded 
from public scrutiny is hard to reconcile with the basic liberal concern for the separate interests 
of each individual, as well as with the liberal conviction that no one should be at the mercy of 
another’s absolute, arbitrary power.  And, in any case, the very idea that childrearing is not 
subject to public scrutiny is no longer congruent with contemporary practices and institutions.  





withdrawn from the regulation of sex, marriage, and divorce, it has at the same time taken on a 
growing role in the supervision of child welfare and the quality of parental care.28 
The premise of this dissertation is that we may make a still stronger claim about the 
importance of childhood for social and political philosophy.  Because we are counted as minors 
for such a significant portion of our lives, and because this is by far the most formative period of 
life, any full appreciation of core liberal values like autonomy, equality, responsibility, and 
opportunity must come to grips with what these mean for the first stages of life.  One thing that 
soon becomes apparent is that these ideals are, on the whole, more demanding at the beginning 
of life than they are at the middle of life.  It is one thing to permit individuals to pursue their own 
good in their own way; it is quite another to raise a person in such a way that she is capable of 
effectively forming and pursuing a conception of her own good and has realistic opportunities to 
do so.  Or, again, the idea that all individuals should enjoy equal opportunity sounds very fine, 
but to what extent should it restrict the freedom of parents to do what they think best for their 
children?   
As these two examples suggest, childhood poses problems for liberals on both the right and 
the left.  Right-wing positions that emphasize negative duties of noninterference seem to assume 
independent individuals, but this picture is hard to reconcile with the dependence of children.  
On the other hand, the sharing and giving characteristic of families seems problematic for left-
wing positions that conceive of undeserved inequalities between individuals as inherently unjust.  
I have set forth my own views on these issues at length in the preceding chapters, and I will not 
attempt to rehash them all here.  My intention is only to highlight the central importance of 
                                                          





questions about the governing of children to liberalism generally.  In what follows, I want to take 
notice of three further sets of questions raised—but not settled—by the arguments of this 
dissertation.  
I 
In Part I, I argued that liberty had a different moral significance at the beginning of life than 
it did in the middle of life.  One corollary of this is that adults with cognitive capacities 
comparable to those of children should not generally be treated like children.  A natural follow-
up question is whether something similar is true of the end of life.  For instance, diseases like 
Alzheimer’s make reduced cognitive functioning and personality change very common amongst 
the elderly.  In their ground-breaking book Deciding for Others, Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock 
observe that between 10 and 18 percent of those sixty-five and older, and between 15 and 20 
percent of those eighty or older, suffer from some form of dementia (1990: 270).  Given the 
aging demographics of most developed societies, the proper treatment of the elderly with 
compromised cognitive functioning is fast becoming a social issue of vast proportions.  
Especially puzzling is the question as to when we ought to defer to an elderly person’s current 
preferences, when these conflict with the wishes she had before the onset of dementia.  
Ordinarily, we respect a person’s right to change her mind.  But we also typically privilege those 
desires a person manifests when lucid and rational.  The following sketch of a real case study 
illustrates the way these considerations can come into conflict.  A man, who on religious grounds 
used to strongly object to suicide or the withholding of life-saving treatment, develops 
Alzheimer’s disease.  As a consequence of his dementia, he not only loses his ability to do most 





begins telling his children that he no longer wants to go on.  In deciding whether to provide or 
withhold life-preserving treatments, should his children defer to his current expressed 
preferences or to his former religious values—values which he held when he was in full 
command of his faculties, but which sadly he can no longer understand (Jaworksa 1999: 107)?   
The importance I have attributed to respect for life-authorship would seem to lead to a view 
like that defended by Ronald Dworkin:  that the heart of autonomy is a competent person’s 
freedom to make judgments in light of her own beliefs and values about the overall shape of the 
kind of life she wants she wants to lead (1993: 224-226).  This suggests that the person’s will 
prior to the onset of dementia ought to be given priority.  But it is easy to feel uneasy about that 
position, especially when a person’s former values now seem alien or incomprehensible to him.  
For reasons such as this, a number of authors have argued that Dworkin’s view fails to respect 
the more limited, but nonetheless valuable, autonomy of those “at the margins of agency.”29 
II 
Turning now to a second set of issues:  In Part II,  I examined the moral basis of parental 
rights.  However, I left relatively unexplored questions about the extent to which the 
responsibilities and costs of childrearing ought to fall on parents alone and whether society has 
any obligation to the parents to help shoulder these burdens.  On the one hand, some 
philosophers (including many feminists) argue that a just society should make substantial 
provision and accommodation to parents performing the socially necessary labor of reproducing 
society.  This might include measures such as parental leave, subsidized day-care, and reduced 
                                                          





hours.30  On the other hand, some liberal egalitarians think that, so long as people freely choose 
to have children, it is unfair to make others subsidize the costs of those choices.31  And suppose 
we decided that society does have some obligation to the parents to help shoulder the burdens of 
care.  We are left with the question as to how much support is called for.  After all, we already 
have a publicly supported educational system; perhaps that is more than enough.   
It may be that this is a place where Hegel’s understanding of a rational social order can be 
useful.  For Hegel, a social order is rational when its major social institutions—like the family, 
the economy, and the state—work together like the parts of an organism to form a coherent, 
harmonious whole.32  As we have seen (in Chapter 10), the tragedy of Antigone, on Hegel’s 
reading, is that allegiance to the family came into contradiction with allegiance to the state.  
Arguably, the institutions of the family and the economic sphere in our society are now out of 
harmony with one another in a different way.  Ever since women began to take on traditionally 
male work roles, which were designed on the assumption that someone else would take care of 
the children, working parents (especially mothers) have faced great difficulties balancing their 
work and family roles.  In that the family performs the necessary social labor of producing and 
socializing the next generation; in that the opportunity to participate in both work and family 
roles (and not just one or the other) is integral to our modern conception of social freedom;33 and 
in that one of the proper roles of the state is to ensure that the other social institutions work 
together to make this freedom available to all; we have the beginnings of a Hegelian argument 
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for the state’s responsibility to enable individuals to reconcile their work and family roles 
without undue hardship.  A more developed form of such an argument would have to answer two 
further questions.  First, what can be said to sharpen the admittedly vague notion of “undue 
hardship”?34  And, second, to what extent would such a policy be consistent with the 
environmentalist aim of discouraging overpopulation?  After all, just as society has reasons for 
wanting a next generation, it also has reasons for wanting that generation not to be too large.     
III 
Another issue that requires further investigation concerns the nature of the child’s right to an 
education.  As the philosophical questions involved here are somewhat deeper and require more 
motivation, I shall be a little more expansive on this issue than I was in discussing the previous 
two.  In Part III, I considered the child’s right to an education as a question about distributive 
justice.  This perspective probably encourages thinking about the right to education in 
quantitative terms:  Are children receiving enough education?  Do they enjoy equal 
opportunities?  And so on.  But no less important are qualitative questions about the kind of 
education to which children are entitled.  Let me enter into the problem historically.  Since the 
Enlightenment, many philosophers have emphasized that education is not intrinsically liberating, 
that it can just as well be an instrument of control and oppression.  Religious superstition has 
long been castigated on such grounds.  For example, we find the young Hegel arguing that some 
of the educational methods of churches fetter their pupils’ intellects or else frighten them from 
ever daring to think for themselves.  By undermining the individual’s ability to make his own 
                                                          






choices about religion and other matters, such an education “infringes the child’s natural right to 
the free development of his faculties and brings him up a slave instead of as a free citizen.”35  In 
a similar way, the use that authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century made of 
state-run school systems awoke widespread concern in liberal democracies about the evils of 
political indoctrination (cf. Gatchel 1972). 
More subtly, there are forms of educations that encourage rigorous thinking and critical 
thought, but only within certain bounds.  In a fascinating essay on the Jewish Yeshiva, Moshe 
and Tova Halbertal explain that while the education in the traditional Yeshiva aims to develop an 
inquisitive and searching attitude toward the interpretation of the Torah and the Talmud, “there 
are questions that may not be voiced.”  “Questions aimed at the meaning of the practice as a 
whole, inquiries concerning theological and religious beliefs, historical contextualization and 
moral critique which might undermine claims for authority, are not a part of the legitimate 
ongoing conversation” (1998: 464).  Roy Mottahedeh relates a similar picture of traditional 
Shi’ite madrasa education.  This education, he says, “is highly speculative about the formal 
relations of agreed sources of knowledge, but not necessarily about uncertain knowledge.”  As a 
consequence, “the logic studied is deductive; induction, needed for dealing with uncertain 
matters, is not formally studied” (1998: 456).   
These more authoritarian or traditionalist educational regimes raise the question: What sort of 
education is appropriate for free citizens in a modern society?  Perhaps, taking a page from Kant, 
we could say that such an education would enable people “to make use of [their] own 
understanding without direction from another,” whether that direction comes from “a book that 
                                                          





understands for me, a spiritual advisor who has a conscience for me, or a doctor who decides 
upon a regimen for me.”  Moreover, this education must give people the courage and resolution 
to actually make use of their own faculties.  This, according to Kant, is the meaning of 
Enlightenment.  A person is enlightened when she does not remain “a minor for life” under the 
intellectual supervision of guardians.36 
This is a sketch of one conception of an “education for autonomy.”  It faces two important 
challenges.  One is a conceptual question.  Just what does it mean to think for oneself?  What 
does that rule out?  Does it, for instance, rule out accepting beliefs on religious authority?  What 
about conformity to tradition or to prevailing ideas and mores?  Mill, after all, tells us that “He 
who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice” (OL: III, ¶ 3 / CW, XVIII: 262).  
To this, it may be responded that autonomy is concerned, not so much with the content of 
someone’s ideas, but with one’s manner of accepting them.  Even Mill, we will be reminded, 
distinguished between “an intelligent following of custom” and “a blind and mechanical 
adhesion to it” (OL: III, ¶ 5 / CW, XVIII: 263).  What matters is whether we have critically 
examined our beliefs, values, and goals and have endorsed them for reasons of our own.   
But philosophers have expressed two concerns with this answer.  First, it may seem to prize 
too highly the Socratic ideal of the self-reflective, examined life.  But some people’s characters 
seem to naturally incline more toward action than introspection.  And thus, some writers who 
champion the ideal of autonomy deny that people need to engage in much critical self-reflection 
to think or make choices for themselves (Raz 1986: 371; Wall 1998: 129).  The second concern 
has to do with authority.  Kant makes it sound as if the enlightened person never substitutes 
                                                          





reliance on authority for the verdicts of his own understanding.  But it seems impossible to get 
along, especially in a complex society, without reliance on authority.  In fact, Kant’s example of 
deferring to a doctor’s authority seems to highlight this point.  Isn’t it rational to defer to 
another’s judgment, when I have reason to believe he can judge better than I can?  Perhaps the 
point is that we can autonomously defer to authority only on the basis of good reasons.  But is 
the test whether we actually have good reasons or that we think we have good reasons?  If it is 
suggested that an autonomous deference to authority requires that we have done due diligence in 
critically examining the reasons we have for not deciding on our own, then we seem to be back 
to the idea that autonomy requires critical reflection, at least at some level of deliberation.  I am 
not, of course, suggesting that the conceptual challenge is insuperable.  I only mean to show 
where further work remains to be done.   
I said that there were two challenges to the broadly Kantian picture of education for 
autonomy.  The second is a normative one.  So-called “political liberals,” Rawls being the most 
prominent, have argued that diversity regarding religious and moral outlooks is a natural 
outcome of a free society, and that liberal institutions need to be defended on grounds that can 
command the broad assent of different reasonable worldviews, religious and traditional as well 
as secular and modernist.  But ideals like autonomy or individuality, it is said, are too sectarian, 
too bound up with certain modernist conceptions of the good life, to be the subject of this 
overlapping consensus.  This, according to Rawls, has important implications for a state’s 
educational policy, for the political liberal will “not seek to cultivate the distinctive virtues and 
values of the liberalisms of autonomy and individuality” (1993: chs. 1-2, pp. 199-200).  But to 
some critics this just takes for granted the legitimacy of the authority of parents over their 





those that limit political power (cf. Ackerman 1980: ch. 5; Clayton 2006: ch. 3)?  Although I 
have touched upon this question in Chapter 10 (see 10.4.C and 10.5), I do not believe I have yet 
seen to the bottom of it. 
∴ 
“Education,” Michael Walzer has observed, “expresses what is, perhaps, our deepest wish: to 
continue, to go on, to persist in the face of the future.”  In education, we attempt to form a type 
of character in the next generation that is continuous with, if not identical to, our own, but also 
one which seems appropriate to the kind of society that we believe in.  This gives rise to three 
kinds of problems for liberal theory—problems with which the chapters of this dissertation have 
wrestled.  First, people are likely to disagree about the nature of the society they actually live in, 
or what it is becoming, or what it should be.  And even where there is consensus about the sort of 
society they want to live in, there may still be disagreement about the sort of character that is 
most likely to sustain that kind of society and how that type of character might be fostered  
(Walzer 1983: 197).  Therefore, not only must we develop “first-order” theories about the proper 
aims and methods of education, but we must also work out an account of who has what authority 
to make decisions about education.  However, the liberal cannot easily stop there, as if the child 
were merely a lump of clay, bound to be formed by one party or another according to its own 
particular ideals.  The liberal must also come to terms with the limits on adult authority, whether 
exercised by parents or the state, arising from the child’s right to be treated as a person born to a 
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